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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Ermi Perez-Chininin

Petitioner,

v.

Markwayne MULLIN, in his official capacity, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Department of Homeland Security;

Warden of the Imperial Regional Adult Detention Facility,

Respondents.

Case Number: **'26CV4594 RSH MMP**

To be supplied by the Clerk of
The United States District Court

EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Expedite Handling Requested]

INTRODUCTION

1. Respondents are detaining Petitioner, Ermi Perez-Chininin ("Petitioner"), in violation of law.

2. Petitioner entered the United States on September 30, 2024. In his Notice to Appear (NTA), Respondents classified him as a noncitizen 'present in the United States who [has] not been admitted or paroled,' rather than an 'arriving alien.' Later, Petitioner was released from custody under I.N.A. § 236, 8 U.S.C. 1226, which allows the Attorney General to release a noncitizen from custody "pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.".

3. Petitioner filed an I-589 Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal.

4. The continued detention of Petitioner serves no legitimate purpose.

5. The risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty here is substantial.

6. To remedy this unlawful detention, Petitioner seeks declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of immediate release.

7. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court order Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

PARTIES

8. Petitioner is a citizen of Peru who is seeking asylum in the United States. He is not an arriving alien, nor is he seeking admission. for Respondents to justify re-detaining Petitioner.

9. Petitioner is currently in Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") custody at the Imperial Regional Adult Detention Facility.

10. Respondent Markwayne Mullin is the Secretary of Homeland Security. He is sued in his official capacity. In that capacity, Respondent Mullin is responsible for overseeing the enforcement of federal immigration policies, including those that resulted in the detention of Petitioner.

11. Respondent, Warden of the Imperial Regional Adult Detention Facility. He/she is sued in his official capacity. In that capacity, he/she is the custodian of detained non-citizens, including Petitioner.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

12. This court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause). Federal questions in this case arise under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1524, and the United States Constitution.

13. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et. seq., the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et. seq., the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2).

14. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and § 1391(b), (e), venue is proper in this district. Venue is proper because Petitioner is in Respondents' custody in the District of California. Venue is further proper because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Petitioner's claims occurred in this district, where Petitioner is now in Respondent's custody. Venue is also proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

15. No statutory requirement of administrative exhaustion applies to Petitioner's challenge to the unlawfulness of her detention. Moreover, the judicially created "general rule that parties exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts" does not apply to Petitioner's present challenge, as there are no prescribed administrative remedies to which he could resort. *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 144–45 (1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in *Woodford v. Ngo*, 548 U.S. 81 (2006).

16. DHS has taken the position that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Accordingly, there are no administrative remedies that Petitioner could exhaust before seeking habeas relief.

17. Further, neither an immigration judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals can rule on a petitioner's constitutional claims. *See Matter of R-A-V-P-*, 27 I. & N. Dec. 803, 804 n.2 (B.I.A. 2020) (holding that IJs and the BIA lack any authority to consider the constitutionality of the statutes or regulations governing immigration detention that they administer and are bound to follow); *Matter of C--*, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529, 532 (B.I.A. 1992) ("[I]t is settled that the immigration judge and this Board lack jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality of the Act

and the regulations."); *see also Gonzalez v. O'Connell*, 355 F.3d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that "the BIA has no jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues").

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

18. Petitioner is a citizen of Peru who is seeking asylum in the United States. Petitioner arrived in the United States on or about September 30, 2024. Petitioner was issued a NTA and placed in full removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. *See* Ex. A, NTA.

19. On the NTA, the Government's specifically checked the box identifying Petitioner as an "alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled," rather than checking the box for "arriving alien." *Id.*

20. Respondents then released Petitioner.

21. Petitioner filed an I-589 Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal. Petitioner has no criminal history in the United States.

22. Respondents re-detained Petitioner on July 27, 2026, for what appears to be no individualized reason. Respondents re-detained Petitioner in Newark, New Jersey. Following this arrest, Respondents transferred Petitioner to a detention facility in New Jersey where he remains in custody without the individualized assessment required by law.

23. Petitioner is currently detained at the Imperial Regional Adult Detention Facility.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Custody Determination Under INA

24. As relevant here, the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101-1524, describes two means of handling the custody and potential removal of noncitizens.

25. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d). The text of § 1226 explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the Rodriguez Vazquez court explained, "[w]hen Congress creates 'specific exceptions' to a statute's applicability, it 'proves' that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies." *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1257 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2025) (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)).

26. In addition, while on release, the noncitizen may apply for asylum or other relief in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158. While a grant of asylum is discretionary, the right to apply for asylum is not. The Refugee Act, codified in various sections of the INA, broadly affords a right to apply for asylum to any noncitizen, like Petitioner, "who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States[.]" 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1); Refugee Act of 1980, § 101(a), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).

27. The INA guarantees to noncitizens in standard removal proceedings who apply for asylum and other relief valuable procedural rights that reduce the risk of an erroneous decision. These include the rights to legal counsel, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) and § 1362; to present supporting evidence (both documentary and through lay and expert witness testimony) and to challenge through cross-examination adverse evidence during a full adversarial hearing before an immigration judge (IJ), 8 U.S.C. § 1148(b)(1)(B); to seek reconsideration or reopening of an adverse decision, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)-(7), to appeal an adverse decision of an IJ to the Board of Immigration Appeals based on the full evidentiary record, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5), and to appeal an adverse decision of the Board to a federal circuit court of appeals, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b).

28. Noncitizens seeking asylum are guaranteed Due Process under the Fifth Amendment to the *U.S. Constitution. Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).

29. The second relevant means of detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1225, which provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Respondents treat noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under § 1225 as ineligible for bond.

30. The mandatory detention scheme under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) applies only to noncitizens arriving at U.S. ports of entry who recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (emphasis added).

31. As to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), this subsection provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal. Because expedited removal provides very few procedural protections, it applies narrowly to only those noncitizens who are inadmissible to the United States because they engaged in fraud or misrepresentation to procure admission or other immigration benefits, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C), or who are applicants for admission without

required documentation, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7). As relevant here, the government may not subject any other person to expedited removal. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1), (b)(3).

32. For noncitizens in expedited removal, the INA does not grant them the rights enshrined in standard removal proceedings. To begin, an immigration officer may order them removed "without further hearing or review," 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), unless the noncitizen has expressed an intent to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution. But even then, the noncitizens' rights are truncated. Although the immigration officer "shall refer the [noncitizen] for an interview by an asylum officer," 8 U.S.C § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii), a "credible fear" interview differs from an asylum application. First, the INA does not, as it does during standard removal proceedings, guarantee the noncitizen with the rights to counsel, to present documents or witness testimony, or to cross-examine adverse evidence. See id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iv). Second if the asylum officer decides that the noncitizen does not have a credible fear of persecution, the noncitizen may seek review before an IJ, but review is limited to the record of the interview. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III). Finally, if the IJ concurs with the asylum officer, the noncitizen is removed without any further review by the Board of Immigration Appeals or a federal court. Only if a noncitizen passes a

credible fear interview may they apply for asylum and related relief in full removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f).

33. An expedited removal order comes with significant consequences beyond removal itself. Noncitizens who are issued expedited removal orders are subject to a five-year bar on admission to the United States unless they qualify for a discretionary waiver. 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 212.2. Similarly, noncitizens issued expedited removal orders after having been found inadmissible based on misrepresentation are subject to a lifetime bar on admission to the United States unless they are granted a discretionary exception or waiver. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C).

34. These two processes have governed removal proceedings for nearly three decades. The release provisions for noncitizens placed in standard removal proceedings under § 1226 and the mandatory detention provisions for noncitizens recently arriving in the United States under § 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) were enacted in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585.

35. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible. That practice was

consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed "arriving" were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply "restates" the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)); *Martinez v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 2084238, at *8 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) ("The idea that a different detention scheme would apply to non-citizens 'already in the country,' as compared to those 'seeking admission into the country,' is consonant with the core logic of our immigration system ") (citing *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. at 289) (cleaned up))

36. 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) applies to those who are "already in the country" and are detained "pending the outcome of removal proceedings." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018).

