IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-01267

JOSE ANGEL LORENZO RIOYOS,

Petitioner,

v.

JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity as Warden of the Denver Contract Detention Facility;
ROBERT HAGAN, in his official capacity as Field Office Director, Denver Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official capacity as Secretary of U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and
PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States.

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner, JOSE ANGEL LORENZO RIOYOS, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully petitions this Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the statutory basis and constitutionality of his ongoing immigration detention.

2. Rioyos is a long-term resident of the United States who has continuously resided here since March 2018. Nearly nine years after his entry, he was arrested in the interior of the United States and placed in removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. He is presently detained at the Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado, under the custody and control of Respondents.

3. Courts in this District have previously found that aliens who, like Rioyos, entered the United States without inspection and remain present for years prior to an arrest by ICE are subject to the discretionary detention scheme established by 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and not the mandatory detention required by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

4. Rioyos requested a custody redetermination hearing pursuant to *Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltazar*, No. 25-cv-2720-RMR, 2025 WL 3251143, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 21, 2025). He was subsequently scheduled for a custody redetermination hearing, and at the hearing on March 17, 2026, was denied bond after the court found it "has no jurisdiction to set a bond."

5. The IJ's Order nor the discussion at the hearing illuminated why the immigration court did not have jurisdiction under *Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltazar*, No. 25-cv-2720-RMR, 2025 WL 3251143, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 21, 2025), nor did it consider any of the evidence presented by Rioyos in support of his request for custody redetermination in that he is not a danger to the community nor a flight risk.

6. Respondents continued detention of Rioyos violates his Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process and requires his immediate release from custody as remedy.

CUSTODY

7. Rioyos has been in the custody of Respondents since February 4, 2026. He is currently detained at the Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado, under Respondents' direct physical control and supervision.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

8. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act), 28 U.S.C. § § 2201-02 (declaratory relief), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution (Suspension Clause), as Rioyos

is in custody and challenges his custody in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.

9. Federal district courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear habeas claims by individuals challenging the lawfulness of their detention. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 678 (2001).

10. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and 28 U.S.C. § 2242 because Rioyos is confined in this District, at least one Respondent is in this District, Rioyos's immediate physical custodian is in this District, and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims in this action occurred in this District. *See Trump v. J.G.G.*, 145 S. Ct. 1003, 1005–06 (2025) (per curiam) ("For core habeas petitions, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

NOTICE OF RELATED CASES

11. Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 3.2 and in the interest of judicial economy, Rioyos provides notice that this action is related to numerous habeas petitions recently adjudicated in this District involving the same Respondents, the same detention facility, and the same legal question concerning the scope of mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) as applied to long-term residents who are not presently seeking admission. *See Hernandez v. Baltazar*, No. 25-cv-03094-CNS, 2025 WL 2996643, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025); *Loa Caballero v. Baltazar*, No. 25-cv-03120-NYW, 2025 WL 2977650, at *6 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025); *Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltazar*, No. 25-cv-2720-RMR, 2025 WL 3251143 at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 21, 2025); and *Garcia Cortes v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025).

12. Most notably, two federal judges—including the Honorable Regina M. Rodriguez of this District—have conditionally certified class actions generally comprised of noncitizens

newly subjected to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) pursuant to Respondents' new policy. *See Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltazar*, No. 25-cv-2720-RMR, 2025 WL 3251143, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 21, 2025); *Bautista v. Noem*, --- F.R.D. ---, 2025 WL 3288403, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). Those class certification decisions are currently pending on appeal before the Tenth and Ninth Circuits, respectively.

13. Notwithstanding the conditional certification of those classes, Immigration Judges have continued to decline to conduct custody redetermination hearings for noncitizens who fall within the scope of the certified classes. Immigration Judges, pursuant to guidance from the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), have taken the position that class certification alone does not displace *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), and the Immigration Court lacks jurisdiction to make custody redeterminations.

