

Jane M. Imholte
Assistant Federal Defenders
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
188 W. Northern Lights Blvd., Suite 700
Anchorage, Alaska 99503
Phone: (907) 646-3400
Fax: (907) 646-3480
Email: jane_imholte@fd.org

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

EBDANASSR ALEBW,

Petitioner,

vs.

ARNALDO HERNANDEZ,
SUPERINTENDENT, ANCHORAGE
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY;

LAURA HERMOSSILO, FIELD OFFICE
DIRECTOR, SEATTLE FIELD OFFICE,
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT;

TODD LYONS, ACTING DIRECTOR,
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT;

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, SECRETARY
OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY;

TODD BLANCHE, ACTING UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondents.

Case No. **3:26-cv-00228-SLG**

**AMENDED NOTICE OF MOTION;
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

To: U.S. Attorney Michael Heyman

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Petitioner Ebdalnassr Alebw, by and through counsel, hereby files the instant Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, along with the

supporting documents and exhibits. Petitioner is currently detained at the Anchorage Correctional Complex and requests that the Court consider this motion on an emergency basis for the reasons below.

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner moves this Court for an order enjoining Respondents Department of Homeland Security (DHS), United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Todd Blanche in his official capacity as the U.S. Attorney General, and the Warden of the Anchorage Correctional Center where Petitioner is incarcerated, **to release Petitioner from custody or, in the alternative, refrain from transferring Petitioner to a facility outside of Alaska until he is afforded a constitutionally adequate opportunity to challenge the third-country removal order, and a constitutionally adequate opportunity to plead his claim for reasonable fear of removal.**

The reasons in support of this Motion are set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities. This Motion is based on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, as well as the attached Exhibits.

As set forth in the Points and Authorities in support of this Motion, this case warrants a temporary restraining order due to Mr. Abelw's weighty liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in remedying his unlawful re-incarceration, which was imposed based on an unlawful removal order that violates immigration laws and due process. The only mechanism to ensure that he is not removed

from this District in violation of his due process rights is a temporary restraining order from this Court. WHEREFORE, Mr. Abelw's prays that this Court grant his request for a temporary restraining order **to release him from custody or, in the alternative, to enjoin ICE/DHS from transferring him to a location outside of Alaska until Petitioner is afforded a constitutionally adequate opportunity to plead his claim for reasonable fear of removal to a third country.**

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Mr. Alebw was arrested on June 5, 2026, by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials in Anchorage. He is currently being held in custody as an immigration detainee at the Anchorage Correctional Complex and is expected to be removed to the Central African Republic on June 11, 2026.

Mr. Alebw recently relocated to Alaska after being released from detention in Louisiana. While Mr. Alebw is subject to a prior order of removal, **he was granted withholding of removal by an immigration judge on June 27, 2025.**

Although petitioner has given notice that he has a reasonable fear of removal to a third country—the Central African Republic—he has not yet been referred to an asylum officer for an interview to determine whether he has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture under INA § 241(b)(3) and the Convention Against Torture, as is required by the Department of Homeland Security’s own Guidance Regarding Third Country Removals (Docket 11-1) . Not only is Mr. Alebw entitled to an interview regarding his fear, DHS is required to reopen Mr. Alebw’s removal proceedings so that Mr. Alebw may have a hearing regarding his fear of persecution or torture in the Central African Republic. *Douangdala v. Bondi*, 2026 U.S. Dist. Lexis 91149, *7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 2026).

Finally, the notice of revocation that Mr. Alebw was served after his arrest by ICE is defective and violates Mr. Alebw's due process rights. *M.P.P.P. v. Santacruz*, 2026 U.S. Dist. Lexis 124346 (C.D. Cal. 2026).

PETITIONER WARRANTS A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

A temporary restraining order should be issued if “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or irreversible damage will result” to the applicant in the absence of an order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to prevent irreparable harm before a preliminary injunction hearing is held. *See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. Of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda City*, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974).

The standard for issuing a TRO is the same as the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. *See Stuhlberg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co.*, 240 F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the analysis for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions is “substantially identical”). **When seeking a TRO or PI, plaintiffs must establish: (1) they are “likely to succeed on the merits” of their claims, (2) they are “likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction,” (3) “the balance of equities tips in [their] favor” and (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).**

The Court may weigh the request for a preliminary injunction with a sliding-scale approach. *Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). Even if Petitioner does not show a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court may still grant a temporary restraining order if he raises “serious questions” as to the merits of his

claims, the balance of hardships tips “sharply” in his favor, and the remaining equitable factors are satisfied. *Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011). As set forth in more detail below, Petitioner satisfies both standards.

ARGUMENT

A. Applying the *Winter* factors, Petitioner Can Establish Grounds for a Temporary Restraining Order

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits.

Petitioner is likely to succeed on his claim that removal to a third country under ICE's current policy, without meaningful notice and reopening of his removal proceedings for a hearing, would violate due process. Although the REALID Act stripped district courts of the power to exercise judicial review of final orders of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, *see* 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(5), this Court has the power to determine whether Petitioner's ongoing detention and confinement pursuant to that underlying final order of removal comports with due process.

Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976). To state a claim for a violation of procedural due process rights, a petitioner must establish (1) a protected property or liberty interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections. *ASSE Int'l, Inc. v. Kerry*, 803 F.3d 1059, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court must also consider “the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” *Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53 F.4th 1189, 1207 (9th Cir. 2022) *quoting Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 335.

In this case, Petitioner's liberty interest is substantial. Petitioner's interest in not being detained is "the most elemental of liberty interests" *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)). As the Ninth Circuit noted in *S. v. Holder*, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), "The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that civil commitment for *any* purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty." *Id.*, 638 F.3d at 1204 *quoting Addington v. Texas*, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979).