37. 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) applies not just to persons who are deportable, but also to noncitizens who are inadmissible. Specifically, while § 1226(a) provides the general right to seek release, § 1226(c) carves out discrete categories of noncitizens from being released—including certain categories of inadmissible noncitizens—and subjects those limited classes of inadmissible aliens instead to mandatory detention. *See*, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A), (C).

38. The Laken Riley Act (LRA) added language to § 1226 that directly references people who have entered without inspection or who are present without authorization. *See* LRA, PL 119-1, January 29, 2025, 139 Stat 3. Pursuant to these amendments, people charged as inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A) (the inadmissibility ground for entry without inspection) or (a)(7)(A) (the inadmissibility ground for lacking valid documentation to enter the United States) and who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to § 1226(c)'s mandatory detention provisions. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E).

39. This legislative amendment would be entirely unnecessary if all entrants without inspection were already subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225. *See Jimenez v. FCI Berlin, Warden*, 799 F. Supp. 3d 59, 71 (D.N.H. 2025). Because Petitioner has no criminal history, the LRA does not apply, and he remains under the default discretionary authority of Section 1226(a).

40. By including such individuals under § 1226(c), Congress reaffirmed that § 1226 covers persons charged under § 1182(a)(6)(A) or (a)(7). Generally speaking, grounds of deportability (found in 8 U.S.C. § 1227) apply to people like lawful permanents residents, who have been lawfully admitted and continue to have lawful status, while grounds of inadmissibility (found in § 1182) apply to those who have not yet been admitted to the United States. *See*, e.g., *Barton v.*

Barr, 590 U.S. 222, 234 (2020) ("specific exceptions' to a statute's applicability, it 'proves' that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies.") (quoting *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)).

41. On January 20, 2025, President Donald Trump issued several executive actions relating to immigration, including "Protecting the American People Against Invasion," an order (EO) setting out a series of interior immigration enforcement actions. The Trump administration, through this and other actions, has outlined sweeping, executive branch-led changes to immigration enforcement policy, establishing a formal framework for mass deportation. The "Protecting the American People Against Invasion" EO instructs the DHS Secretary "to take all appropriate action to enable" ICE, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to prioritize civil immigration enforcement procedures including through the use of mass detention.

42. On January 21, 2025, Acting Deputy Secretary of DHS Benjamin Huffman issued for public inspection and effective immediately a designation expanding the scope of expedited removal to apply nationwide and to certain noncitizens who are unable to prove they have been in the country continuously for two years. On January 24, 2025, DHS published a Notice that expanded the

application of expedited removal. Office of the Secretary, Dep't of Homeland Security, Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 15 Fed. Reg. 8139 ("January 2025 Designation"). The designation was "effective on" January 21, 2025.

43. The January 2025 Designation expands the pool of noncitizens who can be subjected to the summary removal process substantially to include noncitizens who are apprehended anywhere in the United States and who have not been in the United States continuously for more than two years. *Id.* at 8140.

44. The January 2025 Designation does not state that it applies to noncitizens who were in the United States before its effective date.

45. On July 8, 2025, without congressional authorization, the Executive Branch announced a new policy entitled "Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission." The policy asserts that all undocumented noncitizens deemed "applicants for admission" are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy purports to apply even to those, like Petitioner, whom at the time of the policy shift, the government had already placed in standard removal proceedings, released from custody, and allowed to apply for asylum. The policy shift also violates the government's own regulations. These regulations limit the government from seeking dismissal of full removal proceedings unless it can show that the "[c]ircumstances of the case

have changed". See 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a)(7) (emphasis added). But the government's new policy purports to allow it to seek dismissal based on changed circumstances independent of the noncitizen's case.

46. Adopting this same position, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued a published decision holding that all noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are considered applicants for admission and are ineligible for immigration judge bonds. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

47. ICE and EOIR have adopted this policy even though numerous federal courts have rejected this exact conclusion. For example, after IJs in the Tacoma, Washington, immigration court stopped providing bond hearings for persons who entered the United States without inspection and who have since resided here, the U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the United States. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239; *see also Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025) (granting habeas petition based on same conclusion). Accordingly, federal courts have roundly rejected Respondent's erroneous interpretation of the INA since ICE implemented its July 8, 2025 memo. *See Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, 2025 WL

