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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Hector Raul Perez Chacha

Petitioner,

v.

Markwayne MULLIN, in his official capacity, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security;

Warden of the Imperial Regional Detention Facility, in his/her official capacity

Respondents.

Case No.: **'26CV4518 RBM JAC**

EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Expedite Handling Requested]

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner is a citizen of Ecuador who entered the United States without inspection in July 2021.

2. On July 28, 2026, Petitioner was stopped by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officers and placed under arrest. Petitioner was subsequently taken into ICE custody and is currently detained at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility in Calexico, California.

3. Despite longstanding practice and clear statutory language, both DHS and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") now insist that all persons who entered without inspection are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and therefore subject to mandatory detention. This misclassification is contrary to almost 30 years of settled law and practice, and it is unlawfully premised solely upon the manner in which a person initially entered the country.

4. Because Petitioner's current detention is based entirely on a statute that does not apply to him, his custody is void ab initio and lacks any legal basis. Consequently, the violation cannot be cured by a bond hearing under a different statute; rather, the Court must exercise its habeas power to order immediate release.

5. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court order Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
6. Petitioner further requests that the Court compel Respondents to produce any "Warrant of Arrest" issued at the time of detention, if any such warrant exists

II. PARTIES

7. Petitioner is a citizen of Ecuador and entered in to the USA in July 2021.
8. Petitioner is currently in Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") custody at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility in California.
9. Respondent, Markwayne Mullin, is named in his official capacity as the Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, he is responsible for overseeing ICE's day-to-day operations, leading approximately 20,000 ICE employees. Secretary Mullin is the ultimate legal custodian of Petitioner.
10. Respondent is the Warden of the Imperial Regional Detention Facility. He/she is sued in his official capacity. In that capacity, he/she is the custodian of detained non-citizens, including Petitioner, housed at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility.

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

11. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States, and the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104 - 208, 110 Stat. 1570.

12. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C, § 2241, Art. I, § 9, el. 2 of the Constitution of the United States (the Suspension Clause) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as Petitioner is presently in custody under color of the authority of the United States, and such custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 5 U.S.C. § 702, the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and the Court's equitable habeas authority.

13. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and § 1391(b), (e), venue is proper in this district. Venue is proper because Petitioner is in Respondents' custody in the District of California. Venue is further proper because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Petitioner's claims occurred in this district, where Petitioner is now in Respondent's custody. Venue is also proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States.

IV. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

14. No statutory requirement of administrative exhaustion applies to Petitioner's challenge to the unlawfulness of her detention. Moreover, the judicially created "general rule that parties exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts" does not apply to Petitioner's present challenge, as there are no prescribed administrative remedies to which he could resort. *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 144–45 (1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in *Woodford v. Ngo*, 548 U.S. 81 (2006).

15. DHS has taken the position that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Under the BIA's interpretation, any person who is present in the United States without having been formally admitted or paroled is deemed an "applicant for admission," regardless of how long that person has been physically present in the United States. Because Respondents maintain that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, there are no administrative remedies available through which Petitioner can obtain review of the legality of that detention before seeking habeas relie.

16. Further, neither an immigration judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals can rule on a petitioner's constitutional claims. *See Matter of R-A-V-P-*, 27 I. & N. Dec. 803, 804 n.2 (B.I.A. 2020) (holding that IJs and the BIA lack any authority to consider the constitutionality of the statutes or regulations governing

immigration detention that they administer and are bound to follow); *Matter of C--*, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529, 532 (B.I.A. 1992) ("[I]t is settled that the immigration judge and this Board lack jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality of the Act and the regulations."); *see also Gonzalez v. O'Connell*, 355 F.3d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that "the BIA has no jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues").

V. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

17. Petitioner is a citizen of Ecuador.

18. Petitioner has resided continuously in the United States since July 2021..

19. On July 28, 2026, Petitioner was stopped by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officers and placed under arrest. Petitioner was subsequently taken into ICE custody. Respondents provided no individualized reason or explanation for this new detention and are denying Petitioner any opportunity for a custody redetermination.

20. He is currently detained at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility located in California.

VI. PETITIONER IS BEING UNLAWFULLY DETAINED BASED UPON THE GOVERNMENT'S MISAPPLICATION OF THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

21. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

22. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge (IJ). See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a custody redetermination ("bond hearing") at the outset of their detention, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

23. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

24. Finally, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

25. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

26. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226 was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

27. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without admission or parole were not detained under § 1225 but instead under § 1226(a). See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

28. In the nearly three decades following, most people who entered without admission or parole and who were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible for release. That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed "arriving" were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply "restates" the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

29. On July 8, 2025, ICE, "in coordination with" the Department of Justice, announced a new policy that rejected this well-established understanding of the statutory framework and abruptly reversed decades of practice.

30. The new policy, entitled "Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission," claims that all persons who entered the United States without admission or parole shall now be deemed "applicants for admission"

under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and therefore subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person was apprehended and applied those who have been in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

31. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are considered applicants for admission who are seeking admission and therefore subject to mandatory detention.

