DETAINED

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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

Martin Torres-Solorzano,
Petitioner,

v.

Markwayne MULLIN, Secretary of U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
Todd BLANCHE, United States Attorney General;
David J. VENTURELLA, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Julio HERNANDEZ, Acting Seattle Field Office Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Bruce SCOTT, Warden, Northwest ICE Processing Center;
Respondents.

Case No.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This Petition challenges the unlawful and prolonged detention of Petitioner Martin Torres-Solorzano (A#[redacted]), an adult citizen of Mexico, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

2. Petitioner has been continuously detained by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") since November 2025. He is currently confined at the Northwest ICE Processing Center in Tacoma, Washington.
3. Petitioner timely filed his appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") on May 21, 2026. That appeal remains pending.
4. Because Petitioner's appeal is pending before the BIA, his removal order is not administratively final, and his removal is not imminent.
5. Petitioner has now been detained for over seven months without any constitutionally adequate custody determination. Since his arrest in November 2025, Petitioner has not received a single bond hearing or custody review of any kind.
6. The Constitution does not permit the government to detain a person indefinitely without providing a meaningful opportunity to be heard. At a minimum, due process requires an individualized custody determination where the government bears the burden of justifying continued detention.
7. Regardless of the statutory basis invoked by Respondents, prolonged detention without an individualized hearing violates due process.
8. Petitioner's only contact with the criminal justice system occurred more than a decade ago and consisted of misdemeanor traffic-related offenses. He has incurred no criminal convictions in approximately fifteen years since then. He has incurred no criminal convictions in the many years since, and has lived continuously in the community throughout that period.
9. Civil immigration detention under § 1226 is constitutionally permissible only for a limited period. When detention under § 1226 becomes prolonged, continued incarceration

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without a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 312 (2018); *Rodriguez v. Marin*, 909 F.3d 252, 255-56 (9th Cir. 2018); *Martinez v. Clark*, No. C18-1669-RAJ-MAT, 2019 WL 5968089 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019); *Smith v. Hernandez*, No. 2:26-cv-01138-JNW (W.D. Wash. May 13, 2026).

10. To the extent Petitioner's current detention may be characterized as a re-detention following his 2011 release on bond in the same removal proceeding, this Court has likewise held that re-detention without a meaningful custody determination violates the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., *E.A.T.-B. v. Wamsley*; *Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley*; *Kumar v. Wamsley*; *Ledesma Gonzalez v. Bostock*.

11. Accordingly, Petitioner's continued detention is unlawful, and this Court should order his immediate release or, at minimum, a prompt bond hearing within seven days, with Respondents bearing the burden of justifying continued detention by clear and convincing evidence.

II. PARTIES

12. Petitioner, Martin TORRES-SOLORZANO (A# [redacted]), is an adult citizen of Mexico, currently detained at the Northwest ICE Processing Center in Tacoma, Washington.

13. Respondent Markwayne MULLIN is sued in his official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. He is the cabinet-level secretary responsible for all immigration enforcement in the United States and has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner.

14. Respondent Todd BLANCHE is sued in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States. The Immigration Judges who decide removal cases and applications for relief from removal do so as his designees.

15. Respondent David J. VENTURELLA is sued in his official capacity as the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). He is the head of the federal agency responsible for all immigration enforcement in the United States.

16. Respondent Julio HERNANDEZ is sued in his official capacity as Acting Seattle Field Office Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security. He is responsible for overseeing ICE operations pertaining to noncitizens within its territorial jurisdiction, such as Petitioner, including detentions, enforcement, and removal operations. He is the immediate legal custodian of the Petitioner for purposes of a federal habeas petition.

17. Respondent Bruce SCOTT is sued in his official capacity as the Warden of the Northwest ICE Processing Center, the immigration detention center where Petitioner is being detained. The Warden has immediate physical custody of Petitioner.

III. JURISDICTION

18. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus); and 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act).

19. Further, this Court has jurisdiction under the Suspension Clause of Article I, § 9, cl. 2, of the U.S. Constitution. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).

20. No other petitions, appeals, or motions regarding habeas corpus have been filed with any other court.

IV. VENUE

21. Venue in the Western District of Washington is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) because the Petitioner is currently detained in this judicial district.