2609425 (E..D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (disagreeing with BIA's analysis in *Yajure Hurtado*); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025) (same); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Martinez v. Hyde*, CV 25-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Garcia Jimenez v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03162-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374223 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025); *Aguilar Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 25-CV-3142 (SRN/SGE), 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v Noem*, 5:25-cv-01789-ODW-DFM, 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. CA Aug 15, 2025); *Jacinto v. Trump*, et al., 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 (D. Neb. August 19, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2025); *Herrera Torralba v. Knight*, 2:25-cv-03166-RFB-DJA (D. Nev. Sep. 5, 2025); *Eliseo A.A. v. Olson*, No. 25-CV-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025 WL 2886729 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); *Mayamu K. v. Bondi*, No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), Doc. No. 226 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025); *Khalid B.Q. v Noem*, No. 0:25-cv-04584 (JWB-DJF), Doc. No 10. (D. Minn. December 18, 2025).

48. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the Attorney General is authorized, pending a removal decision, to either "detain" or "release" a noncitizen on "bond" or "conditional parole." While this provision grants the Government broad

authority, "due process must account for the wide discretion that Section 1226(a) vests in the Government to arrest any person in the United States suspected of being removable." *Reyes v. King*, No. 19 Civ. 8674, 2021 WL 3727614, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2021) (emphasis in original). Consequently, before this discretion is exercised to deprive an individual of their liberty, "§ 1226(a) and its implementing regulations require ICE officials to make an individualized custody determination." *Velesaca v. Decker*, 458 F. Supp. 3d 224, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). This requirement is rooted in the statutory text itself; because the Attorney General "may continue to detain" an arrested noncitizen, the Supreme Court has made clear that such permissive language requires "some level of individualized determination." *Id.* at 235 (quoting *I.N.S. v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rts., Inc.*, 502 U.S. 183, 194 (1991)).

49. While not binding precedent, the decision in *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2025), is a dispositive factual and legal roadmap for the relief sought here.

50. In *Lopez*, as in the present case, the petitioner entered without inspection, Respondents released the petitioner on his own recognizance pursuant to INA section 236. He lived in the interior for years, and was suddenly re-arrested by ICE after he attended his scheduled master hearing. *Id.* at 482.

51. The Court held that a noncitizen residing in the interior of the U.S. for a significant period is governed by the discretionary detention framework of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not the mandatory framework of § 1225(b). *Id.* at 484-5.

52. The Lopez Government's own NTA identified the petitioner as "present in the United States without being admitted or paroled" and left the "arriving alien" checkbox unmarked. *Id* at 481. The Court determined that that CBP released him on his own recognizance also pursuant to § 1226. Id. at 485-6.

53. Finding the Government's recent shift in policy by alone does not justify the petitioner re-detention without making any individualized assessment and the Court ordered his immediate release. *Id.* at 493-4, 499.

54. Petitioner's detention under § 1225(b)(2) is likewise invalid. His detention was incidental, there was no individualized assessment made by Respondents. As numerous federal courts have now found, § 1225(b)(2) applies to noncitizens seeking admission into the United States. It does not apply to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who were paroled, and placed in standard removal proceedings, and allowed to apply for asylum.

Administrative Procedures Act

55. Respondent's detention of Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) is patently unlawful, violates due process, and violates the Administrative Procedure Act. *See Lopez Benitez*, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 494-5. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the Attorney General "may... detain" or "may release" a noncitizen pending a removal decision, a discretionary grant that "undoubtedly vests broad authority," yet "due process must account for the wide discretion that Section 1226(a) vests in the Government to arrest any person in the United States suspected of being removable." *Reyes v. King*, 2021 WL 3727614, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2021) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, before exercising this power to strip an individual of their liberty, "§ 1226(a) and its implementing regulations require ICE officials to make an individualized custody determination." *Velesaca v. Decker*, 458 F. Supp. 3d 224, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). This requirement is compelled by the statutory text itself; because the Attorney General "may continue to detain," the Supreme Court has clarified that such language requires "some level of individualized determination." *Id.* at 235 (quoting *I.N.S. v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rts., Inc.*, 502 U.S. 183, 194 (1991)).

56. Under the APA, a court shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action" that is an abuse of discretion. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

57. An action is an abuse of discretion if the agency "entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its

decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." Nat'l Ass'n of Home *Builders v. Defs. Of Wildlife*, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) (quoting *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).

