

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
3 VALDOSTA DIVISION

4 LAZO SANDOVAL, Ericks Misael,

5 *Petitioner,*

6 v.

7 Warden of IRWIN COUNTY DETENTION
8 CENTER, *in his official capacity*

9 Respondent.

Case No.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
28 U.S.C. § 2241

Agency number: A



INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Ericks Misael Lazo Sandoval (“Petitioner”) is in the physical custody of Respondent at the Irwin County Detention Center in Ocilla, GA. He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) will conclude that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.

2. Petitioner is charged with, *inter alia*, having entered the United States (“U.S”) without admission or inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

3. Based on this allegation in Petitioner’s removal proceedings, DHS will certainly deny Petitioner’s release from immigration custody, consistent with a new DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the U.S. without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

4. Similarly, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA or Board”) issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges (“IJs”), holding that an IJ has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the U.S. without admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

5. Petitioner’s detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the U.S. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute

1 expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered
2 the U.S. without inspection.

3 6. Respondent's new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory
4 framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like
5 Petitioner.

6 7. Moreover, on November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary
7 judgment on behalf of individual plaintiffs and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide
8 class and extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*,
9 No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
10 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners), *Maldonado*
11 *Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3288403, at
12 *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond
13 Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting
14 Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).

15 8. The declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained
16 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under §
17 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11. The court then issued a final
18 judgment in favor of the class on December 18, 2025.

19 9. Nonetheless, the EOIR and its subagency, the Immigration Court and the DHS,
20 have blatantly refused to abide by the declaratory relief and have unlawfully ordered that class
21 members be denied the opportunity to be released on bond.

22 10. IJs have informed class members in bond hearings that they have been instructed
23 by "leadership" that the declaratory judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* is not controlling, even
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1 with respect to class members, and that instead IJs remain bound to follow the agency's prior
2 decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

3 11. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be released
4 unless Respondent provides a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven (7) days.

5 JURISDICTION

6 12. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondent. Petitioner is detained at the
7 Irwin County Detention Center located in Georgia.

8 13. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28
9 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States
10 Constitution (the Suspension Clause), because Petitioner is in Custody under the authority of the
11 United States and challenges the legality of that detention.

12 14. This Court retains the jurisdiction to review the legality of immigration detention
13 through the writ of habeas corpus. See *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).

14 15. Sections 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(9) and 8 U.S.C. §1252 (g) do not strip this Court of
15 jurisdiction.

16 16. The Supreme Court has explained that §1252(b)(9) does not channel all
17 immigration-related claims into a petition for review and does not bar habeas challenges to
18 detention. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 839 (2018). Likewise, §1252 (g) is narrowly limited
19 to three discrete actions and does not apply to challenges to the legality of detention. *Reno v.*
20 *American Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm*, 525 U.S. 471 (1999).

21 17. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory
22 Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

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VENUE

18. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

19. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondent is an employee, officer, or agency of the U.S., and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Middle District of Georgia.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

20. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondent to show cause “forthwith,” unless the Petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondent must file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

21. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

PARTIES

22. Petitioner ERICKS MISAEL LAZO SANDOVAL is a citizen of Nicaragua who has been in immigration detention since on or about March, 2026. Petitioner was detained in ICE

1 custody, transferred to Irwin, and Petitioner is unable to obtain review of his custody by an IJ,
2 pursuant to the Board's decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

3 23. Respondent is the Warden of the Irwin County Detention Center where Petitioner
4 is detained. He has immediate physical custody of Petitioner and is being sued in his official
5 capacity.

6 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

7 24. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of
8 noncitizens in removal proceedings.

9 25. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal
10 proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally
11 entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d),
12 while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are
13 subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

14 26. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to
15 expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission
16 referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

17 27. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered
18 removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

19 28. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

20 29. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the
21 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
22 104–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section
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1 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1,
2 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

3 30 Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, FOIR drafted new regulations explaining
4 that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained
5 under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited
6 Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings;
7 Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

8 31. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection
9 and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal
10 history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent
11 with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving”
12 were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)
13 (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply
14 “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

15 32. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new policy that
16 rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of
17 practice.

18 33. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for
19 Applicants for Admission,”¹ claims that all persons who entered the U.S. without inspection shall
20 now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies
21 regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in the U.S. for
22 months, years, and even decades.

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24 ¹ Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission>.

1 34. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a published
2 decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the
3 U.S. without admission or parole are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are
4 ineligible for IJ bond hearings.

