UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO DIVISION

ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ ROBAINA,	
Petitioner,	
v.	**3:26-CV-02006 -LS**
MARK WAYNE MULLIN,	
Respondent.	

Federal[1] Respondents' Response to
Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal Respondents provide the following response to Petitioner's habeas petition. Any allegations that are not specifically admitted herein are denied. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Petitioner seeks release from civil immigration detention, claiming that his post-removal-order detention has been become indefinite, contrary to statute, and the Due Process Clause. *See* ECF No. 1. Petitioner's claims lack merit, and this petition should be denied.

Petitioner has a final order of removal, which mandates his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) for a 90-day removal period. Detention can be extended past the removal period in the exercise of discretion where removal is reasonably foreseeable. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). ICE decided in its discretion to continue Petitioner's detention past the 90-day removal period, which is a decision protected from judicial review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).

Petitioner has not shown here that there is no likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Even if Petitioner were able to make such a showing, the burden would shift to Respondents who can show that removal is, in fact, significantly likely in the reasonably

[1] The Department of Justice represents only federal employees in this action.

foreseeable future. For these reasons, the Court should deny this habeas petition.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Cuba, was paroled into the United States on May 26, 1980. *See* Ex. A (NTA). He was thereafter convicted in the Circuit Court at Dade County Florida for the offense of Burglary of an Unoccupied Dwelling Possession of Burglary Tools, and Grand Theft Third Degree. *See id.* He was also convicted in the Circuit Court at Dade County Florida for the offense of Burglary of an Unoccupied Dwelling on February 18, 1997. *Id.* He therefore became removable and was issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) on May 28, 1997. *Id.* He was ordered removed by an immigration judge on December 18, 1997, and that removal order is final. *See* Ex. B (IJ Removal Order). Upon information provided by ICE, Petitioner was thereafter encountered and detained by ICE ERO on July 2, 2026, and remains detained pending removal proceedings. Consequently, Petitioner has been detained for **34 days** as of the date of this filing.

II. Detention Is Lawful Under 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6).

The authority to detain aliens after the entry of a final order of removal is set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). That statute affords ICE a 90-day mandatory detention period within which to remove the alien from the United States following the entry of the final order. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). The 90-day removal period begins on the latest of three dates: the date (1) the order becomes "administratively final," (2) a court issues a final order in a stay of removal, or (3) the alien is released from non-immigration custody. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).

Not all removals can be accomplished in 90 days, and certain aliens may be detained beyond the 90-day removal period. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). Under § 1231, the removal period can be extended in a least three circumstances. *See Glushchenko v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 566 F.Supp.3d 693, 703 (W.D. Tex. 2021). Extension is warranted, for

example, if the alien presents a flight risk or other risk to the community. *Id.*; *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C); (a)(6). An alien may be held in confinement until there is "no significant likelihood of removal in a reasonably foreseeable future." *Zadvydas*, at 533 U.S. at 680.

III. There Is No Good Reason to Believe That Removal Is Not Significantly Likely in the Reasonably Foreseeable Future.

Petitioner cannot show "good reason" to believe that removal is unlikely. In *Zadvydas*, the U.S. Supreme Court held that § 1231(a)(6) "read in light of the Constitution's demands, limits an alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States" but "does not permit indefinite detention." 533 U.S. at 689. "[O]nce removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by the statute." *Id.* at 699. The Court designated six months as a presumptively reasonable period of post-order detention but made clear that the presumption "does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months." *Id.* at 701.

Once the alien establishes that he has been in post-order custody for more than six months at the time the habeas petition is filed, the alien must provide a "good reason" to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. *See Andrade v. Gonzales*, 459 F.3d 538, 543–44 (5th Cir. 2006); *Gonzalez v. Gills*, No. 20–60547, 2022 WL 1056099 at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 8, 2022). Unless the alien establishes the requisite "good reason," the burden will not shift to the government to prove otherwise. *Id.*

The "reasonably foreseeable future" is not a static concept; it is fluid and country-specific, depending in large part on country conditions and diplomatic relations. *Ali v. Johnson*, No. 3:21–CV–00050-M, 2021 WL 4897659 at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2021). Additionally, a lack of visible progress in the removal process does not satisfy the petitioner's burden of showing that there is no significant likelihood of removal. *Id.* at *2 (collecting cases); *see also Idowu v. Ridge*, No. 3:03-