58. To avoid an abuse of discretion, the agency must articulate "a satisfactory explanation" for its action, "including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." *Dep't of Com. v. New York*, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569 (2019) (citation omitted).

59. Re-detention Petitioner, without consideration of any individualized facts and circumstances applicable to him, and without finding that he is a danger to the community or a flight risk, and while his standard removal proceedings are still pending, Respondents have violated the APA.

60. When Respondents conditionally paroled Petitioner into the United States, they considered Petitioner's facts and circumstances and determined that he was not a flight risk or danger to the community. No changes to the facts have occurred that might justify this revocation of his release.

61. The fact that Respondents have already released Petitioner under the same facts and circumstances shows that Respondents do not consider him to be a danger to the community or a flight risk.

62. Respondents here have acted in a manner that is arbitrary and capricious by detaining Petitioner without explaining why his parole was terminated, failing to provide written notice, and failing to act through any of the regulatorily authorized actors empowered to terminate parole.

Due Process

63. By detaining Petitioner without articulating a rationale based on her individualized circumstances, and by detaining her in contradiction of her individualized circumstances as Respondents have previously assessed them, they have abused their discretion under the APA. Noori, 2025 WL 2800149 at * 10 (parolee developed a private interest in remaining free in the one year he has resided in the United States since entry); *Munoz Materano v. Arteta*, 2025 WL 2630826, *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (unpub); *Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley,* F.Supp.3d, 2025 WL 2637663, *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2025) (finding that parolee's liberty interest did not expire with his parole agreement); *see also Y-Z-L-H- v. Bostock*, F.Supp.3d, 2025 WL 1898025, * 14 (D. Ore. July 9, 2025) (finding detention of a parolee who had not completed his asylum process to be arbitrary and capricious and ordering immediate release).

64. Because the private interest in freedom from immigration detention is substantial, due process requires the government to bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the

community before redetaining him. See e.g., *Fernandez Lopez v. Wofford*, 2025 WL 2959319 at *8; J.S.H.M v. Wofford, 2025 WL 2938808, *16 (E.D. Ca. Oct. 16, 2025) (unpub); *Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer*, F.Supp.3d, 2025 WL 1953796, *17 (W.D.N.Y. July 16, 2025) (detention of parolee without a reasoned explanation or changed circumstances and without a meaningful opportunity to be heard violates due process).

65. To the extent that Respondents purport to detain Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), his detention under that statute is unlawful the mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and were explicitly released under 8 U.S.C. 1226. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

66. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

67. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution applies to all persons within the United States. Once a noncitizen enters this country, whether the presence is "lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent," the Due Process Clause applies to the noncitizen. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

68. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

69. Respondents' detention of Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Petitioner's ongoing detention violates the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that "[n]o person shall be. . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. Const., Amend. 5.

70. Due Process requires that detention "bear a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was] committed." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing *Jackson v. Ethiopiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).

71. Petitioner seeks immediate release to the extent that Respondents justify his detention on 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which plainly does not apply to him.

72. Although neither the Constitution nor the federal habeas statutes delineate the necessary content of habeas relief, I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A straightforward reading of [the Suspension Clause] discloses that it does not guarantee any content to . . . the writ of habeas corpus"), implicit in habeas jurisdiction is the power to order release. *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) ("[T]he habeas court must have the power to order the conditional release of an individual unlawfully detained.").

73. The Supreme Court has noted that the typical remedy for unlawful detention is release from detention. *See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren*, 553 U.S. 674 (2008) ("The typical remedy for [unlawful executive detention] is, of course, release."); *see also Wajda v. US*, 64 F.3d 385, 389 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating the function of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 "is to obtain release from the duration or fact of present custody."). "[B]eing free from physical detention is 'the most elemental of liberty interests.'" *Günaydın*, 2025 WL 1459154, at *7 (quoting *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 531 (2004)). Petitioner has been detained for weeks. As a parolee, Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his parole. *See, e.g., Pinchi*, 2025 WL 2084921, at *4 ("[Petitioner's] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria.")