The second factor, risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty, also weighs in Petitioner's favor. *See, e.g., Ledesma Gonzalez*, 2025 WL 2841574, at *8; *Barrenechea v. Albarran*, No. CV25-7883-VC, 2025 WL 2717279, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2025); *Manzanarez*, 2025 WL 3247258, at *4 *quoting A.E. v. Andrews*, No. 25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025). Petitioner was lawfully released from detention in another district, having had the merits of a *Habeas* petition fully litigated there. ICE has lawlessly re-detained Mr. Abelw in direct violation of that order and has failed to comply with their own required procedure to provide Mr. Abelw the opportunity to have a hearing regarding his fear of return to the Central African Republic. Numerous courts in the Ninth Circuit have also held that if a noncitizen claims fear of removal to a third country, the government must allow them to pursue withholding of removal through reopened removal proceedings before an immigration judge. However, referring the noncitizen for a credible fear interview, as the DHS memo requires, is not enough; **the government must affirmatively reopen proceedings with the immigration court to provide the noncitizen a meaningful opportunity to be heard on his claims.**

Douangdala v. Bondi, 2026 U.S. Dist. Lexis 91149, *7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 2026). DHS itself in its memorandum of March 30, 2025, indicates that a noncitizen who, like Mr. Abelw, affirmatively states a fear of being removed to a designated third country should be provided with a hearing. Docket 11-1. The risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is thus high.

The final factor, the government's interest in detaining an immigrant based on an unlawful detention is negligible. Moreover, it would be less of a fiscal and administrative burden for the Government to allow Petitioner to return home to await a determination on his reasonable fear application, and present his other claims for adjustment of status, than to continue to detain him in a detention facility. *Diaz v. Kaiser*, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) ("[T]he Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.")

2. Irreparable Harm.

The Ninth Circuit has recognized “the irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration detention.” *Rodriguez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1253 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citing *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017)) (“For example ... subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention facilities, the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result of detention, and the collateral harms to children of detainees whose parents are detained.”). “In the absence of an injunction, harms such as these will continue to occur needlessly on a daily basis.” *Hernandez*, 872 F.3d at 995. “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably

constitutes irreparable injury.’” *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012). “As other courts that have faced this issue have explained, the violation of petitioner’s statutory rights causes ‘immediate and irreparable injury.’” *Lepe v. Andrews*, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Here, Petitioner is being deprived of his physical freedom, and absent relief will continue to suffer irreparable harm by this restraint. Petitioner’s imminent transfer outside this district would also cause irreparable harm, given that it is likely he will end up being removed to a country he has never known. The Central African Republic is one of the most dangerous countries in the world.¹ Mr. Abelw has a due process right to reopen his removal proceedings based on his fear² of being persecuted or tortured in the Central African Republic.³ **If the court does not grant the requested TRO, Mr. Abelw will be removed to Central African Republic. He will never be able to litigate his due process claim. Worse, Mr. Abelw’s health and very life will be at extreme risk. Removing Mr. Abelw to the Central African Republic without due process to a country where he is likely to be persecuted and tortured would be a violation of the INA, international law, and the U.S. Constitution.** Finally, Mr. Abelw was wrongfully denied asylum because of the unlawful Circumvention of

¹ See State Department CAR Human Rights Report, 2024, Exhibit A, attached; and “US-Central African Republic Deportation Agreement Escalates Attack on Immigrants and Puts Lives at Risk,” Parrin and Arvey, Just Security, June 10, 2026, Exhibit B, attached.

² See Alien Informal Interview, Exhibit C, Attached.

³ Although Respondent argues that Mr. Alebw’s fear is not sufficiently particular, that issue is not for this Court to decide. The determination whether Mr. Alebw’s fear of being removed to the Central African Republic warrants protection and relief from removal is for the Immigration Judge or USCIS asylum officer to decide. This is why it is so critical for Mr. Alebw to receive a hearing and to have his case reopened as the law requires.

Lawful Pathways (CLP) rule, which a federal district court in California has vacated. *East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, et al., v. Trump, et al.*, No. 18-CV-06810-JST, 2026 WL 1256873 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2026). Mr. Abelw has filed a motion to reconsider his asylum case due to the vacatur of the CLP rule. Removing Mr. Abelw to the Central African Republic now would deprive him of the opportunity to have his asylum case reconsidered by an immigration judge in the United States.

Furthermore, Mr. Abelw has already suffered constitutional violations because the revocation of his release was defective. When DHS revokes a noncitizen's release, they must be notified of the reasons for the revocation. 8 CFR § 241.4(l)(1); *M.P.P.P. v. Santacruz*, 2026 U.S. Dist. Lexis 124346 (C.D. Cal. 2026). “[C]ourts in this district and across the country have held that such vague, boilerplate statements are insufficient notice.” *M.P.P.P. v. Santacruz*, 2026 U.S. Dist. Lexis 124346 (C.D. Cal. 2026) (citing *Gutnik v. Bondi*, 2026 U.S. Dist. Lexis 54588 (C.D. Cal. 2026); *Martinez v. Noem*, 2026 U.S. Dist. Lexis 42727 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2026). Like in *M.P.P.P.*, Mr. Abelw received an informal interview on the same day that he was arrested and served the Notice of Revocation. In these circumstances, courts have found that this “essentially bar[s] the noncitizen from being able to submit any evidence or information that may show that the revocation of their release is unlawful.” *P.P. v. Santacruz*, 2026 U.S. Dist. Lexis 124346 (C.D. Cal. 2026) (citing *Kiwana v. Larose*, 2026 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8504 (S.D. Cal. 2026); *Abdullah v. Noem*, 2026 U.S. Dist. Lexis 412333 (S.D. Cal. 2026).

