

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION

DANIEL RODRIGUEZ SAUCEDO,

Petitioner,

v.

LADEON FRANCIS, Field Office
Director of Enforcement and Removal
Operations, ATLANTA Field Office,
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity
as Acting director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; Immigration and
Customs Enforcement;
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY;
TODD BLANCHE, U.S. Attorney
General; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW;
JASON STREEVAL, Warden of
STEWART DETENTION CENTER,

Respondents.

Case No. 4:26-cv-625

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Daniel RODRIGUEZ SAUCEDO is in the physical custody of Respondents at the STEWART DETENTION CENTER. He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in direct collaboration with the adjudicative body with jurisdiction over immigrants (the Executive Office of Immigration Review) (EOIR) have concluded Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.

2. Upon information and belief, Petitioner is charged with, inter alia, having entered the United States without admission or inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

3. Based on this allegation in Petitioner's removal proceedings consistent with a new DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

4. On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges, holding that an immigration judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

5. Petitioner's detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on

1 conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner,
2 are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without inspection.

3 6. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory
4 framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like
5 Petitioner.

6 7. More importantly, the Government itself has made an abrupt about-face on
7 this issue. Respondents should be judicially estopped from asserting their current
8 interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), because they previously prevailed in litigation
9 after asserting the opposite interpretation. As explained in *New Hampshire v. Maine*, 532
10 U.S. 742 (2001), judicial estoppel applies when a party assumes a position in a legal
11 proceeding, succeeds in maintaining that position, and then adopts a contrary position in a
12 subsequent proceeding to gain an unfair advantage. Here, Respondents previously, and
13 successfully, argued that individuals who entered the United States without inspection were
14 subject to detention under § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2)(A), and courts accepted that
15 position. Respondents now reverse course and assert that such individuals are subject to
16 mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), thereby denying them bond hearings. This
17 shift in legal position undermines the integrity of the judicial process and imposes an unfair
18 detriment on Petitioners who relied on the prior interpretation. Accordingly, Respondents
19 should be estopped from asserting this inconsistent position.

20 8. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be released
21 unless Respondents provide a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days.
22
23

JURISDICTION

9. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the STEWART DETENTION CENTER in LUMPKIN, GEORGIA.

10. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

11. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

12. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493- 500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

13. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

14. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

15. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or

1 confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application
2 for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who
3 entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the
4 application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

5 **PARTIES**

6 16. Petitioner Daniel RODRIGUEZ SAUCEDO is a citizen of Mexico who has been in
7 immigration detention since the 30th of March 2026. ICE did not set bond and Petitioner
8 is unable to obtain review of his custody by an IJ, pursuant to the Board’s decision in
9 *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Due to this erroneous decision,
10 it would be futile for Petitioner to apply to EOIR without the intervention of this honorable
11 Court.

12 17. Respondent Ladeon Francis is the Director of the Atlanta Field Office of ICE’s
13 Enforcement and Removal Operations division; however, on information and belief, the
14 DHS is rotating their Field Office Director without publishing a schedule of rotation. As
15 such, Ladeon Francis or his unknown, unannounced provisional replacement is Petitioner’s
16 immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner’s detention and removal. He or his
17 acting counterpart is named in his or her official capacity. Respondent Francis’s address is
18 180 Ted Turner Dr Se, Ste 522. Atlanta GA 30303.

19 18. Respondent Todd Lyons is named in his official capacity as the Acting Director of the
20 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). As the senior Official Performing the
21 duties of the Director of ICE, he is responsible for the administration and enforcement of
22 the immigration laws of the United States; routinely transacts business in the Middle
23 District of Georgia; is legally responsible for any effort to detain Petitioner; and as such is

1 a custodian of the Petitioner. His address is ICE, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, 500
2 12th St. SW, Mail Stop 5900, Washington DC 20536-5900.

