

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA**

Eliud Jahdiel De La Luz Baez,

Petitioner,

v.

Pamela Bondi, Attorney General,

Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security,

Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

David Easterwood, Acting Director, St.
Paul Field Office Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, and

Dave McDaniel, Sheriff of Hardin County
Jail.

Respondents.

Case No. 0:26-cv-1976

**VERIFIED PETITION
FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

Expedited Handling Requested

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner, Mr. Eliud Jahdiel De La Luz Baez (“Mr. De La Luz Baez”), by and through the undersigned attorney, hereby files this petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief to require U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) to release Mr. De La Luz Baez from ICE detention, or in the alternative to return and then enjoin Petitioner’s transfer to a facility outside of Minnesota and to provide a bond hearing pending the completion of any immigration proceedings.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (federal employee mandamus action); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus); Art. I, § 9, c. 2 of the U.S. Constitution (“Suspension Clause”); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (waiver of sovereign immunity); and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Declaratory Judgment Act).

3. Federal question jurisdiction exists because Mr. De La Luz Baez seeks to challenge his custody as a violation of the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

4. Federal district courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear habeas petitions by noncitizens challenging the lawfulness or constitutionality of their detention by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510 516-17 (2003); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830, 839-41 (2018); and *Nielsen v. Preap*, 139 S. Ct. 954, 961-63 (2019).

5. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), (e)(1)(B), and 2241(d) because Mr. De La Luz Baez is detained within the District of Minnesota.

6. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), (e)(1) because Mr. De La Luz Baez resided in Minnesota prior to his detention. Mr. De La Luz Baez was transferred out of Minnesota and is currently detained in Eldora, IA. Nevertheless, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), (e)(1) allows for habeas actions to “be brought in any judicial district in which (A) the defendant resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action

is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.” In this case, Mr. De La Luz Baez resided in Minnesota prior to detention for nearly two decades, was detained in Minnesota, was initially in the custody of the Minnesota ICE field office, was held in ICE detention in Minnesota for nearly four months before being transferred to Iowa, has extensive family in Minnesota, previous employment and education in Minnesota, legal counsel in Minnesota, U and T Visa applications pending as a result of incidents arising in Minnesota, and has pending removal proceedings in Fort Snelling, Minnesota. Furthermore, Respondents can easily be served in accordance with *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493 (1973) (“So long as the custodian can be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ "within its jurisdiction" requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim, or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself is confined outside the court's territorial jurisdiction”).

7. This Court has found in similar cases that jurisdiction and venue are proper in Minnesota despite transfer outside of Minnesota, as Respondents routinely do, because the “immediate custodian rule is not automatic, and the venue for habeas petitions allow for equitable concerns such as convenience and appropriateness of the district,” *Jose A. v. Noem*, No. 26-cv-480 (JMB/ECW), 2026 WL 172524 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2026) (citing *Luis N. v. Trump*, No. 26-cv-0171 (MJD/SGE) Doc. No. 8 at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2026) (citing *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493 (1973))). In this case, Respondent was detained in Minnesota and has extensive ties to Minnesota. The only connection to Iowa in this case is due to the Respondents’ decision to transfer the Petitioner

out of Minnesota and continue his unlawful detention there. To deny venue in Minnesota would allow Respondents to forum shop, by making independent decisions to transfer detainees out of custody in Minnesota, a decision that is wholly out of the control of the Petitioner.

8. Venue is also proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A), because Respondents are operating in this district.

PARTIES

9. Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico and a resident of Rice County, MN, who is currently being held at the Hardin County Jail in Eldora, IA. Petitioner is under the direct control of the respondents and has no scheduled release date.

10. Respondent Pamela Bondi is being sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the head of the Department of Justice. Attorney General Bondi shares responsibility for implementation and enforcement of the immigration detention statutes, along with Respondent Noem. Attorney General Bondi is a legal custodian of Mr. De La Luz Baez.

11. Respondent Kristi Noem is being sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, Secretary Noem is responsible for the administration of the immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a), routinely transacts business in the District of Minnesota, supervises the Fort Snelling ICE Field Office, and is legally responsible for pursuing Petitioner's detention and removal. As such, Respondent Noem is a legal custodian of Mr. De La Luz Baez.

12. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and is sued in his official capacity. Defendant Lyons is responsible for Petitioner's detention.

13. Respondent David Easterwood is being sued in his official capacity as the Acting Field Office Director for the Fort Snelling Field Office for ICE within DHS. In that capacity, Field Director Easterwood has supervisory authority over the ICE agents responsible for detaining Mr. De La Luz Baez. The address for the Fort Snelling Field Office is 1 Federal Drive, Fort Snelling, Minnesota 55111.

14. Respondent Sheriff Dave McDaniel is being sued in his official capacity as the Sheriff responsible for the Hardin County detention facility. Because Petitioner is detained in the Hardin County facility, Sheriff McDaniel has immediate day-to-day control over Petitioner.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

15. Petitioner is a resident of Rice County, MN and a citizen of Mexico, and has lived in the United States since September 2004.

16. Mr. De La Luz Baez has a pending asylum application on appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals, a pending U Visa application, a pending T Visa application, and a pending initial DACA application. He does not have a final order of removal. Mr. De La Luz Baez came to the US when he was around one and a half years old. When he entered, he was openly sleeping in the backseat of a family member's car at the Southern US Border and the immigration officials at the time did not ask his family members about Mr. De La Luz Baez's immigration status, but instead, allowed him to enter the US.

17. Petitioner has remained in the US since that date. On March 12, 2020, Petitioner submitted a U Visa application. On August 14, 2024, USCIS issued him a bona fide determination through his pending U Visa, granting him an automatic stay on any final order of removal and granting him a period of deferred action. He has a valid work permit through this period of deferred action until September 9, 2028. Furthermore, on January 22, 2021, he submitted an initial DACA application, which remains pending to this day. Due to federal litigation surrounding the DACA program itself, it cannot be adjudicated at this time. On April 24, 2023, Petitioner also submitted a T Visa application as the derivative on his mother's case. On January 14, 2025, he received another bona fide determination through this pending T Visa, enabling him to apply for a second layer of deferred action, if desired.

18. Petitioner is a well-established member of his community in Rice County, Minnesota. He completed his GED and welding classes at a community college in 2023. With his valid work permit, he has been gainfully employed in the United States.

19. Respondent ICE arrested Mr. De La Luz Baez on August 4, 2025. Mr. De La Luz Baez was arrested by ICE after being taken into state criminal custody for a criminal warrant related to a misdemeanor harassment charge. He was ultimately convicted of this charge under Minn. Stat. § 609.749.2(b)(3) and sentenced to serve 80 days in the Rice County Jail with credit for time served at 80 days. He complied with this sentence and paid all necessary fines related to the criminal proceeding. Besides this incident, Petitioner's criminal record is limited to petty misdemeanor traffic violations, all of which are paid in full.

20. Given the massive amounts of unlawful detentions conducted by Respondents publicly in the past nine months, Respondents are running out of physical space to continue detaining people. Detainees are being held in cramped quarters at the Henry Whipple Federal Building, before being sent to remote locations across Minnesota or to facilities as far away as El Paso, Texas. In this case, Mr. De La Luz Baez was transferred to a facility in Iowa, despite having no ties to that state.

21. Specifically, in Mr. De La Luz Baez's case, Petitioner was detained by local police on August 2, 2025 in Rice County, MN and then released on August 4, 2025, where Respondents were waiting to take him into civil custody at the Freeborn County Jail in Albert Lea, MN, where he remained until November 26, 2025. At that time, Respondents transferred him against his requests to the Hardin County Jail in Eldora, IA, where he remains to this day. Despite the resolution of the misdemeanor charge, Petitioner has not received any indication from Respondents on when he is to be released from ICE detention.

22. Detaining Mr. De La Luz Baez is an expensive and pointless endeavor. Mr. De La Luz Baez respectfully seeks the opportunity to return home and to continue following the legal processes set up by Congress and DHS for immigrants to seek status in this country.

23. Pending the adjudication of this Petition, Mr. De La Luz Baez further seeks an order returning Petitioner to Minnesota and restraining the Respondents from transferring Petitioner to a location outside of the State of Minnesota, so that the jurisdiction of this Court is not impeded, and so that Petitioner remains accessible to legal counsel and loved ones.

STANDARD OF LAW

24. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The “Great Writ” has been referred to by US Courts as “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). A petitioner may seek a writ of habeas corpus when their custody violates the US Constitution or a federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 22441(c)(3), which should be granted if the petitioner meets their burden of proof—a preponderance of evidence. *Aditya W. H. v. Trump*, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn. 2025).

25. Detained immigrants petitioning under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 face no statutory exhaustion requirements. *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 965 (D. Minn. 2025). Nor is a judicially imposed prudential exhaustion requirement appropriate where, as here: time is of the essence, facts are largely undisputed, and the parties’ disagreement is based on a legal conclusion. *Id.* at 967-68.

26. Other courts in the Eighth Circuit have similarly declined to require prudential exhaustion when evaluating a detained immigrant’s habeas corpus petition under similar circumstances—to address a question of statutory interpretation that does not require developing a factual record, and where the agency is demonstrably unlikely to reverse its course. *Giron Reyes v. Lyons*, 2025 WL 2712427 at *3 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025).