Finally, Petitioner is not being provided with the medical care he requires for

diabetes and high blood pressure. Upon information and belief, he has not received medication necessary for treating these conditions since his detention on June 5. He faces immediate and irreparable medical complications as long as he is in DHS custody.

3. Balance of Equities.

The consideration of the balance of equities and the public interest in an injunction merge when the government is a party. *Yang v. Kaiser*, No. 2:25-CV-02205-DAD-AC (HC), 2025 WL 2791778, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025) (citing *Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell*, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009))).

“It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 247, 272 (1976)). Moreover, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has recognized ‘irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration detention’ including ‘the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result of detention.’ ” *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017); *Leiva-Perez v. Holder*, 640 F.3d 962, 969-970 (9th Cir. 2011) (the inability to pursue a petition for review may constitute irreparable harm).

4. An Injunction is in the Public Interest.

“It is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012). Furthermore, “[j]ust as the public has an interest in the orderly and efficient administration of this country’s

immigration laws, the public has a strong interest in upholding procedural protections against unlawful detention.” *Hoac*, 2025 WL 1993771, at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Respondents “cannot reasonably assert that [they are] harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” *Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S.*, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983); *see also Rodriguez v. Robbins*, 715 F. 3d 1127, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[The government] cannot suffer harm from an injunction that merely ends an unlawful practice[.]”).

B. Petitioner is Entitled to Relief Despite the Stay of the District Court’s Order in *D.V.D.*

Although the district court’s order in *D.V.D. v. DHS*, No. CV-25-10676-BEM, 2026 WL 521557 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2026) has been stayed, Mr. Alebw is nonetheless entitled to relief. First, the Supreme Court has not explained the reasoning for its stays in that case. *Phong Thanh Nguyen v. Scott*, 796 F. Supp. 3d 703, 732 (W.D. Wash. 2025). “[A]bsent ‘clear guidance from the Supreme Court’ that cases like *Andriasian*, *Himri*, and *Aden* are ‘no longer good law,’ this Court must follow ‘well-established precedent.’” *Id.* (citing *Launch Alaska v. Dep’t of the Navy*, 2025 U.S. Dist. Lexis 149894 (D. Alaska Aug. 5, 2025)). Mr. Alebw may still petition the court for injunctive relief and this Court may apply the Massachusetts District Court’s rationale in *D.V.D.* to Mr. Alebw as persuasive authority.⁴ As the district court held in *Phong Thanh Nguyen*, “*D.V.D.* does not preclude

⁴ If the decision in *D.V.D.* takes effect, it would be binding on Mr. Alebw’s claims as a class member. Furthermore, numerous courts around the country have granted habeas cases for

the Court from granting a preliminary injunction here.” 796 F. Supp. 3d 703, 732 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

1. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
2. Grant this Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, releasing Petitioner from ICE custody;
3. Declare that Petitioner’s arrest and detention violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;
4. Enjoin Respondents from transferring Petitioner outside this District or removing Petitioner pending these proceedings;
5. Order Respondents to refrain from rearresting or re-detaining Petitioner unless they provide 14 days’ advance notice of a pre-deprivation hearing authorized by a neutral adjudicator.

DATED this 10th day of June, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

petitioners like Mr. Alebw finding the third country removal policy unlawful and/or ordering due process protections prior to any third country removal. *See, e.g., Vu v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-01366-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3114341, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025); *Cruz-Medina v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-1768-ABA, -- F.Supp.3d --, 2025 WL 2841488, at *7 (D. Md. Oct. 7, 2025); *Kumar v. Wamsley*, No. C25-2055-KKE, 2025 WL 3204724, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 17, 2025); *Sagastizado Sanchez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-00104, -- F.Supp.3d --, 2025 WL 2957002, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025); *Esmail v. Noem*, No. 2:25cv-08325-WLH-RAO, 2025 WL 3030589, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025); *Nguyen v. Scott*, No. 2:25-cv-01398, 796 F.Supp.3d 703, 727-35 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025); *Azzo v. Noem*, 2025 WL 3535208 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025); *Barka v. Mattos*, 2025 WL 3723998 (D. Nev. Dec. 23, 2025); *Portela-Hernandez v. Trump*, 2026 WL 74042 (D. Md. Jan. 9, 2026); *L.R. v. Noem*, 2026 WL 161605 (D. Nev. Jan. 21, 2026).

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FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

/s/ Jane M. Imholte

Assistant Federal Defender
Federal Public Defender
188 W. Northern Lights Blvd., Suite 700
Anchorage, AK 99503
Phone: (907) 646-3400
Fax: (907) 646-3480
Email: jane_imholte@fd.org

Certificate of Service:

I hereby certify that on June 10, 2026, the foregoing and any attachments was filed with the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the District of Alaska at newcvcases@akd.uscourts.gov.

A courtesy copy of the foregoing was provided to the following by email on March 12, 20226:

Acting United States Attorney Michael Heyman at michael_heyman@usdoj.gov

Assistant United States Attorney Jacki Traini at jackie.traini@usdoj.gov

Assistant United States Attorney Christopher Schroeder at christopher.schroeder@usdoj.gov .

/s/ Jane M. Imholte

Central African Republic 2024 Human Rights Report

Executive Summary

There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in the Central African Republic during the year. The government again postponed local elections, from October to 2025.

Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflict by armed groups, the armed forces, and Kremlin-backed Wagner Group forces; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom; restrictions on religious freedom; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; and existence of the worst forms of child labor.

The government took limited steps to identify and punish officials who committed human rights abuses.

Armed groups reportedly continued to perpetrate serious abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law. They reportedly committed unlawful killings, physical abuses, abductions, sexual assaults,

looting, and destruction of property. The government investigated and prosecuted some of these actions, in coordination with the Special Criminal Court. The transnational criminal organization the Wagner Group secured blanket immunity from the government as part of its security agreement.

