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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUIS ARMANDO VALLADOLID VALADEZ ([redacted],

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN, IMPERIAL REGIONAL DETENTION FACILITY; FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, SAN DIEGO FIELD OFFICE, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; DAVID VENTURELLA, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General of the United States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; and EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,

Respondents.

Case No. '26CV3874 CAB BJW

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241

Immigration Detention — Bond Hearing

DETAINED

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner LUIS ARMANDO VALLADOLID VALADEZ brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge his unlawful detention without any

opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility in Calexico, California, within this judicial district. On June 29, 2026, Immigration Judge Anne Kristina Perry of the Imperial Immigration Court denied Petitioner's request for a custody redetermination solely on the ground that the court "presently lacks jurisdiction, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)." Petitioner does not challenge his removal proceedings; he challenges only the lawfulness of his categorical, no-bond detention.

2. This case concerns an unprecedented expansion of immigration detention authority through agency policy—one that strips residents of the United States of their liberty without any hearing and without any individualized justification.

3. In July 2025, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") issued a nationwide directive instructing immigration officers to treat noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection—notwithstanding years of residence in this country—as "applicants for admission" subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Shortly thereafter, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") issued a precedential decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), adopting and formalizing this policy nationwide and holding that immigration judges lack jurisdiction to conduct bond hearings for noncitizens who entered without inspection, even when those individuals have lived in the United States for years and were arrested in the interior. As a result, immigration judges—including the immigration judge in Petitioner's case—are systematically denying bond hearings on jurisdictional grounds.

4. This policy marks a sharp departure from nearly thirty years of settled law and practice following enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, under which individuals arrested inside the United States were detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which expressly provides for discretionary release on bond and meaningful custody review. The government's new interpretation discards that framework and instead applies 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)—a provision historically limited to individuals at or near the border seeking entry—to persons who long since entered and established their lives within the United States.

5. The statutory scheme does not permit this result. As the Supreme Court has explained, § 1225 governs inspection and detention at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, while § 1226 governs the arrest and detention of noncitizens already present inside the United States. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287–88 (2018). The Ninth Circuit has likewise held that § 1226 provides the general detention authority for individuals present inside the country. *Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). By treating individuals apprehended in the interior as if they are perpetually "seeking admission," the government collapses this statutory distinction and renders § 1226 largely meaningless, in violation of basic principles of statutory interpretation. *See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).

6. Judges of this District have repeatedly rejected the government's position. *See Esquivel-Ipina v. LaRose*, 812 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 2025 WL 2998361 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (Sammartino, J.) (ordering individualized bond hearing under § 1226(a) within fourteen days for noncitizen arrested in the interior after years of residence); *Esquivel Pacheco v. LaRose*, 818 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2026) (Ohta, J.) (ordering release, with any future bond hearing to place the

burden on the government by clear and convincing evidence); *Garcia v. Noem*, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1078 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (bond hearing is the appropriate remedy where petitioner was wrongfully subjected to § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention); *see also Pineda v. Warden of Imperial Regional Detention Facility*, No. 3:26-cv-01801-GPC-AHG, ECF No. 5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2026) (granting § 2241 petition of a noncitizen detained at this same facility, where Respondents did not oppose a bond hearing and thereby "effectively concede[d]" that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), governed; ordering a § 1226(a) hearing within seven days and barring transfer from this district; Respondents thereafter noticed compliance, see Docket, ECF No. 7 (Apr. 10, 2026)). Courts of appeals to reach the merits have overwhelmingly agreed. *See Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Federal Detention Center Miami*, 175 F.4th 1258 (11th Cir. 2026) (holding § 1226, not § 1225(b)(2), governs detention of unadmitted noncitizens present in the interior); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026) (same, and holding due process independently requires a bond hearing); *Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden*, 175 F.4th 61 (2d Cir. 2026) (same); *Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security*, 175 F.4th 828 (7th Cir. 2026) (agreeing that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not reach interior arrests). Hundreds of district courts nationwide, including in this Circuit, have reached the same conclusion. In candor to the Court, Petitioner notes that two circuits have accepted the government's interpretation, *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), and *Avila v. Bondi*, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026); neither is binding here, and both conflict with *Jennings* and *Rodriguez Diaz*.

7. The policy is also unconstitutional. For more than a century, the Supreme Court has recognized that noncitizens who have entered the United States—even unlawfully—are entitled to due process protections. *Yamataya v. Fisher*, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). Once

inside the country, "the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). Immigration detention, although civil, must be justified by individualized determinations and accompanied by meaningful procedural safeguards. *See Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 527 (2003). The Ninth Circuit has made clear that due process requires a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, with an opportunity to present evidence and challenge detention. *Singh v. Holder*, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203–05 (9th Cir. 2011); *see also Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[T]he government's discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due process.").

8. The government's policy eliminates these protections entirely. Petitioner has been detained categorically, without any bond hearing, without any finding of flight risk or danger, and without any opportunity to obtain release. The risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty under such a system is extreme and fails the balancing test set forth in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

9. Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico, born in 2003 in Ixtlán, Michoacán. He is married to a United States citizen, Yahaira Ruby Avila Bernal, and he and his wife have one United States citizen child, born in Phoenix, Arizona, in 2023. According to DHS's own charging document, Petitioner arrived in the United States at or near Calexico, California, on or about April 11, 2020—more than six years ago—and was not apprehended upon arrival. (**Exhibit A**, Notice to Appear, Form I-862, dated June 22, 2026, Allegation 3.) On or about June 20, 2026, Border Patrol agents stopped and arrested Petitioner in Indio, California—in the interior

of the United States, more than seventy miles north of the international boundary. He was not encountered at a port of entry, during inspection at the border, or while crossing the boundary. (**Exhibit C** at 44 (Bond Worksheet).) Petitioner has resided in the United States continuously since his April 2020 entry. Petitioner has no criminal history. His release plan is concrete: Petitioner will reside with his United States citizen wife and United States citizen child at the family home in Avondale, Arizona. His wife has executed a Form I-134 Declaration of Financial Support, and his sister-in-law, a United States citizen employed full time with annual income exceeding $62,000, has executed a supplemental Form I-134 as financial co-sponsor; together they commit to provide Petitioner with housing, food, and transportation and to ensure his attendance at all immigration proceedings. (**Exhibit C**.)

10. On June 22, 2026, DHS served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear placing him in removal proceedings under INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. The NTA charges Petitioner with inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) (present without admission or parole) and INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (no valid entry document). (**Exhibit A**.) The "arriving alien" box on the NTA is not checked; DHS instead checked the box designating Petitioner as "an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled." (*Id.*) Petitioner is not charged under, and is not detained pursuant to, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231. His master calendar hearing before the Imperial Immigration Court is set for July 8, 2026.

11. Petitioner timely requested a custody redetermination. On June 29, 2026, following a hearing, Immigration Judge Anne Kristina Perry denied the request on the sole ground that the "Court presently lacks jurisdiction, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado*, 29 I & N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)." (**Exhibit B**, Order of the Immigration Judge, June 29, 2026.) The Immigration Judge

made no finding that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community. Petitioner reserved appeal; DHS waived appeal. (*Id.*)

12. Petitioner remains detained at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility, 1572 Gateway Road, Calexico, California 92231, in Imperial County, within the Southern District of California.

THE MALDONADO BAUTISTA LITIGATION

13. On November 20, 2025, the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted partial summary judgment holding that noncitizens who entered without inspection and were not apprehended upon arrival are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)—not § 1225(b)(2)(A)—and are entitled to consideration for release on bond. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3289861 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025). On November 25, 2025, the court certified a nationwide "Bond Eligible Class" and extended the declaratory judgment to the class. 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). The court entered final judgment on December 18, 2025, 813 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2025), and on February 18, 2026, granted a motion to enforce and vacated *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* under the Administrative Procedure Act. 820 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (C.D. Cal. 2026).

14. Petitioner is a member of the certified Bond Eligible Class: he (a) is a noncitizen in the United States without lawful status; (b) entered the United States without inspection and was not apprehended upon arrival; and (c) is not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231.

15. In candor to the Court, Petitioner acknowledges that the Ninth Circuit has stayed the *Maldonado Bautista* judgment and vacatur order insofar as they extend beyond the Central

District of California, pending the government's appeal. *Maldonado Bautista v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security*, Nos. 25-7958, 26-1044 (9th Cir. Mar. 31, 2026) (stay pending appeal, following Mar. 6, 2026 administrative stay). In granting the stay, the Ninth Circuit expressly observed that any harm to detainees "is lessened by the fact that they can seek habeas relief in their districts of confinement"—precisely the relief sought here. The Ninth Circuit has not decided the merits; the statutory question is also under submission in *Rodriguez-Vasquez v. Bostock*, No. 25-6842 (9th Cir. argued Mar. 4, 2026). Petitioner therefore does not rest on the classwide judgment alone. This petition presents independent statutory and constitutional claims that this Court may—and courts in this District routinely do—resolve on their own merits. *See Esquivel-Ipina*, 812 F. Supp. 3d 1073; *Esquivel Pacheco*, 818 F. Supp. 3d 1168. Petitioner pleads his class membership to preserve all rights in the event the stay is lifted or the judgment is affirmed.

EXHAUSTION IS NOT REQUIRED AND WOULD BE FUTILE

16. There is no statutory requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies where a noncitizen challenges the lawfulness of his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In the Ninth Circuit, exhaustion is prudential, not jurisdictional, and may be waived. *Laing v. Ashcroft*, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004); *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017); *Castro-Cortez v. INS*, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001); *see also Al-Sadeai v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement*, 540 F. Supp. 3d 983 (S.D. Cal. 2021). Prudential exhaustion is waived where administrative remedies are inadequate or ineffective, pursuit would be futile, or irreparable injury will result. *Hernandez*, 872 F.3d at 988 (quoting *Laing*, 370 F.3d at 1000).

17. Exhaustion would be futile here because the agency has predetermined the dispositive issue. The BIA's precedential decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* binds all immigration judges, and on January 13, 2026, the Chief Immigration Judge issued nationwide guidance instructing all immigration judges to continue applying *Yajure Hurtado* as binding precedent notwithstanding contrary federal court rulings, and on June 2, 2026, the Board reaffirmed and extended its position in *Matter of N-A-G-C-*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 662 (BIA 2026). Exhaustion is excused where the agency's position on the dispositive question is already set. *Sun v. Ashcroft*, 370 F.3d 932, 941 (9th Cir. 2004); *Laing*, 370 F.3d at 1000–01. Every court in this District to address the question has waived exhaustion as futile. *Esquivel-Ipina*, 812 F. Supp. 3d 1073 (exhaustion futile because the Board is obligated to apply *Yajure Hurtado*).

18. Nor is a request for humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) an adequate substitute for a hearing: as a factual matter, parole review is conducted informally by DHS officers—the jailing authority—without a hearing, without a record, and without administrative appeal. *See Rodriguez v. Robbins*, 804 F.3d 1060, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing parole's deficiencies), *rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018); *Nadarajah v. Gonzales*, 443 F.3d 1069, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006).

19. In any event, Petitioner requested a bond hearing and was denied for lack of jurisdiction. He has exhausted every remedy realistically available to him.

JURISDICTION

20. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility, 1572 Gateway Road, Calexico, California 92231, in Imperial County, California. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) and (c)(3) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause). This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

21. Because Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his detention—not any final order of removal—no provision of the INA strips this Court of jurisdiction. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 292–94 (§ 1252(b)(9) does not bar habeas review of detention claims); *Singh*, 638 F.3d at 1200.

VENUE

22. Venue lies in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the judicial district in which Petitioner is detained and in which his immediate custodian is located. *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493–500 (1973); *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004). Venue is also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are officers, employees, and agencies of the United States and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in this district.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

23. The Court should act on this petition "forthwith." 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Habeas corpus is "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement." *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963), *overruled in part on other grounds by Coleman v. Thompson*, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). "The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application." *Yong v. INS*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Courts in this District have issued orders to show cause within days of filing and ordered bond hearings within seven to fourteen days of judgment in materially identical cases. *See Esquivel-Ipina*, 812 F. Supp. 3d 1073; *Pineda*, ECF No. 5 at 3 n.2 (ordering a hearing in seven days over the government's request for fourteen, because "the seriousness and urgency of this violation demands prompt resolution").

PARTIES

24. Petitioner LUIS ARMANDO VALLADOLID VALADEZ is a citizen of Mexico who has resided in the United States since on or about April 11, 2020, and has been in immigration detention since on or about June 20, 2026.

25. Respondent Warden, Imperial Regional Detention Facility, is the warden of the facility where Petitioner is detained, 1572 Gateway Road, Calexico, CA 92231, operated under contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The Warden has immediate physical custody of Petitioner and is Petitioner's immediate custodian. *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 434–35 (2004). The Warden is sued in his or her official capacity.

26. Respondent Field Office Director, San Diego Field Office, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations, is responsible for the administration of immigration detention within this district, including Petitioner's detention at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility, and is sued in his or her official capacity.

27. Respondent Markwayne Mullin is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. He is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. He has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in his official capacity.

28. Respondent David Venturella is the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and is sued in his official capacity.

29. Respondent Todd Blanche is the Acting Attorney General of the United States. He is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. He is sued in his official capacity.

30. Respondent U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention of noncitizens.

31. Respondent Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is the federal agency responsible for adjudicating removal proceedings and custody redeterminations, including through the Imperial Immigration Court.

CLAIM ONE

Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act — Detention Governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Not § 1225(b)(2)(A)

32. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

33. Petitioner is a noncitizen present in the United States who entered without inspection more than six years ago and was arrested in the interior, in Indio, California, more than seventy miles from the international boundary. Under the plain text and structure of the INA, his detention pending removal proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes release on bond or conditional parole and entitles him to a custody redetermination hearing before an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d).

34. By detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and denying him a bond hearing under § 1226(a), Respondents violate Petitioner's statutory rights under the INA. It "simply defies common usage" to say that a noncitizen arrested inside the United States, years after entry, is trying to acquire "lawful entry" into it. *Jacobo-Ramirez v. Mullin*, No. 2:25-cv-02136-RFB-MDC, 2026 WL 879799, at *16 (D. Nev. Mar. 30, 2026); *accord Hernandez Alvarez*, 175 F.4th 1258; *Lopez-Campos*, 175 F.4th 713; *Barbosa da Cunha*, 175 F.4th 61; *Castañon-Nava*, 175 F.4th 828; *Esquivel-Ipina*, 812 F. Supp. 3d 1073; *Esquivel Pacheco*, 818 F. Supp. 3d 1168.

35. As a member of the Bond Eligible Class certified in *Maldonado Bautista*, Petitioner is additionally entitled to the benefit of that court's declaratory judgment, which has the "force and effect of a final judgment." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Petitioner pleads this basis in the alternative and to preserve it pending the Ninth Circuit's resolution of the stayed appeal.

CLAIM TWO

Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment

36. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

37. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. This protection extends to all persons within the United States, including noncitizens regardless of immigration status. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 693; *Yamataya*, 189 U.S. at 100–01. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690. Once a noncitizen has entered the United States, "the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States." *Id.* at 693; *see also Landon v. Plasencia*, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982); *Trump v. J.G.G.*, 604 U.S. 670 (2025) (per curiam).

38. Civil immigration detention must bear a reasonable relation to its legitimate purposes—ensuring appearance and protecting the community—and must be accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards and individualized findings. *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 527; *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690–91; *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1997). The Ninth Circuit requires meaningful procedural protections in immigration detention, including access to a bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator. *Singh*, 638 F.3d at 1203–05 (government must prove flight risk or danger by clear and convincing evidence; constitutional holding undisturbed by *Jennings*, which left the constitutional question open); *Rodriguez Diaz*, 53

F.4th at 1196–97; *Hernandez*, 872 F.3d at 981; *accord Esquivel Pacheco*, 818 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (placing clear-and-convincing burden on the government).

39. Petitioner has been detained categorically, with no bond hearing, no individualized finding of flight risk or dangerousness, and no meaningful process to challenge his confinement. Under *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), Petitioner's fundamental liberty interest, *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992), the extreme risk of erroneous deprivation inherent in a no-hearing regime, and the availability of less restrictive means (an individualized bond determination) compel the conclusion that Respondents' detention of Petitioner without a hearing violates due process.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully prays that this Court:

a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;

b. Issue an order to show cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 requiring Respondents to show cause why the writ should not be granted, returnable within three days;

c. Issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to release Petitioner;

d. Alternatively, issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to release Petitioner unless they provide him an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) before an immigration judge within seven days, at which the government bears the burden of justifying continued detention;

e. Declare that Petitioner's detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);

f. Pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, enjoin Respondents from transferring Petitioner outside the Southern District of California during the pendency of this action and pending any ordered bond hearing, see Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Pineda, ECF No. 5 (ordering that Respondents "SHALL NOT transfer Petitioner from this district pending her bond hearing");

g. Award Petitioner reasonable attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and

h. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

DATED: July 6, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

Ivan Alexandrovich

Ivan Alexandrovich, Esq.

VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I am submitting this verification on behalf of LUIS ARMANDO VALLADOLID VALADEZ because I am his attorney. I have discussed with Petitioner (and/or his family and prior counsel) the events described in this Petition. Based on those discussions and my review of the record, I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the attached Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on July 6, 2026, at Tempe, Arizona.

Ivan Alexandrovich

Ivan Alexandrovich, Esq.

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit A – Notice to Appear, Form I-862 (June 22, 2026), with continuation page

Exhibit B – Order of the Immigration Judge Denying Custody Redetermination for Lack of Jurisdiction (June 29, 2026)

Exhibit C – Respondent's Submission of Documents in Bond Proceedings, Imperial Immigration Court (filed June 26, 2026) (equities evidence including Petitioner's birth certificate with certified translation; his U.S. citizen child's and U.S. citizen spouse's birth certificates; marriage certificate; Form I-134 Declarations of Financial Support executed by Petitioner's U.S. citizen spouse and U.S. citizen co-sponsor, with supporting proof of identity, income, and residence; letters of support; and Respondent's Bond Worksheet)(filed with personal identifiers redacted per Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2)

Exhibit D – Pineda v. Warden of Imperial Regional Detention Facility, No. 3:26-cv-01801-GPC-AHG (S.D. Cal.): Order Granting Petition (ECF No. 5, Mar. 27, 2026); Clerk's Judgment (ECF No. 6, Mar. 30, 2026); and case docket sheet reflecting Respondents' Notice of Compliance (ECF No. 7, entered Apr. 10, 2026)