74. That courts with habeas jurisdiction have the power to order outright release is justified by the fact that, "habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy," *Schlup v. Delo*, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995), and that as an equitable remedy, federal courts "[have] broad discretion in conditioning a judgment granting habeas relief [and are] authorized . . . to dispose of habeas corpus matters 'as law and justice require.'" *Hilton v. Braunskill*, 481 U.S. 770, 775

(1987), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243. An order of release falls under court's broad discretion to fashion relief. See, e.g., *Jimenez v. Cronen*, 317 F. Supp. 3d 626, 636 (D. Mass. 2018) ("Habeas corpus is an equitable remedy. The court has the discretion to fashion relief that is fair in the circumstances, including to order an alien's release.").

CAUSE OF ACTION

COUNT ONE: VIOLATION OF THE IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY ACT - 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)

75. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

76. Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) because he is not an "arriving alien." As confirmed by Petitioner's NTA, the Government checked the box identifying Petitioner as an "alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled," rather than checking the box for "arriving alien." *See Hernandez-Parrilla v. De Anda-Ybarra*, 2025 WL 3632769, at 4 (D.N.M. Dec. 15, 2025) (holding that when the NTA fails to check the "arriving alien" box, the petitioner is substantially likely to establish he is not subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225).

77. Section 1225 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code governs aliens arriving at the border and seeking admission from outside the country. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225.

78. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), specifically, cannot apply as it only applies to those "applicants for admission" who are "seeking admission" at the time of the detention and Petitioner was not "seeking admission" at the time he was detained, nor is he doing so now. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

79. The plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) limits its application to an alien who is "seeking admission." Petitioner is not "seeking admission"; he is already physically present in the United States and has been since his entry in September 2024. *See Jimenez v. FCI Berlin*, 799 F. Supp. 3d 59, 70-71 (D.N.H. 2025). As held in *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. 2025), the term "seeking admission" implies a present-tense action—something currently occurring at the border—which cannot apply to a noncitizen who has established a residence in the interior. *Id.*

80. Treating "applicant for admission" as synonymous with "seeking admission" renders the latter phrase mere surplusage, violating the cardinal rule of statutory construction. *TRW Inc. v. Andrews*, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001). Petitioner is "seeking to remain," which is distinct from "seeking admission." *Jimenez Reyes v. Olson*, 2025 WL 3765963, at 4 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 30, 2025).

Classifying Petitioner as 'seeking admission' after a year of residency renders the statutory phrasing redundant, thereby violating the canon against surplusage.

81. Respondents' attempt to apply Section 1225(b)(2)(A) to Petitioner improperly strikes the phrase "seeking admission" from the statute. This interpretation violates the fundamental canon against surplusage, which prohibits a construction that renders statutory terms meaningless. *See Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). Because Petitioner is an asylum seeker pursuing a legal right to remain, he is not seeking "initial entry" or "admission" as contemplated by the mandatory detention scheme.

82. As Respondents assert authority to detain Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and no such authority exists under that provision, he requests that he be immediately released.

COUNT TWO: VIOLATION OF THE IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY ACT - 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

83. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

84. The Government's own internal categorization on the NTA constitutes a determination that Petitioner is "present" in the interior of the country rather than "arriving" at a port of entry. *See Patel v. Crowley*, 2025 WL 2996787, at 5 (N.D.

Ill. Oct. 24, 2025). As the court noted in Patel, "Section 1225(b)(2)(A) would correspond to those 'arriving' while Section 1226(a) would correspond to those 'present.'" Consequently, because the Government's own agent designated Petitioner as "present," Petitioner must be governed by the discretionary detention framework of Section 1226(a).

85. Section 1226 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code governs the detention of aliens pending a determination of removal from the United States.

86. When Respondents released Petitioner on his own recognizance, they made the determination that Petitioner is not a flight risk nor danger to community. His specific circumstances has not changed and Respondents has not made any individual assessments. Respondents simply detained him by considering him as an "applicant for admission" which vast majority of district courts across the country held that this new interpretation is "novel" but "wrong." (emphasis added). Supra.

87. Therefore, Petitioner's re-detention is legally defect. Petitioner is not an applicant for admission.

88. As Respondents assert authority to detain Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and no such authority exists under that provision, he requests that he be immediately released.