5 35. Moreover, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* has been vacated by a federal district court
6 and no longer valid precedent. On February 18, 2026, the United States District Court for the
7 Central District of California vacated the BIA's decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* in its
8 entirety. *See Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---
9 ---, 2025 WL 3289861 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026). The court held that the BIA's interpretation —
10 stripping Immigration Judges of authority to conduct bond hearings for noncitizens who entered
11 the United States without inspection—was contrary to law and departed from decades of
12 established agency practice. *Id.* The court further certified a nationwide class of “Bond
13 Eligible” individuals, defined as noncitizens who entered without inspection and are not
14 otherwise subject to mandatory detention under other statutory provisions, and extended
15 declaratory relief to all class members. *Id.* Petitioner falls squarely within the certified class: he
16 entered without inspection at the United States Border on or about November 19, 2022, has
17 resided here continuously, and has no disqualifying criminal conviction that would subject him
18 to mandatory detention under §1226(c). The vacatur of *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* restores the
19 longstanding framework under which Immigration Judges routinely exercised jurisdiction over
20 bond proceedings for individuals in Petitioner's circumstances and confirms that this Court retain
21 full authority under INA §236(a) to conduct a bond hearing and set a reasonable bond in
22 Petitioner's case. Notwithstanding the vacatur, Respondents have refused to abide by the
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1 declaratory relief and continue to deny bond hearings to class members, including Petitioner, in
2 direct contravention of the court's order.

3 36. Since Respondent adopted these new policies, dozens of federal courts have
4 rejected their new interpretation of the INA's detention authorities. Courts have likewise rejected
5 *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE.

6 37. Even before ICE or the BIA introduced these nationwide policies, IJs in the
7 Tacoma, Washington, immigration court stopped providing bond hearings for persons who
8 entered the U.S. without inspection and who have since resided here. There, the United States
9 District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is
10 likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not
11 apprehended upon arrival to the U.S. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D.
12 Wash. 2025).

13 38. Subsequently, court after court has adopted the same reading of the INA's
14 detention authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation. *See, e.g., Gomes v. Hyde*,
15 No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez v. Hyde*,
16 No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025);
17 *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11,
18 2025), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL
19 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025
20 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGF,
21 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-
22 ODW (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-
23 BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH),
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2025 WL 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428 JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093 JF-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051 (E.C.T/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *see also, e.g., Palma Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that “[t]he Court tends to agree” that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

39. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS’s and EOIR’s new interpretation because it defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

40. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to “decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”

41. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph

(E)’s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, “[w]hen Congress creates ‘specific exceptions’ to a statute’s applicability, it ‘proves’ that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies.” *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); *see also Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7.

42. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the U.S., including those who are present without admission or parole.

43. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the U.S. The statute’s entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are “seeking admission” to the U.S. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

44. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to people like Petitioner, who have already entered and were residing in the U.S. at the time they were apprehended.

45. Finally, as mentioned above, on November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary judgment on behalf of individual plaintiffs and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide class and extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d --

--, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment)

46. Despite this declaratory judgment holding that the Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A), class members are being blatantly refused bond hearings across the country. *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11.

FACTS

47. Petitioner Ericks Misael Lazo Sandoval is a thirty-three (33) year old national of Nicaragua who entered without inspection through Mexico and has resided in the United States since his sole entry on or about November 19, 2022.

48. Petitioner has a documented history of cooperation with U.S. Law enforcement. On or about November 16, 2023, Petitioner filed his I-589 (Asylum) application with USCIS, over two years before his detention. The application was filed in the one-year deadline. Additionally, he came to the U.S. before the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways.

49. On or about March 2026, Petitioner was detained during his annual check-in appointment with ICE. Petitioner was taken into ICE Custody at IRWIN COUNTY DETENTION CENTER. Petitioner was issued an NTA after being detained.

50. DHS initiated removal proceedings before the Stewart Immigration Court. His case was docketed on March 18, 2026.

51. ICE has charged Petitioner with, inter alia, being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the U.S. without inspection.

57. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT II
Violation of the Bond Regulations

58. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in preceding paragraphs.

59. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the heading of “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of [Noncitizens],” the agencies explained that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (emphasis added). The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had entered without inspection were eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing regulations.

60. Nonetheless, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, EOIR has a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to individuals like Petitioner.

61. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

COUNT III
Violation of Due Process

62. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

63. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government

1 custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint lies at the heart of the liberty that the
2 Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

3 64. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official
4 restraint.

5 65. The government’s detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing
6 to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process

7 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

8 WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- 9 a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- 10 b. Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the Middle District of
11 Georgia while this habeas petition is pending;
- 12 c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondent to show cause why this
13 Petition should not be granted within three (3) days;
- 14 d. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondent release Petitioner or, in
15 the alternative, provide him with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
16 within seven (7) days;
- 17 e. Declare that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful;
- 18 f. Award Petitioner attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act
19 (“EAJA”), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under
20 law; and
- 21 g. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.
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5 Dated: April 28, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

6 /s/ Matthew O. Boles

Matthew O. Boles

7 GA Bar No. 904287; LA Bar No. 37593

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11 *Counsel for Petitioner*

Verification

I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in the foregoing Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

/s/ Matthew O. Boles

Date: April 28, 2026