IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

EUILMER GUERRERO CORDOVA, Petitioner, v. Warden, Midwest Regional Reception Center; and Field Office Director, ICE ERO, Respondents.	)	Case No. 26-3105-JWL

RESPONSE TO § 2241 HABEAS PETITION AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Respondent hereby responds to Petitioner's habeas Petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and the Court's Order to Show Cause (Doc. 2). Petitioner Euilmer Guerrero Cordova ("Petitioner") challenges his detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). On April 28, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner argues his continued detention violates the Constitution, including his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The Court should deny the Petition because Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention, as he is actively seeking admission under the Cuban Adjustment Act and because he entered the United States as an arriving alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). The Court should also decline to reach Petitioner's condition of confinement claim because a habeas petition is not the appropriate vehicle for such claims.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On May 22, 2024, Petitioner applied for admission into the United States at the Paso Del Norte Port of Entry in El Paso, Texas. (Declaration of D.O. Christian McCall [attached as Exhibit A], ¶ 5). Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cuba. (McCall Decl., ¶ 4). Petitioner was

temporarily paroled into the United States pursuant to Section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (McCall Decl., ¶ 5). DHS issued a Notice to Appear ("NTA") on the same day, charging Petitioner as inadmissible to the United States under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). (*Id.*). The NTA classified Petitioner as an arriving alien. (*Id.*).

On August 29, 2024, Petitioner was arrested in Jefferson County, Kentucky, for Criminal Trespassing – 3rd Degree, No Operator's License, Operating a Motor Vehicle Under the Influence of Alcohol, Possessing Open Alcohol Beverage Container in a Motor Vehicle, Resisting Arrest, and Criminal Littering. (McCall Decl., ¶ 6). On March 6, 2025, he was convicted of Criminal Trespassing – 3rd Degree and Alcohol Intoxication in a Public Place (amended down from Operating a Motor Vehicle Under the Influence of Alcohol). The remaining charges were dismissed. (*Id.*).

On May 30, 2025, Petitioner filed an application for adjustment of status with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"). (McCall Decl., ¶ 7); (Doc. 1, pg. 5). Petitioner states that this immigration case is "active and ongoing." (Doc. 1, pg. 5).

On July 3, 2025, Petitioner was arrested in Harrison County, Indiana, for Operating Vehicle with Alcohol Concentration Equivalent to .15 or More and Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated. (McCall Decl., ¶ 8). That case remains pending. (*Id.*).

On July 5, 2025, Petitioner was taken into ICE custody. (McCall Decl., ¶ 9). Petitioner's removal case remained pending as USCIS considered Petitioner's application for adjustment of status. On November 2, 2025, Petitioner filed an application for adjustment of status with the Immigration Court. (McCall Decl., ¶ 10). On December 3, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion with the Immigration Court, requesting that removal proceedings be terminated

or administratively closed. (McCall Decl., ¶ 11). On December 5, 2025, the Immigration Judge denied the request to terminate, but granted administrative closure. (McCall Decl., ¶ 12). Administrative closure is a docket management tool used by Immigration Judges to remove cases from their active docket. (McCall Decl., ¶ 13).

On December 12, 2025, DHS moved to re-calendar removal proceedings, highlighting that Petitioner is detained and that the anticipated duration of the USCIS proceedings cannot be ascertained. (McCall Decl., ¶ 14). On January 8, 2026, the Immigration Judge granted DHS's motion to re-calendar. (McCall Decl., ¶ 15). The Immigration Judge also reconsidered the December 4, 2025, decision denying termination. (*Id.*). The Immigration Judge terminated proceedings, finding that Petitioner is eligible for adjustment of status, and that USCIS has jurisdiction over that application. (*Id.*).

On February 4, 2026, DHS filed an appeal of the Immigration Judge's decision with the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). (McCall Decl., ¶ 16). Petitioner was transferred to the Midwest Regional Reception Center in Leavenworth, Kansas, on April 1, 2026. (McCall Decl., ¶ 17). During the day, Petitioner is housed in a low security pod with approximately 50 other individuals. He has regular access to books, board games, video games, and TV. Detainees in low security pods have regular access to outdoor recreation. Detainees also have regular access to medical care when needed or requested. (*Id.*).

