UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION

SEYMEN CIMENLI,

Petitioner,

v.

Warden of the Irwin County Detention Center; Field Office Director, Atlanta Field Office, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; DAVID VENTURELLA, Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General of the United States,

Respondents.

Docket No.

PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Seymen Cimenli (A-[redacted] is being unlawfully detained by Respondents and deprived of release on bond. Petitioner is a native and citizen of Turkey who presented himself for inspection at the San Ysidro, California Port of Entry on or about September 25, 2024, pursuant to a scheduled CBP One appointment, and was paroled into the United States.

2. He was inspected by U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") and paroled into the United States for humanitarian reasons by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). That same day, Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear ("NTA"), which designated him as "an arriving alien" and charged him with

removability pursuant to section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") as an immigrant not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa or other valid entry document at the time of his application for admission. *See* Ex. A, Notice to Appear.

3. Petitioner timely filed a Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, with the New York – Varick Immigration Court on October 29, 2024. Venue was subsequently changed to the Charlotte Immigration Court, where Petitioner's asylum application is currently pending. No final order of removal has been entered. Petitioner's case thus remains in active removal proceedings, and he is subject to pre-final order detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

4. Petitioner is currently detained at the Irwin County Detention Center, 132 Cotton Drive, Ocilla, Georgia 31774. Petitioner has remained in continuous ICE custody without the benefit of a bond hearing.

5. Petitioner is subject to pre-final order of removal detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Noncitizens detained under section 1226(a) are subject to discretionary detention and can request a change in custody redetermination (i.e. bond hearing) with an Immigration Judge ("IJ").

6. However, on July 8, 2025, DHS issued an internal Interim Guidance ("Policy") that took the baseless position that—contrary to statutory principles and governing case law—noncitizens who are "applicants for admission"—including noncitizens like Petitioner who were inspected and paroled into the United States—are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) instead of discretionary detention under section 1226(a). On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") issued a decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) that sided with DHS' position.

7. DHS' contention that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) is without merit. DHS' Policy has upended decades of DHS' own interpretation of bond eligibility under sections 1226(a) and 1225(b). The vast majority of district courts across the country that have addressed this issue have rejected DHS' arguments and found that it violates the INA and noncitizens' due process rights.

8. For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant habeas relief and direct Respondents to release Petitioner.

JURISDICTION

9. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq*.

10. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause).

11. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 *et seq*., the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq*., and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

12. Venue is proper because Petitioner is detained at the Irwin County Detention Center in Ocilla, Irwin County, Georgia, which is within this District and the Valdosta Division. Venue is also proper in this District because Respondents are officers, employees, or agencies of the United States. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

PARTIES

13. Petitioner Seymen Cimenli is a native and citizen of Turkey. His alien

registration number is A[redacted] He is currently detained at the Irwin County Detention Center, Ocilla, Georgia.

14. Respondent Warden of the Irwin County Detention Center is sued in their official capacity as warden of the facility in which Petitioner is detained. The Warden is the physical custodian of Petitioner.

15. Respondent Field Office Director is responsible for the Atlanta Field Office of ICE, with administrative jurisdiction over Petitioner's immigration case. They are a legal custodian of Petitioner.

16. Respondent David Venturella is sued in his official capacity as the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Respondent Venturella is a legal custodian of Petitioner and has authority to release him.

17. Respondent Markwayne Mullin is sued in his official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, Respondent Mullin is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the INA, and oversees ICE, the component agency responsible for Petitioner's detention and custody. Respondent Mullin is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

18. Respondent Todd Blanche is sued in his official capacity as the Acting Attorney General of the United States and the senior official of the U.S. Department of Justice. In that capacity, he has the authority to adjudicate removal cases and to oversee the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"), which administers the immigration courts and the BIA. Respondent Blanche is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

19. Petitioner presented himself for inspection at the San Ysidro, California Port of Entry on or about September 25, 2024, pursuant to a scheduled appointment made through the CBP One application, and was paroled into the United States for humanitarian reasons.

20. Upon his parole, Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear ("NTA") dated September 25, 2024, which designated him as "an arriving alien" and charged him with removability pursuant to section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") as an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, was not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa or other valid entry document required by the INA. *See* Ex. A, Notice to Appear.