32. In recent months federal district courts have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents' new interpretation of the INA's detention authorities.[1]

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[1] See, e.g., Quituizaca v. Bondi, No. 6:25-CV-6527-EAW, 2025 WL 3264440 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2025); Alvarez Ortiz v. Freden, No. 25-CV-960-LJV, 2025 WL 3085032, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025); Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025). Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); Diaz Martinez v. Hyde, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); Rosado v. Figueroa, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); Maldonado v. Olson, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); Romero v. Hyde, No. 25-

33. Subsection 1226(a) applies by default to all persons "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to "decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen]." The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without admission or parole. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond

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11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); Samb v. Joyce, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH), 2025 WL 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); Leal-Hernandez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); Kostak v. Trump, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); Vasquez Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); see also, e.g., Palma Perez v. Berg, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that "[t]he Court tends to agree" that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); Jacinto v. Trump, No. 4:25- cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, "[w]hen Congress creates 'specific exceptions' to a statute's applicability, it 'proves' that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies." *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)).

34. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

35. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

36. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who, at the time of his apprehension, had already entered the country and were living within the United States

A. Procedural Requirements to Detain Noncitizens Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

37. Government may detain noncitizens under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). However, while Section 1226(a) authorizes the discretionary detention of any alien within the country, it also expressly mandates that such an arrest be predicated on a validly issued warrant. In the absence of a warrant, the detention is statutorily unauthorized.

38. The "[a]pprehension and detention of aliens" is governed under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which provides that:

> **On a warrant issued by the Attorney General**, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, **the Attorney General ... may release the alien on bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General.**

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

39. The regulations provide that, to detain a person under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the Department **must issue an I-200 to take a person into custody**. The regulation states:

> (b) Warrant of arrest—
>
> (1) In general. At the time of issuance of the notice to appear, or at any time thereafter and up to the time removal proceedings are completed, **the**

respondent may be arrested and taken into custody under the authority of Form I–200, Warrant of Arrest. A warrant of arrest may be issued only by those immigration officers listed in § 287.5(e)(2) of this chapter and may be served only by those immigration officers listed in § 287.5(e)(3) of this chapter.

(2) If, after the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a determination is made not to serve it, any officer authorized to issue such warrant may authorize its cancellation.

(c) Custody issues and release procedures—

(1) In general.

(i) After the expiration of the Transition Period Custody Rules (TPCR) set forth in section 303(b)(3) of Div. C of Pub.L. 104–208, no alien described in section 236(c)(1) **of the Act may be released from custody during removal proceedings except pursuant to section 236(c)(2) of the Act.**

8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b). (emphasis added).

40. Under the governing regulations, to take a person into custody under Section 1226(a), the Department must issue **a Form I-200, Warrant of Arrest**. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b)(1) (emphasis added). "[I]ssuance of a warrant is a necessary condition to justify discretionary detention under section 1226(a)." *Roseline K. N. v. Bondi*, No. 26-cv-540 (KMM/SGE), (D. Minn. Jan. 25, 2026) (quoting Cristian Z. v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-157 (ECT/ECW), 2026 WL 123116, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2026)).

41. Neither Petitioner nor Counsel has been able to verify whether Respondents issued a Warrant of Arrest (Form I-200) at the time of the arrest by Respondents. Consequently, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court compel Respondents to produce any warrant or legal instrument used to authorize the detention.

42. If Respondents cannot produce a valid Form I-200 (Warrant of Arrest) issued at the time of the arrest, the detention is doubly unauthorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). In the absence of both a valid warrant and a valid mandatory detention statute, there is no legal basis to justify Petitioner's continued detention.

43. Even if Respondents produce a valid Form I-200, the detention remains unlawful because Respondents have invoked 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) as their authority. By its plain text, § 1225(b)(2) applies only to "applicants for admission." Petitioner is not an applicant for admission, and § 1225(b)(2) provides no authority for his detention.

44. Lacking valid statutory authority, Petitioner's detention violates Due Process and is void ab initio. Immediate release is the only proper remedy

VII. REMEDY

45. Although neither the Constitution nor the federal habeas statutes delineate the necessary content of habeas relief, *I.N.S. v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A straightforward reading of [the Suspension Clause] discloses that it does not guarantee any content to . . . the writ of habeas corpus"), implicit in habeas jurisdiction is the power to order release. *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) ("[T]he habeas court must have the power to order the conditional release of an individual unlawfully detained.").

46. The Supreme Court has noted that the typical remedy for unlawful detention is release from detention. *See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren*, 553 U.S. 674 (2008) ("The typical remedy for [unlawful executive detention] is, of course, release."); *see also Wajda v. US*, 64 F.3d 385, 389 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating the function of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 "is to obtain release from the duration or fact of present custody."). "[B]eing free from physical detention is 'the most elemental of liberty interests.'" *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 531 (2004).

