UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SOUZA SANTOS, AMOS **Petitioner,** **v.** **JAMISON, J.L., in his official capacity as Warden, Federal Detention Center, Philadelphia; JOHN RIFE, in his official capacity as the Field Office Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal Operations, Philadelphia Field Office; TODD LYONS, in his official capacity as the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity as U.S. Attorney General** **Respondents.**	**Case No.** **PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241

Petitioner respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a writ of habeas corpus to remedy Petitioner's unlawful detention by Respondents, as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner, Amos Souza Santos, is a Brazilian national who is in the physical custody of the United States Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), and is currently detained at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia ("FDC"). He now faces unlawful detention because DHS and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) have concluded that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention. Prior to his detention, Mr. Souza Santos had lived in the U.S. for approximately 1 year and two months after entering the U.S. without inspection and being released on his recognizance by immigration officials.

2. Upon knowledge and belief, on January 18, 2025, Respondents detained Mr. Souza Santos for one day after he entered the United States without inspection. After determining that he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, Respondents released him from custody on his own recognizance. Petitioner then resided in Philadelphia.

3. But on March 17, 2026, Respondents arrested Petitioner while attending a routine ICE check-in in Philadelphia, a year and two months after his entry into the U.S. He is currently detained at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia.

4. No change in circumstances has disturbed Respondents' previous findings from January 18, 2025, that Petitioner is neither a danger nor a flight risk. Yet Respondents are denying him access to a bond hearing before an immigration judge—a right that, by regulation, must be provided to anyone detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

5. ICE claims the authority to indefinitely detain Mr. Souza Santos without a bond hearing under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), consistent with a new DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025. This policy instructs all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

4. Mr. Souza Santos' detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. The BIA's interpretation conflicts with the plain language and structure of the statute, as well as decades of agency practice. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Mr. Souza Santos. Therefore, the application of 1225(b)(2) to Mr. Souza Santos is contrary to law and violates the Immigration and National Act (INA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

5. As a result, Mr. Souza Santos is unlawfully detained in immigration custody without any means to seek release from detention.

6. In the alternative, Mr. Souza Santos' detention pending removal proceedings without a notice or opportunity to be heard violates his substantive and procedural due process rights under the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment because it deprives Mr. Souza Santos of liberty without due process of law. Detention of all noncitizens who are subject to inadmissibility grounds, like Petitioner, without any individualized hearing does not "bear a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual was committed." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Moreover, application of the *Mathews v. Eldridge* balancing test shows that a bond hearing is necessary to protect Petitioner from an unnecessary deprivation of liberty. *See* 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

7. Mr. Souza Santos therefore respectfully requests that this Court issue a writ of habeas corpus and order his release from custody. *See, e.g.*, *Ndiaye*, 2025 WL 3229307 at *5 n.5 (ordering immediate release and finding that "[a] bond hearing would certainly result in [Petitioner's] release and only serve to delay relief when the "Government has offered no rationale to refuse bond"); Order, ECF No. 5, *Benitez Crespo v. Jamison*, No. 26-cv-93 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2026) (same). In the alternative, Petitioner requests that this Court conduct a bond hearing at which (1) Respondents bear the burden of proving flight or danger risk by clear and convincing evidence, and (2) considers alternatives to detention that could mitigate risk of flight and ability to pay in setting any bond. *See German Santos v. Warden Pike Cty. Corr. Facility*, 965 F.3d 203, 213-14 (3d Cir. 2020).

PARTIES

7. Petitioner, Mr. Souza Santos, is a noncitizen currently detained by Respondents pending removal proceedings. He is detained in ICE custody at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

8. Respondent J.L. Jamison is sued in his official capacity as the Warden of the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center ("FDC"). He has direct custodianship over Petitioner at Philadelphia FDC. Respondent's office is located at 700 Arch St, Philadelphia, PA 19106.

9. Respondent John Rife is sued in his official capacity as the Field Office Director of U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Philadelphia Field Office. He is responsible for the administration and management of ICE Enforcement Removal Operations in Pennsylvania and exercises administrative control over Petitioner's custody. Respondent's office is located at 114 N 8th St, Philadelphia, PA 19107.

10. Respondent, Todd Lyons, is named in his official capacity as the Acting Director of ICE. In this capacity, Respondent Lyons is responsible for the administration of federal immigration law and the execution of detention and removal determinations, and, as such, he is a legal custodian of Petitioner. Respondent Lyons's office is located at 500 12th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20536.

11. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS oversees ICE, which is responsible for administering and enforcing the immigration laws. Secretary Noem is the ultimate legal custodian of Petitioner. She is sued in her official capacity. Respondent Noem's office is located at U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. 20528.

12. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, including the Executive Office for Immigration Review. She is sued in her official capacity.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

15. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, PA.

