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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Franklin Rodriguez,

Petitioner,

v.

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, JESUS ROCHA, Acting Field Office Director, San Diego Field Office, CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden at Otay Mesa Detention Center,

Respondents.

CIVIL CASE NO.:

'26CV4107 BAS DDL

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

[28 U.S.C. § 2241]

[1] Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., is filing the instant petition with provisional appointment under Chief Judge Order No. 134.

INTRODUCTION

Franklin Rodriguez is a Cuban national that, on information and belief, was ordered removed in 2022. In December of that year, he was briefly detained when he entered the country. He said that within 24 hours he was released and given paperwork that, he has since learned, was a removal order. Regardless, he continued to live in Florida without incident. In late June, he was detained by immigration authorities.

Mr. Rodriguez seeks immediate release because his detention violates his statutory and regulatory rights, *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and the Fifth Amendment.

(1) Zadvydas violations: Petitioner must also be released under *Zadvydas* because—having proved unable to remove him in the past—the government cannot show that there is a "significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." *Id.* at 701. *See, e.g.*, *Conchas-Valdez*, 2025 WL 2884822, No. 25-cv-2469-DMS (S.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2025); *Alic v. Dep't of Homeland Sec./Immigr. Customs Enf't*, No. 25-CV-01749-AJB-BLM, 2025 WL 2799679 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2025); *Rebenok v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-2171-TWR, ECF No. 13 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2025) (granting habeas petitions releasing noncitizens due to *Zadvydas* violations).

(2) Third-country removal due process violations: This Court should enjoin ICE from removing Petitioner to a third country without providing an opportunity to assert fear of persecution or torture before an immigration judge. *See, e.g.*, *Rebenok v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-2171-TWR at ECF No. 13; *Van Tran v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2770623 at *3; *Nguyen Tran v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-2391-BTM, ECF No. 6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2025); *Louangmilith v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2881578, No. 25-cv-2502-JES, *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025); *Ho v. Noem*, 25-cv-02453-BAS-BLM, ECF 11 (Oct. 10, 2025) (all either granting temporary restraining orders or habeas

petitions ordering the government to not remove petitioners to third countries pending litigation or reopening of their immigration cases).

This Court should grant this habeas petition and issue appropriate injunctive relief on all grounds addressed below.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. ICE has not been able to remove Mr. Rodriguez to Cuba.

Based on information and belief, Mr. Rodriguez entered the United States in December 2022. He was briefly detained, then released with paperwork on December 16, 2022. He does not speak or read *any* English. "I didn't realize I had a deportation letter, I hadn't been set up with any court dates, I hadn't been given any appointments," he said through an interpreter.

He went more than three years living in Florida without interacting with immigration authorities or incident.

In June of 2026 Mr. Rodriguez was arrested outside a gas station. No charges were filed, but he was transferred to immigration custody. He was detained and sent to an ICE detention center in Miami. He was put on several planes and, this week, made his way to Otay Mesa Detention Center.

He seeks immediate release.

II. The repatriation agreement with Cuba allows it to use its discretion in accepting Cuban nationals that entered the United States prior to 2017 on a case-by-case basis.

Prior to 2017, there was no repatriation agreement between the United States and Cuba. *Clark v. Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005). On January 12, 2017, the United States and Cuba signed a joint statement ("2017 Joint Statement") by which Cuba agreed to the repatriation of some Cuban nationals. *Cuba (17-112) – Joint Statement Concerning Normalization of Migration Procedures*, Jan. 12, 2017, available at https://www.state.gov/17-112/. The 2017

Joint Statement required Cuba to accept some Cuban nationals but allowed it to use its discretion to accept others on a case-by-case basis.

Specifically, under the agreement Cuba "shall receive back all Cuban nationals who after the signing" of the 2017 Joint Statement "found by the competent authorities of the United States to have tried to irregularly enter or remain in that country in violation of United States law." *Id.* at 2. The agreement also stated that Cuba "shall accept individuals included in the list of 2,746 to be returned in accordance with the Joint Communiqué of December 14, 1984," who came to the United States in 1980 via the Port of Mariel. *Id.* Cuba is not required to accept a third group of Cuban Nationals. Under the 2017 Joint Statement, Cuba agrees to "consider and decide on a case-by-case basis the return of other Cuban nationals presently in the United States of America who before the signing of this Joint Statement had been found by the competent authorities of the United States to have tried to irregularly enter or remain in that country in violation of United States law." *Id.* Mr. Rodriguez admittedly falls into this first group of Cuban Nationals and, in theory, is subject to mandatory repatriation.

Howover, despite the 2017 Joint Statement, a 2019 report by the Office of Inspector General classified Cuba as an "uncooperative country" in 2017, 2018, and 2019 based on its failure to provide travel documents on a timely basis. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Report No. OIG-19-28, *ICE Faces Barriers in Timely Repatriation of Detained Aliens* (Mar. 11, 2019), available at https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-

03/OIG-19-28-Mar19.pdf at pages 6-7, 10, 29. In May of 2018, Cuba was one of nine countries with the uncooperative categorization. *Id.* at 10.

Based on the facts of Mr. Rodriguez's individual case, it is evident that ICE has not obtained travel documents from Cuba. This is evident because ICE has had nearly 4 years to obtain travel documents and has not done so.

III. The government is carrying out deportations to third countries without providing sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard.

When immigrants cannot be removed to their home country—including Cuban immigrants—ICE has begun deporting those individuals to third countries without adequate notice or a hearing. The Trump administration reportedly has negotiated with at least 58 countries to accept deportees from other nations. Edward Wong et al, *Inside the Global Deal-Making Behind Trump's Mass Deportations*, N.Y. Times, June 25, 2025. On June 25, 2025, the New York Times reported that seven countries—Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Kosovo, Mexico, Panama, and Rwanda—had agreed to accept deportees who are not their own citizens. *Id.* Since then, ICE has carried out highly publicized third country deportations to South Sudan and Eswatini.

The Administration has reportedly negotiated with countries to have many of these deportees imprisoned in prisons, camps, or other facilities. The government paid El Salvador about $5 million to imprison more than 200 deported Venezuelans in a maximum-security prison notorious for gross human rights abuses, known as CECOT. *See id.* In February, Panama and Costa Rica took in hundreds of deportees from countries in Africa and Central Asia and imprisoned them in hotels, a jungle camp, and a detention center. *Id.*; Vanessa Buschschluter, *Costa Rican court orders release of migrants deported from U.S.*, BBC (Jun. 25, 2025). On July 4, 2025, ICE deported eight men to South Sudan. *See* Wong, *supra*. On July 15, ICE deported five men to the tiny African nation of Eswatini where they are reportedly being held in solitary confinement. Gerald

Imray, *3 Deported by US held in African Prison Despite Completing Sentences, Lawyers Say*, PBS (Sept. 2, 2025). Many of these countries are known for human rights abuses or instability. For instance, conditions in South Sudan are so extreme that the U.S. State Department website warns Americans not to travel there, and if they do, to prepare their will, make funeral arrangements, and appoint a hostage-taker negotiator first. *See* Wong, *supra*.

On June 23 and July 3, 2025, the Supreme Court issued a stay of a national class-wide preliminary injunction issued in *D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security*, No. CV 25-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1142968, at *1, 3 (D. Mass. Apr. 18, 2025), which required ICE to follow statutory and constitutional requirements before removing an individual to a third country. *U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. D.V.D.*, 145 S. Ct. 2153 (2025) (mem.); *id.*, No. 24A1153, 2025 WL 1832186 (U.S. July 3, 2025).[2] On July 9, 2025, ICE rescinded previous guidance meant to give immigrants a "'meaningful opportunity' to assert claims for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) before initiating removal to a third country" like the ones just described. Exh. A ("Third Country Removal Policy").