21. Following his parole, Petitioner timely filed a Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, with the New York – Varick Immigration Court on October 29, 2024. *See* Ex. B, Form I-589 Application for Asylum.

22. Petitioner's Form I-589 application remains pending. On April 5, 2026, venue was changed from the New York – Varick Immigration Court to the Charlotte Immigration Court after Petitioner relocated to North Carolina. *See* Ex. D, Order of the Immigration Judge dated April 5, 2026. Petitioner's individual merits hearing is currently scheduled for December 13, 2028. *See* Ex. E, Notice of Internet Based Hearing dated July 6, 2026, setting individual merits hearing.

23. No final order of removal has been entered into the Petitioner's case. Although Petitioner conceded removability on December 30, 2024, the Immigration Judge has not yet adjudicated his pending applications for asylum and withholding of removal. *See* Ex. C, Respondent's Written Pleadings dated December 30, 2024.

24. Petitioner's removal proceedings remain pending before the Charlotte Immigration Court. Petitioner is subject to pre-final order detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

25. Petitioner was taken into ICE custody on or about July 17, 2026, and detained at the Irwin County Detention Center, 132 Cotton Drive, Ocilla, Georgia 31774. *See* Ex. F, Form I-830, Notice to EOIR: Alien Address, dated July 17, 2026. Petitioner remains in continuous ICE custody at the Irwin County Detention Center. *See* Ex. G, ICE Online Detainee Locator System record

26. For nearly twenty-two months following his parole, Petitioner complied with all immigration obligations, kept the Immigration Court apprised of his address as he relocated, and appeared as required. Petitioner does not have any criminal history. Petitioner has no record of absconding or failing to comply with immigration obligations.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

27. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for noncitizens in removal proceedings. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard non-expedited removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in section 1226(a) detention are entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

28. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

29. Finally, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who are subject to final orders of removal, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

30. The detention provisions at section 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(c) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act ("LRA"), Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

31. Following enactment of the IIRIRA, the EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under section 1225 and that they were instead detained under section 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997). In the decades that followed, most noncitizens who entered without inspection—unless they were subject to some other detention authority—received bond hearings. This practice was also consistent with the practice prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA, in which noncitizens who were not deemed "arriving" were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that section 1226(a) simply "restates" the detention authority previously found at section 1252(a)).

32. On July 8, 2025, DHS issued a memo to all employees of ICE stating that "[t]his message serves as notice that DHS, in coordination with the Department of Justice (DOJ), has revisited its legal position on detention and release authorities. DHS has determined

that section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) [8 U.S.C. § 1225], rather than section 236 [8 U.S.C. § 1226], is the applicable immigration detention authority for all applicants for admission. The following interim guidance is intended to ensure immediate and consistent application of the Department's legal interpretation while additional operational guidance is developed." The memo further stated DHS' new position with regard to custody determinations as follows:

> An "applicant for admission" is an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States, whether or not at a designated port of arrival. INA § 235(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)]. **Effective immediately, it is the position of DHS that such aliens are subject to detention under INA § 235(b) [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)] and may not be released from ICE custody except by INA § 212(d)(5) parole**. These aliens are also ineligible for a custody redetermination hearing ("bond hearing") before an immigration judge and may not be released for the duration of their removal proceedings absent a parole by DHS. For custody purposes, these aliens are now treated in the same manner that "arriving aliens" have historically been treated. **The only aliens eligible for a custody determination and release on recognizance, bond, or other conditions under INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] during removal proceedings are aliens admitted to the United States and chargeable with deportability under INA § 237, with the exception of those subject to mandatory detention under INA § 236(c) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)].**
>
> Moving forward, ICE will not issue Form I-286, Notice of Custody Determination, to applicants for admission because Form I-286 applies by its terms only to custody determinations under INA § 236 and part 236 of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations. With a limited exception for certain habeas petitioners, on which the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) will individually advise, if Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) previously conducted a custody determination for an applicant for admission still detained in ICE custody, ERO will affirmatively cancel the Form I-286.
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> *See* https://www.aila.org/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission (last accessed August 4, 2025) (emphasis original).

33. As a result, DHS now considers *all* noncitizens who have entered the United States without inspection or who, like Petitioner, were inspected and paroled into the United States, and are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility, including long-time U.S. residents, to be subject to mandatory detention under section 1225(b) and ineligible for release on bond.