14. As a result, noncitizens who are members of the conditionally certified classes—and whose detention turns on the same statutory question presented here—remain detained without any individualized custody determination, notwithstanding the pendency of class wide litigation addressing the legality of Respondents' detention policy. Individual habeas petitions therefore continue to be filed in this District to resolve the threshold statutory authority for detention and to prevent prolonged confinement without review.

15. Each of these matters involves materially indistinguishable facts and the same core statutory question presented here. Rioyos provides this Notice solely to inform the Court of related proceedings and to promote judicial efficiency but does not seek consolidation nor assignment to any particular judge.

HABEAS CORPUS

16. Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through habeas. *Soberanes v. Comfort*, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004). More specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2241

"confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear such cases." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)) (authorizing any person to claim in federal court that they are being held "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States").

17. The fundamental purpose of § 2241 habeas proceeding is the same as that of § 2254 habeas and § 2255 proceedings: they are an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody. *McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Com'n*, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)).

PARTIES

A. Petitioner

18. Petitioner Jose Angel Lorenzo Rioyos was detained by Respondents on February 4, 2026, and has been detained at the Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado, since that date. He is in the custody and direct control of Respondents and their agents.

B. Respondents

19. Respondent Juan Baltazar is the Warden of the Denver Contract Detention Facility, a private, for-profit detention facility that contracts with ICE to detain individuals suspected of civil immigration violations. Respondent Baltazar has immediate physical custody of Rioyos and is sued in his official capacity.

20. Respondent Robert Hagan is the Field Office Director of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Denver Field Office. In this capacity, he is responsible for the administration of immigration laws and the execution of immigration enforcement and detention policy within ICE's Denver Area of Responsibility, including the detention of Rioyos. Respondent Hagan maintains an office and regularly conducts business in this district and is sued in his official capacity.

21. Respondent Todd Lyons is the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. As the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of ICE, he is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States; routinely transacts business in this District; and is legally responsible for any effort to detain and remove Rioyos. Respondent Lyons is sued in his official capacity.

22. Respondent Markwayne Mullin is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and has ultimate authority over DHS. In that capacity and through his agents, Respondent Mullin has broad authority over and responsibility for the operation and enforcement of the immigration laws; routinely transacts business in this District; and is legally responsible for pursuing any effort to detain and remove Rioyos. Respondent Mullin is sued in his official capacity.

23. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States and the most senior official of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). In that capacity and through her agents, she is responsible for overseeing the implementation and enforcement of the federal immigration laws. The Attorney General delegates this responsibility to the Executive Office for Immigration Review, which administers the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals. Respondent Bondi is sued in her official capacity.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

24. Rioyos has been a longtime Colorado resident of nine years after he entered the United States without inspection in March 2018.

25. On December 2, 2024, Rioyos married his U.S. citizen wife and in April 2025, they began the process to petition for Rioyos's lawful permanent resident status.

26. On February 4, 2026, DHS arrested Rioyos in the interior of the United States, long after his entry and not in connection with any attempt to seek admission.

27. DHS issued a Notice to Appear charging him as "an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled" and placing him in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a removal proceedings. *See Notice to Appear, dated February 4, 2026, attached hereto as Attachment A.*

28. DHS also alleged in the Form I-213 to have issued a Form I-200, Warrant for Arrest of Alien, authorizing arrest under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), but the warrant does not exist. *See DHS Form I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, dated February 4, 2026, attached hereto as Attachment B.*

29. DHS has never alleged that Rioyos is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), and his corresponding lack of criminal history confirms that detention category would not apply. *See Exhibit B, attached hereto.*

30. On January 13, 2026, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) issued a directive to Immigration Judges instructing them to deny bond redeterminations for detainees under class certifications like *Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltazar*, No. 25-cv-2720-RMR, 2025 WL 3251143, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 21, 2025) and *Bautista v. Noem*, --- F.R.D. ---, 2025 WL 3288403, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025), asserting that those class certifications do not purport to vacate, stay or enjoin *Matter of Yajure Hurtado.*

31. Despite this directive, Rioyos requested a bond on March 8, 2026. In support of his custody redetermination request, Rioyos submitted the *Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltazar* opinion, his criminal history search demonstrating no criminal history, letter of support from his U.S. citizen wife and sponsor, proof of his U.S. citizen wife's pregnancy, proof of his pending I-130 petition, proof of his fixed address with his U.S. citizen wife, proof of his employment history and employment prospects if released, and letters of support from friends and family. *See Rioyos's evidentiary submission, dated March 8, 2026, attached hereto as Attachment D.*

32. The following day on March 9, 2026, Rioyos received notice that his custody redetermination hearing was scheduled for March 17, 2026.