CV-1293-R, 2003 WL 21805198, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2003). Conclusory allegations are also insufficient to meet the alien's burden of proof. *Nagib v. Gonzales*, No. 3:06-CV-0294-G, 2006 WL 1499682, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 31, 2006) (citing *Gonzalez v. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement*, No. 1:03-CV-178-C, 2004 WL 839654 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2004)). One court explained:

> To carry his burden, [the] petitioner must present something beyond speculation and conjecture. To shift the burden to the government, [the] petitioner must demonstrate that "the circumstances of his status" or the existence of "particular individual barriers to his repatriation" to his country of origin are such that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Idowu, 2003 WL 21805198, at *4 (citation omitted).

There is no dispute that Petitioner's removal order has been final. Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that his continued detention pending removal is contrary to statute and in violation of his due process rights. *See generally* ECF No. 1. Petitioner, however, relies on only conclusory allegations and speculation to argue that he is not subject to continued detention *Id.*

Petitioner's conclusory and speculative claims are wholly insufficient to meet his burden of proof under *Zadvydas*. See *Nogales v. Dept. of Homeland Sec.*, No. 21-10236, 2022 WL 851738 at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 22, 2022) (citing *Rice v. Gonzalez*, 985 F.3d 1069, 1070 (5th Cir. 2021)); *Akbar v. Barr*, SA-20-CV-01132-FB, 2021 WL 1345530 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2021); *see also Andrade*, 459 F.3d at 543–44; *Boroky v. Holder*, No. 3:14-CV-2040-L-BK, 2014 WL 6809180, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2014). As such, Petitioner cannot meet his burden to provide good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. *See Thanh v. Johnson*, No. EP-15-CV-403-PRM, 2016 WL 5171779, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2016) (denying habeas relief where government has taken affirmative steps to obtain travel

documents). The burden of proof, therefore, does not shift to Federal Respondents to prove that removal is likely.

IV. ICE Has Afforded Petitioner Procedural Due Process.

To establish a procedural due process violation, Petitioner must show that he was deprived of liberty without adequate safeguards. *See Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); *Daniels v. Williams*, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). The Fifth Circuit has not provided guidance to lower courts, post-*Arteaga-Martinez*, on the appropriate standard for reviewing a procedural due process claim alleged by an alien detained under § 1231, but the Fourth Circuit, post-*Arteaga-Martinez*, used the *Zadvydas* framework to analyze a post-order-custody alien's due process claims. *See Linares v. Collins*, 1:25-CV-00584-RP-DH, ECF No. 14 at 10–14 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2025) (discussing *Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez*, 596 U.S. 573 (2022) and *Castaneda v. Perry*, 95 F.4th 750, 760 (4th Cir. 2024)). To the extent this Court finds that any additional analysis is required beyond the constitutional analysis outlined in *Jennings* and *Thuraissigiam*, *supra*, this Court may look to *Zadvydas* to review the procedural claim at issue here. *Id.*

Additionally, the Fifth Circuit finds no procedural due process violation where the constitutional *minima* of due process is otherwise met. *Murphy v. Collins*, 26 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 1994). Even if the Court were to find a procedural due process violation here, the remedy is substitute process. *Mohammad v. Lynch*, No. EP-16-CV-28-PRM, 2016 WL 8674354, at *6 n.6 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2016) (finding no merit to petitioner's procedural due process claim where the evidence demonstrated that the review had already occurred, thereby redressing any delay in the provision of the 90-day and 180-day custody reviews). Even in the criminal context, failure to comply with statutory or regulatory time limits does not mandate release of a person who should otherwise be detained. *U.S. v. Montalvo-Murillo*, 495 U.S. 711, 722 (1990).

Petitioner has received the maximum process afforded by Congress under the statutes, to include placement in "removal proceedings before an immigration judge". Such process included notice and an opportunity to be heard, and the opportunity for judicial review through the appellate court. This process addresses constitutional concerns that were identified in *Zadvydas*, allowing the alien notice and opportunity to be heard regarding continued detention pending removal. Petitioner's procedural due process claim, like his substantive one, should be denied.

V. Conclusion

Petitioner's continued detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). It is not unreasonably prolonged, nor is it in violation of the INA or the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court should deny this petition.

Respectfully submitted,

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