As of today's date, DHS's appeal remains pending with the BIA. Moreover, Petitioner's application for adjustment of status filed with USCIS remains pending. (McCall Decl., ¶ 18).

ARGUMENT

Petitioner is not yet subject to a final order of removal, as the termination of Petitioner's removal proceedings remains pending with the BIA. Thus, Petitioner's requested relief hinges on

whether he is entitled to a bond hearing prior to issuance of a final order of removal. Here, Petitioner is properly subject to detention without a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) because Petitioner is (1) both an "applicant for admission" and "seeking admission," as he is pursuing adjustment of status to permanent resident status under the Cuban Adjustment Act; and (2) an "arriving alien," which prior court cases have evaluated under § 1225(b)(2).

Moreover, Petitioner's conditions of confinement claims should be dismissed because such claims must be raised in a civil rights action, not a habeas corpus petition.

I. Petitioner is "seeking admission" under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) because he submitted, and is pursuing, an application for adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act.

Section 1225(b) of Title 8 authorizes the detention of certain aliens arriving in the United States. Section 1225(b)(2) describes the "other aliens" who may be detained while participating in full removal proceedings:

> Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). "Admission" is "the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). An "applicant for admission" is defined as "[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States[.]" 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a). Applicants for admission may be temporarily released on parole "for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit," but such parole "shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).

The government respectfully maintains that an applicant for admission is necessarily "seeking admission" to the United States. This Court and others, however, have rejected this

position reasoning that the "seeking admission" requirement "is not satisfied in the case of an already-present alien by the mere fact that the alien is an 'applicant for admission'" *Galdamez Orellana v. Welsh*, No. 26-3019-JWL, 2026 WL 710121, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 13, 2026) (citing *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, 166 F.4th 494, 508-21 (5th Cir. 2026) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). Instead, this Court has reasoned that "seeking admission" means "actively seeking admission." *Id.*; *see also Buenrostro-Mendez*, 166 F.4th at 510. Even under this standard, however, the Petitioner in this case is subject to detention under § 1225 because he *is* actively seeking admission to the United States.

Here, Petitioner applied for admission into the United States at the Paso Del Norte Port of Entry in El Paso, Texas, on May 22, 2024. Petitioner was temporarily released on parole "for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). As the Supreme Court made clear, this specific provision authorizes temporary parole from detention under § 1225(b). *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 283 (2018). Thus, the government has always considered Petitioner to be detained pursuant to § 1225. On the same day, DHS issued a NTA on the same day, charging Petitioner as inadmissible to the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Petitioner was classified as an arriving alien. But because Petitioner is a native of Cuba and was paroled under § 1182(d)(5), he maintained eligibility to adjust his status to that of a lawfully admitted permanent resident after a period of one year under the Cuban Adjustment Act. "The term 'lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).

As Petitioner's Petition and exhibits make clear, Petitioner is, and always has been, actively seeking to be admitted as a lawful permanent resident under the Cuban Adjustment Act. Petitioner

alleges that he has a pending adjustment of status application (Doc. 1, pgs. 5-6). In the IJ's order terminating removal proceedings, which is on appeal, the Immigration Court also expressly recognized that Petitioner is actively pursuing adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act and that the application remained pending. (Doc. 1-1, pg. 11-12).