27. “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [immigrants], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or

permanent.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). Regarding these due process standards, at the point of six months of an immigrant’s detention, it becomes presumptively unreasonable. *Id.*

28. In July of 2025, Respondent DHS began ignoring the decades-long consensus of how 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) should be interpreted, which the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) articulated in a subsequent ruling. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA Sept. 5, 2025). Respondents suddenly claim that individuals who have been residing within the United States for more than two years are somehow metaphorically “seeking admission,” simply because they may have pending claims for asylum or other forms of status.

29. However, this Court and the majority around the country have made clear that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) only authorizes detention for noncitizens who are at the border seeking physical entry at the time of detention, not those whose detention is discretionary and governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). *Eliseo A.A. v. Olson*, Civ. No. 25-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025 WL 2886729 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); *Mayamu K. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025); *Khalid B.Q. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4584 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 10 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2025); *Xuseen A. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4514 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 16 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025); *Vedat C. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4642 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 9 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025).

30. Here, Petitioner was waived through at the US border by immigration officials as a child and therefore was lawfully admitted. See *Matter of Areguillin*, 17 I&N Dec. 308 (BIA 1980); *Matter of Quilantan*, 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010). If Respondents were to assert

8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2) as a basis for detaining Mr. De La Luz Baez without a hearing, then, that conclusion would be incorrect. His detention could only be pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), which would have required a warrant, which, to Petitioner's knowledge, the Respondents are not purporting to invoke.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

Fifth Amendment Due Process

Respondents are Confining Petitioner without A Valid Legal Basis or any Semblance of Due Process.

31. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained above.

32. Mr. De La Luz Baez has due process rights as a resident of the United States. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

33. Federal courts use the three-part test in *Mathews v. Eldridge* to determine whether civil detention violates a detainee's due process rights. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The elements of this test are: (1) the private interest that the official action affects; (2) the risk that the procedures used will result in an erroneous deprivation of the private interest, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest in following the existing procedures, both in achieving their objectives and in the potential burdens of an alternate procedure. *Id.* at 335.

34. Here, all three factors favor the petitioner.

35. First, Mr. De La Luz Baez has a significant private interest at stake. A person's interest in freedom from physical detention is "the most elemental of liberty interests." *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004); see also

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”). Mr. De La Luz Baez is wrongfully confined, a direct attack on Petitioner’s liberty interests.

36. Second, Mr. De La Luz Baez will continue to be deprived of this interest if the current procedure (detaining Mr. De La Luz Baez without a legal basis) is followed. Petitioner has been detained since August 2025, for more than six months, and it is therefore presumptively unreasonable. See, e.g., *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. 121 S.Ct. 2491. Furthermore, there is no rational explanation for detaining Mr. De La Luz Baez. If Respondents’ purported basis for detaining Petitioner is under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2), that argument has been rejected time and time again in this court. *Ahmed A v. Bondi*, Case No. 25-4776 (JWB/DJF) (January 6, 2026); *Maldonado v. Olson*, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1142–48, 1150–52 (D. Minn. 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 968–970 (D. Minn. 2025); *Mayamu K. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819, at *7–8 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025); *R.E. v. Bondi*, No. 0:25-cv-3946-NEB, 2025 WL 3146312 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025); *Herrera Avila v. Bondi*, No. 0:25-cv-3741 (JRT), 2025 WL 2976539 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025).

37. Lastly, the Government has no legitimate interest in refusing to follow its own rules. Mr. De La Luz Baez poses no safety threats to the community. Releasing Petitioner, or at a minimum holding a bond hearing, would in fact *save* the government the resources and expense of continued imprisonment.

38. The placement of Mr. De La Luz Baez in detention pending the resolution of ongoing immigration proceedings violates Mr. De La Luz Baez's constitutional rights to due process guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment.

COUNT TWO

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)

Petitioner's Ongoing Detention Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) is Unlawful because Petitioner is not Seeking Admission and therefore cannot be held under that Authority

39. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above.

40. Respondents would be violating the Immigration and Nationality Act by attempting to apply mandatory detention through 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), to Petitioner. Petitioner was nowhere near the border and was not "seeking admission" when he was apprehended. Furthermore, because of his waive-through entry as a child, he was lawfully admitted to the US.

COUNT THREE

Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706

Detaining Petitioner Pursuant to an Unlawful Interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) violates the Administrative Procedure Act

41. Mr. De La Luz Baez re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

42. The APA provides that a "reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

43. The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).

44. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country lawfully and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens could properly be detained under § 1226(a), but would then be eligible for release on bond unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231. Nothing in Petitioner’s criminal nor immigration history implicate any of these statutory provisions.