Under the new guidance, ICE may remove any immigrant to a third country "without the need for further procedures," as long as—in the view of the State Department—the United States has received "credible" "assurances" from that country that deportees will not be persecuted or tortured. *Id.* at 1. If a country fails

[2] Though the Supreme Court's order was unreasoned, the dissent noted that the government had sought a stay based on procedural arguments applicable only to class actions. *Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. D.V.D.*, 145 S. Ct. 2153, 2160 (2025) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Thus, "even if the Government [was] correct that classwide relief was impermissible" in *D.V.D.*, Respondents still "remain[] obligated to comply with orders enjoining [their] conduct with respect to individual plaintiffs" like Mr. Rodriguez. *Id.* In short, the Supreme Court's decision does not override this Court's authority to grant individual injunctive relief. *See Nguyen v. Scott*, No. 2:25-CV-01398, 2025 WL 2419288, at *20–23 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025).

to credibly promise not to persecute or torture releasees, ICE may still remove immigrants there with minimal notice. *Id.* Ordinarily, ICE must provide 24 hours' notice. But "[i]n exigent circumstances," a removal may take place in as little as six hours, "as long as the alien is provided reasonably means and opportunity to speak with an attorney prior to the removal." *Id.*

Upon serving notice, ICE "will not affirmatively ask whether the alien is afraid of being removed to the country of removal." *Id.* (emphasis original). If the noncitizen "does not affirmatively state a fear of persecution or torture if removed to the country of removal listed on the Notice of Removal within 24 hours, [ICE] may proceed with removal to the country identified on the notice." *Id.* at 2. If the noncitizen "does affirmatively state a fear if removed to the country of removal" then ICE will refer the case to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") for a screening for eligibility for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). *Id.* at 2. "USCIS will generally screen within 24 hours." *Id.* If USCIS determines that the noncitizen does not meet the standard, the individual will be removed. *Id.* If USCIS determines that the noncitizen has met the standard, then the policy directs ICE to either move to reopen removal proceedings "for the sole purpose of determining eligibility for [withholding of removal protection] and CAT" or designate another country for removal. *Id.*

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

This Court should grant this petition and order two forms of relief.

First, it should order Mr. Rodriguez's immediate release. *Zadvydas v. Davis* holds that immigration statutes do not authorize the government to detain immigrants like Petitioner, for whom there is "no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).

Second, it should enjoin the Respondents from removing Petitioner to a third country without first providing notice and a sufficient opportunity to be heard before an immigration judge.

I. Claim 1: Mr. Rodriguez's detention violates *Zadvydas* and 8 U.S.C. § 1231.

A. Legal background

In *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court considered a problem affecting people like Mr. Rodriguez: Federal law requires ICE to detain an immigrant during the "removal period," which typically spans the first 90 days after the immigrant is *ordered* removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)-(2). After that 90-day removal period expires, detention becomes discretionary—ICE may detain the migrant while continuing to try to remove them. *Id.* § 1231(a)(6). Ordinarily, this scheme would not lead to excessive detention, as removal happens within days or weeks. But some detainees cannot be removed quickly. Perhaps their removal "simply require[s] more time for processing," or they are "ordered removed to countries with whom the United States does not have a repatriation agreement," or their countries "refuse to take them," or they are "effectively 'stateless' because of their race and/or place of birth." *Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft*, 257 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 2001). In these and other circumstances, detained immigrants can find themselves trapped in detention for months, years, decades, or even the rest of their lives. If federal law were understood to allow for "indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention," it would pose "a serious constitutional threat." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 699. In *Zadvydas*, the Supreme Court avoided the constitutional concern by interpreting § 1231(a)(6) to incorporate implicit limits. *Id.* at 689.

Zadvydas held that § 1231(a)(6) presumptively permits the government to detain an immigrant for 180 days after his or her *removal order* becomes final. After those 180 days have passed, the immigrant must be released unless his or

her removal is reasonably foreseeable. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. After six months have passed, the petitioner must only make a prima facie case for relief—there is "good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." *Id.* Then the burden shifts to "the Government [to] respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing." *Id.* Using this framework, Mr. Rodriguez can make all the threshold showings needed to shift the burden to the government.