33. At the hearing on March 17, 2026, Rioyos asserted the immigration court had jurisdiction to redetermine his custody status pursuant to the *Mendoza Gutierrez* class order, Rioyos's clear membership in the class, and that pursuant to the plain language of the statute, he is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). *See Transcript of Bond Hearing, dated March 17, 2026, attached hereto as Attachment D.*

34. The court did not consider any of the evidence presented in support of his custody redetermination request and denied the request for lack of jurisdiction. *See Order of the Immigration Judge, dated March 18, 2026, attached hereto as Attachment C.*

35. Rioyos's removal proceedings are pending, and no final removal order exists.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

36. The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes DHS to detain noncitizens who are in removal proceedings and prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

37. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge (IJ). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

38. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention "in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that the alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted." 8 U.S.C. § 1225.

39. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

40. This case concerns the detention provisions at § § 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

41. As an initial matter, Rioyos is a class member of the certified class in *Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltazar*, No. 25-cv-2720-RMR, 2025 WL 3251143, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 21, 2025). As a result, he was considered detained under § 1226(a) as a matter of law.

42. The class in *Mendoza Gutierrez* is defined as: all people who are arrested or detained by Respondents in Colorado pending a decision on whether they are to be removed from the United States… or who are otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of an Immigration Court located in Colorado where the government asserts they are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Id.*

43. Rioyos initially entered without inspection and is not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

44. Because Rioyos's most recent detention was not "upon arrival," he is a *Mendoza Gutierrez* class member. Moreover, even if Rioyos was not a *Mendoza Gutierrez* class member, he would still be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2).

45. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585.

46. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without admission or parole were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal

Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) ("Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination").

47. Thus, in the decades that followed their enactment in 1996, most people who entered without admission or parole and were thereafter arrested and placed in standard removal proceedings were considered eligible for release on bond and received bond hearings before an IJ, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible. That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed "arriving" were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply "restates" the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

48. Beginning in July 2025, DHS adopted a policy of mandatory detention directly at odds with the INA. *See* U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, ICE Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission, AILA Doc. No. 25071607 (July 8, 2025), https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission (last visited Mar. 22, 2026).

49. This policy was later adopted by EOIR in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), and subsequently deemed unlawful. *See Rodriguez Vasquez v. Bondi*, 779 F.Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025); *Maldonado-Bautista v. Santacruz*, --F.Supp.3d--, 2026 WL 468284, *10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026).

50. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS's and EOIR's new interpretation because it defies the INA. The plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Rioyos.

51. Subsection 1226(a) applies by default to all persons "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to "decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen]."

52. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without admission or parole. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a).

53. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

54. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

55. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to people like Rioyos, who has already entered and was residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Count One
Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), INA § 236(a)

56. Rioyos realleges and incorporates herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of the petition as if fully set forth herein.

57. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

58. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Rioyos unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

Count Two
Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution – Substantive Due Process

59. Rioyos realleges and incorporates herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of the petition as if fully set forth herein.

60. Rioyos alleges Respondents violated his due process rights by failing to consider his relevant evidence at the bond hearing. Denying a bond hearing to a noncitizen detained under § 1226(a) violates the noncitizens' due process rights. *See Garcia Abanil v. Baltazar*, No. 25-cv-04029- WJM-STV, 2026 WL 100587 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2026).

61. Because Rioyos is detained under § 1226(a), at a minimum, he was entitled to the due process owed to him is that provided for in § 1226—namely, an individualized bond hearing before an IJ. *See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (E.D. Mich.