22. Venue is further appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) because the Respondents live, work, and operate within this judicial district and because the actions which gave rise to this Petition took place in Tacoma, Washington, which falls within this judicial district.

V. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

23. Petitioner Martin TORRES-SOLORZANO (A# [redacted] is an adult citizen and national of Mexico, born on [redacted]

24. Petitioner has lived in the United States for over twenty-five years. He last entered the United States in or about August 1998.

25. On March 8, 2011, the Department of Homeland Security served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear, charging him as removable under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and placing him in removal proceedings.

26. On April 11, 2011, an Immigration Judge conducted a custody redetermination and granted Petitioner release on a bond of $10,000. Petitioner posted the bond and was released from custody.

27. Following his release, Petitioner pursued relief from removal. In December 2011, he filed an application for cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents (Form EOIR-42B) and a related application to adjust status (Form I-485). The underlying family

petition filed on his behalf by his United States citizen brother (Form I-130) had been approved in 2003.

28. Throughout this period, Petitioner remained living in the community. He maintained valid employment authorization, worked, and resided continuously in Washington State with his family.

29. During the approximately fourteen years following his release on bond, Petitioner fully complied with the conditions of his release. Respondents permitted him to remain at liberty throughout the pendency of his removal proceedings while he maintained employment authorization, resided openly in Washington, and continued pursuing available immigration relief.

30. In or about November 2025, DHS took Petitioner back into custody in connection with the same, ongoing removal proceedings. Petitioner was arrested during an ICE enforcement operation at a gas station. Prior to his arrest, Respondents had made no allegation that Petitioner had absconded, violated any bond condition, or failed to appear for immigration proceedings.

31. He has been detained continuously since that date at the Northwest ICE Processing Center in Tacoma, Washington.

32. Since DHS took Petitioner into custody in November 2025, he has not received any bond hearing or custody redetermination of any kind. No Immigration Judge has conducted an individualized custody determination addressing Petitioner's current detention, and at no point has the government been required to justify his continued confinement.

33.

34. Respondents provided Petitioner no written custody determination explaining why detention had suddenly become necessary after permitting him to remain at liberty for approximately fourteen years following the Immigration Judge's bond decision.

35. On April 30, 2026, the Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed to Mexico.

36. Petitioner timely appealed the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals on May 21, 2026, where the appeal remains pending. Because Petitioner's appeal is pending, his removal order is not administratively final, and his removal is not imminent.

37. Petitioner's current detention has now exceeded seven months. The fifteen-year removal proceeding against him has never resulted in an administratively final order of removal.

38. Petitioner's criminal history is limited and remote. Petitioner's criminal history consists of a 2002 misdemeanor traffic matter that was amended to negligent driving and a 2011 misdemeanor DUI conviction. He has incurred no criminal convictions in approximately fifteen years since that time and has successfully lived in the community throughout that period.

39. At no point since his November 2025 re-arrest has Petitioner received a constitutionally adequate hearing at which the government was required to justify continued detention.

40. Petitioner's detention has become prolonged and continues without any clear end point while his appeal remains pending before the BIA.

41. Nothing in the record suggests Petitioner's detention is likely to conclude in the immediate future. His BIA appeal remains pending, and if necessary, judicial review could further extend the duration of detention.

42. Petitioner is therefore being detained in violation of the Due Process Clause.

VI. MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Due Process Clause

43. Petitioner's appeal remains pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals. Because the BIA has not yet issued a final decision, Petitioner's removal order is not administratively final. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). Accordingly, Petitioner's detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not 8 U.S.C. § 1231. See *Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,* 594 U.S. 523, 536-37 (2021). The Government's statutory authority to detain under § 1226 does not displace the constitutional requirement of adequate procedural safeguards when detention becomes prolonged.

44. This case concerns the Government's prolonged detention of Petitioner for over seven months without providing any individualized bond hearing. Indeed, the removal proceeding against Petitioner has itself remained pending for over fifteen years without ever resulting in an administratively final order. Due process requires that when detention under § 1226 becomes unreasonably prolonged, the Government must afford a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to determine whether continued detention is justified and whether Petitioner presents a flight risk or danger to the community.

45. "Freedom from imprisonment, from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint, lies at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Courts consistently recognize this interest as "the most elemental of liberty interests." *Smith v. Hernandez*, No. 2:26-cv-01138-JNW, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 13, 2026); see also *Rodriguez v. Marin*, 909 F.3d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 2018) (expressing "grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional").

46. Consistent with this principle, individuals detained under § 1226 have a fundamental liberty interest in freedom from prolonged civil detention without an individualized hearing. When the Government detains a noncitizen for months without any custody determination, procedural due process protections become particularly weighty because the detention has ceased to serve its limited purpose of securing the person pending removal proceedings.

47. Such liberty is protected by the Fifth Amendment because, "although indeterminate, [it] includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty," such as the ability to be gainfully employed and live with family, "and its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the [detained individual] and often on others." *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). Petitioner has resided in the United States for over twenty-five years and built his family and working life in this country. An Immigration Judge previously found him suitable for release on bond in 2011, and he lived in the community for the following fourteen years. Every additional day of detention inflicts grievous loss on Petitioner and his family.

48. To protect against arbitrary prolonged detention and to ensure the right to liberty, due process requires "adequate procedural protections" that test whether the Government's asserted justification for a noncitizen's physical confinement "outweighs the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

49. Due process requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner before the Government may continue prolonged civil detention without an individualized custody determination. *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 267

(1970) ("The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner." (citation modified)).

50. Here, Respondents afforded Petitioner no opportunity whatsoever to challenge the necessity of renewed detention before depriving him of the liberty interest he had enjoyed for approximately fourteen years.

51. Courts in this District have consistently recognized that these principles apply to noncitizens detained for prolonged periods under § 1226 without a bond hearing, even where the Government contends that mandatory detention applies.

52. In Smith v. Hernandez, this Court applied the multi-factor test set forth in *Martinez v. Clark*, No. C18-1669-RAJ-MAT, 2019 WL 5968089 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019), and held that prolonged detention without a bond hearing is unconstitutional, even where the Government asserted mandatory detention under § 1226(c) and even where the petitioner had a serious criminal history. *Smith v. Hernandez,* No. 2:26-cv-01138-JNW (W.D. Wash. May 13, 2026). This Court reached consistent conclusions in *Joshi v. Wamsley,* No. 2:26-CV-00148-TLF, 2026 WL 456822 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 18, 2026), and *Toktosunov v. Wamsley*, No. 2:25-CV-1724-TL, 2025 WL 3492858 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 5, 2025).

53. In Smith, this Court held that even assuming § 1226(c) mandatory detention applied, the petitioner's prolonged detention without a bond hearing violated due process because "the most important factor," the length of detention, weighed in the petitioner's favor, and five of the eight Martinez factors weighed in his favor overall. Smith v. Hernandez, No. 2:26-cv-01138-JNW, at *5. The Court further explained that even a serious criminal history

does not eliminate the constitutional requirement that the Government provide a bond hearing. *Id.*

54. The Court explained that the Government's interest in continuing to detain a noncitizen under § 1226 without a hearing is low, because the modest administrative burden of providing a bond hearing is far outweighed by the risk of erroneous deprivation of the fundamental liberty interest at stake. Id. As a result, the Court ordered a bond hearing within seven days, at which the Government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. *Id.*

55. This Court applied consistent analysis in *Populus-Revuelta v. Scott*, No. 2:26-CV-00636-RAJ, 2026 WL 1067317 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2026). There, the Court reasoned that pursuing a statutory appeal process does not constitute abusive delay and cannot be used to weigh against a petitioner in the Martinez analysis. The Court further noted that "the fact that the Government may believe it has a valid reason to detain Petitioner does not eliminate its obligation to effectuate the detention in a manner that comports with due process." *Id. at *5.*

56. The Joshi court reached the same conclusion, holding that the likely duration of future detention weighed in the petitioner's favor because BIA appeals routinely take over six months, and any subsequent Ninth Circuit review would add many additional months. Joshi, 2026 WL 456822, at *5.