B. The six-month grace period has expired.

The six-month grace period has long since ended. The *Zadvydas* grace period is linked to the date the final order of removal *is issued*, in this case—on information and belief—December 16, 2022. It lasts for "*six months* after a final order of removal—that is, *three months* after the statutory removal period has ended." *Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft*, 257 F.3d 1095, 1102 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001). Indeed, the statute defining the beginning of the removal period is linked to the latest of three dates, all of which relevant here are tied to when the removal order is issued. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).[3]

Here, Mr. Rodriguez's order of removal was entered on or around December 16, 2022. Accordingly, his 90-day removal period began then. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). The *Zadvydas* grace period thus expired on or around June 16, 2023, three months after the removal period ended. *See, e.g.*, *Tadros v. Noem*, 2025 WL 1678501, No. 25-cv-4108(EP), *2–*3. That is more than three years ago. That also is more than six months.

[3] Those dates are, specifically, (1) "[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final;" (2) "[i]f the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court's final order;" or (3) "[i]f the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement." *Id.*

The government has sometimes argued that release and rearrest resets the six-month grace period completely, taking the clock back to zero. "Courts . . . broadly agree" that this is not correct. *Diaz-Ortega v. Lund*, 2019 WL 6003485, at *7 n.6 (W.D. La. Oct. 15, 2019), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2019 WL 6037220 (W.D. La. Nov. 13, 2019); *see also Sied v. Nielsen*, No. 17-CV-06785-LB, 2018 WL 1876907, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018) (collecting cases).

The courts have also rejected the government's arguments that the presumptively reasonable detention period under *Zadvydas* runs from the point at which detention begins, and not from the end of the removal period. A recent district court reasoned that a review of the legislative history relied on by *Zadvydas* contradicts the government's arguments. *Castro-Napoles v. Noem*, No. 26-CV-03212-RFL, 2026 WL 1720963, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 15, 2026). Looking at the legislative history, it is clear that "Congress viewed six months as a presumptively reasonable amount of time for the government to effectuate removal, regardless of the non-citizen's detention status during that time. Once those six months have passed, removal is presumed not to be reasonably foreseeable, and thus any further detention is presumed to be unreasonable." *Id.*

Thus, the presumptive period runs from the date of removal order. Here that was more than three years ago and the burden shifts to the government.

C. The history of Cuba being uncooperative with repatriation provides very good reason to believe that Mr. Rodriguez will not likely be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Because the six-month grace period has passed, this Court must evaluate Mr. Rodriguez's *Zadvydas* claim using the burden-shifting framework. At the first stage of the framework, Mr. Rodriguez must "provide[] good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. This standard can be broken down into three parts.

"Good reason to believe." The "good reason to believe" standard is a relatively forgiving one. "A petitioner need not establish that there exists no possibility of removal." *Freeman v. Watkins*, No. CV B:09-160, 2009 WL 10714999, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2009). Nor does "'[g]ood reason to believe' . . . place a burden upon the detainee to demonstrate no reasonably foreseeable, significant likelihood of removal or show that his detention is indefinite; it is something less than that." *Rual v. Barr*, No. 6:20-CV-06215 EAW, 2020 WL 3972319, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 14, 2020) (quoting *Senor v. Barr*, 401 F. Supp. 3d 420, 430 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)). In short, the standard means what it says: Petitioners need only give a "good reason"—not prove anything to a certainty.

"Significant likelihood of removal." This component focuses on <u>whether</u> Mr. Rodriguez will likely be removed: Continued detention is permissible only if it is "significant[ly] like[ly]" that ICE will be able to remove him. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. This inquiry targets "not only the *existence* of untapped possibilities, but also [the] probability of *success* in such possibilities." *Elashi v. Sabol*, 714 F. Supp. 2d 502, 506 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (second emphasis added). In other words, even if "there remains *some* possibility of removal," a petitioner can still meet its burden if there is good reason to believe that successful removal is not significantly likely. *Kacanic v. Elwood*, No. CIV.A. 02-8019, 2002 WL 31520362, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2002) (emphasis added).

"In the reasonably foreseeable future." This component of the test focuses on <u>when</u> Mr. Rodriguez will likely be removed: Continued detention is permissible only if removal is likely to happen "in the reasonably foreseeable future." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. This inquiry places a time limit on ICE's removal efforts. If the Court has "no idea of when it might reasonably expect [Petitioner] to be repatriated, this Court certainly cannot conclude that his removal

is likely to occur—or even that it might occur—in the reasonably foreseeable future." *Palma v. Gillis*, No. 5:19-CV-112-DCB-MTP, 2020 WL 4880158, at *3 (S.D. Miss. July 7, 2020), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2020 WL 4876859 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 19, 2020) (quoting *Singh v. Whitaker*, 362 F. Supp. 3d 93, 102 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)). Thus, even if this Court concludes that Mr. Rodriguez "would *eventually* receive" a travel document, he can still meet his burden by giving good reason to anticipate sufficiently lengthy delays. *Younes v. Lynch*, 2016 WL 6679830, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2016).

Mr. Rodriguez readily satisfies this standard for two reasons.

First, as explained above, the United States has categorized Cuba as uncooperative in providing travel documents in a timely manner.

Second, Mr. Rodriguez's own experience bears this out. ICE has now had almost four years to deport him. It apparently has made no efforts to do so.

Third, the government appears to be considering a military assault on Cuba. James LaPorta, et. al, *Senior defense officials looking at Cuba military options*, CBS News (July 16, 2026 9:53 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cuba-military-options-pentagon/. At the risk of stating the obvious, bombing a country makes it less likely that the bombee will cooperate with the bomber.

Thus, Mr. Rodriguez has met his initial burden, and the burden shifts to the government. Unless the government can prove a "significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future," Mr. Rodriguez must be released. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701.

II. Claim 2: ICE may not remove Mr. Rodriguez to a third country without adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.

In addition to unlawfully detaining him and the failure to comply with regulations and statute, ICE's policies threaten his removal to a third country without adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. These policies violate the Fifth Amendment, the Convention Against Torture, and implementing regulations.

A. Legal background

U.S. law enshrines protections against dangerous and life-threatening removal decisions. By statute, the government is prohibited from removing an immigrant to any third country where they may be persecuted or tortured, a form of protection known as withholding of removal. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The government "may not remove [a noncitizen] to a country if the Attorney General decides that the [noncitizen's] life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the [noncitizen's] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." *Id.*; *see also* 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16, 1208.16. Withholding of removal is a mandatory protection.

Similarly, Congress codified protections enshrined in the CAT prohibiting the government from removing a person to a country where they would be tortured. *See* FARRA 2681-822 (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note) ("It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States."); 28 C.F.R. § 200.1; *id.* §§ 208.16-208.18, 1208.16-1208.18. CAT protection is also mandatory.

To comport with the requirements of due process, the government must provide notice of the third country removal and an opportunity to respond. Due process requires "written notice of the country being designated" and "the statutory basis for the designation, i.e., the applicable subsection of § 1231(b)(2)." *Aden v. Nielsen*, 409 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2019); *accord D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 25-cv-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1453640, at *1 (D. Mass. May 21, 2025); *Andriasian v. INS*, 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999).

The government must also "ask the noncitizen whether he or she fears persecution or harm upon removal to the designated country and memorialize in writing the noncitizen's response. This requirement ensures DHS will obtain the

necessary information from the noncitizen to comply with section 1231(b)(3) and avoids [a dispute about what the officer and noncitizen said]." *Aden*, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 1019. "Failing to notify individuals who are subject to deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the United States and for withholding of deportation to the country to which they will be deported violates both INS regulations and the constitutional right to due process." *Andriasian*, 180 F.3d at 1041.

If the noncitizen claims fear, measures must be taken to ensure that the noncitizen can seek asylum, withholding, and relief under CAT before an immigration judge in reopened removal proceedings. The amount and type of notice must be "sufficient" to ensure that "given [a noncitizen's] capacities and circumstances, he would have a reasonable opportunity to raise and pursue his claim for withholding of deportation." *Aden*, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 1009 (citing *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) and *Kossov v. I.N.S.*, 132 F.3d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 1998)); *cf. D.V.D.*, 2025 WL 1453640, at *1 (requiring the government to move to reopen the noncitizen's immigration proceedings if the individual demonstrates "reasonable fear" and to provide "a meaningful opportunity, and a minimum of fifteen days, for the non-citizen to seek reopening of their immigration proceedings" if the noncitizen is found to not have demonstrated "reasonable fear"); *Aden*, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 1019 (requiring notice and time for a respondent to file a motion to reopen and seek relief).

"[L]ast minute" notice of the country of removal will not suffice, *Andriasian*, 180 F.3d at 1041; *accord Najjar v. Lunch*, 630 Fed. App'x 724 (9th Cir. 2016), and for good reason: To have a meaningful opportunity to apply for fear-based protection from removal, immigrants must have time to prepare and present relevant arguments and evidence. Merely telling a person where they may be sent, without giving them a chance to look into country conditions, does not give them a meaningful chance to determine whether and why they have a credible fear.

B. The June 6, 2025 memo's removal policies violate the Fifth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, the Conviction Against Torture, and Implementing Regulations.

The policies in the June 6, 2025 memo do not adhere to these requirements. First, under the policy, ICE need not give immigrants *any* notice or *any* opportunity to be heard before removing them to a country that—in the State Department's estimation—has provided "credible" "assurances" against persecution and torture. Exh. A. By depriving immigrants of any chance to challenge the State Department's view, this policy violates "[t]he essence of due process," "the requirement that a person in jeopardy of serious loss be given notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it." *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (cleaned up).

Second, even when the government has obtained no credible assurances against persecution and torture, the government can still remove the person with between 6 and 24 hours' notice, depending on the circumstances. Exh. A. Practically speaking, there is not nearly enough time for a detained person to assess their risk in the third country and martial evidence to support any credible fear—let alone a chance to file a motion to reopen with an IJ. An immigrant may know nothing about a third country, like Eswatini or South Sudan, when they are scheduled for removal there. Yet if given the opportunity to investigate conditions, immigrants would find credible reasons to fear persecution or torture—like patterns of keeping deportees indefinitely and without charge in solitary confinement or extreme instability raising a high likelihood of death—in many of the third countries that have agreed to removal thus far. Due process requires an adequate chance to identify and raise these threats to health and life. This Court must prohibit the government from removing Mr. Rodriguez without these due process safeguards.

III. This Court must hold an evidentiary hearing on any disputed facts.

Resolution of a prolonged-detention habeas petition may require an evidentiary hearing. *Owino v. Napolitano*, 575 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). Mr. Rodriguez hereby requests such a hearing on any material, disputed facts.

IV. Prayer for relief

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

1. Order Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody;
2. Enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) unless and until Respondents obtain a travel document for his removal;
3. Enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner without first following all procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(*l*), 241.13(i), and any other applicable statutory and regulatory procedures;
4. Enjoin Respondents from removing Petitioner to any country other than Cuba, without first following the consecutive procedures of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2).
5. Enjoin Respondents from removing Petitioner to any country other than Cuba, unless they provide the following process, *see D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. CV 25-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1453640, at *1 (D. Mass. May 21, 2025):
   a. written notice to both Petitioner and Petitioner's counsel in a language Petitioner can understand;
   b. a meaningful opportunity, and a minimum of ten days, to raise a fear-based claim for CAT protection prior to removal;

c. if Petitioner is found to have demonstrated "reasonable fear" of removal to the country, Respondents must move to reopen Petitioner's immigration proceedings;

d. if Petitioner is not found to have demonstrated a "reasonable fear" of removal to the country, a meaningful opportunity, and a minimum of fifteen days, for the Petitioner to seek reopening of his immigration proceedings.

6. Order all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: July 16, 2026

s/ Daniel J. Yadron, Jr.

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PROOF OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, will cause the attached petition for a writ of habeas corpus to be emailed to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of California at USACAS.Habeas2241@usdoj.gov when I receive the court-stamped copy.

Dated: July 16, 2026

s/ Daniel J. Yadron, Jr.
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