This Court recently held in *Khudyi, v. Carter, et al.*, No. 26-3030-JWL, 2026 WL 1098197, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 23, 2026), however, that a petitioner who was seeking asylum was not "seeking admission" because the statute's reach "would not cover aliens already present in this country." This reasoning should not apply to aliens such as Petitioner, who present at a port of entry for the purpose of seeking admission and are paroled under § 1182(d)(5), especially here. Petitioner's presence in this country was for the purpose, and in furtherance, of him actively seeking admission to the United States as a lawful permanent resident under the Cuban Adjustment Act. These facts show that an alien *can* be (and in this case, *is*) "seeking admission" while physically present in the United States. *See also, e.g.*, *Espinoza Hernandez v. Olson,* No. 25-cv-1670-bhl, 2026 WL 161509, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 21, 2026) ("By asking for asylum, Espinoza Hernandez is literally seeking admission—authorization to remain lawfully in this country."); *Chen v. Almodovar*, No. 1:25-cv-8350-MKV, 2025 WL 3484855, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025) (stating that where an alien was "actively seeking admission (i.e., lawful status) through asylum, the Court concludes that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) clearly applies to Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pending the resolution of his removal proceedings.") (citation omitted).

Thus, Petitioner's pursuit of adjustment of status demonstrates that he is an "applicant for admission" and has been seeking, and continues to seek, admission for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). He is therefore subject to mandatory detention under the same statute, regardless

of his temporary parole into the Under States, which was necessary to allow him to continue to seek admission under the Cuban Adjustment Act.

II. Petitioner is an "arriving alien," and this Court has already determined that such aliens are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).[1]

An alien who enters through a port of entry and is paroled into the United States remains an arriving alien. The definition of "arriving alien" includes "an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien seeking transit through the United States at a port-of-entry[.]" 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1001.1(q). "An arriving alien remains an arriving alien even if paroled" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), "and even after any such parole is terminated or revoked." 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1001.1(q). These regulatory provisions are reinforced by the text of the humanitarian parole statute:

> The Secretary of Homeland Security may, except as provided in subparagraph (B) or in section 1184(f) of this title, in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.

8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); *see also Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (repeating that parole "shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien" under § 1182(d)(5)(A)).

As a corollary, a paroled alien is "'treated as if stopped at the border' for purposes of immigration law," at least when constitutional due process is at issue. *Suarez-Tejada v. United States*, 85 F. App'x 711, 712-13 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). More specifically, a paroled

[1] Respondent acknowledges that this Court recently rejected this argument in *Khudyi*, No. 26-3030-JWL, 2026 WL 1098197 (D. Kan. Apr. 23, 2026). The government respectfully includes this argument for purposes of preserving the argument on appeal.

alien is "legally considered to be detained at the border and hence as never having effected entry into this country." *Id.* at 712 (quoting *Sierra v. INS*, 258 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001)); *see also Baca-Prieto v. Guigni*, 95 F.3d 1006, 1011 (10th Cir. 1996) ("A paroled alien is, therefore, not deemed to be within the United States and is subject to exclusion just as if he were initially appearing at the border seeking entry.") (citation omitted).[2]

These provisions and principles apply to the facts of this case. Petitioner entered the United States through a port of entry and was granted parole. He remained an arriving alien during his period of parole, which expired one year after his entry into the United States.

This Court has previously approved the detention of an arriving alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). In *De La Rosa Espinoza v. Guadian*, No. 20-3126-JWL, 2020 WL 3452967 (D. Kan. June 24, 2020), the petitioner presented himself at a port of entry. *Id.* at *1 & n.1. An immigration judge found the petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), denied the petitioner's asylum application, and ordered the petitioner's removal. *Id.* at *1-2. Petitioner appealed to the BIA, and his administrative appeal remained pending. *Id.* at *2. An appeal to the BIA involving the denial of the petitioner's request for parole also remained pending. *Id.* The petitioner filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that "his prolonged detention without a bond hearing violate[d] the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." *Id.* at *3 (citation modified); *see also id.* at *6 (noting that the petitioner did not argue he had "a statutory right to release or a bond hearing"). The United States maintained that the petitioner was "an arriving alien" for whom detention was mandatory under § 1225(b)(2)(A) until he was "subject to a final order of removal." *Id.* at *5.

[2] Although the petitioner in *Galdamez Orellana v. Welsh*, No. 26-3019-JWL, 2026 WL 710121, at *1 (D. Kan. Mar. 13, 2026), also received parole, Mr. Galdamez Orellana, unlike the petitioner here, initially entered the United States illegally, without authorization or inspection.