57. This Court's decisions in Smith, Populus-Revuelta, Joshi, and Toktosunov are consistent with decisions across this District addressing prolonged detention under § 1226. See, e.g., *Lopez v. Garland,* 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879-80 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (finding twelve months of detention weighed in favor of granting bond hearing); *Amado v. United States Dep't of*

Just., No. 3:25-cv-02687-LL-DDL, 2025 WL 3079052, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (explaining that courts have found detention over seven months without a bond hearing weighs toward unreasonableness and collecting cases); *Yagoub v. LaRose*, No. 3:26-cv-00914 JLS-JLB, 2026 WL 673799, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2026) (finding detention of nearly eight months weighed in petitioner's favor).

58. The same Martinez factors weigh decisively in Petitioner's favor here. Petitioner has been detained for over seven months without any bond hearing, a period courts in this District have consistently found unreasonable. Smith v. Hernandez, No. 2:26-cv-01138-JNW (W.D. Wash. May 13, 2026). The likely duration of future detention weighs equally in Petitioner's favor, as his BIA appeal remains pending and BIA appeals routinely take over six months. *Joshi v. Wamsley,* No. 2:26-CV-00148-TLF, 2026 WL 456822, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 18, 2026). Petitioner's immigration detention far exceeds any sentence associated with his remote misdemeanor traffic history. The Government may raise that history at a bond hearing. It may not use it to avoid providing one. Smith, No. 2:26-cv-01138-JNW. The prior Immigration Judge's decision granting bond further reinforces the Martinez analysis. A neutral Immigration Judge previously determined that Petitioner could safely remain at liberty, and Respondents nevertheless returned him to detention more than fourteen years later without obtaining any renewed individualized custody determination. Petitioner has done nothing to prolong his detention, and the entirety of the delay is attributable solely to Respondents. Populus-Revuelta v. Scott, No. 2:26-CV-00636-RAJ, 2026 WL 1067317, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2026). The eighth factor is neutral. At minimum, the most important factors, the length of detention, likely duration of future detention, lack of abusive delay, and conditions of confinement, weigh strongly

in Petitioner's favor. Even if the Court treats the nature of Petitioner's prior traffic matters as favoring Respondents, Smith confirms that criminal-history concerns do not eliminate the constitutional requirement of a bond hearing. His continued detention without any bond hearing has become unreasonable and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, Petitioner's continued detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and a bond hearing is required immediately. At that hearing, the Government bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner presents a flight risk or danger to the community. Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). If the Government fails to provide a constitutionally adequate bond hearing within seven days of this Court's order, Petitioner must be immediately released. Jimenez v. Wolf, No. 19-CV-07996-NC, 2020 WL 1082648, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2020).

Re-Detention Without a Custody Determination

59. Separate and apart from the unreasonable length of Petitioner's detention, due process is independently violated by the manner in which Respondents returned Petitioner to custody. The Fifth Amendment protects not only against the initial deprivation of liberty, but also against the revocation of a liberty interest the Government has already conferred.

60. On April 11, 2011, an Immigration Judge in these same proceedings conducted a custody redetermination, found Petitioner suitable for release, and granted him release on a bond of $10,000. Petitioner posted that bond and was released. That determination was a considered, individualized adjudication by a neutral decisionmaker, and Petitioner thereafter lived at liberty in the community for approximately fourteen years.

61. Petitioner's release on bond conferred a liberty interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. That liberty, "although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty," and "its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the [individual] and often on others." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).

62. In or about November 2025, Respondents returned Petitioner to custody. They did so without first affording him any hearing, without any individualized finding that his circumstances had changed, and without requiring any showing that his continued liberty posed a flight risk or a danger to the community.

63. Respondents likewise never sought modification of the Immigration Judge's prior custody determination before returning Petitioner to detention. Instead, they unilaterally revoked Petitioner's liberty despite the absence of any intervening judicial finding that he had become either a danger to the community or a flight risk.

64. Where the Government seeks to revoke a previously granted liberty interest, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral decisionmaker. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 481-82; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976). Under Mathews, the adequacy of the procedures afforded is assessed by weighing the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation under the existing procedures and the value of additional safeguards, and the Government's interest, including the administrative burden of additional process. Each factor favors Petitioner. His interest in remaining at liberty after fourteen years in the community is profound, the risk of erroneous deprivation is total because no process whatsoever preceded his re-detention, and the Government's interest can be fully protected through a hearing at which it bears the burden of justifying continued custody.

65. This Court has recognized that re-detention of a noncitizen who was previously released, without a renewed custody determination, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., *E.A.T.-B. v. Wamsley; Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley; Kumar v. Wamsley; Ledesma Gonzalez v. Bostock.*

66. This Petition has been verified by Petitioner. See Verification of Petitioner.

VII. CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process

Procedural Due Process

67. Petitioner restates and realleges all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

68. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from subjecting Petitioner to prolonged civil detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 without providing a constitutionally adequate individualized bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

69. Petitioner has been in continuous immigration custody since November 2025, a period now exceeding seven months. During that time, Petitioner has maintained a fundamental liberty interest in freedom from prolonged physical confinement. That interest is "the most elemental of liberty interests" recognized by the Constitution. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

70. Due process therefore requires Respondents to provide Petitioner with an individualized hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to determine whether continued detention is justified based on individualized findings of danger or flight risk. *Singh v. Holder*, 638 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011); *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).

71. Since Petitioner's arrest on November 2025, Respondents have failed to provide Petitioner with any individualized custody determination, any written explanation for his continued detention, or any opportunity to be heard before a neutral decisionmaker to determine whether continued detention is justified based on individualized findings of danger or flight risk.

72. Instead, Respondents have continued to detain Petitioner for over seven months without any constitutionally adequate process. To the extent Respondents rely on Petitioner's remote misdemeanor traffic history, that history may be raised at a bond hearing. It does not justify the complete absence of any hearing.

73. Respondents also deprived Petitioner of his previously granted liberty interest by re-detaining him approximately fourteen years after his Immigration Judge bond determination without providing any pre-deprivation or prompt post-deprivation hearing.

74. This Court has held that the Government's belief that it has a valid reason to detain a noncitizen does not eliminate its obligation to effectuate that detention in a manner that comports with due process. *Smith v. Hernandez*, No. 2:26-cv-01138-JNW (W.D. Wash. May 13, 2026); *Populus-Revuelta v. Scott*, No. 2:26-CV-00636-RAJ, 2026 WL 1067317, (W.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2026).

75. The Government cannot detain a person for eight months without a hearing and justify that detention later.

76. Accordingly, Respondents' continued detention of Petitioner without an individualized bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

VIII. IRREPARABLE INJURY

77. Petitioner has suffered and continues to suffer irreparable injury as a result of his unlawful detention.

78. Petitioner has been deprived of his physical liberty since November 2025, a period now exceeding seven months, without any individualized bond hearing or constitutionally adequate custody determination. He has been separated from the family and community he established over more than twenty-five years of continuous residence in the United States.

79. Continued physical detention without constitutionally adequate process is itself irreparable harm.

80. Petitioner's detention substantially interferes with his ability to pursue his pending BIA appeal, communicate effectively with counsel, gather supporting evidence, and meaningfully assist in his own defense.

81. Petitioner additionally suffers the ongoing harms inherent in physical incarceration, including separation from his family and community, emotional distress, and restrictions on daily liberty. After more than twenty-five years of continuous residence in the United States, Petitioner has been separated from the family, work, and community ties he built over that period. These harms compound with each additional day of unlawful detention.

82. "It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).

IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

A. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;

B. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody or, in the alternative, "...ordering Respondents to provide Petitioner with a constitutionally adequate individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge within seven (7) days, at which Respondents bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses either a flight risk or a danger to the community and that no less restrictive alternatives to detention would reasonably mitigate those risks;

C. Enjoin Respondents from continuing to detain Petitioner absent constitutionally adequate written notice and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker;

D. Declare that Respondents violated Petitioner's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;

E. Award reasonable attorney's fees and costs; and

F. Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 09th day of July, 2026

/s/ Jashan Multani

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