Conversely, according to DHS "[t]he only aliens eligible for a custody determination and release on recognizance, bond, or other conditions under INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] during removal proceedings are aliens admitted to the United States and chargeable with deportability under INA § 237, with the exception of those subject to mandatory detention under INA § 236(c) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)]." *Id.*

34. On September 5, 2025, the BIA issued a decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) holding that, based on the plain language of section 1225(b)(2)(A), IJs lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission.

35. Federal district courts have overwhelmingly rejected DHS' position. In November and December 2025, the United States District Court for the Central District of California certified a nationwide class and entered declaratory and injunctive relief holding that noncitizens who entered without inspection and were subsequently arrested in the interior of the United States are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), and are entitled to consideration for release on bond by an Immigration Judge. *See Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 813 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (amended consolidated order), final judgment entered, 813 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2025). On February 18, 2026, that same court formally vacated *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* under the Administrative Procedure Act. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, 820 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (C.D. Cal. 2026). The same reasoning applies with full force to noncitizens who, like Petitioner, were inspected and paroled into the United States and were later arrested in the interior while their removal proceedings remained pending. Although the Ninth Circuit has stayed portions of those orders pending appeal (No. 26-1044), and Respondents maintain that Matter of Yajure

Hurtado remains operative before the immigration courts, the Supreme Court has confirmed that individual habeas petitions challenging detention must be brought in the district of confinement. *See Trump v. J.G.G.*, 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (per curiam) (citing *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004)). The instant Petition is the precise vehicle the Supreme Court has indicated must be used: an individual § 2241 habeas petition filed in the district where Petitioner is confined.

36. The Eleventh Circuit—whose decisions bind this Court—has already addressed the question presented here and rejected Respondents' position. *See Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami*, 175 F.4th 1258 (11th Cir. 2026) (affirming grant of habeas relief and holding that § 1225(b)(2)(A)'s mandatory-detention rule reaches only the narrower category of applicants for admission actively "seeking admission" at the border, while § 1226 supplies the default rule of detention for an alien arrested and detained in the interior). The Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have issued merits holdings reaching the same conclusion. See Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61 (2d Cir. 2026); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026); Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, No. 26-6019, 2026 WL 1876709 (10th Cir. June 30, 2026). The Seventh Circuit, in a ruling on a stay pending appeal, likewise concluded that the Government was not likely to succeed on the merits of its § 1225(b)(2)(A) argument. *See Castañon Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 161 F.4th 1048 (7th Cir. 2025). Courts within this Circuit have applied *Hernandez Alvarez*'s reasoning to noncitizens who, like Petitioner, presented at a port of entry, were paroled into the United States, and were later arrested in the interior. See B.A.M.A. v. Warden, Irwin Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 7:26-CV-95-WLS-ALS, 2026 WL 1362520 (M.D. Ga. May 13, 2026) (applying Hernandez Alvarez and holding that a noncitizen inspected and paroled at a port of entry and

later arrested in the interior was not "seeking admission" under § 1225(b)(2)(A)). Even before Hernandez Alvarez, courts in this Circuit reached the same conclusion on materially identical facts. *See Guaiquire v. Quinones*, 818 F. Supp. 3d 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2026) (noncitizen who entered at a port of entry, was designated an "arriving alien," was paroled, and lived in the United States while her asylum case remained pending was not "seeking admission" under § 1225(b)(2)(A) when later arrested in the interior; ordering release). This Court, too, has granted relief in this posture. *See A.H.C.C. v. Warden, Irwin Cnty. Det. Ctr.*, No. 7:25-CV-192-WLS-ALS, 2026 WL 36692 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2026) (holding Irwin County detainee was detained under § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), and ordering a bond hearing within seven days); *Lopez v. Paulk*, No. 7:26-CV-00029-WLS-ALS, 2026 WL 961942 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2026) (holding detained asylum seeker charged under § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) was subject to § 1226(a)), enforced by 2026 WL 961948 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 6, 2026) (ordering an individualized bond hearing at which the Government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence); *A.A. v. Warden, Stewart Det. Ctr.*, No. 4:24-CV-191-CDL-AGH, 2026 WL 1105047 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2026) (report and recommendation) (concluding that prolonged detention without a bond hearing of a noncitizen charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) violates due process). The Fifth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion in *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), and the Eighth Circuit followed suit in *Avila v. Bondi*, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). Those decisions are not binding on this Court and are contrary to controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent. The BIA has adhered to the Government's position. See Matter of Q. Li, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025) (noncitizen detained upon arrival at the border and later paroled returns to § 1225(b) custody upon termination of parole); Matter of N-A-G-C-, 29 I&N Dec. 662 (BIA 2026) (reaffirming Matter of Yajure Hurtado as to noncitizens present without