45. Nonetheless, the Board has evidently adopted a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner and others in the same position. If this is not Respondents’ position in the present matter, then the Petitioner requests that the true reason and justification for the length of Petitioner’s detention be revealed.

46. Respondents, through their recent administrative decision, failed to articulate any reasoned explanations for new interpretation of the Act. The Board’s decision represents a change in the agencies’ policies and positions that negates the plain language of the Act, the will of Congress, and decades of administrative precedent.

47. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Mr. De La Luz Baez would be arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law, and as such, it violates the APA. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2). If this is not the alleged basis of his detention, then Petitioner is not lawfully nor reasonably detained under any other grounds.

REMEDY

48. An available remedy for Respondents' unlawful conduct as outlined in this complaint is for Petitioner to be released immediately.

49. Immigration detention is civil in nature, and as a result Congress must have expressly authorized it by statute, and the detention must be reasonably related to its statutory purpose. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687, 690 (2001) (quoting *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). Detention here serves no statutory purpose, as there is no indication that Petitioner's detention was based on any facts that might indicate that Petitioner should be in custody for some reason.

50. Since Section 1225 does not apply to noncitizens who are in Petitioner's situation – those who have lawfully been waived through at the border or those who have been detained while residing within the United States for more than two years (as opposed to those who are detained while in the process of physically entering the United States) – the law that Respondents are purportedly using to detain Petitioner simply does not apply so as to authorize Petitioner's detention. See *Eliseo A.A. v. Olson*, Civ. No. 25-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025 WL 2886729 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); *Mayamu K. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025); *Khalid B.Q. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4584 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 10 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2025); *Xuseen A. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4514 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 16 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025); *Vedat C. v. Bondi*,

Civ. No. 25-4642 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 9 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025). To Petitioner's knowledge, no other legal basis for detention has been proffered by Respondents.

51. When a habeas petitioner's detention is without legal basis, the typical remedy is release. *Munaf v. Geren*, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (describing release as the "typical remedy" for "unlawful executive detention").

52. Respondents will no doubt argue, as they have in similar cases before this Court, that if the Court rules that Petitioner should have been detained pursuant to § 1226, instead of § 1225, then the remedy is a bond hearing as opposed to outright release. *See, e.g., Ahmed A.* Civ. No. 25-4776, Doc. No. 9. at 9-10. However, this Court has rejected this argument, saying that:

[A] bond hearing presupposes lawful detention authority under § 1226. Where that authority has not been invoked or established, ordering a bond hearing would treat the absence of statutory authority as a mere procedural irregularity rather than a substantive defect ... Where the record shows Respondents have not identified a valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the remedy is not to supply one through further proceedings.

Id. at Doc. No. 10 at 6.

53. Nor here would § 1226(a) have supported a lawful detention in the first instance. Detention under § 1226(a) would require a warrant issued by the Attorney General. *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 961 (D. Minn. 2025). To put it plainly, "absent a warrant a noncitizen may not be arrested and detained under section 1226(a)." *See also Ahmed M. v. Bondi et al.*, 2026 WL 25627, *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (quoting *Chogllo Chafila v. Scott*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 2:25-cv-00437-SDN, 2025 WL 2688541, at *11 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 2025)). Upon Petitioner's best understanding, Respondents had no such warrant.

54. Here, where detention is either (1) unlawfully based on 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2), which does not apply to Petitioner, or, (2) is unreasonable under longstanding constitutional due process precedent, release is the appropriate remedy.

REQUEST FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

55. Within three days, unless good cause for a delay is shown, “[a] court, justice or judge entering a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

56. The Undersigned Attorney Jacob R. Peterson, on behalf of Petitioner, respectfully requests that the Court issue an Order to Show Cause directing Respondents to file a return within three days of the Court’s order, showing cause, if any, why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief;

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Enjoin Respondents from transferring Petitioner out of the District of Minnesota pending the duration of these proceedings;
- (3) Issue an Order requiring Respondents to show cause as to why Petitioner should not be released immediately, or in the alternative afforded a bond hearing;

- (4) Alternatively, issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring Respondents to release Petitioner unless they provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;
- (5) Include in the Order that all the Petitioner's belongings must be released with him; and
- (6) Grant any other and further relief that this Court may deem just and proper.

Date: 03/20/2026

/s/ Jacob R. Peterson
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**Verification by Someone Acting on
Petitioner's Behalf Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242**

I am submitting this verification on behalf of Petitioner because I am Petitioner's attorney. I have discussed the factual assertions in this petition with Petitioner's family and friends, who are also acting on Petitioner's behalf and who I understand to have personal knowledge of the facts alleged herein. I hereby verify that the statements made in the attached Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, including the statements regarding Petitioner's detention status, are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Date: 03/20/2026

/s/ Jacob R. Peterson
Jacob R. Peterson, Esq.