3 19. Respondent Markwayne Mullin ("Secretary Mullin") is the Secretary of the Department of
4 Homeland Security. He is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the
5 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for
6 Petitioner's detention. Secretary Mullin has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner
7 and is sued in his official capacity. Respondent Mullin's address is U.S. Department of
8 Homeland Security, Office of the General Counsel, 2707 Martin Luther King Jr Ave Se
9 Washington DC 20528-0525. Respondent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the
10 federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the
11 detention and removal of noncitizens.

12 20. Respondent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the federal agency responsible for
13 implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.

14 21. Respondent Todd Blanche is the Attorney General of the United States. He is responsible
15 for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and
16 the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. He is sued in his official
17 capacity. Respondent Blanche's address is U.S. Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania
18 Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20530-0001.

19 22. Respondent Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is the federal agency
20 responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including
21 for custody redeterminations in bond hearings.

22 23. Respondent, Warden Jason Streeval, is employed by the private, for-profit detention
23 corporation contracted by the Government as an agent to confine immigrants at Stewart

1 Detention Center, where Petitioner is detained. He has immediate physical custody of
2 Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity. Respondent Warden's address is Warden,
3 Stewart Detention Center, 1116 S Washington Ave, Lumpkin, GA 39862.

4 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

5 24. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in
6 removal proceedings.

7 25. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal
8 proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are
9 generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§
10 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or
11 convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

12 26. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited
13 removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission
14 referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

15 27. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed,
16 including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

17 28. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

18 29. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal
19 Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
20 –208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section
21 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L.
22 No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

23 30. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in
24 general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained

1 under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and
2 Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal
3 Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

4 31. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were
5 placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal
6 history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was
7 consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not
8 deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer.
9 *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting
10 that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

11 32. In *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) explicitly
12 acknowledged that individuals who have already entered the United States and are not
13 apprehended within 100 miles of the border or within 14 days of entry are subject to
14 discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not mandatory detention under § 1225(b).
15 During oral argument on November 30, 2016, then-Solicitor General Ian Gershengorn
16 stated: “If they are not detained within 100 miles of the border or within 14 days... then
17 they are under 1226(a) and not 1226(c)” and further clarified, in response to a question
18 concerning “an alien who has come into the United States illegally without being admitted
19 [and] who takes up residence 50 miles from the border,” the Government responded, “The
20 answer is they are held under 1226(a) and that they get a bond hearing...” Transcript of
21 Oral Argument at 7–8, *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. ____ (2018) (No. 15-1204). DHS
22 reiterated that such individuals “would be held under 1226(a)” and cited the administrative
23 record to support that position. *Id.* These statements reflect DHS’s prior litigation stance

1 that § 1226(a) governs detention for noncitizens who have entered and are residing in the
2 United States, a position directly contrary to the agency's current interpretation applying §
3 1225(b)(2)(A) to such individuals. Having prevailed in *Jennings* after taking this position,
4 they should be estopped from taking the contrary position now simply because their
5 political or litigation interests have changed. Estoppel in this case is necessary to preserve
6 the predictability inherent in the rule of law and due process under the Fifth Amendment,
7 as well as to protect the integrity of the judicial system.

8 33. On July 8, 2025, ICE, "in coordination with" DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected
9 well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of
10 practice.

11 34. The new policy, entitled "Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants
12 for Admission,"¹ claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection
13 shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy
14 applies regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in
15 the United States for months, years, and even decades.

16 35. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a published decision, *Matter*
17 *of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the United States
18 without admission or parole are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are
19 ineligible for IJ bond hearings.

20 36. This Court has held in similar cases that petitioners present in the United States at the time
21 of their detention, who have not been lawfully admitted and are not attempting to be
22 lawfully admitted, like the Petitioner, are subject to detention under INA § 1226(a). *J.A.M.*

¹ Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission>.

1 v. *Streeval*, No. 4:25-CV342-CDL, 2025 WL 3050094 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025). *P.R.S v.*
2 *Streeval*, No. 4:25-CV-330-CDL, 2025 WL 3269947 (M.D. Ga Nov. 14, 2025).

3 **FACTS**

4 37. Mr. Daniel Rodriguez Saucedo (“Mr. Rodriguez”) is a citizen and national of Mexico.