Although the Court in *De La Rosa Espinoza* focused on the constitutional due process issue raised by the petitioner, the Court was required, nonetheless, to determine whether the petitioner had a statutory right to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Id.* at *6-8. The Court agreed that arriving aliens, including those participating in humanitarian parole programs, are "legally considered to be detained at the border and hence as never having effected entry into this country." *Id.* at *6 (citation omitted). The Court further agreed that for an alien "on the threshold of initial entry," the procedure authorized by Congress "*is* due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." *Id.* (citation omitted); *see also id.* at *7-8 (stating that "an arriving alien has a procedural due process right only to the process accorded to her by Congress") (citation modified).

The Court in *De La Rosa Espinoza* ultimately denied the petitioner's request for habeas relief. *Id.* at *8. The Court held that "the applicable statutory process shapes Petitioner's procedural due-process rights and Petitioner has no statutory right to release or a bond hearing." *Id.*; *see also Bataineh v. Lundgren*, No. 20-3132-JWL, 2020 WL 3572597, at *8 (D. Kan. July 1, 2020) (confirming that in *De La Rosa Espinoza* the Court "held that the applicable statutory process shapes an arriving alien's procedural due-process rights and therefore they have no statutory right to release or a bond hearing").[3]

De La Rosa Espinoza and *Bataineh* summarize Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court case law explaining why an arriving or paroled alien generally is limited to the procedural due process rights bestowed by Congress. *De La Rosa Espinoza*, 2020 WL 3452967, at *6-8; *Bataineh*, 2020 WL 3572597, at *7-9. And the Supreme Court in *Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam* stated:

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[3] While not part of any holding, other cases decided by this Court contain references to arriving aliens and 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) too. *See, e.g.*, *Trujillo Araya v. Guadian*, No. 20-3234-JWL, 2020 WL 7626508, at *1 & n.2 (D. Kan. Dec. 22, 2020) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1001.1(q), and 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B) and indicating that "CBP determined Petitioner to be an arriving alien and detained him without bond pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)"); *Zhiriakov v. Barr*, No. 20-3141-JWL, 2020 WL 3960442, at *2 (D. Kan. July 13, 2020) ("CBP determined Petitioner to be an arriving alien and detained him without bond pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).").

> In 1892, the Court wrote that as to "foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to law," "the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law." Since then, the Court has often reiterated this important rule.
>
> Respondent argues that this rule does not apply to him because he was not taken into custody the instant he attempted to enter the country (as would have been the case had he arrived at a lawful port of entry). Because he succeeded in making it 25 yards into U. S. territory before he was caught, he claims the right to be treated more favorably. The Ninth Circuit agreed with this argument.
>
> We reject it. It disregards the reason for our century-old rule regarding the due process rights of an alien seeking initial entry. That rule rests on fundamental propositions: "[T]he power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative;" the Constitution gives "the political department of the government" plenary authority to decide which aliens to admit; and a concomitant of that power is the power to set the procedures to be followed in determining whether an alien should be admitted.
>
> This rule would be meaningless if it became inoperative as soon as an arriving alien set foot on U.S. soil. When an alien arrives at a port of entry—for example, an international airport—the alien is on U.S. soil, but the alien is not considered to have entered the country for the purposes of this rule. On the contrary, aliens who arrive at ports of entry—even those paroled elsewhere in the country for years pending removal—are "treated" for due process purposes "as if stopped at the border."
>
> The same must be true of an alien like respondent. As previously noted, an alien who tries to enter the country illegally is treated as an "applicant for admission," § 1225(a)(1), and an alien who is detained shortly after unlawful entry cannot be said to have "effected an entry." Like an alien detained after arriving at a port of entry, an alien like respondent is "on the threshold." The rule advocated by respondent and adopted by the Ninth Circuit would undermine the "sovereign prerogative" of governing admission to this country and create a perverse incentive to enter at an unlawful rather than a lawful location.