47. Because the detention itself is a continuing wrong, a secondary hearing cannot retroactively validate a detention that remains unauthorized.

48. Ordering a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge ("IJ") would be a futile exercise. Recent evidence suggests that bond hearings under § 1226(a) are increasingly characterized by "preordained outcomes" and "summary decisions"

that lack specific factual citations.[2] For instance, in *Quiroz Vacarias v. Noem* (Case No. 1:26-cv-0574-WJM), an IJ denied bond using boilerplate language that failed to engage with the evidence, effectively acting as a "mere rubber-stamp" for the government's detention decisions. *See Zheng v. Rokosky, et al.*, 2026 WL 800203, at *6.

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[2] See, e.g., Zheng v. Rokosky, et al., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2026 WL 800203, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2026) (ordering immediate release after "IJ erroneously stated that she lacked jurisdiction in direct defiance of [the] Court's Order, failed to provide any explanation whatsoever for her supposed alternative holding that Petitioner is a flight risk, and by all appearances acted as a 'mere rubber-stamp' . . . for Respondents' predetermined decision to deny bond"); Montero-Martinez v. Mattos, et al., 2026 WL 674497, at *1-2 (D. Nev. Mar. 9, 2026) (ordering release after petitioner's due process rights were violated when his bond was "revoked based on materially false information" regarding his criminal record); Miri v. Bondi, 2026 WL 622302, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026) (ordering release after finding IJ abused its discretion in denying bond where they "did not explain the reasons for denying Miri's bond," "did not describe which Martinez factors were considered, if any, or what evidence was relied on," and "did not explain the reasons for denying Miri's bond and the record does not establish that the [IJ] relied on the appropriate factors"); Rodriguez v. Greene, 2026 WL 574961, at *12 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2026) (finding due process violation where "the IJ's decision . . . contain[ed] zero reference to any record or arguments put forth by either party," denied bond "exclusively on jurisdictional grounds," and held in the "alternative" that the petitioner was a danger to the community and a flight risk "without supplying any reasoning [as to] how the IJ came to such a conclusion").

49. Given that the government's conduct "can no longer be attributed to mere negligence or ineptitude," allowing a bond hearing would effectively permit the Government to "**transform an unlawful detention into a lawful one through post-hoc justifications.**" *Zheng*, 2026 WL 800203, at *11 (emphasis added).

VIII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT 1: VIOLATION OF 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)

50. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein and does so for all additional counts.

51. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), specifically, cannot apply as it only applies to those "applicants for admission" who are "seeking admission" at the time of detention and Petitioner was neither an "applicant for admission," nor was he "seeking admission" at the time he was detained, nor is he doing so now. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

52. As Respondents assert authority to detain Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and no such authority exists under that provision, he requests that he be immediately released.

COUNT 2: VIOLATION OF 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

53. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein and does so for all additional counts.

54. Section 1226 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code allows the government to detain noncitizens "pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States," but only "[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General." 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

55. Absent such a warrant of arrest, detention is unlawful and immediate release is required.

COUNT 3: VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS

56. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein, and does so for all additional counts.

57. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

58. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

59. The Government's detention of Petitioner without constitutionally adequate process was unlawful.

60. The government's detention of Petitioner without a bond hearing violates his right to due process.

61. Respondents have not demonstrated that Petitioner needs to be detained. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (finding immigration detention must further the twin goals of (1) ensuring the noncitizen's appearance during removal proceedings and (2) preventing danger to the community). There is no credible argument that Petitioner cannot be safely released back to his community.

62. Petitioner has a substantial liberty interest in remaining free from physical detention. *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004)).

63. Because of Petitioner's profound legal interest in his liberty as a noncitizen, his detention violates his due process rights. *See generally Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard before deprivation of a legally protected interest).

64. Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

1. WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court grant the following relief:
2. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
3. Order that Respondents not transfer the Petitioner outside of this District during the pendency of this Petition;
4. Order the Petitioner's immediate release from custody; or
5. Declare ICE's July 8 policy and the BIA's Matter of Yajure Hurtado decision unlawful;
6. Order Respondents to immediately return all of Petitioner's seized personal property, including but not limited to any government-issued identification or immigration documents, such as a state driver's license to the extent such items were seized and remain in Respondents' possession;
7. Fashion such additional relief as is necessary and appropriate, including declaratory relief or other interim relief necessary to vindicate Petitioners' rights under U.S. and international law;
8. Declare that Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;
9. Award Petitioner reasonable attorney's fees and costs of this action under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and any other applicable law; and

10. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper

Respectfully submitted.

Dated: August 7, 2026

/s/Mehmet Y. Turkoglu, Esq.
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Verification by Petitioner's Legal Counsel
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I am submitting this verification because I am the Attorney for the Petitioner. I hereby verify that the statements made in the attached Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, including the statements regarding Petitioner's detention status are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ Mehmet Y. Turkoglu Date: August 7, 2026
Mehmet Y. Turkoglu, Esq