COUNT THREE: VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

89. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

90. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause protects against arbitrary detention and requires that detention be reasonably related to its purpose and accompanied by adequate procedures to ensure that detention is serving its legitimate goals.

91. The government's detention of Petitioner is unjustified. Respondents have not demonstrated that Petitioner needs to be detained. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (finding immigration detention must further the twin goals of (1) ensuring the noncitizen's appearance during removal proceedings and (2) preventing danger to the community). There is no credible argument that Petitioner cannot be safely released back to his community.

92. Petitioner has a substantial liberty interest in remaining free from physical detention. *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004)). Having determined that Petitioner was neither a flight risk nor a danger at the time of his initial release, the Government cannot re-detain him on January 5, 2026, without a reasoned explanation or evidence of changed circumstances.

93. The "purpose" of Petitioner's release was to allow him to remain in the United States while pursuing his applications for asylum and withholding of

removal. Because Petitioner's asylum claim remains pending and he is still in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, the purpose of his conditional parole has not been served. *See Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock*, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1145 (D. Or. 2025). Consequently, any attempt to return Petitioner to physical custody before the adjudication of his asylum claim violates his due process rights without showing any justifiable cause.

94. Because of Petitioner's profound legal interest in his liberty as a noncitizen, his detention violates his due process rights. *See generally Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard before deprivation of a legally protected interest).

95. Petitioner's ongoing detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

COUNT FOUR: VIOLATION OF THE APA – FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REGULATORY MANDATE AND *ACCARDI* DOCTRINE

96. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

97. Petitioner's re-detention violates the Due Process Clause and the APA because the discretionary authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) mandates an "individualized custody determination" rather than a categorical deprivation of

liberty. *See Velesaca*, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 241. Because the statute provides that the Attorney General "may continue to detain," Respondents' failure to perform a specific exercise of judgment regarding Petitioner's individual circumstances constitutes an unconstitutional and arbitrary abuse of discretion. See Reyes, 2021 WL 3727614, at *6.

98. Here, Respondents re-detained Petitioner without written notice or any articulated explanation as to how his individual circumstances have changed to justify a deprivation of liberty.

99. Respondents' action also violates the mandate of United States ex rel. *Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954).

100. Respondents must observe the rules, regulations or procedures which it has established. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).

101. Respondents acted in excess of their regulatory authority or limitation.

102. Respondents' action constitutes a final agency decision.

103. Petitioner has no administrative remedy available to him.

104. Respondents' action violates the APA.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully prays that Court grant the following:

1. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
2. Order that Respondents not transfer the Petitioner outside of this District during the pendency of this Petition;
3. Declare that Respondents' action is arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion under the Administrative Procedure Act;
4. Declare that Respondents failed to adhere to its regulations;
5. Order Petitioner's immediate release;
6. Order that Respondents are permanently enjoined from rearresting or otherwise detaining Petitioner under § 1225;
7. Order that any future detention or re-detention of Petitioner must comply with all statutory and constitutional requirements, including the identification of a lawful statutory basis for detention and the provision of adequate procedural and substantive due process;
8. Order Respondents to immediately return all of Petitioner's seized personal property, including but not limited to any government-issued identification or immigration documents, such as a state driver's license or

Employment Authorization Document (EAD) to the extent such items were seized and remain in Respondents' possession;

9. Grant such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper, including any equitable relief necessary to restore Petitioner to his status prior to the unlawful detention.

10. Order that, to the extent that Respondents seek to re-arrest or otherwise re-detain Petitioner under any statutory authority, including but not limited to §§ 1225 or 1226, this Court shall retain jurisdiction over the matter and Petitioner may move to reopen these proceedings.

11. Grant Petitioner reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

12. Grant any further relief this court deems just and proper.

Dated: August 11, 2026

/s/ Yakup Talha Sevinc
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*Pending Pro Hac Vice Admission
Lead Counsel for Petitioner

Verification by Petitioner's Legal Counsel
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I am submitting this verification because I am the Attorney for the Petitioner. I hereby verify that the statements made in the attached Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, including the statements regarding Petitioner's detention status are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ Mehmet Y. Turkoglu Date: August 11, 2026
Mehmet Y. Turkoglu, Esq