591 U.S. 103, 138-39 (2020) (citations omitted).

As suggested in *Thuraissigiam*, there is a long ancestry to the rule that an arriving or paroled alien has only the procedural due process rights conveyed by Congress. *See, e.g.*, *Leng May Ma v. Barber*, 357 U.S. 185-86, 188-90 (1958) (rejecting the habeas petition of an alien who had been paroled into the United States for six years and had been detained for more than four

years); *Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206, 208, 212, 215 (1953) (finding no violation of due process for a non-entered alien detained for over three years without a bond hearing, as "an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing"); *United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy*, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."); *Kaplan v. Tod*, 267 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1925) (determining that an alien living in America on parole for almost 10 years had not entered the country, as she "was still in theory of law at the boundary line and had gained no foothold in the United States"); *United States v. Ju Toy*, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905) (indicating that a paroled alien, "although physically within our boundaries," is to be "regarded as if he had been stopped at the limit of our jurisdiction"); *Nishimura Akiu v. United States*, 142 U.S. 660, 659-60 (1892) (denying a due process challenge by an alien who had spent over eight months in custody without a bond hearing, because the decisions of executive officers, "acting within powers expressly conferred by congress," constituted due process).

It follows that Petitioner cannot obtain habeas relief by invoking the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. As an arriving alien to whom humanitarian parole was initially extended and later terminated, Petitioner is deemed to be "on the threshold" and not to have effected entry into the United States for Constitutional purposes. His due process rights are defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and "neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond hearings." *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297.

III. Petitioner's conditions of confinement claims cannot be litigated pursuant to a habeas corpus petition.

Petitioner additionally argues that his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights have been violated because he has been in facilities where he lacked adequate medical care and experienced inhumane conditions. (Doc. 1, pgs. 6-7). It is not clear whether Petitioner is charging that he

suffered such conditions at the Midwest Regional Reception Center ("MRRC"). Respondent, however, expressly denies such conditions exist at MRRC. *See* (McCall Decl., ¶ 17). And the exhibits Petitioner provided with his Petition seem to show that Petitioner is receiving appropriate medical attention. But in any event, this attack on his conditions of confinement is inappropriately raised in his habeas Petition and does not support his claim for release.

The general habeas corpus statute allows district courts to issue writs of habeas corpus where, among other things, a detainee establishes that he "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C § 2241(c)(3). To that end, detainees may seek habeas relief based on challenges to "the validity of the fact or length of their confinement." *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973). By contrast, "a prison conditions claim" .... "falls outside habeas's core." *Nance v. Ward*, 597 U.S. 159, 168 (2022); *Nelson v. Campbell*, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004) ("constitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner's confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of [the] core [of habeas corpus]").

In the Tenth Circuit, "[i]t is well-settled law that prisoners who wish to challenge only the conditions of their confinement, as opposed to its fact or duration, must do so through civil rights lawsuits filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or *Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents*, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) - not through federal habeas proceedings." *Standifer v. Ledezma*, 653 F.3d 1276, 1280 (10th Cir. 2011); *see also Boyce v. Ashcroft*, 251 F.3d 911, 918 (10th Cir.), *vacated as moot*, 268 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of habeas petition claiming that conditions of confinement violated Eighth Amendment rights and holding "that petitioner may not raise his challenges to conditions of confinement in a Section 2241 petition.") This Court has similarly concluded that claims regarding the conditions of confinement do not arise under § 2241. *Grimes*

v. Hudson, No. 23-3194-JWL, 2023 WL 5222518, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 15, 2023). This Court, therefore, should decline to order Petitioner's release based on his allegations that he has been in facilities where he lacked adequate medical care and experienced inhumane conditions.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Petitioner's requested relief.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on May 8, 2026, the foregoing was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will provide notice to all registered parties. I further certify that I will cause a copy of the foregoing filing to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following non-CM/ECF participant:

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/s/ Brian E. Vanorsby
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