Section 1. Life

a. Extrajudicial Killings

There were several reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings during the year.

On May 3, local newspapers reported the Wagner Group kidnapped 10 soldiers from the predominantly Muslim PK5 neighborhood in Bangui, the capital's largest Muslim-majority district. Neighborhood residents and former members of local militias had joined the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) after disarming themselves. Wagner mercenaries, accompanied by FACA soldiers, stopped them at their homes and took them to an unknown location. Two days later, the bodies of six of the soldiers, including Staff Sergeant Sanda and Chief Warrant Officer Moussa Zakaria, were brought back to PK5 and found riddled with bullets. The fate of the other four soldiers remained unknown. As a result of the killings, PK5 residents protested.

In October, local media reported the transnational criminal organization

Wagner Group secured blanket immunity from the government.

b. Coercion in Population Control

There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.

c. War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, and Evidence of Acts that May Constitute Genocide, or Conflict-Related Abuses

There were numerous reports of serious human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations countrywide committed by the FACA, Wagner Group elements, and armed groups. Reports of abuses included unlawful killings, torture, disappearances, rape, forced marriage, sexual exploitation and abuse, looting, destruction of property, unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers by armed forces and armed groups, and disruption of humanitarian access.

During the year, the court in Bambari and the SCC took actions to bring those who had committed abuses to justice. On December 13, in the “Ndele I Trial,” the SCC sentenced four individuals for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in April 2020, namely Kalite Azor (20 years in prison), Antar Hamat (15 years), Charfadine Moussa (15 years), and Wodjonodroba Oumar Oscar (15 years).

In the “Ndele II Trial,” seven members of the armed group Popular Front for the Rebirth of the Central African Republic (FPRC) were charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the village of Ndele in March 2020 during fighting between two FPRC factions from different ethnic groups (the ROUNGAS and GOULAS), which involved innocent community members.

The United Nations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported incidents of conflict-related sexual violence. Between January-September, the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) documented 222 cases of conflict-related sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery, affecting 292 victims. MINUSCA noted such cases remained underreported.

Section 2. Liberty

a. Freedom of the Press

The constitution and law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, but the government did not always respect these rights.

The government and security forces suppressed and surveilled independent media and punished criticism of the government. Misinformation and

disinformation, including by Russia-linked actors, proliferated in media.

Physical Attacks, Imprisonment, and Pressure

Journalists reported being assaulted and threatened with violence during the year by authorities and Wagner forces due to their reporting, including on human rights abuses.

In August, Minister of Public Security Michel Nicaise Nassin assaulted and ordered the arrest of two journalists, Jefferson Cyrille Yapende and Jospin Bissi, while they were reporting for France 24. The journalists and their interviewee were released after being detained for an hour and a half. The Union of Central African Journalists and the Association of Central African Bloggers condemned the attack and encouraged the journalists to file a complaint. The government had not responded officially to the incident by year's end.

Censorship by Governments, Military, Intelligence, or Police Forces, Criminal Groups, or Armed Extremist or Rebel Groups

Local journalists reported domestic media outlets routinely engaged in self-censorship. Many independent media outlets reported on and criticized Wagner Group elements' human rights violations, but other topics, such as Wagner's economic interests in the country, were seen as off-limits. Some journalists shared sensitive information with international human rights-

focused NGOs to avoid repercussions for publishing sensitive stories in their own media outlets.

Armed groups limited the freedom of expression in areas they controlled.

Efforts to Preserve the Independence of the Media

On March 18, Minister of Communication and government spokesman Maxime Balalou initiated a weekly meeting gathering all members of the press to discuss developments from the previous week.

On August 2, President Faustin-Archange Touadéra met with media representatives. This meeting, called the “first edition of the press lunch,” allowed media professionals to engage in person with the president on “all subjects that affect the life of the nation,” according to Balalou. The widely reported meeting sought to reduce the spread of false information in the country.

During these press meetings, media representatives were free to ask any questions to government members and get responses from them.

b. Worker Rights

Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining

The law provided for the right of workers, except for senior-level state employees, security force members, and foreign workers in residence for

less than two years, to form or join independent unions without prior authorization. The law provided for the right of workers to organize and administer trade unions without employer interference and granted trade unions full legal status. The law required that union officials be full-time, wage-earning employees in their occupation and allowed them to conduct union business during working hours if the employer was informed 48 hours in advance and provided authorization. The labor code provided that unions could bargain collectively in the public and private sectors. The government, the country's largest employer, set wages after consultation, but not negotiation, with government employee trade unions.

Workers had the right to strike in both the public and private sectors, but the law prohibited security forces, including the armed forces and gendarmes, from striking. Strikes were limited to work-related matters. Requirements for conducting a legal strike were lengthy and cumbersome. For a strike to be legal, authorities required that the union first present its demands, the employer respond to these demands, labor and management attend a conciliation meeting, and an arbitration council find that the union and the employer failed to reach agreement on valid demands. The government required the union to provide eight days' advance written notification of a planned strike. The law stated that if employers initiated a lockout that was not in accordance with the labor code, the employer was required to pay workers for all days of the lockout. The Ministry of Labor had the authority to establish a list of enterprises that were required by law

to maintain a “compulsory minimum service” in the event of a strike. The government had the power of requisition or the authority to end strikes by invoking the public interest. The code made no other provisions regarding sanctions on employers for acting against strikers.

The law expressly outlawed antiunion discrimination. Employees could have their cases heard in labor court. The law did not state whether employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination were required to reinstate workers fired for union activities, although it required employers found guilty of such discrimination to pay damages, including back pay and lost wages.

The government generally enforced applicable laws and respected laws concerning freedom of association in the formal sector. Penalties were commensurate with other violations of civil rights, but enforcement was inconsistent. Workers exercised some of these rights, but only a relatively small part of the workforce, primarily civil servants, exercised the right to join a union. While worker organizations were officially independent of government or political parties, the government exerted some influence over the leadership of some organizations.

Labor unions did not report any underlying patterns of discrimination or abuse. The labor court did not hear any cases involving antiunion discrimination during the year.

Collective bargaining occurred in the private sector during the year,

although the total number of collective agreements concluded was unknown. The government was not generally involved if the two parties were able to reach an agreement. Information was unavailable on the effectiveness of collective bargaining in the private sector.

Forced or Compulsory Labor

See the Department of State's annual *Trafficking in Persons Report* at <https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/>.

Acceptable Work Conditions

Wage and Hour Laws

The law required the Ministry of Labor to set minimum wages in the public sector by decree. The minimum wages in the private sector were established based on sector-specific collective conventions resulting from negotiations between employers and workers' representatives in each sector.

The minimum wage in the private sector varied by sector and type of work. The minimum wage in all sectors was less than the World Bank standard for extreme poverty.

The law set a standard workweek of 40 hours for government employees and most private-sector employees. Household employees could work up to 52 hours per week. The law also required a minimum rest period of 48

hours per week for citizen, foreign, and migrant workers. Overtime policy varied according to the workplace. There was no legal prohibition on excessive or compulsory overtime. The labor code, however, stated employers had to provide for the health and security of employees who were engaged in overtime work.

Occupational Safety and Health

There were general laws on occupational safety and health (OSH) standards in the workplace, but the Ministry of Labor did not precisely define them. The labor code stated a labor inspector could compel an employer to correct unsafe or unhealthy work conditions.

The law provided that workers could remove themselves from dangerous working conditions without jeopardy to their employment. In such instances, the labor inspector notified the employer and required that conditions be addressed within four working days. The high unemployment and poverty rates deterred workers from exercising this right.

Diamond mines, which employed an estimated 400,000 persons, were subject to standards imposed by the mining code and inspection by the Miners' Brigade. Nevertheless, monitoring efforts were insufficient. Despite the law requiring those working in mines to be at least 18, observers frequently saw underage diggers during the year. Diggers often worked in open pits susceptible to collapse, working seven days a week during the dry

season. Diggers were employed by larger mine operators, worked in dangerous conditions at the bottom of open pits, and lacked safety equipment.

The use of toxic chemicals in gold mines endangered environmental and personal health. Observers and NGOs documented the widespread use of cyanide and mercury for gold extraction. The government did not regulate the use of harmful chemicals in semi-mechanized or artisanal mining operations, and NGOs reported the legal definition of semi-mechanized was stretched to include mining operations involving large foreign investors from the People's Republic of China, whose sites were sometimes guarded by government security forces. Wagner Group elements controlled diamond and gold mining sites. Observers reported Wagner Group elements blocked access for inspectors at all the mining sites under their control.

Officially, miners had the right to share in the proceeds of diamond sales. Miners often supplemented these earnings with either black-market diamond sales or wages from other sectors of the economy. NGOs reported the clandestine export of gems and gold undermined equitable profit sharing.

Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement

The government did not effectively enforce wage, overtime, and OSH standards, and violations were common in all sectors of the economy. The

Ministry of Labor had primary responsibility for managing labor standards, while enforcement fell under the Ministry of Interior and Public Safety and the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. The government did not have an adequate number of labor inspectors to enforce compliance with labor laws. Penalties were commensurate with those for similar crimes such as fraud or negligence but were seldom applied and insufficient to enforce compliance. The law applied to foreign and migrant workers as well, although foreign workers had to meet residency requirements to join a union. Employers commonly violated safety and health standards in agriculture and mining. Violations of overtime policy could be referred to the Ministry of Labor, although it was unknown whether this occurred during the year.

Most economic activity in the country, especially for young persons, was informal, conducted by micro-, small, and medium-sized enterprises representing 40 to 60 percent of GDP. The minimum wage applied only to the formal sector, leaving most of the labor force of the country without a minimum wage.

Most labor was performed outside the wage and social security system, especially by farmers in the large subsistence agricultural sector and laborers in the artisanal mining sector. Independent workers were excluded from labor code protections. While most labor protection laws applied to informal-sector employees, laws were not enforced, and violations of wage, hour, and OSH regulations were common. No official entities provided

social protections for workers in the informal sector.

c. Disappearance and Abduction

Disappearance

There were reports of enforced disappearances committed by or on behalf of government authorities. MINUSCA's Human Rights Division reported enforced disappearances perpetrated by the government's armed forces and nonstate armed groups throughout the year, including one incident in May in which the FACA, alongside Wagner and other armed actors, forcibly disappeared nine individuals.

Prolonged Detention without Charges

The constitution prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of persons to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government usually observed these requirements but did so inconsistently. Although the law provided detainees the right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention in court, many detainees were not able to exercise this right due to a lack of quality, affordable legal services and a poorly functioning justice system.

The law provided that persons under arrest be informed immediately of the allegations against them. Article 40 of the penal procedure code stipulated the period of police custody following arrest be limited to 72 hours,

renewable once. At the end of this period, the detainee had to be presented to the public prosecutor or immediately released. Beyond this time, police custody would be illegal. The new constitution adopted in 2023 provided for 48-hour police custody only. According to UN reports, police and the gendarmerie routinely violated the 48-hour custody limit, often on suspicion alone. Most authorities responsible for police custody continued to observe the 72-hour provisions of the criminal procedure code. Detainees had to be presented before a judge within 72 hours and could not be held longer than 144 hours without appearing before a judge. Provisional release was available for those awaiting trial but not consistently granted. Suspects were often detained incommunicado.

The law did not guarantee defendants in nonfelony cases access to state-funded attorneys. Many defendants could not afford counsel. Many prisoners were unaware of their rights, especially outside of Bangui. The practice of appointing lawyers was rare outside of the criminal sessions supported by external donors.

Security forces and armed groups detained individuals without legal basis. Many arrests and detentions occurred during operations by national security forces and Wagner Group elements, according to reports by the United Nations, local press, and NGOs. In some cases, arrests reportedly targeted ethnic and religious minorities on suspicion of alleged collusion with armed groups.

A MINUSCA report published in July documented 431 illegal or arbitrary arrests and detentions by state agents, affecting 1,521 victims (including 61 women, 10 girls, 87 boys and two groups of collective victims). MINUSCA also documented 41 cases in 2023 of illegal arrest and detention committed solely by the FACA affecting 98 victims (including women, girls and boys).

Slow investigation and processing of cases was the primary cause of lengthy pretrial detention. The judicial police force charged with investigating cases was poorly trained and understaffed, resulting in slow case-processing times. Lengthy pretrial detentions also occurred in part because of a lack of affordable legal representation. In many cases, the duration of pretrial detention exceeded the maximum sentence for the alleged crime.

A MINUSCA report released in June highlighted how detention facilities nationwide failed to comply with legal time limits for police custody in pretrial detention. At the end of 2023, nearly 2,000 detainees were awaiting trial, including some who had spent six years or more in prison without trial.

In May, FACA and Wagner forces arrested Joseph Martin Figueira, a Portuguese-Belgian humanitarian consultant for the NGO FHI 360, for “endangering state security and espionage” by allegedly communicating with armed group leaders during multiple humanitarian missions to the country. In July, the state public prosecutor charged Figueira with conspiracy, espionage, incitement to hate and to revolt against the government, complicity in undermining internal security of the state, and

complicity with criminal organizations.

In July, international and local media reported Figueira and three other prisoners – opposition member of parliament Dominique Yandocka and two Franco-Algerians, Osmani Samir Antonio and Bensalem Hacade – held at the Camp-de-Roux military prison in Bangui conducted hunger strikes in protest of unjust and illegal detention. Figueira ended his hunger strike in July and remained in detention at year's end.

d. Violations in Religious Freedom

See the Department of State's annual *International Religious Freedom Report* at <https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/>.

e. Trafficking in Persons

See the Department of State's annual *Trafficking in Persons Report* at <https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/>.

Section 3. Security of the Person

a. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The law prohibited such practices, but there were credible reports government officials employed them and impunity persisted. As of

September, there were no reports the government conducted any official investigations into accusations of torture.

MINUSCA's Human Rights Division reported state actors, such as the FACA, committed most recorded incidents of torture during security operations against armed groups. Nonstate armed groups were responsible for most cases of other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and punishment, such as maiming, dismembering, and widespread sexual violence, according to the same report.

In July, MINUSCA reported that in 2023 it documented 125 victims of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in detention, in some cases resulting in death. In May, a Muslim community leader reported the Wagner Group and the FACA, particularly the Rapid Intervention Battalion, illegally arrested and tortured dozens of persons, mostly from the Muslim community in the Bangui 3rd District, accusing them of planning to overthrow the government and other crimes.

On July 12, President Touadéra announced a new “judicial map” with the creation of four additional courts of appeal during the opening ceremony of the annual judicial general assembly. Following this assembly, the year's first criminal court session of Bangui started on July 22 with 62 registered cases. MINUSCA reported increased court sessions contributed to reducing the number of prisoners awaiting trial and decongesting the prison system, including through acquittals.

More than 20 percent of girls and women were subjected to female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), with variations according to ethnicity and region, according to the 2019 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey study and verified as up to date by UN agencies. In the central-north region, more than 60 percent of women and girls were subjected to FGM/C. The government, with support from the UN Population Fund, mobilized authorities, the Mixed Unit for Rapid Intervention and Repression of Sexual Violence to Women and Children (UMIRR) – an interministerial government agency consisting of the ministries of justice, interior, social affairs, and others – and the judiciary to conduct investigations and prosecutions.

b. Protection of Children

Child Labor

See the Department of Labor's *Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor* at <https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/>.

Child Soldiers

The Secretary of State determined the Central African Republic (CAR) had governmental armed forces, police, or other security forces, and government-supported armed groups – specifically the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group – that recruited or used child soldiers from April 2023 to March 2024. See the Department of State's annual *Trafficking in Persons*

Report at <https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/>.

Armed groups, including the Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique, also continued to recruit and use child soldiers. As part of efforts to improve reintegration of children released from armed groups, on September 30, the government and the United Nations signed a memorandum of understanding for the protection and transfer of children associated with armed forces and groups to civilian authorities.

Child Marriage

The law established 18 as the minimum age for civil marriage, but the government did not effectively enforce the law. Early marriage was more common in Muslim communities. There were reports of forced marriages of young girls to ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka members during the year. The government did not take steps to address forced marriage.

c. Protection to Refugees

The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.

Provision of First Asylum

The laws provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had a system for providing protection to refugees. Individuals who fled their countries of origin and had prior criminal records, however, were immediately repatriated.

Resettlement

According to the International Organization for Migration and the World Food Program, the trend was for increasing numbers of refugees and IDPs to secure durable living situations and return to normal lives. As of July, a total of 4,026,470 persons were affected by armed conflict, including 453,301 IDPs (11 percent of the displaced population), 2,256,970 former IDP returnees (56 percent), 531,919 returnees from abroad (13 percent), and 784,280 refugees (20 percent). In the country, returnees represented the bulk of the population affected.

Voluntary repatriation was governed by tripartite agreements (CAR-Cameroon-UNHCR, CAR-Democratic Republic of Congo-UNHCR, and CAR-Chad-UNHCR) and the CAR national durable solutions strategy in conjunction with the Yaoundé Declaration and the CAR Solutions Support Platform launched in October 2023. The CAR-Republic of Congo-UNHCR Tripartite Agreement had not been signed by year's end.

d. Acts of Antisemitism and Antisemitic Incitement

There was no significant Jewish community in the country, and there were no reports of antisemitic incidents.

US-Central African Republic Deportation Agreement Escalates Attack on Immigrants and Puts Lives at Risk

By [Anjli Parrin](#) and [Savi Arvey](#)

Published on June 10, 2026

The U.S. government's recently [reported agreement](#) with the Central African Republic (CAR) is the latest example of its dangerous and potentially life-threatening strategy: using secretive deals with countries to expel asylum seekers and migrants with no legal or personal connection to the places where they are being sent. CAR has experienced decades of [prolonged armed conflict and violence](#) and remains one of the poorest countries in the world. U.S. citizens are advised not to travel to CAR for any reason, and the State Department warns that doing so could result in them being killed.

While details of the agreement are opaque and have not been shared, an ICE Air deportation flight of third country nationals to CAR is reportedly scheduled for as early as this week. Among those expected to be deported, based on credible information received by the authors, are individuals from Iran, Afghanistan, and other countries who came to the United States to seek safety and who have already been granted protection by a U.S. immigration judge.

Such deportations would be unconscionable and represent a continued escalation of this broader U.S. government effort, which undermines due process, the rule of law, and human rights globally.

Third-Country Deportations

Since early last year, the U.S. government has signed a growing number of third-country forced transfer agreements with [over 30 countries worldwide](#) to expel and deport people to places where they have no legal or personal ties. This global approach, unprecedented in scope and scale, builds on policies that were first implemented during the first Trump administration to send asylum seekers from other countries to [Mexico](#) and [Central America](#).

The U.S. government has used a mix of threats of tariffs, visa restrictions, withholding funding for international organizations, and promises of funding to pressure countries to accept non-nationals. [Third Country Deportation Watch](#), led by Human Rights First (where one of us works) and Refugees International, has tracked that over \$44 million in U.S. taxpayer dollars has been directly sent to governments in relation to these agreements, [including](#) to the [brazenly corrupt](#) government of Equatorial Guinea.

These deportations are [often carried out in](#) secrecy and without any semblance of due process: individuals are often not given any advance warning or the opportunity to challenge their deportation to a third country—with many only discovering they are being sent to a country they may have never heard of while airborne. This practice creates the risk that they will be sent to persecution and torture and violates the [Immigration and Nationality Act \(INA\)](#), [the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act](#), Constitutional [due process protections](#), and international treaty obligations [codified in U.S. law](#) including the prohibition on [refoulement](#).

In April 2025, a federal court in Massachusetts preliminarily enjoined this practice in [D.V.D. v. the Department of Homeland Security](#), but the injunction was stayed by the Supreme Court while litigation continued. The same federal court then invalidated DHS's third-country removal policy in February 2026, holding that it is illegal to remove people to a third country without meaningful notice or opportunity to request protection. The First Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the district court's order at the government's request while it considers the government's appeal of that decision. In the meantime, the U.S. government has been continuing to carry out these secretive deportations, in many cases without notice or the opportunity to raise fear of persecution or torture. Deportations to the Central African Republic, given its life-threatening conditions on the ground and the risk that authorities there could return people with U.S. protections to their home countries, would be unlawful.

This concern is heightened by the past experiences of individuals who were granted protection by a U.S. immigration judge for fear of persecution or torture in their home countries and then deported to other third countries. Individuals with such protections sent under third-country agreements to countries such as [Equatorial Guinea](#) and [Cameroon](#) have faced arbitrary detention upon arrival and already been sent back to their countries of origin – and the very harms they fled.

History of Ongoing Violence and Armed Conflict in CAR

Prior to and since it obtained independence in 1960, CAR has grappled with repeated cycles of violence, armed conflict, and neglect. Between 1997 and 2020 alone, [13 peace agreements](#) were enacted involving various armed groups. In 2013, the country experienced one of the bloodiest periods of violence in its recent history. In just two days in December 2013, [approximately 1,000](#) people were killed. Significant war crimes and crimes against humanity [were alleged](#) to have been committed by all sides, and genocide warnings [were issued](#) by U.N. officials.

A peace agreement between [14 armed groups](#) was negotiated and signed in [2019](#), but has been unevenly implemented. Less than two years after the agreement, multiple signatories had [rescinded and resumed fighting](#) ahead of the 2020-21 election cycle. Following protracted negotiations in [2025](#), two of the main groups re-joined the 2019 peace process.

Yet despite this fragile peace agreement, the State does not have full control of the territory. Since the start of 2026, [at least 60 individuals](#) have been killed in [violent confrontations](#) between State forces, Russian paramilitary personnel, and various non-state groups. Foreign involvement, including Russian mercenaries affiliated with the [Wagner Group](#) and [the Kremlin](#), poses a particularly serious threat. A February 2026 Lansing Institute [report](#) found that Russia's involvement in CAR now constitutes "de facto management of specific territories and resource flows." Wagner Group members and Russian forces have been [accused of](#) extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and torture in CAR. Individuals granted protections by U.S. immigration judges deported to CAR may therefore face the risk of violence, serious injury, or being caught in the middle of conflict. For people fleeing persecution from countries who have close ties to Russia, such as Iranians, they may face heightened risks for their safety.

Lack of Access to Basic Resources

Additionally, CAR remains one of the poorest countries in the world, consistently ranking among the bottom 5 countries and territories globally. Approximately [70 percent](#) of the population has been living on less than \$3 per day. In 2025, the [GDP per capita](#) of CAR exceeded only four other countries – Burundi, South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Yemen.

A failure to invest in and improve basic facilities and resources, including healthcare, food, and fuel, means that accessing any services is extremely difficult. Life expectancy is amongst the lowest in the world at 52.3 years, according to [WHO data](#), well below the [average](#) for sub-Saharan Africa. U.S. cuts to global aid have only worsened these concerns, as U.S. foreign assistance [accounted for](#) approximately 50 percent of the humanitarian response in CAR in 2024.

The State Department's own guidelines acknowledge these challenges, [advising](#) U.S. citizens that "[m]edical services in the Central African Republic are extremely limited, with no "adequate medical treatment available for routine and emergency procedures" and even minor health issues requiring medical evacuation.

CAR has very few hospitals and medical centers, and most of these are located in the capital, Bangui, limiting accessibility and [creating disparities](#). According to the WHO, [roughly only half](#) of persons targeted to receive humanitarian assistance have been reached. Persistently [high rates](#) of tuberculosis, lower respiratory infections, malaria, and HIV/AIDS strain the already weak health system, along with a growing number of risks of potential disease outbreaks including, as of May 2026, Ebola. WHO declared the [risk of outbreak](#) is high at the regional level, and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) [listed](#) CAR as one of 10 countries facing the likelihood of exposure.

The arrival of third country nationals from the United States puts them at immediate danger of health concerns and would only exacerbate an already weak system that is struggling to grapple with the [existing needs](#) of displaced persons and refugees in the country. As of May 2026, funding for [only 17 percent](#) of the country's humanitarian needs for the year had been received.

Closing Civic Space and Democratic Backsliding

Beyond the risks above, in recent years under CAR President Faustin Archange Touadéra and his allies, there has been significant curtailment in civic space, free expression, and democratic norms. Opposition leaders and civil rights activists have been [arrested and jailed](#), critics have been subjected to surveillance, and state-affiliated militia groups engage in regular violence and [political intimidation](#). Civil society organizations that one of the co-authors works closely with express regular fear of speaking out about ongoing human rights violations. "Everyone is scared, you are all scared for your life and for your family," one leading human rights activist told one of us.

Limitations on democratic norms operate alongside a broader governance environment of entrenched corruption. CAR is ranked [150th of 180](#) countries on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, reflecting widespread perception of public sector corruption. Watchdog reports note [weak accountability systems](#), including the judiciary.

In 2023, CAR had a [highly controversial](#) Constitutional Referendum in which term limits were abolished and [presidential power consolidated](#). During the voting, Russian paramilitaries from the Wagner Group were openly involved in the vote, [providing security and logistical support](#) throughout the process. Touadéra also removed the former president of the [Constitutional Court](#), thereby allowing for the appointment of a pro-Touadéra Court president and effectively [barring those who opposed](#) the Referendum from holding rallies or protesting this power grab.

Further, there are heightened concerns for minorities and those not Central African. [Anti-foreigner and xenophobic](#) sentiments continue to run high in the country and historically have been [used as fuel](#) for much of the violence and conflict. This is particularly worrying for immigrants, including those who may be [perceived as Muslim](#), sent under these agreements.

Should the U.S. send third country nationals to CAR, monitoring their safety and wellbeing, as well as obtaining transparency about their treatment and conditions in the country, would be extremely challenging. This then further heightens the risks that they may face, and that these risks would go unnoticed and unchallenged.

Not Safe Enough for U.S. Citizens

Because of the ongoing security risk of “unrest, crime, kidnapping, health, terrorism,” and other concerns, the current State Department Travel Advisory for CAR [recommends](#) that U.S. citizens “do not travel to Central African Republic for any reason.” The country is listed as a Level 4 risk, the State Department’s most severe advisory level. For U.S. citizens who must travel to CAR, the State Department recommends drafting a will, leaving DNA samples with a medical provider, and establishing a proof of life protocol with loved ones in case of a hostage situation. CAR’s designation was updated [as recently as](#) January 2026, not to lower the country’s advisory level, but rather to add a health risk warning due to CAR’s current lack of reliable medical services.

By signing a third-country agreement with the Central African Republic – a country with persistent insecurity, a history of armed conflict, and lack of access to basic medical and other essential services – the U.S. government aims to deport people with no legal or personal ties to life-threatening conditions in one of the most fragile countries in the world. These unconscionable and unlawful third country deportations to CAR and other countries must be stopped.

Members of Congress have taken [steps to demand oversight](#) on the egregious [use of U.S. taxpayer funding](#) allocated to governments agreeing to accept third country nationals. They should not look away. Congress should demand further transparency and require the U.S. government to publicly release these agreements, including with the Central African Republic.

FEATURED IMAGE: Senegalese peacekeepers of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) patrol near Carnot on May 28, 2026. (Photo by Pacome PABANDJI / AFP via Getty Images)

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

ALIEN INFORMAL INTERVIEW
UPON REVOCATION OF ORDER OF SUPERVISION UNDER
8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(l)

STATEMENT OF: ALEBW, Ebdalnasser
(Detainee)

A-File #: [REDACTED]

Detention Location: Anchorage ICE Office

INTERVIEWING ICE OFFICER: Holmes, R.; Deportation Officer, Anchorage Sub-Office
(Print Name, Title & Duty Station)

On June 5, 2026, I conducted an initial informal interview of the detainee listed above in order to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation of his or her order of supervision stated in the notification letter. At the interview, the alien made the following oral response regarding the reasons for revocation:

Alien has brother in Anchorage, Ak. Has a sponsor who provides a place to live along with a job to obtain income - Batt RH Patriot Auto, where ALEBW will work on the vehicles and sell them.
6/5/26

ALEBW has never heard of the Central African Republic (CAR) and does not know what to do in that country and believes he may be hurt there.

The detainee ☒ did ☐ did not provide a written statement.

The detainee ☐ did ☒ did not provide any documents. Any documents provided are attached.

R. Holmes
Signature of Interviewing Officer

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