5 38. Mr. Rodriguez entered the United States in 1998 and has been present ever since.

6 39. On March 25, 2026, Mr. Rodriguez was stopped for a traffic violation and arrested for
7 driving without a license in Emerson, Ga.

8 40. An ICE detainer was issued and he subsequently transferred to the Stewart Detention
9 Center where he remains detained.

10 41. Pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, the immigration judge is unable to consider
11 Petitioner’s bond request, and his unlawful detention cannot be litigated before that body,
12 who collaborated with the DHS – who is a party to these contested proceedings – to adopt
13 the DHS position wholesale, because such efforts would be futile.

14 42. As a result, Petitioner remains in detention. Without relief from this court, he faces the
15 prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his family and
16 community while his appeal of his removal proceedings remains pending.

17 **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

18 **COUNT I**

19 **Violation of the INA**

20 43. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding
21 paragraphs.

22 44. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all
23 noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility.

1 45. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention
2 and violates the INA.

3 **COUNT II**

4 **Violation of the Bond Regulations**

5 46. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in preceding
6 paragraphs.

7 47. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-Immigration
8 and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA.
9 Specifically, under the heading of “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of
10 [Noncitizens],” the agencies explained that “[d]espite being applicants for admission,
11 [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred
12 to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond
13 redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (emphasis added). The agencies thus made clear
14 that individuals who had entered without inspection were eligible for consideration for
15 bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing regulations.

16 48. Nonetheless, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, EOIR has a policy and practice of
17 applying § 1225(b)(2) to individual like Petitioner.

18 49. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention
19 and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

20 **COUNT III**

21 **Violation of Due Process**

22 50. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in
23 the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

1 51. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process
2 of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody,
3 detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause
4 protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

5 52. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

6 53. The government’s detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to
7 determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

8 **Judicial Estoppel**

9 54. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in
10 the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

11 55. The Government is judicially estopped from asserting that Petitioner is subject to
12 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). In prior litigation,
13 including *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, the Government successfully argued that individuals who
14 entered without inspection and were not apprehended near the border or within 14 days
15 were subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a), not mandatory detention under §
16 1225(b)(2)(A). See *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, No. 15-1204, Tr. of Oral Arg. at 7–8 (Nov. 30,
17 2016). Courts accepted that position. Now, the Government reverses course and asserts the
18 opposite interpretation to deny bond hearings. Under *New Hampshire v. Maine*, 532 U.S.
19 742 (2001), judicial estoppel applies where a party assumes a position, prevails, and then
20 adopts a contrary position to gain an unfair advantage. The Government’s reversal
21 undermines the integrity of the judicial process and prejudices Petitioners who relied on
22 the prior interpretation.
23

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the Middle District of Georgia while this habeas petition is pending;
- c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days;
- d. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner or, in the alternative, provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;
- e. Declare that Petitioner's detention is unlawful;
- f. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and
- g. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 16th of April 2026.

/s/ Peter Tadeo, Esq.

Peter Tadeo, Esq.

Attorney for Petitioner

Georgia Bar No. 505253

Tadeo and Silva Law

P.O. Box 921249

Peachtree Corners, Georgia 30010

Telephone: (404)993-8941

Email: Peter@tadeosilvalaw.com

28 U.S.C. § 2242 VERIFICATION STATEMENT

I am submitting this verification on behalf of the Petitioner because I am the
Petitioner's attorney. I have discussed with Petitioner's family members and have reviewed various
documents for Petitioner. On the basis of those discussions, I hereby verify that I have reviewed
the foregoing Petition and that the facts and statements made in this Petition and Complaint are
true and correct to the best of my knowledge or belief pursuant to 28 USC § 2242.

DATED this 16th day of April, 2026.

/s/ Peter Tadeo, Esq.
Peter Tadeo, Esq.
Georgia Bar No. 505253
Tadeo and Silva Law
P.O. Box 921249
Peachtree Corners, Georgia 30010
Telephone: (404)993-8941
Email: Peter@tadeosilvalaw.com

Attorney for Petitioner