ADAM GORDON
United States Attorney
DANIELLE L. BROWN
Colorado State Bar No. 57814
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
Office of the U.S. Attorney
880 Front Street, Room 6293
San Diego, CA 92101
Telephone: (619) 546-8693
Facsimile: (619) 546-7751
Email: danielle.brown2@usdoj.gov

Attorneys for Respondents

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**

**SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

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| JUVENTINO MORALES JUAREZ,<br><br>Petitioner,<br><br>v.<br><br>MARKWAYNE MULLIN, *et al.*,<br><br>Respondents. | Case No.: 26-cv-03910-RBM-BJW<br><br>**RESPONSE TO PETITION** |

Petitioner has filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. As an initial matter, Petitioner has failed to plead sufficient information in his habeas petition. The Constitution limits federal judicial power to designated "cases" and "controversies." U.S. Const., art. III, § 2; *see also SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights*, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972) (federal courts may only entertain matters that present a "case" or "controversy" within the meaning of Article III). "Absent a real and immediate threat of future injury there can be no case or controversy, and thus no Article III standing for a party seeking injunctive relief." *Wilson*

*v. Brown*, No. 05-cv-1774-BAS-MDD, 2015 WL 8515412, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015) (citing *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000) ("[I]n a lawsuit brought to force compliance, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish standing by demonstrating that, if unchecked by the litigation, the defendant's allegedly wrongful behavior will likely occur or continue, and that the threatened injury is certainly impending.") (simplified)). At the "irreducible constitutional minimum," standing requires that a petitioner demonstrate the following: (1) an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the United States and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).

Further, an individual may seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if he is "in custody" under federal authority "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). But habeas relief is available to challenge only the legality or duration of confinement. *Pinson v. Carvajal*, 69 F.4th 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2023); *Crawford v. Bell*, 599 F.2d 890, 891 (9th Cir. 1979); *Dep't of Homeland Security v. Thraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 117 (2020) (The writ of habeas corpus historically "provide[s] a means of contesting the lawfulness of restraint and securing release."). The Ninth Circuit squarely explained how to decide whether a claim sounds in habeas jurisdiction: "[O]ur review of the history and purpose of habeas leads us to conclude the relevant question is whether, based on the allegations in the petition, release is *legally required* irrespective of the relief requested." *Pinson*, 69 F.4th at 1072 (emphasis in original); *see also Nettles v. Grounds*, 830 F.3d 922, 934 (9th Cir. 2016) (The key inquiry is whether success on the petitioner's claim would "necessarily lead to immediate or speedier release."); *Guselnikov v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-1971-BTM-KSC, 2025 WL 2300873, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2025) (finding petitioners' claims did not arise under § 2241 because they were not arguing they were unlawfully in custody and receiving the requested relief would not entitle them to release); *Giron Rodas v. Lyons*, No. 25cv1912-LL-AHG, 2025 WL 2300781, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025) ("Like in *Pinson*, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner's §

2241habeas petition since it cannot be fairly read as attacking 'the legality or duration of confinement.'") (quoting *Pinson*, 69 F.4th at 1065).

Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that "[h]abeas Corpus Rule 2(c) is more demanding [than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)]. It provides that the petition must 'specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner' and 'state the facts supporting each ground.'" *Mayle v. Felix*, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005) (citing Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court ("Federal Habeas Rules"); *see also James v. Borg*, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief."). As stated by the Advisory Committee's Note on Habeas Corpus Rule 4, 28 U.S.C., p. 471, "notice pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Petitioner's habeas petition fails to supply sufficient or coherent factual information for the Court to adjudicate his claims, or to establish that he is unlawfully detained. *See* ECF No. 1 at 4-5. As such, the Court should deny the petition. *See Alonso Velasquez v. LaRose*, No. 25-cv-3216-JES-AHG, 2025 WL 3473773 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2025) (dismissing without prejudice habeas petition that failed to allege sufficient factual information).

While the government believes this petition should be dismissed for failure to properly state a habeas claim, for purposes of judicial the government provides the following response. It is the government's position that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). However, the government acknowledges that Petitioner appears to be a member of the Bond Eligible Class certified in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, 813 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2025). The Ninth Circuit has stayed application of the Order beyond the Central District of California. However, Respondents acknowledge the prior orders from this District directing bond hearings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

in similar cases.[1] Respondents therefore do not oppose an order from this Court directing a bond hearing be held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).[2]

DATED: July 15, 2026

ADAM GORDON
United States Attorney

*s/ Danielle L. Brown*
DANIELLE L. BROWN
Special Assistant United States Attorney

[1] Petitioner also challenges his detention citing violations of Due Process. Should the Court grant the petition, it should decline to address these additional arguments. *INS v. Bagamasbad*, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) ("As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.").

[2] To the extent the Court issues an order directing a bond hearing under 1226(a), considering heavy caseloads and staffing levels, Respondents respectfully request that such order provide the government 14 days from issuance to hold such bond hearing. The Ninth Circuit has confirmed that at a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the burden is on the detainee to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not a flight risk or danger to the community. *See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022); *see also Dos Santos v. Becerra*, No. 26-cv-01423-GPC-VET, 2026 WL 800201 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2026).