Aug. 29, 2025). Rioyos's continued detention without the bond hearing that should have been provided to him pursuant to § 1226 constitutes an ongoing violation of his constitutional right to due process. *See Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar*, 794 F. Supp. 3d 926, 941-43 (D. Colo. 2025).

62. To remedy the constitutional violation, the Court should order Rioyos's immediate release.

63. Immediate release is the customary remedy in habeas proceedings. *See Dep't of Homeland Security v. Thursaissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 107 (2020) ("Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from unlawful detention."); *Munaf v. Geren*, 553 U.S. 674, 698 (2008) (explaining that "the quintessential habeas remedy" is release from custody).

64. Because § 1226(a) governs Rioyos's detention, the denial of any bond hearing constitutes an ongoing violation of both the INA and due process. Section 1226(a) contemplates discretionary detention accompanied by an individualized custody determination. Here, no such determination occurred.

65. At the hearing on March 17, the Immigration Judge made no factual findings, exercised no discretion, and considered none of the evidence Rioyos submitted in support of release. This is not a harmless procedural defect—it is the deprivation itself. This deprivation cannot be squared with the procedural protections Congress required or the Constitution demands.

66. In this circumstance—where Respondents have clearly violated Rioyos's due process rights by depriving him of the administrative process to which he is entitled—the Court must conclude that his immediate release is warranted.

Count Three
Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution – Procedural Due Process

67. Rioyos realleges and incorporates herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of the petition as if fully set forth herein.

68. Pursuant to *Mathews v. Eldridge*, courts weight the following factors in evaluating due process claims: (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

69. Rioyos has a significant private liberty interest at stake as his physical freedom "is the most elemental of liberty interests." *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); *Vizguerra-Ramirez v. Baltazar*, No. 25-cv-00881-NYW, 2025 WL 3653158, at *13 (D. Colo. Dec. 17, 2025) (same).

70. Additionally, Rioyos's liberty interest is not diminished by any final order of removal, or the availability of any existing process to challenge Respondents' decision to detain him without bond. *See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53 F.4th 1189, 1208 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding the habeas petitioner's liberty interest was diminished by the fact that he was subject to a final order of removal, had already been afforded an individualized bond hearing, and had additional process available to him through a further bonding hearing before an IJ upon a showing of materially changed circumstances).

71. Regarding the risk of erroneous deprivation, there are no existing procedures whatsoever for Petitioner to challenge his detention pending the conclusion of his removal proceedings without the opportunity for release on bond.

72. The risk of erroneous deprivation is extraordinarily high where ICE and DHS agency officials have sole, unguided, and unreviewable discretion to detain Rioyos without any individualized showing of why his detention is warranted, nor any process for Rioyos to challenge the exercise of that discretion.

73. Given that Rioyos has significant ties to the country, specifically his pending petition filed on his behalf by his U.S. citizen wife, and because Respondents have not asserted that he is dangerous or a flight risk, he is being arbitrarily and unjustifiably deprived of his liberty.

74. As the process afforded to justify Rioyo's detention was constitutionally defective, immediate release from custody is the appropriate remedy given the due process violations that pervaded his bond hearing.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Rioyos asserts that ordering another bond hearing even with the burden shifted to the government is not an adequate remedy here. The record of the March 17, 2026, bond hearing shows that the Immigration Court did not meaningfully engage with the extensive evidence Rioyos submitted, and instead terminated the proceeding on the threshold ground without undertaking the individualized custody determination that due process requires. *See Transcript of Bond Hearing, dated March 17, 2026, attached hereto as Attachment D.*

Where the administrative process has already broken down in a way that deprives the detainee of any meaningful custody adjudication, immediate release is the appropriate habeas remedy. A court does not cure an unlawful detention by ordering the detainee to return to the very same defective process that produced the unlawful detention in the first place. Here, the March 17

hearing confirms that another bond hearing would not be a meaningful remedy because the Immigration Court did not actually evaluate the evidence relevant to release. Rioyos therefore respectfully requests that this Court grant the following relief:

(1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;

(2) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days;

(3) Declare that Rioyos's detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the INA, and the implementing regulations;

(4) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to immediately release Rioyos from custody;

(5) In the alternative, issue an order compelling Respondents to provide Rioyos an individualized determination—and a meaningful opportunity for him to be heard in the determination process—of his eligibility for release within three days;

(6) In the alternative, conduct a hearing before this Court to determine whether Rioyos presents a flight risk or danger that justifies continued detention; and

(7) Order that at the bond hearing, the Government shall bear the burden to justify his continued detention by clear and convincing evidence; and

(8) Grant any further relief the Court deems just and proper.

Dated this 26th day of March 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Skylar M. Larson
Skylar M. Larson, Esq.
8275 E. 11th Ave. # 200176
Denver, CO 80220
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Email: skylarmlarsonesq@gmail.com

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that service of the foregoing **Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Attachments A-E** will be effectuated contemporaneously with the Court's issuance of an Order directing service, at which time true and correct copies will be sent as directed to the following:

JUAN BALTAZAR, Warden of the Denver Contract Detention Facility
3130 N Oakland Street
Aurora, CO 80010
Respondent

ROBERT HAGAN, Field Office Director, Denver ICE Field Office
12445 E. Caley Avenue
Centennial, CO 80111
Respondent

TODD LYONS, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
245 Murray Lane, SW
Mail Stop 0485
Washington, DC 20528-0485
Respondent

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of U.S. Department of Homeland Security
245 Murray Lane, SW
Mail Stop 0485
Washington, DC 20528-0485
Respondent

PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530
Respondent

KEVIN TRASKOS, Chief, Civil Division
U.S. Attorney's Office District of Colorado
1801 California Street, Ste. 1600
Denver, CO 80202
Attorney for Respondents

s/ Skylar M. Larson
Skylar M. Larson, Esq.

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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JOSE ANGEL LORENZO RIOYOS,

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PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States.

Respondents.

ATTACHMENTS TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

ATTACHMENT A.	Notice to Appear, dated February 4, 2026
ATTACHMENT B.	DHS Form I-213, dated February 4, 2026
ATTACHMENT C.	Order of the Immigration Judge, dated March 18, 2026
ATTACHMENT D.	Transcript of Bond Hearing, dated March 17, 2026
ATTACHMENT E.	Rioyos's Evidentiary Submission, dated March 8, 2026

Elizabeth [redacted]
[redacted]
Denver, CO 80219
[redacted]
US Citizen

03/03/2026

To Whom It May Concern,

I am writing this letter in strong support of Jose Angel Lorenzo Rioyos. I have had the pleasure of knowing Jose Angel for 5 years.

During this time, I have come to know Jose Angel as a person with strong morals, integrity, and honesty.

I always invite him to my family gatherings and can honestly say he is very respectful around my family and friends; he is hard working and does not get into any type of trouble.

Please feel free to contact me should you require any further information.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

Elizabeth [redacted]

Maria [redacted]

[redacted]

Denver, CO 80227

[redacted]

U.S Citizen

03/04/2026

To Whom It May Concern,

I am writing this letter is strong support of Jose Angel Lorenzo Rioyos. I have had the pleasure of getting to know Jose Angel for 5 years.

During this time, I have come to know Jose Angel as a person with strong morals, integrity, honesty, courage and perseverance.

He has always been welcome to the house; he's married to my sister. He has always been respectful and helpful. He's very hardworking and does not get into any trouble.

Please feel free to contact me if there is any more information needed.

Sincerely,

Maria [redacted]

Maria [redacted]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 8th day of March 2026, I uploaded a true and correct copy of the foregoing **Respondent's Motion for Custody Redetermination and Index of Exhibits in Support**, regarding **Jose Angel LORENZO RIOYOS**, [redacted] electronically through ECAS and both parties are participating in ECAS. Therefore, as specified under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.32(a) no separate service is required, and service has been completed.

/s/ Skylar M. Larson
Skylar M. Larson, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent