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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

EBDANASSR ALEBW,
Petitioner

v.

ARNALDO HERNANDEZ,
SUPERINTENDENT, ANCHORAGE
CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX; et al.

Defendants.

Case No. 3:26-cv-00228-SLG

UNITED STATES' NOTICE OF FILING

Federal Respondents, through undersigned counsel, notifies the Court of its filing of the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Notice of Revocation of Release including the Alien Informal Interview as well as the Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider filed in the Executive Office for Immigration Review.

//

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this June 9, 2026, in Anchorage, Alaska.

MICHAEL J. HEYMAN
United States Attorney

/s/ Joshua A. Traini
Assistant U.S. Attorney
United States of America

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 9, 2026,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was served electronically on the following:

Jane M. Imholte
Federal Public Defender
District of Alaska
Attorney for Petitioner

/s/ Joshua A. Traini
Office of the U.S. Attorney

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

NOTICE OF REVOCATION OF RELEASE

Alien Name: Alebw, Ebdalnassr

A- File #



Your release on the order of supervision (OSUP) issued to you on or about 05/13/2026 is hereby
Date OSUP Issued (MM/DD/YYYY)
revoked. You will remain detained in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody at this time.

☐ Your release has been revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(i), for the following reason(s):

☐ The purposes of release have been served.

☐ You violated a condition of your release. Specifically, you:
(Information about how condition of release violated)

☐ It is appropriate to enforce the removal order entered against you as ICE has the ability and means to effectuate your removal.

☐ ICE has obtained a travel document and scheduled your removal to take place no later than:
Date (MM/DD/YYYY)

☐ ICE is seeking a travel document to effect your expeditious removal to _____
Country of Removal

☐ On _____, you were ordered removed to _____, but you
Date (MM/DD/YYYY) Country
were granted withholding of removal to _____. Your case is under review
Country

for removal to an alternate country.

☐ Your conduct, or other circumstance, indicates that release is no longer appropriate. Specifically, you:
(Information about why release no longer appropriate)

OR

☒ Your release has been revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), for the following reason(s):

☐ You violated a condition of your release. Specifically, you:
(Information about how condition of release violated)

☒ Circumstances have changed such that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

☐ ICE has obtained a travel document and scheduled your removal to take place no later than:
06/11/2026
Date (MM/DD/YYYY)

- ☐ ICE is seeking a travel document to effect your expeditious removal to _____
Country of Removal
- ☐ On _____, you were ordered removed to _____, but you
Date (MM/DD/YYYY) Country
were granted withholding of removal to _____. Your case is under review
Country
for removal to an alternate country.

Notice of Informal Interview

On 06/05/2026, you will be afforded an informal interview at which you will be given an opportunity to
Date (MM/DD/YYYY)
respond to the reasons for this revocation. You may submit any evidence or information you wish to be reviewed in support of your release.

Penalties for Failure to Comply with Order of Removal

You are advised that you must demonstrate that you are making reasonable efforts to comply with the order of removal and that you are cooperating with ICE's efforts to remove you by taking whatever actions ICE requests to affect your removal. You are also advised that any willful failure or refusal on your part to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary for your departure, or any conspiracy or actions to prevent your removal or obstruct the issuance of a travel document, may subject you to criminal prosecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) and civil penalties under 8 U.S.C. § 1324d.

EMMANUEL

Digitally signed by EMMANUEL
ESPINAL
Date: 2026.06.05 14:35:17
+04'00'

ESPINAL

Signature of Authorized Official

06/05/2026

Date (MM/DD/YYYY)

Emmanuel Espinal

Name of Authorized Official

Acting Unit Chief

Title of Authorized Official

(Note: 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 revocation must be EAD or FOD where there is a public interest to do so and referral to EAD not reasonable; 241.13 may be by RMD)

PROOF OF SERVICE

(1) Personal Service

(a) I Holmes, R, Deportation Officer,
Name of ICE Officer Title
certify that I served ALEBW, Ebdalnassr with a copy of this document at
Name of detainee
Anchorage ICE Office on 06/05/2026, at 1115.
Institution Date (MM/DD/YYYY) Time

Refused to sign
Detainee Signature

06/05/2026

Date (MM/DD/YYYY)

- ☐ cc: Attorney of Record or Designated Representative
☐ cc: A-File

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

**ALIEN INFORMAL INTERVIEW
UPON REVOCATION OF ORDER OF SUPERVISION UNDER
8 C.F.R. § 241.4(I); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)**

STATEMENT OF: ALEBW, Ebdalnassr
(Detainee)

A-File #: 

Detention Location: Anchorage ICE Office

INTERVIEWING ICE OFFICER: Holmes, R.; Deportation Officer, Anchorage Sub-Office
(Print Name, Title & Duty Station)

On June 5, 2026, I conducted an initial informal interview of the detainee listed above in order to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation of his or her order of supervision stated in the notification letter. At the interview, the alien made the following oral response regarding the reasons for revocation:

Alien has brother in Anchorage, Ak. Has a sponsor who provides a place to live along with a job to obtain income - Batt RH Patriot Auto, where ALEBW will work on the vehicles and sell them. 6/5/26

ALEBW has never heard of the Central African Republic (CAR) and does not know what to do in that country and believes he may be hurt there.

The detainee ☒ did ☐ did not provide a written statement.

The detainee ☐ did ☒ did not provide any documents. Any documents provided are attached.


Signature of Interviewing Officer

FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY

Mariya Howykowycz, Esquire
 6026 State Road
 Cleveland, Ohio 44134

DETAINED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
 EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
 OFFICE OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE
 OAKDALE, LOUISIANA

_____)
)
 IN THE MATTER OF:)
)
 EBDALNASSR ALEBW) File No. 
)
 Respondent)
)
 In Removal Proceedings)
 _____)

IMMIGRATION JUDGE: NEXT HEARING:
 D’ANNA H. FREEMAN not scheduled

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND,
 IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUA SPONTE RECONSIDERATION

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RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Ebdalnassr Alebw (hereafter “Respondent”), by and through his counsel Mariya Howykwycz, hereby moves the Immigration Court to reconsider its denial of Respondent’s application for asylum, issued on June 27, 2026, in light of vacatur of the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule by the decision of District Court for the Northern District of California *East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, et al. v. Donald J. Trump, et al.*, No. 18-CV-06810, 2026 WL 1256873 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2026), as the Respondent’s application for asylum was denied *solely* on the ground of the regulatory bar to asylum eligibility under the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.33. *See Harmon v. Thornburgh*, 878 F.2d 484, 495 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“When a reviewing court determines that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result is that the rules are vacated—not that their application to the individual petitioners is proscribed.”); *Action on Smoking & Health v. C.A.B.*, 713 F.2d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (“To vacate ... means ‘to annul; to cancel or rescind; to declare, to make, or to render, void; to defeat; to deprive of force; to make of no authority or validity; to set aside.’ ” (citation omitted)); *Kiakombua v. Wolf*, 498 F.Supp.3d 1, 50 (D.D.C. 2020) (Jackson, J.) (“In essence, a vacatur order takes the unlawful agency action off the books[.]” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent Ebdalnassr Alebw is a citizen and national of Syria and a practicing member of the [REDACTED]. Respondent has been [REDACTED] by the extremist group formerly known as [REDACTED], now [REDACTED], due to his adherence to the [REDACTED].

On December 28, 2024, Respondent entered the United States without inspection, seeking refuge and asylum. He was taken in ICE custody shortly after his entry and detained in

the Jackson Parish Correctional Center, Louisiana. On January 30, 2025, Respondent had a credible fear interview with an asylum officer. During the interview, Respondent described the harm he had suffered in Syria and claimed that he had crossed the U.S.-Mexico border without inspection because his life in Mexico was in danger. *See Interview Notes¹, page 9* (“I was scared of those people who came to the Mosque. I was afraid for my life... That lady said she would send someone to stab me... so many things like that happen in Mexico even for 5 dollars. They were talking to me like the [\$]2000 was theirs and I took it from them.”). Nevertheless, the asylum officer made negative credible fear determination, so Respondent sought its review by an immigration judge.

On February 05, 2025, the immigration judge of the LaSalle Immigration Court, Louisiana vacated the negative credible fear determination made by the asylum officer. As a result, on March 24, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) placed Respondent in full removal proceedings before the Oakdale Immigration Court, Louisiana. On May 8, 2025, Respondent, through his attorney Akram Abusharar, filed his application for asylum and for withholding of removal claiming past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his Sufi Islam religion, political opinion that is against the extremist ideology of the governing militia group in Syria, and membership in the particular social group of Syrian Sufi Muslims.

On the individual hearing on June 27, 2025, the immigration judge found Respondent ineligible for asylum due to the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.33(a)(1) and ordered Respondent’s removal to Syria, but concurrently granted withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3). No alternative country of removal was designated. Respondent’s attorney Mr. Akram Abusharar waived appeal without consulting Respondent and

¹ Filed with the Court on June 27, 2025.

explaining him his right to appeal the decision of the immigration judge to deny his asylum application to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). *See* Hearing for Ebdalnassr Alebw, , June 27, 2025 at 1:00 p.m. Respondent stayed in the ICE custody.

On September 30, 2025, Respondent's new attorney Rashad Almasmari filed "Motion to Reconsider or, in the Alternative, to Reopen Proceedings" with the Oakdale Immigration Court. The immigration judge construed the motion as a motion to reconsider and denied it on October 1, 2025, stating that:

In this case, the Court found the respondent ineligible for asylum due to the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways bar but granted withholding of removal under Section 241(b)(3) of the Act. It did not grant Voluntary Departure as counsel mistakenly claims in the motion and these two forms of relief or protection are mutually exclusive. As the respondent was denied asylum due to a regulatory bar and not on the merits of the claim itself, there is no legal basis to reconsider the decision. Reconsideration of any new evidence will not change the outcome, as it merely provides more support for the application that was already granted.

Order of the Immigration Judge dated October 1, 2025.

On January 9, 2026, through his new counsel Mariya Howykowycz, Respondent filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the District Court of the Western District of Louisiana, arguing that there is no significant likelihood of removal in reasonably foreseeable future. On May 12, 2026, the District Court of the Western District of Louisiana ordered Respondent's release from the ICE custody. On May 13, 2026, Respondent was released from ICE custody, and he settled in Anchorage, Alaska.

On June 5, 2026, Respondent was re-detained by ICE and served with a Notice of Revocation of Release advising him that he would be removed no later than June 11, 2026. *See Exhibit A. Notice of Revocation of Release.* Under information and belief, ICE intends to remove Respondent to the Central African Republic by June 11, 2026.

On the same day, June 5, 2026, Respondent filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the District Court of the Alaska District. The case is pending.

III. STANDARD FOR RECONSIDERATION

A motion to reconsider “shall specify the errors of fact or law in the previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” INA § 240(c)(6)(C); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(2). *See also Gonzalez Hernandez v. Garland*, 9 F.4th 278 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Motions to reconsider look back to the prior proceedings and must “specify [] errors of law or fact in the previous order.”).

In general, a respondent may file only one motion to reconsider within 30 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order. INA § 240(c)(6)(A), (B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). However, these time and numeric limitations are subject to equitable tolling. *See infra* Section V.B.

Alternatively, this Court has authority to reconsider its previous decision *sua sponte* at any time. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (“An immigration judge may upon the immigration judge's own motion at any time ... reconsider any case in which the judge has rendered a decision, unless jurisdiction is vested with the Board of Immigration Appeals.”). Requests that this Court exercise its *sua sponte* authority are authorized by separate authority and are not constrained by the regulation. *See, e.g., Rubalcaba v. Garland*, 998 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that the “departure bar” provision in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) does not limit an immigration judge’s discretion in *sua sponte* reopening); *Reyes-Vargas v. Barr*, 958 F.3d 1295, 1305-06 (10th Cir. 2020) (same).

IV. VACATUR OF THE CIRCUMVENTION OF LAWFUL PATHWAYS RULE

On May 7, 2026, a federal district court in California issued a decision in *East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, et al., v. Trump, et al.*, No. 18-CV-06810-JST, 2026 WL 1256873, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2026), a case challenging the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways (CLP) rule.

The CLP rule bars asylum for most non-Mexicans who arrived at the U.S. southern border between May 11, 2023 and May 11, 2025. The only such individuals not subject to the bar are those who applied for asylum or other protection in a transit country and received a final denial of relief; used the now-defunct CBP One app to obtain an appointment to cross the border at a port of entry; or received advance permission to travel to the United States through an approved parole program. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.33(a)(2). In addition, the CLP rule contains extremely narrow exceptions for people who can demonstrate “exceptionally compelling circumstances,” including an “acute medical emergency,” an “imminent and extreme threat” to life or safety, or being a “victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.33(a)(3).

On July 25, 2023, the district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs, vacating the CLP rule as contrary to the asylum statute, arbitrary and capricious, and procedurally defective. *See Exhibit B. District court decision dated July 25, 2023.* The government appealed that decision and obtained a stay pending appeal, meaning that the CLP rule remained in effect. Following argument, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for supplemental briefing on standing and the CLP rule’s validity in light of intervening Supreme Court precedent *Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine*, 602 U.S. 367 (2024), which addressed organizational standing, and the Trump administration’s termination of the CBP One appointment system, parole programs, and other policies cited in the Rule. *See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump*, 134 F.4th 545, 548 (9th Cir. 2025).

On May 7, 2026, after considering the parties’ supplemental arguments on remand, the district court reaffirmed its 2023 decision and again vacated the CLP. *See Exhibit C. District court decision dated May 7, 2026.*

Therefore, the CLP rule is currently vacated and unenforceable. *See In re: Bernard Madoff Inv. Securities LLC*, 721 F.3d 54, 68 (2d Cir. 2013) (“vacatur dissipates precedential force”); *Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co.*, 108 F.2d 71, 81 (3d Cir. 1939) (holding that a decree considered to be vacated “is no longer binding as a precedent, as the law of the case, or as res judicata”); *United States v. Bethea*, 841 Fed.Appx. 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2021) (“The general, legal understanding of vacatur is that it renders the original judgment null and void.”); *Asgeirsson v. Abbott*, 696 F.3d 454, 459 (5th Cir. 2012) (“this court has consistently held that vacated opinions are not precedent”); *U.S. v. Love*, 706 F.3d 832, 840 n.2 (7th Cir. 2013) (confirming that vacated decisions have “no precedential force.”); *Salitros v. Chrysler Corp.*, 306 F.3d 562, 575 n.2 (8th Cir. 2002) (“A vacated decision is deprived of its precedential effect.”); *Center for Food Safety v. Regan*, 56 F.4th 648, 660 (9th Cir. 2022) (“When a court orders vacatur, it sets aside or invalidates an agency decision or order.”).

V. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THIS MOTION TO RECONSIDER

A. Respondent Meets the Requirements for Statutory Reconsideration.

A motion to reconsider “tackles challenges to the ‘law’ or ‘facts’ that were before the BIA [or the immigration court] when it made its decision.” *Gonzalez Hernandez*, 9 F.4th at 285 (holding that a motion to reconsider is a proper vehicle to challenge a prior decision on the basis of change in the law but denying the petition on other grounds).

Respondent warrants reconsideration because he specifies the error of law in the previous order, i.e. application of the unlawful CLP rule. INA § 240(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(2). Respondent’s application for asylum was denied solely because the immigration judge applied a regulatory bar (i.e. the CLP rule), *see* Hearing for Ebdalnassr Alebw, , June 27, 2025 at 1:00 p.m., which was vacated on May 7, 2026, by a federal district court in California. *East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, et al., v. Trump, et al.*, No. 18-CV-06810-JST, 2026 WL

1256873, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2026).

The grant of asylum is a proper decision here because the sole ground for denial of Respondent's application for asylum was the applicability of the CLP rule, which is no longer sustainable. *See, e.g., In re Maria A. Gonzalez*, 2018 WL 4692814, at *1 (BIA Sept. 11, 2018) (“[W] find [] that due to the Supreme Court's holding in *Dimaya*, the respondent's sole ground of removability is no longer sustainable. Inasmuch as the respondent is no longer removable as charged, we will terminate the respondent's proceedings without prejudice[.]”).

B. Respondent Merits Equitable Tolling of the Filing Deadline and Numerical Limit on Motions to Reconsider, and So the Court Must Treat the Motion as Timely Filed

Respondent's motion should be treated as timely filed and not barred by the numerical limit.

The filing deadline for motions to reconsider at INA § 240(c)(6)(B) and motions to reopen at INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i) is subject to equitable tolling. *See, e.g., Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch*, 831 F.3d 337, 344 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding that, as a matter of first impression, 90-day deadline for filing motion to reopen removal proceedings is subject to equitable tolling).

It is axiomatic that where an individual “qualifies for equitable tolling of the time and/or numerical limitations, the motion is treated as if it were the one the [noncitizen] is statutorily entitled to file.” *Singh v. Holder*, 658 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2011); *see also Lugo-Resendez*, 831 F.3d at 343 (same).

As the Supreme Court regularly has recognized, a litigant is “‘entitled to equitable tolling,’” if he or she shows “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” *Holland v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting *Pace v. DiGuglielmo*, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); *see also Lugo-Resendez*, at 344-45 (5th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “[t]he BIA should . . . take care not to apply the equitable tolling standard too harshly” because its “core purpose . . . is to escape

the evils of archaic rigidity”) (quotations omitted); *Matter of Morales-Morales*, 28 I&N Dec. 708, 717 (BIA 2023) (applying the *Holland* standard).

1. Extraordinary circumstances prevented Respondent from timely filing this motion

Tolling is warranted because an extraordinary circumstance prevented Respondent from timely filing this motion. *See, e.g., Williams v. Garland*, 59 F.4th 620, 643 (4th Cir. 2023) (explaining that the BIA “has held that Supreme Court decisions that significantly change the legal landscape” constitute extraordinary circumstances); *Estrada-Cardona v. Garland*, 44 F.4th 1275, 1287 (10th Cir. 2022) (noting that “[e]quitable tolling claims based on changes in the law are not unheard of”) (quotation omitted); *Bent v. Garland*, 115 F.4th 934, 944 n.10 (9th Cir. 2024) (noting that the BIA has treated vacatur of a conviction relied on for immigration purposes an extraordinary circumstance for purposes of tolling); *Ovalles v. Rosen*, 984 F.3d 1120, 1123 (5th Cir. 2021) (“An intervening legal change can constitute an extraordinary circumstance.”) (quoting *Londono-Gonzalez v. Barr*, 978 F.3d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 2020); *accord Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr*, 822 F.App’x 254, 256–57 (5th Cir. 2020)); *Silverio-Da Silva v. Boente*, 675 F. App’x 487, 488 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Remand may be appropriate when the BIA’s decision has become unsustainable in [the] light of an intervening change in binding precedent.”).

Here, the vacatur of the CLP which has tremendously changed the legal landscape constitutes an extraordinary circumstance.

2. Respondent pursued this motion with reasonable diligence

Tolling is also warranted because Respondent exercised “reasonable” diligence. *Holland*, 560 U.S. at 653 (noting that the tolling standard requires “reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence”) (citation and quotations omitted). Diligence is a fact-specific inquiry that must be conducted on a case-by-case basis. *See, e.g., Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch*, 831 F.3d 337, 344-45 (5th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “equitable tolling does not lend itself to bright-line

rules”) (quoting *Fisher v. Johnson*, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999)); *Williams v. Garland*, 59 F.4th 620, 641 (4th Cir. 2023) (applying a “functional” diligence that considers “when a noncitizen knew or should have known of his rights”). Notably, “the mere passage of time—even a lot of time—before [a noncitizen] files a motion to reopen does not necessarily mean she was not diligent.” *Gordillo v. Holder*, 640 F.3d 700, 705 (6th Cir. 2011); *see also Gaberov v. Mukasey*, 516 F.3d 590, 594 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The test for equitable tolling is not the length of the delay but whether the claimant could reasonably have been expected to have filed earlier.”) (quotation omitted); *Gonzalez Hernandez*, 9 F.4th at 284 (sustaining the immigration judge’s determination that equitable tolling ended on the date that Gonzalez Hernandez learned of the *Dimaya* decision).

In this case, Respondent learned, from his brother, about the vacatur of the CLP rule on May 11, 2026, i.e. four days after the CLP rule was vacated. *See Exhibit D. Declaration of Ebdalnassr Alebw*, ¶15 (“On May 11, 2026, when I was still detained in the Jackson Parish Correctional Center, I had a phone conversation with my brother who told me that Ms. Howykwowycz had advised him that the rule which prevented my grant of asylum was vacated. I told my brother that I would like Ms. Howykwowycz to convince the immigration judge that my application for asylum should be granted.”). It should be also taken into account that Respondent was incarcerated, so his communication with undersigned counsel representing him at that moment in the federal litigation was limited.

Respondent pursued his rights with reasonable diligence – he filed the instant motion to reconsider within 30 days after he learned about the CLP rule vacatur.

3. Respondent merits tolling of the numerical limit on motions to reconsider

Although Respondent previously filed a motion to reconsider on September 30, 2025, this motion should be treated as one he is statutorily entitled to file. The numerical limitation on

motions to reconsider at INA § 240(c)(6)(B) and motions to reopen at INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i) is subject to tolling. *See Jin Bo Zhao v. INS*, 452 F.3d 154, 159 (2d Cir. 2006); *Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS*, 282 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2002); *cf. Ruiz-Turcios v. U.S. Att’y Gen.*, 717 F.3d 847, 850 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that the reasoning behind recognizing that the motion to reopen filing deadline is subject to tolling “appears equally applicable to, and to support, the related conclusion that the one-motion rule is a non-jurisdictional claim processing rule subject to equitable tolling”). Where an individual is entitled to tolling, the motion must be treated as one permitted under the statute.

Here, Respondent is entitled to tolling of the numerical limitation because his prior counsel, Rashad Almasmari, provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Almasmari filed a baseless motion to reconsider² arguing that:

The Court erred in granting withholding of removal but also ordering voluntary departure. This creates a legal and factual contradiction. By granting withholding, the Court recognized the likelihood of persecution. By ordering voluntary departure, the Court nonetheless required Respondent's removal to the very country where the persecuting entity governs.

 nationwide. The Court's decision did not account for this fact. Reconsideration is appropriate under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(2) because the decision rested on an incomplete assessment of the current political reality in Syria.

Motion to Reconsider or, in the Alternative, to Reopen Proceedings filed on September 30, 2025.

Both arguments – that granting withholding of removal and voluntary departure creates “a legal and factual contradiction” and that the Court's decision did not account for the fact that, at the time of the June 27, 2025 decision,  had already consolidated power nationwide – are

² Mr. Almasmari also argued that there are grounds for reopening but the immigration judge construed his motion as a motion to reconsider.

inapposite to the reason why the Respondent's application for asylum was denied, i.e. applicability of the CLP rule. Furthermore, both arguments are plainly wrong because (1) the immigration judge has not granted both voluntary departure and withholding of removal since "these two forms of relief or protection are mutually exclusive," see *Order of the Immigration Judge* filed on October 1, 2025, and because (2) the immigration judge clearly stated in her oral decision that she grants withholding of removal because Respondent's persecutors are currently controlling the whole territory of Syria. See Hearing for Ebdalnassr Alebw, , June 27, 2025 at 1:00 p.m.

By filing the meritless motion to reconsider, Mr. Alasmari highly prejudiced Respondent because filing of a subsequent motion to reconsider is numerically barred.

Respondent has complied with the procedural requirements for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim set forth in *Matter of Lozada*, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). First, the attached Respondent's declaration attests to agreement Respondent had with his prior counsel Mr. Rashad Alasmari whom Respondent asked whether "it is possible to change the grant of withholding of removal for the grant of asylum," who agreed to file a competent motion to reconsider, and was paid \$1,500 for his services. *Exhibit D. Declaration of Ebdalnassr Alebw*, at ¶10. Second, on June 8, 2026. Respondent's counsel Ms. Howykwycz filed a complaint with the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission. See *Exhibit E. Postage for Grievance*. Third, on June 8, 2026, Respondent notified the prior counsel of these claims, provided prior counsel with the opportunity to respond, and informed the prior counsel that undersigned counsel would forward any such response to the Court. See *Exhibit F. Letter to Rashad Alasmari*. Respondent will supplement this motion if he receives a response.

C. In the Alternative, the Court Should Reconsider Sua Sponte

In the alternative, Respondent requests that the Court reconsider the prior removal order

sua sponte. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). “The Board’s power to reopen or reconsider cases sua sponte is limited to exceptional circumstances and is not meant to cure filing defects or circumvent the regulations, where enforcing them might result in hardship.” *Matter of J-J-*, 21 I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 1997). “In order for a change in the law to qualify] as an exceptional situation that merits the exercise of discretion by the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen or reconsider a case sua sponte, the change must be fundamental in nature and not merely an incremental development in the state of the law.” *Matter of G-D-*, 22 I&N. Dec. 1132 (BIA 1999).

In this case, as described above, the change in the law is fundamental because it eliminated the regulatory bar to asylum eligibility. Like in *Matter of X-G-W-* where the respondent acquired eligibility for relief based on coercive population control practices in China by virtue of a particular change in the law, 22 I&N Dec. 71 (BIA 1998), Respondent acquired eligibility for relief based on ‘erasing’ the only reason that prevented him from that eligibility, i.e. on the vacatur of the CLP rule.

VI. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court should grant this motion to reconsider and approve Mr. Ebdalnassr Alebw’s application for asylum.

Respectfully,



Mariya Howykowycz

EXHIBIT A

- ☐ ICE is seeking a travel document to effect your expeditious removal to _____ Country of Removal
- ☐ On _____, you were ordered removed to _____ Country, but you
Date (MM/DD/YYYY)
were granted withholding of removal to _____ Country. Your case is under review
for removal to an alternate country.

Notice of Informal Interview

On 06/05/2026, you will be afforded an informal interview at which you will be given an opportunity to
Date (MM/DD/YYYY)
respond to the reasons for this revocation. You may submit any evidence or information you wish to be reviewed in
support of your release.

Penalties for Failure to Comply with Order of Removal

You are advised that you must demonstrate that you are making reasonable efforts to comply with the order of removal and that you are cooperating with ICE's efforts to remove you by taking whatever actions ICE requests to affect your removal. You are also advised that any willful failure or refusal on your part to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary for your departure, or any conspiracy or actions to prevent your removal or obstruct the issuance of a travel document, may subject you to criminal prosecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) and civil penalties under 8 U.S.C. § 1324d.

EMMANUEL

ESPINAL

Signature of Authorized Official

Emmanuel Espinal

Name of Authorized Official

Acting Unit Chief

Title of Authorized Official

Digitally signed by EMMANUEL
ESPINAL
Date: 2026.06.05 14:35:17
+04'00'

06/05/2026

Date (MM/DD/YYYY)

(Note: 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 revocation must be EAD or FOD where there is a public interest to do so and referral to EAD not reasonable; 241.13 may be by RMD)

PROOF OF SERVICE

(1) Personal Service

(a) I Holmes, R, Deportation Officer
Name of ICE Officer Title

certify that I served ALEBW, Ebdalnassr with a copy of this document at
Name of detainee

Anchorage ICE Office on 06/05/2026, at 1115
Institution Date (MM/DD/YYYY) Time

Detainee Signature

06/05/2026

Date (MM/DD/YYYY)

- ☐ cc: Attorney of Record or Designated Representative
- ☐ cc: A-File

FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY

EXHIBIT B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT,
et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-06810-JST

**ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

Re: ECF Nos. 169, 176

Before the Court are motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs East Bay Sanctuary Covenant (“EBSC”), Central American Resource Center of Los Angeles, Tahirih Justice Center, National Center for Lesbian Rights, Immigrant Defenders Law Center, and American Gateways, ECF No. 169; and Defendants Joseph R. Biden, Merrick Garland, United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), David Neal, Executive Office of Immigration Review, Alejandro Mayorkas, United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Ur Jaddou, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Troy A. Miller, United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), Tae D. Johnson, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), ECF No. 176. The Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 16, 2023, DHS and DOJ published a final rule, Circumvention of Lawful Pathways (“the Rule”), which applies a presumption of asylum ineligibility to noncitizens who traveled through a country other than their own before entering the United States through the southern border with Mexico. 88 Fed. Reg. 31314, 31449–52 (May 16, 2023). Unless they meet one of several exceptions, such individuals will be presumed ineligible for asylum; they may rebut

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this presumption only upon a showing of “exceptionally compelling circumstances” at the time of entry. *Id.* The Rule provides exceptions for unaccompanied children, noncitizens authorized to travel to the United States pursuant to a DHS-approved parole process, certain noncitizens who present at a port of entry, and noncitizens who have been denied asylum or other forms of protection by another country. *Id.*

Plaintiffs are organizations that represent and assist asylum seekers. They argue the Rule is invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) for three reasons: first, it is contrary to law; second, it is arbitrary and capricious; and third, it was issued without adequate opportunity for public comment.

A. Statutory Framework

“In 1980, to limit the [Executive’s] parole power, create a predictable and permanent admissions system, and fulfill international obligations, Congress passed the Refugee Act,” which “provided a statutory basis for asylum, the granting of status to refugees who arrive or have been physically present in the United States.” *Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions*, 850 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); *see also EBSC v. Biden (Entry V)*, 993 F.3d 640, 658 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he Refugee Act of 1980 . . . established an asylum procedure available to any migrant, ‘irrespective of such alien’s status,’ and irrespective of whether the migrant arrived ‘at a land border or port of entry.’”) (quoting Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208(a), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (1980)).

This statutory basis is now found in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), which provides that any noncitizen who arrives in the United States, “whether or not at a designated port of arrival” and “irrespective of [their] status, may apply for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).¹ The statute grants the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security discretion to grant asylum to applicants who qualify as refugees, *id.* § 1158(b)(1)(A), defined as those “unable or unwilling to return to” their home countries “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on

¹ This provision does not apply to noncitizens whom the Attorney General determines can be removed to a safe third country, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A); or to noncitizens who apply for asylum more than one year after arrival or have previously been denied asylum in the United States, *id.* § 1158(a)(2)(B)–(C), unless they demonstrate changed or extraordinary circumstances, *id.* § 1158(a)(2)(D).

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,” *id.* § 1101(a)(42). Certain noncitizens are statutorily barred from eligibility for asylum: those who have persecuted others on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; those who have been convicted by final judgment of a particularly serious crime; those who there are serious reasons to believe have committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to arrival; those who there are reasonable grounds to regard as terrorists or a danger to the security of the United States; and those who have firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United States. *Id.* § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vi). The statute also provides that “[t]he Attorney General may by regulation establish additional limitations and conditions” on asylum eligibility, so long as such limitations and conditions are “consistent with this section.” *Id.* § 1158(b)(2)(C).

B. The Challenged Rule

The Rule establishes a “rebuttable presumption” of asylum ineligibility which applies to all noncitizens who enter the United States at the southern border between May 11, 2023, and May 11, 2025, “after . . . travel[ing] through a country other than [their] country of citizenship, nationality, or, if stateless, last habitual residence.”² 88 Fed. Reg. at 31450. The presumption does not apply to unaccompanied minor children. *Id.* Otherwise, noncitizens are exempt from this presumption only if they (1) have “authorization to travel to the United States to seek parole, pursuant to a DHS-approved parole process”; (2) “[p]resented at a port of entry, pursuant to a pre-scheduled time and place, or presented at a port of entry without a pre-scheduled time and place,” provided they demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “it was not possible to access or use the DHS scheduling system due to language barrier, illiteracy, significant technical failure, or other ongoing and serious obstacle”; or (3) “[s]ought asylum or other protection in a country

² This requirement applies only if the country or countries the noncitizen traveled through are parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 268. 88 Fed. Reg. at 31450. As noted in the preamble to the Rule, all but one of the countries in North, Central, and South America are parties to at least one of these agreements. 88 Fed. Reg. at 31411.

1 through which [they] traveled and received a final decision denying that application,” provided the
2 denial was for a reason other than abandonment of the claim.³ *Id.* To rebut this presumption,
3 noncitizens must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of “exceptionally
4 compelling circumstances” at the time of entry. Such circumstances exist in cases of acute
5 medical emergencies, “imminent and extreme threat to life or safety, such as an imminent threat of
6 rape, kidnapping, torture, or murder,” or “severe . . . trafficking in persons.” *Id.*⁴

7 In simpler terms, under the Rule, noncitizens other than Mexican nationals who cross the
8 southern border are presumed ineligible for asylum unless they (1) have received advance
9 permission to travel to the U.S. to apply for parole; (2) present at a port of entry for a pre-
10 scheduled appointment (or without an appointment, if they can demonstrate an “ongoing and
11 serious obstacle” that precluded pre-scheduling); or (3) have already sought and been denied
12 asylum or other protection in another country en route to the U.S.⁵ The presumption may be
13 rebutted only upon a showing of exceptionally compelling circumstances.

14 The Attorney General and DHS Secretary issued the challenged Rule “pursuant to their
15 shared and respective authorities concerning asylum, statutory withholding, and CAT
16 determinations” under the INA, including their discretionary authority to grant asylum to refugees,

17
18 ³ The exception for noncitizens who apply for and are denied asylum or other protection in transit
19 countries does not differentiate among denials for reasons other than abandonment—for example,
20 claims that are not cognizable under the asylum laws of those transit countries or applications that
21 are procedurally barred. *See* 88 Fed. Reg. at 31450 (“A final decision includes any denial by a
22 foreign government of the applicant’s claim for asylum or other protection through one or more of
23 that government’s pathways for that claim. A final decision does not include a determination by a
24 foreign government that the alien abandoned the claim.”). To qualify for this exception,
25 noncitizens must have applied for and been denied asylum in a country through which they
26 traveled, regardless of whether or not their applications had any possibility of being granted, and
27 regardless of whether or not that country is a safe option for them.

28 ⁴ The Rule provides that exceptionally compelling circumstances will also be found, in removal
proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), where a principal asylum applicant is eligible for
statutory withholding of removal or Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) withholding and would
be granted asylum but for the presumption, and an accompanying family member does not
independently qualify for protection from removal or the principal applicant has a spouse or child
who would be eligible to follow to join them if they were granted asylum. 88 Fed. Reg. at 31452.
In such cases, the presumption will be deemed rebutted.

⁵ As noted above, unaccompanied children are also not subject to the presumption. Because this
challenge largely does not concern the exception for unaccompanied children, the Court does not
discuss this exception in detail.

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A); their authority to establish requirements and procedures to govern asylum applications, *id.*; and their authority to establish additional limitations and conditions for asylum eligibility “consistent with this section,” *id.* § 1158(b)(2)(C). 88 Fed. Reg. at 31323.

The agencies issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“the Notice”) on February 23, 2023, and received public comments until March 27, 2023. Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 88 Fed. Reg. 11704, 11704 (Feb. 23, 2023). Including the last day, the comment period spanned 33 days.⁶ In promulgating the Rule, the agencies invoked the foreign affairs and good cause exceptions to the APA’s required 30-day delayed effective date for substantive rules. *Id.* at 31444–47. The Rule took effect on May 11, 2023. *Id.* at 31314.

C. Procedural History

This case began in November 2018, when Plaintiffs filed suit to challenge an interim final rule, Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations; Procedures for Protection Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 55934 (Nov. 9, 2018), and accompanying presidential proclamation which together barred asylum eligibility for noncitizens who entered the United States outside of designated ports of entry (“Entry Rule”). ECF No. 1. This Court enjoined the Entry Rule. *EBSC v. Trump (Entry I)*, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (granting temporary restraining order); *EBSC v. Trump (Entry II)*, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (granting preliminary injunction). The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court declined to stay the temporary restraining order pending appeal. *EBSC v. Trump (Entry III)*, 932 F. 3d 742 (9th Cir. 2018); *Trump v. EBSC (Entry IV)*, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2018) (mem.). This Court stayed the case in March 2019, pending resolution of the appeal. ECF No. 113. The Ninth Circuit subsequently held that the Entry Rule was substantively invalid and affirmed this Court’s orders granting preliminary injunctive relief. *Entry V*, 993 F.3d at 640.

In 2019, DOJ and DHS issued an interim final rule that rendered noncitizens who crossed

⁶ The parties dispute the exact length of the comment period: Defendants include the final day of the comment period in their calculation, while Plaintiffs omit the final day. For purposes of this motion, the Court assumes that the public could begin submitting comments on the day the Notice was issued and could continue to submit comments until the end of the day the comment period closed, such that the comment period was 33 days long.

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the southern border after traveling through a country other than their own categorically ineligible for asylum (“Transit Rule”). Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33829 (July 16, 2019). The Transit Rule contained three exceptions under which noncitizens could remain eligible for asylum: (1) if they had applied for and been denied asylum or other protection in at least one country en route to the United States; (2) if they qualified as victims of human trafficking; and (3) if the only countries they traveled through were not parties to one of three international treaties. *Id.* at 33843. This Court enjoined the Transit Rule. *EBSC v. Barr (Transit I)*, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922 (N.D. Cal. 2019). The Ninth Circuit narrowed the scope of the injunction, staying it outside of the Ninth Circuit, and explained that this Court retained jurisdiction to further develop the record in support of a broader injunction. *EBSC v. Barr (Transit II)*, 934 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2019). Following remand, this Court restored the nationwide scope of the injunction. *EBSC v. Barr (Transit III)*, 391 F. Supp. 3d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2019). The Supreme Court then stayed the injunction pending appeal. *Barr v. EBSC (Transit IV)*, 140 S. Ct. 3 (2019) (mem.). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court’s order granting a nationwide injunction and held that the Transit Rule was substantively invalid. *EBSC v. Garland (Transit V)*, 994 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2020).

The Rule Plaintiffs presently challenge removed provisions implementing the Entry and Transit Rules. *See* 88 Fed. Reg. at 31319. On May 11, 2023—the day the Rule was scheduled to take effect, which was five days before its publication—Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to lift the stay in this case and requesting leave to file an amended and supplemental complaint. ECF No. 147. Pursuant to the parties’ subsequent stipulation, the Court granted the motion and adopted the parties’ proposed case schedule, which contemplated proceeding directly to summary judgment. ECF No. 163. The parties now move for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 169, 176. The Court permitted and has considered amicus briefs by a group of former immigration judges and members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), ECF No. 172, and by National Citizenship and Immigration Services Council 119, ECF No. 174-1.

II. JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

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III. LEGAL STANDARD

Granting summary judgment is proper when a “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). For cases involving review of agency action under the APA, “[t]he function of the district court is to determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.” *City & County of San Francisco v. United States*, 130 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting *Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS*, 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985)). In such cases, a court’s review is generally limited to the administrative record. *Lands Council v. Powell*, 395 F.3d 1019, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2005).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Issues

The Court begins by addressing preliminary issues that affect this Court’s jurisdiction to reach the merits and grant the relief sought—namely, Article III standing, statutory standing, and provisions of the INA that limit judicial review.

1. Article III Standing

“Article III confines the federal judicial power to the resolution of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021). “For there to be a case or controversy under Article III, the plaintiff must have a ‘personal stake’ in the case—in other words, standing.” *Id.* (quoting *Raines v. Byrd*, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997)). “[T]o establish standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant, and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” *Id.* “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing” each element of standing. *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). At summary judgment, plaintiffs “must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts,’ which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken as true.” *Id.* (internal citation omitted).

Plaintiffs assert organizational standing to challenge the Rule. “An organization may establish standing on its own behalf by showing that the defendant’s conduct resulted in ‘a

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diversion of its resources and frustration of its mission,’ or caused a substantial loss in organizational funding.” *Transit V*, 994 F.3d at 974 (internal citation omitted) (quoting *Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs*, 285 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2002)); see *Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman*, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (allegations that challenged practices “frustrated” organization’s mission and required reallocation of resources are sufficient to confer direct standing because “[s]uch concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities—with the consequent drain on the organization’s resources—constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests”). “[U]nder *Havens Realty*, ‘a diversion-of-resources injury is sufficient to establish organizational standing,’ if the organization shows that, independent of the litigation, the challenged ‘policy frustrates the organization’s goals and requires the organization to expend resources in representing clients they otherwise would spend in other ways.’” *Entry III*, 932 F.3d at 765 (first quoting *Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Cegavske*, 800 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 2015), then quoting *Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach*, 657 F.3d 936, 943 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).

Plaintiffs are immigration legal services organizations that represent noncitizens seeking asylum. ECF No. 169-2 ¶¶ 5, 7; ECF No. 169-3 ¶¶ 4, 12–13; ECF No. 169-5 ¶ 10; ECF No. 169-6 ¶¶ 6, 9, 11; ECF No. 169-7 ¶¶ 6, 12; ECF No. 175 ¶¶ 6–7. Plaintiffs assert that the Rule frustrates their organizational goals, requires them to reallocate resources in a manner which will limit the number of clients they serve, and will cause them to lose funding. ECF No. 169-2 ¶¶ 11, 13; ECF No. 169-3 ¶ 17; ECF No. 169-5 ¶ 11; ECF No. 169-6 ¶ 14; ECF No. 169-7 ¶¶ 19–20, 26; ECF No. 175 ¶ 18.

The Rule will frustrate Plaintiffs’ missions and require them to divert resources from existing programs. ECF No. 169-2 ¶ 16; ECF No. 169-3 ¶¶ 25–26; ECF No. 169-5 ¶ 24; ECF No. 175 ¶¶ 18, 21. Under the Rule, many of Plaintiffs’ clients will be presumed ineligible for asylum. ECF No. 169-2 ¶¶ 7, 11; ECF No. 169-3 ¶ 18; ECF No. 169-5 ¶¶ 15, 28–43; ECF No. 169-6 ¶¶ 10–11; ECF No. 169-7 ¶¶ 20, 32–43; ECF No. 175 ¶¶ 15, 37. To assist asylum seekers, Plaintiffs will need to overhaul their screening and intake processes to determine whether clients can qualify for an exception to the Rule or rebut the presumption, and assign staff to gather

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relevant evidence and prepare such arguments. ECF No. 169-2 ¶ 13; ECF No. 169-3 ¶ 24; ECF No. 169-5 ¶¶ 20–23. Because many of their clients will be presumed ineligible for asylum, Plaintiffs will have to assist clients who cannot meet an exception or rebut the presumption in seeking other forms of relief—statutory withholding of removal and CAT withholding—which are far more time- and resource-intensive than asylum, largely because they impose a higher evidentiary standard. ECF No. 169-2 ¶ 11; ECF No. 169-3 ¶ 21; ECF No. 169-5 ¶ 17; ECF No. 169-7 ¶ 24. Because of the higher evidentiary standard, Plaintiffs will have to devote resources to filing appeals to the BIA and petitions for review. ECF No. 169-7 ¶ 24. Statutory withholding and CAT withholding do not permit principal applicants to petition for derivative applicants—as asylum does—so Plaintiffs will have to devote additional resources to preparing separate applications to ensure the safety of applicants’ family members. ECF No. 169-2 ¶ 12; ECF No. 169-3 ¶¶ 22–23; ECF No. 169-5 ¶¶ 18–19. Plaintiffs will also need to adjust outreach programs to educate the community about the new Rule and develop new materials for such outreach. ECF No. 169-3 ¶ 27; ECF No. 169-4 ¶ 35; ECF No. 169-6 ¶ 22; ECF No. 175 ¶ 37.

Because Plaintiffs will need to devote additional resources to each client seeking asylum—for additional screening and preparation to argue that exceptions apply or rebut the presumption; for the complexities involved in preparing statutory withholding and CAT withholding applications; and for the training required to prepare staff to take on these tasks—Plaintiffs will be able to represent fewer clients. ECF No. 169-2 ¶¶ 13–14; ECF No. 169-4 ¶ 36; ECF No. 169-5 ¶ 23; ECF No. 169-6 ¶ 16; ECF No. 169-7 ¶ 22. Several Plaintiffs additionally anticipate a loss of funding due to these operational shifts. ECF No. 169-2 ¶¶ 8, 13–14; ECF No. 169-6 ¶ 16; ECF No. 175 ¶ 36.

EBSC, for instance, focuses on affirmative asylum, which is “core to the organization’s mission, and accounts for almost half . . . [its] budget.” ECF No. 169-6 ¶ 8. A substantial number of EBSC’s affirmative asylum clients are likely to be subject to the Rule’s presumption of ineligibility: in 2022, nearly a third of EBSC’s affirmative asylum clients crossed the southern border between ports of entry after transiting through a third country, *id.* ¶ 10; EBSC’s clients include victims of gender-based violence and indigenous, LGBT, and HIV positive individuals,

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who are particularly vulnerable to violence en route to the United States and are likely to have “great difficulty accessing protection” in transit countries, *id.* ¶ 11; and many of EBSC’s clients are “illiterate or only marginally literate,” such that they will struggle to use the CBP One mobile scheduling application, *id.* Because such individuals will be presumed ineligible for asylum, EBSC will need to “significantly cut [its] affirmative asylum program,” which is core to its mission, *id.* ¶ 18, and “make [an] enormous and costly shift in how [it] provide[s] services,” *id.* ¶ 19, by pivoting to removal defense work, for which it would need to find new funding sources, *id.* ¶ 21. “If EBSC were no longer able to file [affirmative asylum] cases for most individuals who entered without inspection after transiting through a third country, [it] would face a marked decrease in [its] budget, which would jeopardize [its] entire asylum program.” *Id.* ¶ 16.

Because Plaintiffs offer uncontroverted evidence that the Rule will frustrate their organizational goals, require diversion of resources, and substantially affect their funding, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Rule.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs nevertheless lack standing to challenge “what is, in essence, a decision regarding enforcement of the immigration laws against third parties,” such that standing is barred by *Linda R.S. v. Richard D.*, 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973), and *Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB*, 467 U.S. 883, 897 (1984). ECF No. 176-1 at 22. The Ninth Circuit previously rejected this argument, explaining that those cases concern third-party, not organizational, standing. *Entry V*, 993 F.3d at 664 n.6.⁷

On reply, Defendants argue that *United States v. Texas*, 143 S. Ct. 1964 (2023), additionally precludes Plaintiffs from challenging the Rule. ECF No. 182 at 8–9. In that case, the Supreme Court held that two states lacked standing to challenge DHS’s immigration-related arrest and prosecution priorities, which the states argued conflicted with arrest mandates in the INA. *Id.* at 1969–70. Relying on *Linda R.S.*, the Supreme Court explained that the states had no judicially cognizable interest in the Executive’s “exercise of enforcement discretion over whether to arrest or prosecute.” *Id.* at 1970. The Court also explicitly noted that “a challenge to an Executive Branch

⁷ The Court notes that the Supreme Court’s decision in *United States v. Texas*, 143 S. Ct. 1964 (2023), suggests these cases are not limited to third-party standing.

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1 policy that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution priorities *and* the Executive
2 Branch’s provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis . . .
3 because the challenged policy might implicate more than simply the Executive’s traditional
4 enforcement discretion.” *Id.* at 1974 (emphasis in original).

5 The Rule Plaintiffs challenge does not seem to implicate the Executive’s exercise of
6 enforcement discretion over whether to arrest or prosecute. Regardless, the Rule certainly
7 implicates the Executive’s provision of legal benefits or legal status because it categorically limits
8 eligibility for asylum, which offers “a number of benefits, including pathways to lawful permanent
9 resident status and citizenship,” the opportunity to obtain derivative asylum for spouses and
10 unmarried children, employment authorization, the freedom to travel abroad without prior
11 government approval, and eligibility for certain federal financial benefits. *Entry III*, 932 F.3d at
12 759–60. Thus, *United States v. Texas*, 143 S. Ct. at 1964, does not bar Plaintiffs from challenging
13 the Rule.

14 The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have established Article III standing.

15 2. Statutory Standing

16 Courts “presume that a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests
17 ‘fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.’” *Lexmark Int’l, Inc v. Static*
18 *Control Components, Inc.*, 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014) (quoting *Allen v. Wright*, 468 U.S. 737, 751
19 (1984)). “[T]he test ‘forecloses suit only when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or
20 inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that’
21 Congress authorized that plaintiff to sue.” *Id.* at 130 (quoting *Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band*
22 *of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak*, 567 U.S. 209, 225 (2012)). Because Plaintiffs bring an APA
23 challenge to rules promulgated pursuant to the INA, the Court considers whether Plaintiffs fall
24 within the zone of interests protected by the INA. *Patchak*, 567 U.S. at 224.

25 The Ninth Circuit has already held that organizations that provide asylum services—some
26 of which are parties to this case—fall within the zone of interests protected by the INA, and
27 therefore satisfy the zone-of-interests standard to bring an APA challenge. *See Entry III*, 932 F.3d
28 at 768–69 (“Although the Organizations are neither directly regulated nor benefitted by the INA,

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we nevertheless conclude that their interest in ‘provid[ing] the [asylum] services [they were] formed to provide’ falls within the zone of interests protected by the INA.”) (alterations in original) (quoting *El Rescate Legal Servs. v. EOIR*, 959 F.2d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 1991)); *Entry V*, 993 F.3d at 668 (“The Organizations’ claims fall within the zone of interests of the INA and of the regulatory amendments implemented by the Rule.”). Because Plaintiffs’ “purpose is to help individuals apply for and obtain asylum, provide low-cost immigration services, and carry out community education programs with respect to those services,” their “interests are ‘marginally related to’ and ‘arguably within’ the scope of the statute,” such that the zone-of-interests analysis does not foreclose suit. *Entry V*, 993 F.3d at 668.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have statutory standing to challenge the validity of the Rule.

3. Jurisdictional Bars

Defendants argue that several provisions of the INA prohibit this Court from reviewing the Rule or granting any remedy.

a. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(A)(iv), (e)(1), and (e)(3)

First, Defendants argue that the Rule implements expedited removal, such that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(A)(iv), (e)(1), and (e)(3) divest this Court of jurisdiction to review or vacate the Rule. Section 1252(a)(2)(A)(iv) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . except as provided in subsection (e), procedures and policies adopted by the Attorney General to implement” expedited removal. Section 1252(e)(1) provides that no court may grant equitable relief “in any action pertaining to an order to exclude” based on expedited removal, while Section 1252(e)(3) limits judicial review of regulations implementing the expedited removal statute to cases initiated in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. These provisions therefore limit judicial review of rules implementing the expedited removal statute.

Defendants argue that the Rule implements the expedited removal statute because the presumption of asylum ineligibility must be applied in expedited removal proceedings. The argument stretches too far. As the Ninth Circuit previously explained, “[b]ars to asylum eligibility may eventually be relevant to removal proceedings, but they are not ‘regulation[s] . . . to

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implement [removal orders]’ or otherwise entirely linked with removal orders.” *Entry V*, 993 F.3d at 666–67. “This is consistent with the purposes of these jurisdictional limitations: allowing collateral APA challenges to an asylum-eligibility rule does not undermine Congress’s desire to ‘limit all aliens to one bite of the apple with regard to challenging’ their removal orders.” *Id.* at 667 (quoting *Martinez v. Napolitano*, 704 F.3d 620, 622 (9th Cir. 2012)). The Rule implements the asylum statute by imposing new conditions on asylum eligibility; that the standard articulated in the Rule is also applied in the expedited removal process does not convert the Rule into one implementing the expedited removal statute.

The Court is not persuaded that Defendants’ proposed reading of the limit on judicial review imposed by Sections 1252(a)(2)(A)(iv), (e)(1) and (e)(3) is appropriate. “As the Supreme Court has observed, where ‘Congress wanted [a] jurisdictional bar to encompass [particular] decisions [under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”)] . . . it expressed precisely that meaning.” *Entry II*, 354 F. Supp. 3d. at 1119 (alterations in original) (quoting *Kucana v. Holder*, 558 U.S. 233, 248 (2010)). Congress could have imposed similar limits on judicial review of challenges to regulations that implement the asylum statute, but it did not do so. “[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 430 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting *INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987)). In the absence of binding authority holding that these provisions limit judicial review of regulations implementing the asylum statute, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction over this case.

b. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)

Defendants also argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) divests this Court of jurisdiction to grant the relief Plaintiffs seek. Section 1252(f), titled “[l]imit on injunctive relief,” provides that “no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part IV of this subchapter . . . other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part

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1 have been initiated.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[Section]
 2 1252(f)(1) generally prohibits lower courts from entering injunctions that order federal officials to
 3 take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce, implement, or otherwise carry out the specified
 4 statutory provisions.” *Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez*, 142 S. Ct. 2057, 2065 (2022).

5 First, the Court notes that Plaintiffs seek vacatur under the APA, not an injunction.
 6 Though Defendants argue that the Section 1252(f)(1) bar also applies to vacatur, they cite no
 7 binding authority on this point, and this Court is not aware of any.

8 Further, even if Section 1252(f)(1) did bar relief under the APA, the asylum statute is not
 9 among the statutory provisions specified in Section 1252(f)(1). Defendants argue that, because the
 10 Rule provides that the presumption of asylum ineligibility shall apply in removal proceedings
 11 initiated under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1) and 1229a, vacating or enjoining the Rule would
 12 effectively “enjoin or restrain the operation” of those removal statutes in violation of Section
 13 1252(f)(1) by preventing the agencies from applying the Rule’s presumption in removal
 14 proceedings.

15 The Court is not persuaded by this argument. “At best, the law governing asylum is
 16 collateral to the process of removal.” *Entry V*, 993 F.3d at 667. The Rule imposes conditions on
 17 eligibility for asylum; these conditions are applied across all contexts in which asylum claims may
 18 arise. That any injunction would have a collateral effect on the conditions for asylum eligibility as
 19 applied during removal proceedings does not bring it within the bar imposed by Section 1252(f).
 20 *See Gonzales v. DHS*, 508 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that Section 1252(f)(1) did
 21 not prohibit injunction directly implicating adjustment of status—which is not among the statutory
 22 provisions specified in Section 1252(f)(1)—despite collateral effect on removal); *Aleman*
 23 *Gonzalez*, 142 S. Ct. at 2067 n.4 (noting that *Gonzales*, 508 F.3d at 1227, “stands at most for the
 24 unresponsive proposition that a court may enjoin the unlawful operation of a provision *that is not*
 25 *specified in § 1252(f)(1)* even if that injunction has some collateral effect on the operation of a
 26 covered provision”) (emphasis in original). Congress expressly limited the jurisdictional bar of
 27 Section 1252(f)(1) to “the provisions of part IV of this subchapter,” which do not include the
 28 asylum statute. *Gonzalez v. ICE*, 975 F.3d 788, 813 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[B]y specifying only ‘the

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provisions of Part IV’ and reinforcing its focus on only ‘*such* provisions,’ the statute’s plain text makes clear that its limitations on injunctive relief do *not* apply to *other* provisions of the INA.”) (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). The fact that the removal statutes cross-reference the asylum statute does not bring the asylum statute within the limited jurisdictional bar of Section 1252(f)(1).

The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to review the Rule and grant an appropriate remedy under the APA.

B. APA Claims

The APA provides, in relevant part, that courts “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations . . . ; [or] without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). “[I]n reviewing agency action, a court is ordinarily limited to evaluating the agency’s contemporaneous explanation in light of the existing administrative record.” *Dep’t of Com. v. New York*, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019).

1. Substantive Validity

Plaintiffs argue the Rule is substantively invalid because it is both not in accordance with law and arbitrary and capricious.

a. “Not in Accordance with Law”

The Rule imposes additional conditions on asylum eligibility; such conditions must be “consistent with” Section 1158. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(C). The government argues that the conditions imposed by the Rule are consistent with Section 1158, and that the Court should defer to the agencies’ interpretation of the statute.

To determine whether judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute is appropriate, courts apply the framework articulated by the Supreme Court in *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under *Chevron*, courts first consider “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue”; “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.” *Campos-Hernandez v. Sessions*, 889 F.3d 564,

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568 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 842). “The first and most important canon of statutory construction is the presumption ‘that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’” *In re Pangang Grp. Co., LTD.*, 901 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting *Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain*, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992)). The Court “starts with the plain statutory text and, ‘when deciding whether the language is plain, . . . must read the words in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” *Altera Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue*, 926 F.3d 1061, 1075 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting *King v. Burwell*, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015)). “In addition, [courts] examine the legislative history, the statutory structure, and ‘other traditional aids of statutory interpretation’ in order to ascertain congressional intent.” *Id.* (quoting *Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n*, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981)). “If ‘the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to [a] specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.’” *Wide Voice, LLC v. FCC*, 61 F.4th 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 843).

Congress granted the agencies authority to impose additional conditions on asylum eligibility, but only those consistent with Section 1158. The Rule effectively conditions asylum eligibility on whether a noncitizen qualifies for any of three exceptions—presenting at a port of entry, having been denied protection by another country in transit, and having parole-related travel authorization—or can show exceptionally compelling circumstances.⁸ The agencies can only condition asylum eligibility based on these factors if doing so is consistent with Section 1158.

Two of the conditions imposed by the Rule have been previously found to be inconsistent with Section 1158. Under binding Ninth Circuit precedent, conditioning asylum eligibility on presenting at a port of entry or having been denied protection in transit conflicts with the unambiguous intent of Congress as expressed in Section 1158. *Entry V*, 993 F.3d at 671 (“[T]he [Entry] Rule is substantively invalid because it conflicts with the plain congressional intent

⁸ As noted above, by its terms, the Rule only applies to individuals who transited through a country other than their own en route to the U.S. border. The Rule also contains an exception for unaccompanied minors.

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instilled in [Section] 1158(a), and is therefore ‘not in accordance with law.’”) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)); *Transit V*, 994 F.3d at 976 (“We hold, independently of *Chevron*, that the [Transit] Rule is not ‘consistent with’ [Section] 1158. We note, however, that we would come to the same conclusion even if we were to apply *Chevron*, for the Rule is contrary to the unambiguous language of [Section] 1158.”). Section 1158(a) permits noncitizens to apply for asylum regardless of whether or not they arrive at a designated port of entry; a rule that conditions eligibility for asylum on presentment at a port of entry conflicts with Section 1158(a). *Entry V*, 993 F.3d at 669–70. The safe-third-country and firm-resettlement bars, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A), (b)(2)(A), “specifically address[] the circumstances in which an alien who has traveled through, or stayed in, a third country can be deemed sufficiently safe in that country to warrant a denial of asylum in the United States”; conditioning asylum eligibility on having been denied protection in transit is not consistent with these bars. *Transit V*, 994 F.3d at 978.

Defendants argue that this Court is not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in *Entry V* and *Transit V* because, unlike the Entry and Transit Rules, this Rule does not impose a categorical bar, and a noncitizen may avoid the application of the presumption by qualifying for a different exception. ECF No. 176-1 at 27–29; *see also* 88 Fed. Reg. at 31374 (“[U]nder this [R]ule . . . manner of entry, standing alone, is never dispositive. . . . [T]he narrower application and numerous exceptions and methods of rebutting the presumption demonstrate the differences between the prior, categorical bars [and the Rule].”); *id.* at 31379 (“[T]he [R]ule imposes a condition on asylum . . . eligibility relating to whether the noncitizen availed themselves of a lawful pathway, but the [R]ule does not direct an inquiry as to whether the noncitizen can or should return to a third country.”).

The Court is not persuaded that the existence of other exceptions or the opportunity to rebut the presumption materially distinguishes this Rule from the reasoning of *Entry V* and *Transit V*. In *Entry V*, the Ninth Circuit explained that requiring noncitizens to present at ports of entry “effectively [constitutes] a categorical ban on migrants who use a method of entry explicitly authorized by Congress in [S]ection 1158(a).” 993 F.3d at 669–70. The Entry Rule was contrary to law because it excluded noncitizens from eligibility for asylum based on their failure to present

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at a port of entry, despite express statutory language providing that any noncitizen may apply for asylum, regardless of “whether or not [they arrived] at a designated port of arrival.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). That a noncitizen may attempt to preserve their eligibility for asylum by meeting another of the Rule’s exceptions, or that their failure to present at a port of entry may be excused upon a showing of exceptionally compelling circumstances, does not address the reason why restricting asylum eligibility based on place of entry conflicts with the law. Defendants are correct that the Rule does not impose a categorical bar on all noncitizens subject to the Rule; however, failure to present at a port of entry will exclude those for whom other exceptions are not available and who cannot rebut the presumption.⁹

In *Transit V*, the Ninth Circuit explained that “regulations imposing additional limitations and conditions under [Section] 1158(b)(2)(C) must be consistent with the core principle of [Sections] 1158(a)(2)(A) and (b)(2)(A)(vi)—that an otherwise qualified alien can be denied asylum only if there is a ‘safe option’ in another country.” 994 F.3d at 979. As written, the Rule imposes a presumption of ineligibility on asylum seekers who did not apply for or were granted asylum in a transit country regardless of whether that country is a safe option. That noncitizens may try to escape the presumption by satisfying a different exception, or that the presumption of ineligibility may be rebutted in exceptionally compelling circumstances, does not address whether a noncitizen has a safe option in another country. While Defendants are correct that failure to seek protection in a transit country alone may not be dispositive for many noncitizens subject to the Rule, it would be so for the subset of noncitizens for whom the other exceptions are unavailable

⁹ For example, a noncitizen ineligible for existing DHS parole programs who has been in Mexico for more than 30 business days—and is therefore ineligible for asylum in Mexico, AR 5715 (Ley Sobre Refugiados, Protección Complementaria y Asilo Político, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 27-01-2011, últimas reformas DOF 18-02-2022 (Mex.))—must present at a port of entry to avoid the presumption altogether. If they cannot safely wait for a CBP One appointment to become available, and cannot show some exceptionally compelling circumstance, they are barred from asylum.

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and who cannot rebut the presumption.¹⁰ Regulations imposing additional conditions on asylum must be consistent with the core principle of the safe-third-country and firm-resettlement bars. This Rule is not.

The Court concludes that the Rule is contrary to law because it presumes ineligible for asylum noncitizens who enter between ports of entry, using a manner of entry that Congress expressly intended should not affect access to asylum. The Rule is also contrary to law because it presumes ineligible for asylum noncitizens who fail to apply for protection in a transit country, despite Congress’s clear intent that such a factor should only limit access to asylum where the transit country actually presents a safe option.

b. Arbitrary and Capricious

“The APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard requires that agency action be reasonable and reasonably explained.” *FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project*, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1158 (2021). “The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” *Wide Voice*, 61 F.4th at 1024 (quoting *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).

Nevertheless, [courts] require the agency to ‘examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action,’ and [courts] will strike down agency action as ‘arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,’ or if the agency’s decision ‘is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.’

Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 878 F.3d 725, 732–33 (9th Cir. 2017)

¹⁰ For instance, a noncitizen originating from a third country presently in Mexico who is ineligible for existing DHS parole programs and for whom Mexico is not safe, such that they cannot wait for a CBP One appointment to become available, would be subject to the presumption, regardless of whether any country they traveled through presented a safe option for them. To rebut the presumption, that noncitizen must wait until they experience an extreme and imminent threat to life or safety to enter the United States to seek protection. 88 Fed. Reg. at 31396 (“[D]anger in Mexico generally would justify failing to pre-schedule a time and place to appear at a [port of entry] . . . only when it amounts to an extreme and imminent threat to life or safety.”). If they cannot show that or some other exceptionally compelling circumstance, they are barred from asylum.

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(quoting *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 43).

The Rule is arbitrary and capricious for at least two reasons. First, it relies on the availability of other pathways for migration to the United States, which Congress did not intend the agencies to consider in promulgating additional conditions for asylum eligibility. Second, it explains the scope of each exception by reference to the availability of the other exceptions, although the record shows that each exception will be unavailable to many noncitizens subject to the Rule.

i. “Lawful Pathways”¹¹

As the preamble states, “[t]he [R]ule’s primary purpose is to incentivize migrants, including those intending to seek asylum, to use lawful, safe, and orderly pathways to enter the United States, or seek asylum or other protection in another country through which they travel.” 88 Fed. Reg. at 31336. The final Rule offers several examples of these “lawful pathways,” namely temporary worker visa programs, parole programs, and refugee admission in the United States. *Id.* The agencies justify imposing conditions on asylum eligibility by reference to the availability of these other pathways. *See, e.g., id.* at 31318 (“Available pathways provide lawful, safe[,] and orderly mechanisms for migrants to enter the United States and make their protection claims. . . . [T]his [R]ule also imposes consequences on certain noncitizens who fail to avail themselves of the range of lawful, safe, and orderly means for entering the United States.”); *id.* at 31347 (“[T]he meaningful pathways detailed in the [R]ule, combined with the exceptions and rebuttals to the presumption, provide sufficient opportunities for individuals to meet an exception to or rebut the presumption.”); *see also* ECF No. 176-1 at 33 (“The [R]ule was promulgated based on several urgent and compelling considerations, including . . . the expansion of lawful, safe, and orderly

¹¹ The preamble to the Rule defines “lawful pathways” and “lawful, safe, and orderly pathways” as “the range of pathways and processes by which migrants are able to enter the United States or other countries in a lawful, safe, and orderly manner and seek asylum and other forms of protection as described in this [R]ule.” 88 Fed. Reg. at 31316 n.18. The Rule elsewhere appears to use “pathways” to describe the means by which an individual may qualify for an exception to, or rebut, the presumption. *See, e.g., id.* at 31410 (“The Departments believe that these alternative pathways for a noncitizen to be excepted from or rebut the presumption against asylum eligibility are sufficient.”). For the sake of clarity, the Court uses “pathways” and “lawful pathways” to refer to the means by which noncitizens may enter the United States, and not to refer to any exceptions to or opportunities to rebut the presumption imposed under the Rule.

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pathways noncitizens can pursue to seek entry to the United States.”).

The agencies’ authority to promulgate regulations imposing additional limitations and conditions on asylum eligibility requires only that such conditions be “consistent with” the asylum statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(C); the statute does not otherwise mandate that particular factors be considered in the rulemaking process. However, “agency action must be based on non-arbitrary, ‘relevant factors.’” *Judulang v. Holder*, 565 U.S. 42, 55 (2011) (quoting *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 43). The availability of refugee admissions, parole, or work visas is irrelevant to the availability of asylum, which Congress considered to be independent of any particular means of entry.

Consider, for example, parole. The Executive’s longstanding discretion to parole noncitizens into the country, codified in 1952, has changed only slightly in the decades since. *Compare* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1952) (“The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States.”) *with* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (2018) (“The Attorney General may . . . in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States.”).¹² “Prior to the [1980 Refugee Act], asylum for aliens who were within the United States had been governed by regulations promulgated by the INS, pursuant to the Attorney General’s broad parole authority.” *Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. at 427 n.4. The 1980 Refugee Act ordered the Attorney General to “establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien’s status, to apply for asylum.” Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208(a), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (1980). Asylum would therefore be a benefit for which any qualifying noncitizen at a border or port of entry could apply, independent of the Attorney General’s parole power. Imposing conditions on asylum eligibility based on the availability of parole programs relies on a factor that Congress did not intend to be

¹² While parole is discretionary and must be granted on a case-by-case basis, the Executive has created country-specific programs through which eligible noncitizens may seek individual grants of parole. *See, e.g.*, 87 Fed. Reg. at 63507.

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considered in the asylum context.¹³

Work visas and refugee admissions are similarly irrelevant to asylum. The H-2A and H-2B temporary worker visa programs predate Congress’s enactment of the asylum statute. *See Mendoza v. Perez*, 754 F.3d 1002, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The H-2A visa program—created by the [INA] of 1952 [] and amended by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 [“IRCA”]—permits employers to hire foreign workers to perform temporary agricultural work in the United States.”); *La. Forestry Ass’n Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Lab.*, 745 F.3d 653, 659 (3d Cir. 2014) (“In 1986, Congress enacted [IRCA], which amended the INA by, among other things, bifurcating the H-2 visa program into the H-2A and H-2B programs, which govern the admission of agricultural and nonagricultural workers, respectively.”). The asylum statute expressly instructs that the ability to apply for asylum should not be limited based on status; whether temporary work visas are sufficiently available is irrelevant to whether asylum should remain so. The Refugee Act, which codified the availability of asylum protection, separately established a permanent refugee admission system. Pub. L. No. 96-212, §§ 207–08. That Congress provided for refugees and asylees separately—and has maintained that distinction in the intervening decades—indicates that the availability of refugee protection should not impact asylum eligibility.

Simply put, the asylum statute contemplates that, subject to certain exceptions, any noncitizen physically present in the United States—regardless of whether they entered on a work visa or with parole-related travel authorization—or at a land border or port of entry—regardless of the size and scope of refugee admissions efforts—may apply for asylum. To justify limiting eligibility for asylum based on the expansion of other means of entry or protection is to consider factors Congress did not intend to affect such eligibility. The Rule is therefore arbitrary and capricious.

ii. Scope of Exceptions

Plaintiffs additionally argue that the agencies rely on the exceptions to justify the Rule,

¹³ That Congress later imposed additional limitations on asylum eligibility and granted the Attorney General the authority to impose further limitations consistent with the statute does not alter this analysis; none of the statutory limitations is related to the availability of other ways to enter or be admitted to the United States.

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1 while the record demonstrates that many asylum seekers will be unable to qualify for these
2 exceptions. In the preamble, the agencies acknowledge that the Rule’s exceptions and opportunity
3 for rebuttal are insufficient to ensure that all noncitizens with otherwise meritorious asylum claims
4 will remain eligible for asylum:

5 The Departments acknowledge that despite the protections preserved
6 by the [R]ule and the availability of lawful pathways, the rebuttable
7 presumption adopted in the [R]ule will result in the denial of some
8 asylum claims that otherwise may have been granted, but . . . believe
9 that the [R]ule will generally offer opportunities for those with valid
10 claims to seek protection through asylum, statutory withholding of
11 removal, or protection under the CAT

12 88 Fed. Reg. at 31332. However, the Rule justifies the breadth of its presumption of ineligibility
13 by reference to its multiple exceptions and the opportunity to rebut it. *See, e.g.*, 88 Fed. Reg. at
14 31325 (“These exceptions and opportunities for rebuttal are meant to ensure that migrants who are
15 particularly vulnerable, who are in imminent danger, or who could not access the lawful pathways
16 provided are not made ineligible for asylum by operation of the rebuttable presumption.”); *id.* at
17 31334 (distinguishing the Transit Rule because “this [R]ule includes a number of broader
18 exceptions and means for rebutting the presumption” and “the means of rebutting or establishing
19 an exception to the presumption are not unduly burdensome”); *id.* at 31347 (“[T]he meaningful
20 pathways detailed in the [R]ule, combined with the exceptions and rebuttals to the presumption,
21 provide sufficient opportunities for individuals to meet an exception to or rebut the
22 presumption.”); *id.* at 31418 (“The Departments believe that the [R]ule will generally offer
23 opportunities for those with valid claims to seek protection.”). The Rule further points to the other
24 exceptions and opportunity for rebuttal to justify the scope of each exception. *See, e.g., id.* at
25 31411 (“Applying for, and being denied, asylum or other protection in a third country is one
26 exception to the rebuttable presumption, but noncitizens who choose not to pursue this path may
27 instead seek authorization to travel to the United States to seek parole pursuant to a DHS-approved
28 parole process, or present at a [port of entry] at a pre-scheduled time and place.”); *id.* at 31408
(noting that “the parole processes are not universally available, even to the covered populations,”
but that individuals who cannot qualify for parole processes “can present at a [port of entry] by
using a DHS scheduling mechanism to schedule a time to arrive at [ports of entry] at the [southern

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border] and not be subject to the presumption of ineligibility”). The Rule therefore assumes that these exceptions will, at the very least, present meaningful options to noncitizens subject to the Rule.

Parole programs are not meaningfully available to many noncitizens subject to the Rule. Though other parole programs exist, *see* ECF No. 176-1 at 31, the Rule generally relies on the parole programs for Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan, Venezuelan, and Ukrainian nationals. These programs are country-specific and “are not universally available, even to the covered populations.” 88 Fed. Reg. at 31408. The programs are further limited numerically, capped at 30,000 total individuals from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela per month. AR 4553. Puzzlingly, these programs require that individuals fly to an interior port of entry—that is, an airport—rather than cross the southern border. Implementation of a Parole Process for Cubans, 88 Fed. Reg. 1266, 1273 (Jan. 9, 2023) (“Beneficiaries are required to fly at their own expense to an interior [port of entry], rather than arriving at the [southern border].”); Implementation of a Parole Process for Nicaraguans, 88 Fed. Reg. 1255, 1261 (Jan. 9, 2023) (same); Implementation of a Parole Process for Haitians, 88 Fed. Reg. 1243, 1249 (Jan. 9, 2023) (same); Implementation of Changes to the Parole Process for Venezuelans, 88 Fed. Reg. 1279, 1279–80 (Jan. 9, 2023) (“DHS provided the new parole process for Venezuelans who are backed by supporters in the United States to come to the United States by flying to interior [ports of entry]—thus obviating the need for them to make the dangerous journey to the [southern border].”); *see also* Implementation of the Uniting for Ukraine Parole Process, 88 Fed. Reg. 25040, 25041 (Apr. 27, 2022) (“If advance authorization is granted, the recipient will be permitted to board a flight to the United States for the purpose of requesting parole.”). Because the Rule’s presumption only applies at the southern land border, it necessarily would not apply to beneficiaries of these programs arriving at interior ports of entry. Of course, some number of individuals who receive travel authorization pursuant to a parole program might conceivably cross the southern border anyway.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the record shows

¹⁴ For instance, a prior version of the Venezuelan parole program “required [beneficiaries] to fly to the interior, rather than arriving at the [southern border], *absent extraordinary circumstances*,” suggesting that there are circumstances in which applicants may have remained eligible for parole despite arriving at the southern border. Implementation of a Parole Process for Venezuelans, 87

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that the presumption’s exception for parole-related travel authorization will necessarily be unavailable to many asylum seekers—due to the parole programs’ limited scope and eligibility requirements—and irrelevant to many noncitizens with travel authorization to apply for parole programs that require applicants to fly to interior ports.

Seeking protection in a transit country is similarly infeasible for many asylum seekers subject to the Rule. The preamble to the Rule notes that, while the agencies “recognize that not every country will be safe for every migrant,” they “expect that many migrants seeking protection will be able to access asylum or other protection in at least one transit country.” 88 Fed. Reg. at 31411. The record evidence available to Defendants, however, undermines this finding. Though Defendants argue that “the [R]ule adduces substantial evidence that seeking asylum in transit countries is a viable option for many migrants,” ECF No. 176-1 at 38, the final Rule only specifically discusses Belize, Colombia, and Mexico as countries where noncitizens can effectively seek protection, 88 Fed. Reg. at 31410–11.

The record suggests that seeking asylum or other protection in Belize or Colombia is not a viable option for many migrants. Belize has a limited asylum system: the country has only ever received 4,104 applications for asylum and has granted just 74 of those applications. AR 5423; *see also* AR 4188–89; AR 4967. The Rule highlights Belize’s 2022 amnesty program, which provided a path to citizenship for asylum seekers registered with the Department of Refugees before March 31, 2020, and limited categories of migrants residing in Belize. AR 5425–26; PC 22825.¹⁵ As of September 30, 2022—two months after the end of the registration period—5,097

Fed. Reg. 63507, 64512 (Oct. 19, 2022) (emphasis added).

¹⁵ At oral argument, Defendants challenged Plaintiffs’ reliance on data provided in public comments. ECF No. 186 at 50:10–13 (“I saw many citations to the comments, the PC record citations, but no citations really, very few, to the actual AR, the record itself.”). Public comments form part of the administrative record in the context of informal rulemaking. *Rodway v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.*, 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“The APA requires the reviewing court to ‘review the whole record’ in measuring the validity of agency action. The whole record in an informal rule-making case is comprised of comments received, hearings held, if any, and the basis and purpose statement.”) (internal citation omitted); *Nat’l Ass’n of Chain Drug Stores v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 631 F. Supp. 2d 23, 26 (D.D.C. 2009) (“An informal rulemaking record consists of the following materials: (1) the notice of proposed rulemaking; (2) comments submitted by interested persons; (3) hearing transcripts, if any; (4) other factual information considered by the agency; (5) reports of advisory committees, if any; and (6) the agency’s

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people had applied for amnesty. AR 4968. Because the registration period has ended and eligibility generally requires prior presence in Belize, the amnesty program is not available to newly arriving asylum seekers. Colombia’s asylum system has limited capacity and a significant backlog. AR 4231 (2021 State Department report noting that, of approximately 37,000 applications submitted between January 2017 and June 2021, just 753 were granted); AR 1575 (2023 DHS memorandum noting 26,000-case backlog of asylum cases). The Rule specifically references Colombia’s two-year-old temporary protection program for Venezuelans, 88 Fed. Reg. at 31411, but eligibility is limited to those who arrived irregularly before January 31, 2021, PC 23296, and those who arrived regularly before January 31, 2023, PC 23398. Nothing in the record suggests this program will be available to newly arriving migrants going forward. And migrants who apply for asylum or other protection in Belize or Colombia are at risk of violence while they wait for their applications to be adjudicated. *See, e.g.*, AR 5423 (Belizean government source noting “many migrants find themselves victims of human trafficking” in the country); AR 4204–05 (2021 State Department report noting that migrants are at risk of forced labor in Belize); AR 4224, 4228–29, 4248 (2021 State Department report noting forced labor and human trafficking of migrants, forced recruitment of migrant children by armed groups, and other violence by armed groups in Colombia); PC 22186–93 (2022 non-governmental organization [“NGO”] report documenting gender-based violence against Venezuelan women in Colombia); PC 25592–607, 25615–19 (2022 news report documenting rising violence related to ongoing armed conflict in Colombia).

The record refutes the suggestion that seeking protection in Mexico is a viable option for many asylum seekers. The Rule cites the large number of individuals applying for protection in Mexico as evidence that noncitizens subject to the presumption may seek safety there. 88 Fed. Reg. at 31414–15 (“The Departments . . . note that more than 100,000 individuals felt safe enough to apply for asylum in Mexico in 2022.”). However, while a total of 118,478 individuals applied for protection in 2022, Mexico processed just 34,762 applications that year. AR 5707. Mexico’s

statement of basis and purpose.”). The Court must review the whole record in determining the validity of the agencies’ action, and data submitted in public comments is part of that record.

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refugee agency is underfunded and unable to keep up with demand. *See, e.g.*, PC 24183 (2021 State Department report noting that the increase in agency’s budget “was not commensurate with the growth in refugee claims”); PC 22811 (2023 news report quoting refugee agency director explaining that, as a result of increased demand, the agency is “in a situation of near-breakdown”); PC 23082 (2023 NGO report noting that funding has not kept pace with the increase in applications and that the applications processed in 2022 included “many from previous years”); PC 32446–47 (2022 State Department report noting that civil society groups in Mexico reported that migration authorities did not provide information about how to request asylum, dissuaded migrants from doing so, and encouraged them to instead accept voluntary return to their countries of origin). While they wait for an adjudication, applicants for asylum must remain in Mexico, where migrants are generally at heightened risk of violence by both state and non-state actors. *See, e.g.*, PC 32446–68 (2022 State Department report noting credible reports of gender-based violence against migrants; reports of migrants being tortured by migration authorities; “numerous instances” of armed groups targeting migrants for kidnapping, extortion, and homicide; and that asylum seekers and migrants were vulnerable to forced labor); PC 22839–42 (NGO report documenting violent crimes against 13,480 migrants in Mexico, by both state and non-state actors, between January 2021 and December 2022); PC 76248–87 (table of crimes summarized in preceding report); PC 21752–58 (2022 NGO report discussing gender-based violence in northern Mexico border cities, including against LGBTQI+ and Black migrants); PC 21610–11 (2022 NGO report concerning gender-based violence against Venezuelan women and LGBTQI+ migrants in southern Mexico).¹⁶

¹⁶ In addition to these examples, the record is replete with additional documentation of the extraordinary risk of violence many migrants face in Mexico. *See, e.g.*, PC 22129–30 (2023 news report documenting instances of kidnapping of asylum seekers in northern Mexico); PC 23247–50 (2022 news report quoting Chihuahua state police chief stating that “organized criminal gangs are financing their operations through migrant trafficking”); PC 23082 (2023 NGO report discussing treatment of migrants and asylum seekers); PC 20937–43 (2021 NGO report documenting kidnapping and extortion of Venezuelan migrants in Mexico); PC 29740–29744 (2021 NGO report documenting instances of rape, kidnapping, and other violence experienced by migrant women in Mexico); PC 75946–48 (2022 NGO report documenting violence against migrants in Mexico); AR 4881 (2022 NGO report noting that asylum seekers from Central America have been pursued across the border and found in southern Mexico by their persecutors).

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The record thus undermines the Rule’s finding that Belize, Colombia, and Mexico present viable, safe options for many asylum seekers. Defendants argue that sufficient record evidence supports the Rule’s finding that transit countries present a viable option for many asylum seekers, instructing the Court to “see generally” over 1,200 pages of the administrative record. ECF No. 176-1 at 31 n.11. At oral argument, Defendants directed the Court to this footnote and sources cited within it for data regarding improved safety and conditions in transit countries. ECF No. 186 at 49:9–20. The sources cited in the footnote document asylum, temporary protection, or other immigration programs of varying capacity presently or formerly available in transit countries. *See, e.g.*, AR 1575–77 (2023 DHS memorandum noting that Costa Rica has established a temporary protection program for certain Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan asylum seekers and that Ecuador has opened registration for temporary residence permits for Venezuelans); AR 5465–69 (Costa Rica government website explaining that the temporary protection program applies to nationals of designated countries who applied for asylum prior to September 2022, and is therefore not available to newly arrived migrants); AR 5757–61 (press release from Government of Mexico noting the expansion of temporary labor programs). But none of the sources Defendants cite suggests that safety and conditions in these transit countries have improved, and several of the sources suggest migrants are susceptible to harm in these countries. *See, e.g.*, AR 4256–81 (2021 State Department report noting that migrants in Costa Rica are subject to forced labor and that employers use threats of deportation to withhold wages from Nicaraguan migrants); AR 4282–325 (2021 State Department report noting that migrants and refugees in Ecuador are subject to gender-based violence, human trafficking, forced labor, and forcible recruitment into criminal activity). The record evidence cited by Defendants does not support their argument.

That leaves the exception for noncitizens who present at a port of entry. To avoid the presumption under this exception, noncitizens must secure an appointment using the CBP One mobile application and present at the selected port of entry at the pre-scheduled date and time; if a noncitizen presents at a port of entry but lacks an appointment, they must show “it was not possible to access or use the DHS scheduling system due to language barrier, illiteracy, significant technical failure, or other ongoing and serious obstacle,” or they will be subject to the

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presumption. 88 Fed. Reg. at 31450. “This exception [to the exception] captures a narrow set of circumstances in which it was truly not possible for the noncitizen to access or use the CBP One app,” and exceptions for language barriers or illiteracy “will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.” *Id.* at 31406. The sub-exception for technical failure is “intended to cover technical failures of the app itself . . . rather than a situation in which a migrant is unable to schedule an appointment due to high demand or one where there is a fleeting temporary technical error.” *Id.* at 31407.

The Rule acknowledges various limitations associated with CBP One, including the existence of “connectivity gaps and unreliable Wi-Fi in central and northern Mexico,” the only parts of Mexico in which the app is available; that some individuals may lack smartphones; that the appointment system creates unique challenges for larger families traveling together; that the app is only available in English, Spanish, and Haitian Creole, and some error messages only appear in English; that Login.gov, which applicants must use to access CBP One, is exclusively available in English; and that users have identified various technical issues since the app was first implemented, including the app timing out or becoming overloaded by requests. *Id.* at 31401–05. Additionally, when the Rule was issued, CBP One offered only 1,250 appointments per day across eight southern border ports of entry. AR 2489; 88 Fed. Reg. at 31358. Demand for appointments exceeds supply. PC 21003; PC 21167; PC 25458; PC 25475.

The agencies also “acknowledge that individuals seeking to make an appointment . . . will generally need to wait in Mexico” and “that, in some cases, the conditions in which such individuals wait may be dangerous.” 88 Fed. Reg. at 31400. Because CBP One access is limited to central and northern Mexico, asylum seekers must remain in these areas until they successfully secure an appointment. As discussed above, the record suggests that migrants waiting in Mexico are at serious risk of violence. Under the Rule, however, “danger in Mexico generally would justify failing to pre-schedule a time and place to appear at a [port of entry] . . . only when it amounts to an extreme and imminent threat to life or safety.” *Id.* at 31396. Until the risk of violence rises to this level, individuals seeking to maintain their eligibility for asylum in the United States—and who cannot satisfy either of the other exceptions to the rule—must remain in Mexico, where the record suggests many will not be safe.

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While the Rule explains each exception by reference to another, the record suggests these exceptions will not be meaningfully available to many noncitizens subject to the Rule. The Rule is therefore arbitrary and capricious.

2. Procedural Validity

Prior to promulgating a rule, the APA generally requires agencies to publish notice of the proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). After providing notice, “the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). “The purpose of the notice and comment requirement is to provide for meaningful public participation in the rule-making process.” *Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt*, 58 F.3d 1392, 1404 (9th Cir. 1995). “[Courts] determine ‘the adequacy of the agency’s notice and comment procedure, without deferring to an agency’s own opinion of the . . . opportunities it provided.’” *Kern Cnty. Farm Bureau v. Allen*, 450 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA*, 279 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002)). “[T]he failure to provide notice and comment is harmless only where the agency’s mistake ‘clearly had no bearing on the procedure used or the substance of decision reached.’” *California v. Azar*, 911 F.3d 558, 580 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting *Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan*, 958 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th Cir. 1992)).

Plaintiffs argue that the comment period was too short; that the agencies announced closely related policy changes after the public comment period closed; and that the agencies did not disclose the Office of Immigration Statistics (“OIS”) analysis, model, or data underpinning the agencies’ prediction of a sharp rise in migrants arriving at the southern border.

The agencies provided 33 days for public comment, which Defendants argue is both sufficient under the APA and justified by the impending expiration of Title 42. “When substantial rule changes are proposed, a 30-day comment period is generally the shortest time period sufficient for interested persons to meaningfully review a proposed rule and provide informed comment.” *Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n v. FCC*, 921 F.3d 1102, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2019); *see also Pangea Legal Servs. v. DHS*, 501 F. Supp. 3d 792, 820 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2020) (noting that, “[w]hile

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not binding, the government’s own internal orders state that ‘a comment period . . . should generally be at least 60 days’”) (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821–22 (Jan. 18, 2011)). The COVID-19 public health emergency, pursuant to which the Title 42 public health order was in effect, was extended several times; at least as of December 13, 2022, DHS was actively preparing for the end of Title 42. AR 2591. On January 30, 2023, the Administration formally announced that the COVID-19 public health emergency would expire on May 11. 88 Fed. Reg. at 31435 n.312. On February 23, the agencies published the Notice. *Id.* at 11714. The public comment period extended until March 27, and the final Rule was published on May 16. *Id.* at 31433.

Shortly after the close of the Rule’s comment period, the agencies implemented additional policy changes: DHS announced it would resume conducting credible fear interviews in CBP custody and would only provide 24 hours’ notice for such interviews; DHS would remove non-Mexican nationals, including nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, to Mexico; and the agencies would indefinitely pause a prior regulation which permitted asylum officers to adjudicate certain asylum applications.¹⁷ The agencies did not disclose that they would undertake these policy changes, so the public was unable to comment on how they would interact with the Rule, and the Rule did not address these policies. Plaintiffs argue that these policy changes undermined the rationale for the Rule, because conducting interviews in CBP custody on short notice was likely to dampen the passage rate, while being able to effectuate removals more quickly would lessen overcrowding in border and detention facilities.

The agencies also justified the broad presumption imposed by the Rule using OIS encounter projections which predicted that, once Title 42 was lifted, the agencies would encounter between 11,000 and 13,000 individuals attempting to cross the border without authorization each

¹⁷ In the preamble to the Rule, the agencies state that the Rule does not present staggered rulemaking concerns, noting that “[t]he last asylum-related rulemaking, the Asylum Processing [Interim Final Rule (“IFR”)], was published on March 27, 2022, and was effective on May 31, 2022[,] . . . [so] commenters did not have to contend with the interplay of intersecting rules and related policy changes when drafting their comments.” 88 Fed. Reg. at 31434. The Asylum Processing IFR was paused shortly after the close of the comment period for the challenged Rule.

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day, “absent policy changes and absent a viable mechanism for removing Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan [] nationals who do not have a valid protection claim.”¹⁸ 88 Fed. Reg. at 11705. “[T]he notice required by the APA, or information subsequently supplied to the public, must disclose the thinking that has animated the form of a proposed rule and the data upon which that rule is based.” *California ex rel. Becerra v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior*, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting *Home Box Off., Inc. v. FCC*, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). “Integral to an agency’s notice requirement is its duty to ‘identify and make available technical studies and data that it has employed in reaching the decisions to propose particular rules.’” *Kern Cnty. Farm Bureau*, 450 F.3d at 1076 (quoting *Solite Corp. v. EPA*, 952 F.2d 473, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). In a footnote, the Notice explains that OIS “generates encounter projections every 2–4 weeks, using the best data and modeling available,” and describes the statistical basis for the model and the mathematical processes it incorporates. 88 Fed. Reg. at 11705 n.11. But the Notice does not provide the relevant data that goes into the projections, the factors that impact the model, or the complete OIS analysis on which the Rule depends.

Taken together, these circumstances persuade the Court that the Rule’s notice procedures are insufficient under the APA. The Rule is unquestionably complex—it establishes a presumption of asylum ineligibility for noncitizens who enter at the southern border that is subject to various exceptions, one of which contains its own exception, and is rebuttable only in certain circumstances. That presumption of ineligibility applies across all contexts in which such individuals might be screened for asylum or other protection. The complexity of the Rule suggests that 30 days is unreasonable, particularly because the agencies were preparing for the end of Title 42 well before it was announced, such that they could have issued the Notice with sufficient time to grant a longer comment period and still have had the Rule in place when Title 42 expired. The agencies also did not disclose other, relevant policy changes that would affect the agencies’ reasoning for adopting the Rule, including one that controverted an assumption central

¹⁸ The removal-to-Mexico policy announced after the comment period closed provides the “viable mechanism” referenced here.

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to the agencies’ projection of post-Title 42 encounters at the southern border. *See* 88 Fed. Reg. at 11705 (“[E]ncounters could rise to 11,000–13,000 . . . *absent a viable mechanism for removing* Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan [] nationals who do not have a valid protection claim.”) (emphasis added); *Pangea*, 501 F. Supp. 3d at 821 (noting that staggered policy changes “add[] to the overall context in which the notice provided . . . failed to give the public a meaningful opportunity to comment”). The agencies further justified the breadth and urgency of the Rule on the basis of data that they did not disclose; without any insight into the model or the relevance of the factors it is designed to consider, the public had no means by which to challenge that justification. Together, these circumstances denied the public a meaningful opportunity to comment on the Rule.

Defendants argue that the number of comments received, and the fact that Plaintiffs each submitted a comment, indicates that the public was provided sufficient opportunity to provide meaningful commentary. Given more time, however, Plaintiffs would have provided more in-depth analysis of the Rule and its potential impact on their clients. ECF No. 169-5 ¶ 26; ECF No. 169-7 ¶ 30; ECF No. 175 ¶ 19. Had they known about the contemplated policy changes, Plaintiffs would have discussed how these policy changes would intersect with the Rule to affect their clients. ECF No. 169-3 ¶ 30; ECF No. 169-5 ¶ 26; ECF No. 175 ¶ 20. The Court cannot assume that the agencies would not have taken into consideration more comprehensive comments addressing the related border policies or the OIS analysis that justified the Rule, such that the “agenc[ies]’ mistake ‘clearly had no bearing . . . on the substance of decision reached,’” *Azar*, 911 F.3d at 580. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the agencies’ error was not harmless.

C. Scope of Relief

When an agency decision is unlawful under the APA, the standard remedy is to vacate the agency action and remand to the agency. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (instructing reviewing court to “set aside” agency action); *All. for the Wild Rockies v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 907 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Although not without exception, vacatur of an unlawful agency action normally accompanies a remand.”); *Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy*, 631 F.3d 1072, 1095 (9th Cir. 2011) (“When a court determines that an agency’s action failed to follow Congress’s

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clear mandate the appropriate remedy is to vacate that action.”).

Defendants urge the Court to remand the Rule without vacating it. “[Courts] leave an invalid rule in place only ‘when equity demands’ that [they] do so.” *Pollinator Stewardship Council v. EPA*, 806 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting *Babbitt*, 58 F.3d at 1405). “Whether agency action should be vacated depends on how serious the agency’s errors are and the disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed.” *350 Montana v. Haaland*, 50 F.4th 1254, 1273 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting *Nat’l Family Farm Coal. v. EPA*, 966 F.3d 893, 929 (9th Cir. 2020)). Courts also consider “whether the agency would likely be able to offer better reasoning[;] [] whether by complying with procedural rules, it could adopt the same rule on remand[;] or whether such fundamental flaws in the agency’s decision make it unlikely that the same rule would be adopted on remand.” *Pollinator*, 806 F.3d at 532.

The severity of the agencies’ errors in this case counsels strongly in favor of vacatur. The Rule is both substantively and procedurally invalid. The agencies cannot adopt the same rule on remand; as described above, the Rule is contrary to law. “[T]he threat of disruptive consequences cannot save a rule when its fundamental flaws ‘foreclose [the agency] from promulgating the same standards on remand.’” *North Carolina v. EPA*, 531 F.3d 896, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting *Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA*, 489 F.3d 1250, 1261–62 (D.C. Cir. 2007)); see also *Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal.*, 966 F.3d at 1145 (holding that vacatur was necessary, despite potential adverse impacts, because “the ‘fundamental flaws’ in the [agency’s] analysis are so substantial that it is exceedingly ‘unlikely that the same rule would be adopted on remand’”) (quoting *Pollinator*, 806 F.3d at 532).

The Court is not persuaded that deviating from the presumed remedy of vacatur and remand is appropriate in this case. The Court is mindful that this is “a time of heightened irregular migration throughout the Western Hemisphere,” ECF No. 176-2 ¶ 4; that such migration has dropped since the Rule went into effect, *id.* ¶¶ 13–16; and that, in the absence of the Rule’s presumption of asylum ineligibility, “DHS anticipates a return to elevated encounter levels that would place significant strain on DHS components, border communities, and interior cities,” *id.* ¶ 50. But the Rule—which has been in effect for two months—cannot remain in place, and vacating the challenged Rule would restore a regulatory regime that was in place for decades

1 before.

2 **CONCLUSION**

3 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted.
4 Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied. The Rule is hereby vacated and remanded
5 to the agencies.

6 This order shall be stayed for 14 days. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

7 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

8 Dated: July 25, 2023

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10 JON S. TIGAR
11 United States District Judge

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EXHIBIT C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT,
et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-06810-JST

**ORDER RECONSIDERING STANDING
ON REMAND**

Re: ECF Nos. 187, 205, 217, 222

Plaintiffs are legal services organizations challenging a rule imposing a rebuttable presumption of asylum ineligibility for individuals who do not utilize certain “lawful pathways.” Two events relevant to this case occurred while it was on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. First, the Supreme Court decided *Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine*, 602 U.S. 367 (2024), which addressed organizational standing. Second, the Trump Administration took a series of executive actions foreclosing certain “lawful pathways” and otherwise restricting asylum. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for this Court to reconsider its prior order granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs, in light of both intervening changes. Before the Court is the parties’ supplemental briefing addressing these issues. The Court’s prior summary judgment order is hereby modified to reflect (1) that *Alliance* does not undermine Plaintiffs’ Article III standing and (2) that the termination of lawful pathways underscores the rule’s unlawfulness, as set forth below. The Court therefore reaffirms its prior order.

I. Background

Promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice (“the Departments”) in May 2023, the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule (“the Rule”) creates a rebuttable presumption of asylum ineligibility for noncitizens who crossed the southern border

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into the United States between May 11, 2023 and May 11, 2025, after traveling through a country other than their home country. 88 Fed. Reg. 31,314 (May 16, 2023); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.33(a), 1208.33(a). Noncitizens who sought to enter the United States but lacked authorization to do so could avoid the presumption of asylum ineligibility by seeking asylum or protection in a third country through which they transited, using alternative legal mechanisms such as refugee admissions or parole processes, or by presenting themselves at a Port of Entry (POE) with a pre-scheduled appointment for inspection and processing, made through the CBP One app. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.33(a)(2), 1208.33(a)(2). The presumption of ineligibility therefore functions as an incentive to promote these “lawful pathways,” the availability of which was a central premise of the Rule. *See* 88 Fed. Reg. at 31,314 (“The rule encourages migrants to avail themselves of lawful, safe, and orderly pathways into the United States . . .”). A demonstration of exceptionally compelling circumstances could also rebut the presumption of ineligibility. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.33(a)(3), 1208.33(a)(3).

Plaintiffs are six legal services organizations that provide representation to asylum seekers, operating primarily in California and Texas: East Bay Sanctuary Covenant (“EBSC”), Central American Resource Center (“CARECEN”), American Gateways, Tahirih Justice Center, National Center for Lesbian Rights, and Immigrant Defenders Law Center (“ImmDef”). Challenging the Rule as unlawful, they filed the complaint in this case on November 9, 2018, ECF No. 1, and an amended complaint on May 18, 2023, ECF No. 164.

On July 25, 2023, the Court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs, vacating the Rule as contrary to the asylum statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, arbitrary and capricious, and procedurally defective. ECF No. 187. The Court observed that “conditioning asylum eligibility on presenting at a port of entry or having been denied protection in transit” conflicts with Section 1158 according to binding Ninth Circuit precedent. *Id.* at 16 (citing *EBSC v. Biden*, 993 F.3d 640, 669–70, 671 (9th Cir. 2021); *EBSC v. Garland*, 994 F.3d 962, 976, 678 (9th Cir. 2020)). The Court then rejected Defendants’ argument that the existence of other exceptions or the possibility of rebutting the presumption of ineligibility saved the Rule, because there would be some individuals “for whom other exceptions are not available and who cannot rebut the presumption.” *Id.* at 18–

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19. As to Article III standing, the Court found that Plaintiffs had established a concrete injury because the Rule “will frustrate Plaintiffs’ missions and require them to divert resources from existing programs” and “devote additional resources to each client seeking asylum,” which would decrease the number of clients served and “substantially affect” the organizations’ funding. ECF 187 at 8, 9–10. Defendants appealed on July 25, 2023. ECF No. 189. The Ninth Circuit stayed this Court’s order vacating the Rule, ECF No. 196, and subsequently held appeal proceedings in abeyance pending settlement negotiations that were ultimately unsuccessful, ECF No. 205 at 7.

On January 20, 2025, President Trump took three executive actions affecting the implementation of the Rule. First, he issued an executive order directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to terminate the CBP One appointment system and certain parole processes including those allowing certain nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (“CHNV”) to enter the U.S. *See* Executive Order No. 14165 § 7(a)–(b), 90 Fed. Reg. 8,467, 8,468 (Jan. 29, 2025). While termination of the CBP One app was effective immediately, the CHNV parole programs were terminated on March 25, 2025. Termination of the Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, 90 Fed. Reg. 13,611, 13,611 (Mar. 25, 2025). In a second executive order issued the same day, the President indefinitely suspended all decisions on applications for refugee status, with exceptions only pursuant to the joint agreement of the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security. *See* Executive Order No. 14163 § 3, 90 Fed. Reg. 8,459, 8,459 (Jan. 30, 2025).

The third action that day, Presidential Proclamation 10888, entitled “Guaranteeing the States Protection Against Invasion,” invoked the President’s authorities under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a), and the Constitution, to preclude the entry of noncitizens who engage in an invasion across the southern border, or who fail to submit “sufficient medical information and reliable criminal history and background information as to enable fulfillment of the requirements of” the inadmissibility provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)–(3). Presidential Proclamation 10888 §§ 1, 3, 90 Fed. Reg. 8,333, 8,335 (January 29, 2025). The proclamation barred the same noncitizens from invoking certain forms of protection, including asylum. *Id.* §§ 2, 3, 90 Fed. Reg. at 8,335. Although the U.S. District Court for the District of

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1 Columbia enjoined the application of the Proclamation to noncitizens in the United States,
2 *Refugee & Immigrant Ctr. for Educ. & Legal Servs. v. Noem*, 793 F. Supp. 3d 19, 111 (D.D.C.
3 July 2, 2025), the D.C. Circuit stayed that order insofar as it enjoins, vacates, and declares
4 unlawful the Proclamation’s restrictions on asylum, *see Refugee & Immigrant Ctr. for Educ. &*
5 *Legal Servs. v. Noem*, No. 25-5243, Doc. No. 2128457, at p. 2 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 2025).

6 On February 5, 2025, the parties notified the Ninth Circuit that their settlement discussions
7 were not successful and were given the opportunity to provide their views on how the case should
8 proceed. ECF No. 205 at 7. The Ninth Circuit then vacated this Court’s prior summary judgment
9 order and remanded for further proceedings, directing this Court to address the impact of two
10 intervening changes: the Supreme Court’s decision in *Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance*
11 *for Hippocratic Medicine*, 602 U.S. 367 (2024), and the above-detailed termination of certain
12 “lawful pathways.” *Id.* at 7–8.

13 On April 29, 2025, this Court issued a scheduling order requesting supplemental briefing
14 from the parties concerning the issues identified in the Ninth Circuit’s order. ECF No. 209. The
15 Court also ordered Defendants to file a “statement regarding whether the Rule has been extended.”
16 *Id.* at 2. Although the Rule originally applied only to noncitizens who crossed the southern border
17 between May 11, 2023, and May 11, 2025, the Biden Administration had proposed amending the
18 Rule to apply indefinitely to new border crossers. 89 Fed. Reg. 81,156, 81,274 (Oct. 7, 2024). On
19 May 20, 2025, Defendants notified the Court that they had not extended the Rule to apply to
20 noncitizens who cross the border after May 11, 2025. ECF 210.

21 The Rule therefore only applies to those who crossed the border between May 11, 2023
22 and May 11, 2025 and who have pending asylum proceedings. ECF No. 217 at 6; 8 C.F.R.
23 § 208.33(a)(1)(i). This includes individuals who crossed the border after January 20, 2025, who
24 could not have come to the United States via CBP One appointments, and those crossing after
25 March 25, 2025, to whom the CHNV parole programs were no longer available. ECF No. 217 at
26 6. And although most noncitizens who crossed during that period are also ineligible for asylum
27 because of Presidential Proclamation 10888, that proclamation is being challenged in court, as
28 outlined above. *Id.*

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II. Jurisdiction

This Court has statutory jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Article III standing is discussed below.

III. Discussion

A. Standing

To establish Article III standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” *Cottonwood Env’t Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 789 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)).

“[O]rganizations may have standing ‘to sue on their own behalf for injuries they have sustained.’” *Alliance*, 602 U.S. at 393 (quoting *Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman*, 455 U.S. 363, 379, n.19 (1982)). “In doing so, however, organizations must satisfy the usual standards for injury in fact, causation, and redressability that apply to individuals.” *Id.* at 393–94.

In *Havens*, a nonprofit organizational plaintiff called HOME sued Havens Realty Corporation for “racial steering” practices in leasing its two apartment complexes. 455 U.S. at 366–67. HOME alleged that Havens’ discrimination had “frustrated” the organization’s “efforts to assist equal access to housing through counseling and other referral services” because the organization “has had to devote significant resources to identify and counteract the defendant’s racially discriminatory steering practices.” *Id.* at 379. The Court held that if Havens’ steering practices “perceptibly impaired” the plaintiff’s ability to provide services, then “there can be no question that the organization has suffered injury in fact.” *Id.* “Such concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities—with the consequent drain on the organization’s resources—constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.” *Id.* (citing *Sierra Club v. Morton*, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)).

The Supreme Court followed up *Havens* in *Alliance*, which considered the contours of organizational standing in the context of medical associations’ challenge to FDA actions

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1 facilitating access to mifepristone, an abortion-inducing medication. 602 U.S. at 372–74. The
 2 medical associations argued, in relevant part, that the FDA’s actions had “impaired” their “ability
 3 to provide services and achieve their organizational missions.” *Id.* at 394. As evidence of this
 4 impairment, they identified the costs of performing studies to “better inform their members and
 5 the public about mifepristone’s risks.” *Id.* They also identified the expenditure of “‘considerable
 6 time, energy, and resources’ drafting citizen petitions to FDA, as well as engaging in public
 7 advocacy and public education.” *Id.* “And all of that has caused the organizations to spend
 8 ‘considerable resources’ to the detriment of other spending priorities.” *Id.*

9 On that record, the Supreme Court concluded that the associations had not shown any
 10 actual impairment to their missions because these costs were only incurred as part of the plaintiff
 11 organizations’ attempts to oppose the FDA’s policies. The Court held that “an organization that
 12 has not suffered a concrete injury . . . cannot spend its way into standing simply by expending
 13 money to gather information and advocate against the defendant’s action.” *Id.* In other words,
 14 “[a]n organization cannot manufacture its own standing in that way.” *Id.*

15 In deciding *Alliance*, the Supreme Court both distinguished and reaffirmed *Havens*, in
 16 which the organizational plaintiffs had standing because the defendants’ actions “directly affected
 17 and interfered with” the plaintiff’s “core business activities.” *Alliance*, 602 U.S. at 395 (citing
 18 *Havens*, 455 U.S. at 368). “Critically, HOME not only was an issue-advocacy organization, but
 19 also operated a housing counseling service.” *Id.* In providing false information to the plaintiff’s
 20 Black employees about apartment availability, Havens Realty directly interfered with HOME’s
 21 core activities of providing counseling to home-seekers in a manner “not dissimilar to a retailer
 22 who sues a manufacturer for selling defective goods to the retailer.” *Id.*

23 *Alliance* was consistent with existing Ninth Circuit precedent. *See, e.g., EBSC v. Biden*,
 24 993 F.3d at 663 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Of course, organizations cannot ‘manufacture the injury by
 25 incurring litigation costs or simply choosing to spend money fixing a problem that otherwise
 26 would not affect the organization at all,’ but they can show they ‘would have suffered some other
 27 injury’ had they ‘not diverted resources to counteracting the problem.’” (quoting *La Asociacion de*
 28 *Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. Lake Forest*, 624 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010)); *EBSC v.*
Garland, 994 F.3d at 974–75 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Plaintiffs’ injuries are not ‘manufactured injuries”

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addressing “a problem that would not affect the organization at all.” The injuries affect plaintiffs’ core mission and their organizational funding, and are sufficient to establish standing.” (citation modified)).

In this Court’s summary judgment order, it found that the plaintiff organizations had adequately established two classes of injury in fact. ECF No. 187 at 8–10. First, all Plaintiffs had established standing because the Rule “will frustrate Plaintiffs’ missions and require them to divert resources from existing programs.” *Id.* at 8. “Plaintiffs will need to overhaul their screening and intake processes to determine whether clients can qualify for an exception to the Rule or rebut the presumption, and assign staff to gather relevant evidence and prepare such arguments.” *Id.* at 8–9. For clients ineligible for asylum under the Rule, Plaintiffs will have to assist them in seeking withholding of removal and CAT withholding, which require greater investment of time and resources because they impose a higher evidentiary standard and because they do not allow for derivative claims by family members. *Id.* at 9. Forced to devote more resources to each client, Plaintiffs will be able to serve fewer clients. *Id.* And because of that, several Plaintiffs anticipate losing funding awarded based on the number of clients served, constituting a financial injury. *Id.* at 9–10. The Court therefore concluded that Plaintiffs had established standing because “the Rule will frustrate their organizational goals, require diversion of resources, and substantially affect their funding.” *Id.* at 10.

Defendants argue (1) that legally, *Alliance* prevents Plaintiffs from establishing standing based on the frustration of organizational goals or the diversion of resources and (2) that factually, Plaintiffs “have not substantiated any specific, non-attenuated loss of funding.” ECF No. 222 at 8. The Court disagrees on both grounds.

1. Impairment to Core Activities

Because the Rule impairs their core activities, Plaintiffs have established organizational standing under *Havens* and *Alliance*.

Plaintiffs’ core activities involve representing asylum seekers on affirmative asylum applications. Half of Plaintiff EBSC’s operations budget is dedicated to representing asylum seekers on affirmative asylum applications, but approximately 30% of those clients cross the U.S.

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border between ports of entry after transiting through Mexico and are therefore ineligible for asylum under the Rule. ECF No. 217 at 8. Accordingly, EBSC noted a steep drop in the affirmative asylum applications it filed in the two years after the Rule took effect. *Id.* Tahirih Justice Center, National Center for Lesbian Rights, and American Gateways also provide representation for affirmative asylum applications and have been harmed because fewer individuals are eligible under the Rule. *Id.* These plaintiffs are also harmed because the Rule converts many affirmative asylum cases into defensive ones, which involve a greater number of proceedings and are more labor intensive. *Id.*; ECF No. 217-12 ¶ 12. And the Rule makes representing individuals made ineligible for asylum more difficult by forcing them to seek withholding of removal or CAT protection with their attendant higher evidentiary standards. ECF No. 217 at 9. Forced to engage in more labor-intensive forms of representation, Plaintiffs are forced to divert time and resources, leaving them able to serve fewer clients. *Id.* at 9–10. These impacts will continue because many noncitizens who entered during the Rule’s two-year window will have their cases adjudicated on the merits in the coming years. *Id.* at 9. As in *Havens*, and unlike in *Alliance*, these increased costs result from the *application* of the challenged executive action, not merely *opposition* to it.

Defendants assert that *Alliance* “rejected the notion that an organization can show standing to challenge an action merely by demonstrating frustration of mission and a consequent diversion of resources.” ECF No. 222 at 8. It is true that *Alliance* rejected standing based on “a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests” and held that “issue-advocacy organizations” did not have standing simply because they “incurr[ed] costs to oppose [agency] actions” through lobbying and public education. *Alliance*, 602 U.S. at 394–95. But *Alliance* did not overrule *Havens*. *Id.* at 395 (citing *Havens*, 455 U.S. at 368). Like the *Havens* plaintiff, HOME, Plaintiffs here provide counseling and legal services to clients. And much like the racial steering practices harmed HOME’s activities in furtherance of fair housing by impairing its counseling services, the Rule impedes Plaintiffs’ attempts to secure immigration protection for their clients by making that representation more burdensome. Just as HOME was forced to compensate for the harm by undertaking investigative efforts to root out the discrimination, Plaintiffs have been forced to

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compensate by shifting their focus to defensive proceedings, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. 455 U.S. at 379 (“HOME has had to devote significant resources to identify and counteract the defendant’s racially discriminatory steering practices.”).

To be sure, this case is not precisely the same as *Havens*, which was an “unusual” case that the Court has not extended “beyond its context.” *Alliance*, 602 U.S. at 396. Namely, while the alleged misconduct in *Havens* interfered directly with the ease and accuracy of counseling in a manner akin to a “manufacturer . . . selling defective goods to the retailer,” here, the alleged misconduct has the most direct effect on the availability of relief for clients. *Alliance*, 602 U.S. at 395. But under the particular circumstances of this case, it takes only one more step to connect the availability of relief for Plaintiffs’ clients to interference with their ability to provide services. Because so many clients are made ineligible for asylum, Plaintiffs must undertake more costly and burdensome representation efforts to compensate for the harm to their core services, ultimately serving fewer clients overall. This is a far cry from the manufactured standing in *Alliance*.

In support of their view that Plaintiffs have not established standing under *Alliance*, Defendants cite *Coalition on Homelessness v. City & County of San Francisco*, 758 F. Supp. 3d 1102, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2024). *Coalition on Homelessness* relied on *Arizona All. for Retired Americans v. Mayes*, 117 F.4th 1165, 1177 (9th Cir. 2024), which has now been vacated and taken en banc, 130 F.4th 1177 (9th Cir. 2025). And even under *Arizona Alliance*’s now-vacated read of *Alliance*’s standing requirement, the case here would pass muster. Under *Arizona Alliance*, standing may not “hinge on the claim that the organization has diverted resources in response to government action that does not directly affect the organization’s existing core activities.” *Id.* at 1177. But here, the government action directly affects Plaintiffs’ core activities by obstructing unlawful barriers to clients’ receipt of asylum and forcing Plaintiffs to compensate by diverting resources to other forms of representation.

Defendants also aver that Plaintiffs’ “services have not been impaired within the meaning of *Alliance*, and any re-allocation of resources they have undertaken does not establish standing.” ECF No. 222 at 8. But in the absence of that reallocation of resources and to some extent despite it, Plaintiffs have been and will continue to be impeded in their efforts to perform the core

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organizational function of representing noncitizens seeking immigration protection. In no sense is Plaintiffs’ standing reliant on spending money on advocacy opposing the Rule; rather, their standing is established because they have had to spend more to compensate for the harm the Rule caused to their core organizational missions.¹

2. Funding-Loss Injury

Alliance did not address an organization’s ability to establish standing based on the loss of funding. As this Court and the Ninth Circuit previously held, Plaintiff EBSC has standing to challenge the Rule on that basis. *See* ECF No. 187 at 9–10 (holding that EBSC established standing based on threatened loss of funding because it would be able to serve fewer clients under the Rule); *EBSC v. Biden*, 993 F.3d at 663–64 (holding that EBSC and other plaintiffs established funding-loss injury on a similar theory); *EBSC v. Garland*, 994 F.3d at 974 (same).

Plaintiff EBSC has established that the Rule caused it to lose funding from a \$2,000 per-case grant that it receives for each affirmative asylum case. ECF No. 217 at 10. Since the Rule took effect, EBSC has had to turn away potential affirmative asylum application clients because

¹ Defendants also assert that the Supreme Court’s decision in *United States v. Texas*, 599 U.S. 670 (2023), provides grounds for rejecting Plaintiffs’ standing. ECF No. 222 at 13–14. As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that the same argument was raised in Defendants’ summary judgment briefs, ECF No. 176-1 at 22; ECF No. 182 at 1–2, was considered by the Court in its prior order, ECF No. 187 at 10–11, and is outside of the scope of the supplemental briefing requested by the Court here. *United States v. Texas* is, in any case, inapposite. In that case, the Supreme Court held that state plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge immigration enforcement priorities resulting in too few arrests and prosecutions. The dispute was not “judicially cognizable meaning “traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” *Id.* at 676 (quoting *Raines v. Byrd*, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997)). This was so because the plaintiffs’ suit would interfere with the Executive’s “exclusive” and “absolute” discretion to allocate prosecutorial resources and the Court lacked “meaningful standards for assessing” the exercise of that discretion. *Id.* at 679–80. The state plaintiffs had identified no “precedent, history, or tradition of courts ordering the Executive Branch to change its arrest or prosecution policies so that the Executive Branch makes more arrests or initiates more prosecutions.” *Id.* at 677. In other words, the reasoning and outcome of *United States v. Texas* was extensively tethered to the executive’s discretion to decline to enforce the law or prosecute violations. There are no nonenforcement decisions at issue here. Moreover, the APA and the text of the INA provide clear standards for assessing the imposition of unlawful conditions on asylum. *See* ECF No. 187 at 15–19. Finally, the Court in *United States v. Texas* stated that the “provision of legal benefits . . . could lead to a different standing analysis.” 599 U.S. at 683. Asylum is a legal benefit.

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they were ineligible for asylum and EBSC has therefore lost the corresponding funding. *Id.* From May 2023 to May 2025, EBSC’s new affirmative asylum cases decreased by an average of 50 cases a year from the last year before the Rule took effect, leading to an average loss of over \$100,000 each year. *Id.* “Additionally, each potential asylum client that EBSC has been unable to represent because of the Rule ‘will also lead to a significant loss in future revenue,’ because EBSC’s ‘[s]uccessful affirmative asylum clients generally remain [its] clients in future applications’ for which EBSC charges or receives per-case funding, including green card and citizenship applications.” *Id.*

Defendants assert that “[a]t . . . the time of the amended complaint, EBSC had not adequately substantiated a prospective funding-loss injury,” but the Ninth Circuit has found arguments of the type made by Plaintiffs to suffice. *See EBSC v. Biden*, 993 F.3d at 663–64 (finding that EBSC had sufficiently established funding-loss injury because 80% of its clients would be ineligible for asylum under the challenged rule because they entered without stopping at a port of entry, causing EBSC to “suffer a concomitant loss of funding”).

Meanwhile, Plaintiff ImmDef faces a loss of funding through a government-funded panel attorney program because the Rule increases the complexity of defensive asylum cases and therefore reduces the number of such cases ImmDef can take. ECF No. 217 at 10; ECF No. 217-3 ¶ 15 (explaining that “if we are unable to take on new matters, we will not receive any of our budgeted funding from [a program with the Public Defender Office in San Diego]”). Defendants object that “ImmDef does not quantify the number of cases it is currently handling versus those it handled previously,” ECF No. 222 at 19, but again, the Ninth Circuit has found a funding-loss injury sufficiently established based on an identical theory without requiring such quantification. *See EBSC v. Biden*, 993 F.3d at 664 (finding that CARECEN had sufficiently established funding-loss injury because it receives flat funding from the state per client and would be able to serve fewer clients because of the challenged rule would result in clients being placed into more time- and resource-intensive withholding proceedings).

Plaintiffs have established direct “injuries to their own pocketbooks.” *Washington v. Trump*, 145 F.4th 1013, 1024 (9th Cir. 2025). Even if Plaintiffs had not established impairment to

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their core organizational functions, two Plaintiffs have established financial injury that is unaffected by the holding in *Alliance*.

B. Termination of Lawful Pathways

The Ninth Circuit’s remand order also directed this Court to address the impact of Executive Order 14165, which terminated the CBP One app appointment scheduling system and the CHNV parole processes. ECF No. 205 at 8. The Court concludes that the termination of those pathways underscores the Rule’s inconsistency with the asylum statute. Even before the termination, the Rule violated 8 U.S.C. § 1158 because it “condition[ed] asylum eligibility on presenting at a port of entry or having been denied protection in transit,” which “conflicts with the unambiguous intent of Congress” in 8 U.S.C. § 1158 according to binding Ninth Circuit precedent. ECF No. 187 at 16 (citing *EBSC v. Biden*, 993 F.3d at 671 and *EBSC v. Garland*, 994 F.3d at 976); *see also id.* at 17 (“Section 1158(a) permits noncitizens to apply for asylum regardless of whether or not they arrive at a designated port of entry; a rule that conditions eligibility for asylum on presentment at a port of entry conflicts with Section 1158(a).”). Without access to CBP One appointments, the Rule’s violation of the asylum statute’s expansive authorization for noncitizens to apply for asylum is made even more severe. And with respect to the availability of CHNV parole processes, the removal of an additional lawful pathway increases the number of individuals subject to the Rule’s rebuttable presumption of ineligibility in violation of Section 1158(a).

Defendants argue that “the Rule’s presumption of asylum ineligibility is lawful . . . regardless of whether the CBP One scheduling system and parole processes continue to exist” because asylum is granted as a matter of discretion and the Executive may impose conditions intended to protect “systemic efficiency.” ECF No. 222 at 21–22; *see also id.* at 23–24. Defendants raised these arguments in their summary judgment briefing and the Court rejected them. *See* ECF No. 176-1 at 23–26. Time has not improved their appeal. In any event, because these arguments do not address the effect of the termination of lawful pathways, they are outside of the scope of the Ninth Circuit’s remand and the Court does not address them further.

Defendants also argue that “the elimination of the CBP One appointment system and

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certain parole processes cannot, and does not, undermine the legality of the Rule” for two reasons. ECF No. 222 at 8. First, there exist “additional exceptions and rebuttal grounds.” *Id.* Second, “the Rule was superseded by Presidential Proclamation during the relevant time period.” *Id.*

Defendants’ first argument is the Rule is lawful because even after CBP One appointments and CHNV parole were terminated, individuals could still receive asylum if they sought and were denied protection in a third country, showed exceptionally compelling circumstances, or rebutted the presumption of ineligibility. ECF No. 222 at 23. But this Court previously explained at length that providing means for circumventing an unlawful restriction do not render that restriction lawful if they are not meaningfully available to all asylum seekers. ECF No. 187 at 22–30. Because the Rule bars individuals who did *not* seek protection in a third country, *cannot* show exceptionally compelling circumstances,² and *cannot* rebut the presumption of ineligibility, it unlawfully conflicts with the asylum statute. Moreover, the transit-country-denial requirement is contrary to the asylum statute under *EBSC v. Garland*, 994 F.3d at 975–980.

Second, Defendants argue that “the elimination of any pathways discussed in the Rule had little to no practical impact” because Proclamation 10888 was in effect from the time that the pathways were terminated to the time the Rule expired. ECF No. 222 at 24. As Plaintiffs note, litigation over Proclamation 10888 is ongoing and, should the Proclamation ultimately be enjoined, the Proclamation will serve as no barrier to status for individuals who entered during the relevant time period. ECF No. 223 at 11. Furthermore, the existence of an independent barrier in Proclamation 10888 does nothing to alter this Court’s conclusion that the Rule was unlawful and that the termination of lawful pathways only underscores its unlawfulness.

Plaintiffs finally argue that termination of lawful pathways punctuates the agency’s arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking, because the Rule relied on the existence of lawful

² Defendants baldly suggest that applicants would face no heavy burden establishing exceptionally compelling circumstances where “there is no available scheduling system or alternative lawful pathway to the United States.” ECF No. 222 at 23. But under the Rule, “[s]uch circumstances exist in cases of acute medical emergencies, ‘imminent and extreme threat to life or safety, such as an imminent threat of rape, kidnapping, torture, or murder,’ or ‘severe . . . trafficking in persons.’” ECF No. 187 at 4.

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1 pathways which now no longer exist. ECF No. 187 at 24, 30. However, Defendants are correct
2 that the arbitrary-and-capricious determination is made based on the administrative record “before
3 the [agency] at the time [it] made [its] decision.” ECF No. 222 at 23 (quoting *Citizens to Preserve*
4 *Overton Park v. Volpe*, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)). Plaintiffs respond that the termination of
5 lawful pathways is still persuasive because the Court’s original holding relied in part on the fact
6 that the lawful pathways were “completely discretionary,” “not incorporated into the Rule,” and
7 “could be rescinded (or enjoined) at any time.” ECF No. 223 at 10. The fact that the lawful
8 pathways were subsequently rescinded does in fact validate that holding, but technically speaking,
9 the fact that lawful pathways were in fact terminated is irrelevant to the arbitrary-and-capricious
10 analysis. What is important is still that they *could have been* terminated at any time, the truth of
11 which has not been affected by subsequent events.

12 The termination of lawful pathways underscores the unlawfulness of the Rule and makes
13 the consequences of the Rule’s unlawfulness more severe, but does not alter the Court’s
14 conclusion that the agency’s decision to promulgate it was arbitrary and capricious.

15 CONCLUSION

16 The Court reaffirms its prior summary judgment order, ECF No. 187, and finds, for the
17 reasons set forth above, that (1) Plaintiffs continue to have standing to challenge the Rule
18 following *FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine*, 602 U.S. 367 (2024), and (2) the termination

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
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1 of the “lawful pathways” on which the Rule is premised further confirms the Rule’s
2 unlawfulness.³

3 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

4 Dated: May 7, 2026

5 
6 JON S. TIGARD
United States District Judge


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24 _____
25 ³ Defendants urge this Court to reconsider its decision to vacate the Rule in light of the Supreme
26 Court’s decision in *Trump v. CASA*, 606 U.S. 831 (2025). ECF No. 222 at 20. But as numerous
27 courts have since held, *CASA* had no bearing on vacatur, a remedy expressly provided for in the
28 APA. See, e.g., *Doe v. Trump*, 796 F. Supp. 3d 599, 603 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (rejecting “the *CASA*
argument . . . because the Supreme Court did not resolve ‘the distinct question whether the
Administrative Procedure Act authorizes federal courts to vacate federal agency action.’” (quoting
CASA, 606 U.S. at 847 n.10)); *New York v. United States Dep’t of Energy*, No. 6:25-CV-01458-
MTK, 2025 WL 3140578, at *16 (D. Or. Nov. 10, 2025) (same).

EXHIBIT D

DECLARATION OF EBDALNASSR ALEBW

I, Ebdalnassr Alebw, make the following statement under penalty of perjury:

1. My name is Ebdalnassr Alebw. I am from Syria and I am 55 years old.
2. I fled from Syria because I was targeted for my religion and my political views.
3. When I was in Mexico, I contacted a person named  (she was supposedly an attorney) to make for me an appointment via CBPOne. I was supposed to pay for this service \$3,000. At first, I paid \$1,000 and promised to pay another \$2,000 after my appointment with the Border Patrol was set. 



4. After crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, I was encountered by the Border Patrol and detained. On May 8, 2025, I applied for asylum with the immigration court. I used the services of Mr. Akram Abusharar to prepare my application for asylum. He told me that my case was very strong, that I would be definitely granted asylum,
5. On June 27, 2025, I had an individual hearing at the Oakdale Immigration Court. During the hearing, Mr. Abusharar did not question me about the danger that I had experienced in Mexico. I was granted withholding of removal. I did not understand the difference between asylum and withholding of removal. So, Mr. Abusharar explained to me that asylum and withholding of removal are almost the same but asylum provides a path to the right of permanent residency, while withholding of removal does not. Mr. Abusharar also advised me that I would be released from ICE detention within 30 days if ICE did not appeal against the grant of withholding of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
6. I patiently waited for 30 days. After 30 days, I tried to contact Mr. Abusharar many times calling the number 714-535-5600. Sometimes the phone was answered by the receptionist who used to promise me that Mr. Abusharar would call me back but he never did. I was highly confused with my situation and did not understand what was going on. That's why I decided to find another attorney. I asked my brother Mamdouh Al Abou to find another attorney for me.

7. My brother also called Mr. Abusharar and asked him to at least give me a copy of my record in the immigration court, so this record could be provided to another attorney. Even though Mr. Abusharar promised to email the record he never did. That's why my brother had to fly from Alaska to Mr. Abusharar's office in California to personally obtain the copy of my record in the immigration court.

8. At the beginning of August 2025, an ICE officer came to the dorm where I was detained to take questions from the detainees. I asked him when I would be released and the officer answered me that ICE was looking for a third country for my removal because I was granted withholding of removal to Syria only. It was a shocking information.

9. An ICE officer told me that my attorney should file a motion to reconsider with the immigration court to change the grant of withholding of removal for the grant of asylum.

10. One of the detainees, Mohammed Ali from Mauritania gave me the phone number 313-818-1854 of attorney Rashad Almasmari. My brother set for me a consultation with the attorney. My brother provided the record of my removal proceedings to the attorney. I talked to the attorney's paralegal Mr. Nawfal. I asked whether, on the basis of my record in the immigration court, it was possible to change the grant of withholding of removal for the grant of asylum. Mr. Nawfal assured me that Mr. Almasmari would take care of everything and I would be definitely granted asylum. There was no written agreement between me and Mr. Almasmari. I agreed to pay \$2,500 for his services. I paid \$1,500 advance payment.

11. Mr. Almasmari filed a motion to reconsider with the immigration court which was denied. When I saw the decision of the immigration judge denying the motion, I understood that Mr. Almasmari did something wrong, so I refused to pay another \$1,000.

12. In November 2025, I contacted my current attorney Ms. Mariya Howykowycz. She explained to me that the motion to reconsider filed by Mr. Almasmari did not address the reason of the denial of my application for asylum. I asked her to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

13. On January 9, 2026, through my attorney Ms. Howykowycz, I filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the District Court of the Western District of Louisiana. On May 12, 2026, the District Court of the Western District of Louisiana ordered my release from ICE custody.

14. On May 13, 2026, I was released from ICE custody and settled in Anchorage, Alaska.

15. On May 11, 2026, when I was still detained in the Jackson Parish Correctional Center, I had a phone conversation with my brother who told me that Ms. Howykowycz had advised him that the rule which prevented my grant of asylum was vacated. I told my brother that I would like Ms. Howykowycz to convince the immigration judge that my application for asylum should be granted.

16. On June 5, 2026, I was re-detained by ICE officers who told me I would be removed to the Central African Republic in a couple days. I was terrified by this ICE decision because I fear that I would be persecuted or tortured in the Central African Republic.

17. I sought help from an Alaskan public defender Jane Imholte who filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Alaska District Court.

Signature

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Jane Imholte', written over a horizontal line.

June 7, 2026

EXHIBIT F



Arichka Attorney <kotsyubahowykowycz@gmail.com>

IN RE: Ebdalnassr Alebw

2 messages

Arichka Attorney <kotsyubahowykowycz@gmail.com>

Mon, Jun 8, 2026 at 9:38 AM

To: "rashad@almasmarilaw.com" <rashad@almasmarilaw.com>

Dear Counsel,

Please see a letter attached.

Best regards,

--

Mariya Howykowycz - Admitted to practice by New York State - Practice Limited Exclusively to Immigration and Naturalization Law - Authorized to Practice Immigration and Naturalization Law in All 50 States and US Territories Pursuant to 8 USC 1292.1



LETTER to counsel.pdf

200K

Arichka Attorney <kotsyubahowykowycz@gmail.com>

Mon, Jun 8, 2026 at 11:50 AM

To: "rashad@almasmarilaw.com" <rashad@almasmarilaw.com>

Dear Mr. Alasmari,

Please be advised that your response will be forwarded to the immigration court.

Best regards,

Maroya Howykowycz

[Quoted text hidden]

EBDALNASSR ALEBW



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that the forgoing RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUA SPONTE RECONSIDERATION was electronically filed through ECAS and both parties are participating in ECAS. Therefore, no separate service was completed.

Date June 9, 2026

Mariya Howykowycz

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