admission or parole). Those decisions likewise do not bind this Court and rest on the construction of § 1225(b)(2)(A) that the Eleventh Circuit rejected in Hernandez Alvarez. They are also factually inapposite: the respondent in Matter of Q. Li was arrested at the border while physically arriving, and Matter of N-A-G-C- involved a noncitizen who entered without admission or parole. Petitioner, by contrast, was inspected and paroled at a port of entry and had been living in the interior in compliance with his obligations for nearly twenty-two months when he was re-arrested; he was taking no step to seek entry at the moment of his re-detention, and Matter of Yajure Hurtado by its terms addresses only noncitizens who have not been admitted or paroled. District courts across the country have likewise overwhelmingly rejected Respondents' position. *See, e.g.*, *Cerritos Echevarria v. Bondi*, No. CV-25-03252-PHX-DWL (ESW), 2025 WL 2821282, at *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025) (observing that "In recent months, many district courts across the country have grappled with the same issue, and it appears that all but one of them has rejected Respondents' position and concluded that an alien in Petitioner's situation . . . is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a).").

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Substantive Due Process

37. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

38. Petitioner is challenging DHS' unlawful custody determination that Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and is ineligible for bond, which violates Petitioner's right to substantive due process of law afforded him through the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

39. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]" U.S. Const. amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment — from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint — lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

40. Petitioner is clearly detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is eligible for release on bond. Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Respondents have violated Petitioner's due process rights under the Fifth Amendment by detaining him without the possibility of release on bond.

41. As a remedy, the Court should order Petitioner released from detention, or alternatively direct that an IJ hold a constitutionally adequate bond hearing.

COUNT TWO

Violation of Petitioner's Procedural Due Process Rights

42. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

43. In *Mathews v. Eldridge*, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the factors to consider in determining if government action deprives an individual's Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process or whether the government process is constitutionally adequate. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) The *Mathews* factors are as follows: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; [S]econd, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; [Third], the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. *Id.* at 335.

44. As to the private interest factor, freedom from physical detention "lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690. District courts addressing the same detention policy at issue here have likewise recognized the substantial private interest at stake. *See, e.g.*, *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 803 F. Supp. 3d 409, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025) (recognizing that a noncitizen petitioner subject to immigration detention "has perhaps the most acute private interest known to personkind short of life itself: bodily freedom") This Court has applied the *Mathews* framework to order an individualized bond hearing at which the Government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence *See Lopez v Paulk*, No 7:26 CV 00029 WLS ALS, 2026 WL 961948 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 6, 2026).

45. With respect to the second factor, erroneous deprivation of Petitioner's liberty is at risk. Petitioner is not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) as DHS claims.

46. As to the third factor, there is no significant governmental interest in continuing to hold Petitioner in custody.

COUNT THREE

Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")

47. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

48. Application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) to Petitioner is a violation of the INA because he is instead subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to grant the following:

(1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;

(2) Issue an order directing Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted, with a return due within three days as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2243;

(3) Enjoin Respondents from transferring Petitioner during the pendency of the instant action;

(4) Declare that Petitioner's continued detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); and/or the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution;

(5) Order Petitioner released from detention, or, in the alternative, direct that a constitutionally adequate bond hearing be held before an Immigration Judge at which Respondents bear the burden of justifying continued detention by clear and convincing evidence;

(6) Grant Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") fees and costs; and

(7) Grant any other further relief this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: July 30, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Stephen Elijah Bennett
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VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I represent Petitioner, and I submit this verification on his behalf. Because Petitioner is detained at the Irwin County Detention Center and immediate relief is sought, counsel verifies this petition on his behalf pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242. I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and obtained through Petitioner's family members.

Dated this 30th day of July, 2026.

/s/Muhammed Gulen
Muhammed Gulen