16. This action arises under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

17. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Art. I § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 28 U.S.C. § 1361. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

18. The United States has waived sovereign immunity for this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against one of its agencies and that agency's officers are sued in their official capacities. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 702.

19. Venue is proper in this District because the Petitioner is detained in this District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391; *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004).

20. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

21. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause "forthwith," unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return "within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed." *Id.*

22. Habeas corpus is "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement." *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). "The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application." *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

23. There is no statutory requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies where a noncitizen challenges the lawfulness of his detention. *Arango Marquez v. I.N.S.*, 346 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2003). Any requirement of administrative exhaustion is therefore purely discretionary. *See Santos v. Lowe*, No. 1:18-cv-1553, 2020 WL 4530728, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 2020) ("[T]he exhaustion requirement imposed by courts relating to habeas corpus petitions filed by immigration detainees is a prudential benchmark which is not compelled by statute.").

24. In making that decision, the Court should consider the urgency of the need for immediate review. "Where a person is detained by executive order . . . the need for collateral review is most pressing. . . . In this context the need for habeas corpus is more

urgent." *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008) (waiving administrative exhaustion for executive detainees).

25. Moreover, the exhaustion "doctrine is not without exception." *Ashley v. Ridge*, 288 F. Supp. 2d 662, 666. (D.N.J. 2003). "Courts have found that the exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be required when available remedies provide no opportunity for adequate relief, an administrative appeal would be futile, or if plaintiff has raised a substantial constitutional question." *Id*. at 666-67.

26. As a result of a recent BIA decision, noncitizens who enter the U.S. without admission or inspection are considered "seeking admission" under INA § 235(b)(2)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). In line with this precedent, Immigration Judges lack jurisdiction to hear bond requests or to grant bond to noncitizens who are present in the United States without admission. Therefore, exhaustion before the Immigration Judge would be futile as they have no authority to hear these bond hearings.

27. Further, the BIA does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues. *Qatanani v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S.*, 144 F.4th 485, 500 (3d Cir. 2025); *see also Ashley*, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 667 (citation omitted). Therefore, any administrative exhaustion would also be futile because Petitioner raises a constitutional due process claim. *Qatanani*, 144 F.4th at 500.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

28. Petitioner, Amos Souza Santos, is a 21-year-old native and citizen of Brazil, who entered the U.S. on or around January 18, 2025. *See* Ex. A, Order of release on recognizance.

29. Upon knowledge and belief, after his entry into the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) detained Mr. Souza Santos and placed him into removal proceedings. He was detained for approximately one day before being released on his own recognizance.

30. Mr. Souza Santos had been complying with reporting requirements when he was re-detained by ICE on March 17, 2026. Mr. Souza Santos appeared for a regularly scheduled ICE reporting requirement on March 17, 2026. He had previously attended several ICE reporting check-ins without incident. He was detained and transported to the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, PA, where he remains to date. *See* Ex. B, ICE Detainee Locator.

33. As a result, Mr. Souza Santos is now in detention. Without relief from this court, he faces the prospect of additional months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his community and family, including his wife and two children, ages four years old and three months old. His three-month-old child is a U.S. citizen.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

I. Section 1226(a) Governs the Detention of People Like Petitioner Who are Detained in the United States and Have Not Previously Been Admitted

34. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

35. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226 detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested,

charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

36. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

37. Lastly, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

38. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

39. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended in 2025 by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

40. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

41. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was

consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed "arriving" were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply "restates" the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

42. In recent months, Respondents have abruptly changed course. On May 15, 2025, the BIA issued a decision holding that a noncitizen who entered without inspection and was apprehended and paroled near the border was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) when her parole was terminated and she was re-detained. *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66, 70 (BIA 2025).

43. On July 8, 2025, ICE, "in coordination with" DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice.

44. The new policy, entitled "Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission," claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended, and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

45. On September 5, 2025, the BIA followed suit and issued a precedential decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The BIA held that noncitizens "who are present in the United States without admission are applicants for admission as defined

under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the duration of their removal proceedings." 29 I&N Dec. at 220.

46. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, dozens of federal courts nationwide have rejected their new interpretation of the INA's detention authorities. Courts have likewise rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE.

47. Even before ICE or the BIA introduced these nationwide policies, IJs in the Tacoma, Washington, immigration court stopped providing bond hearings for persons who entered the United States without inspection and who have since resided here. There, the U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the United States. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

48. Subsequently, court after court has adopted the same reading of the INA's detention authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation. *See, e.g.*, *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL

2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2466670, at *8 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *see also, e.g.*, *Palma Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566 at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that "[t]he Court tends to agree" that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

49. District courts in the Third Circuit—including this District—have also joined this chorus in rejecting ICE and EOIR's interpretation. *See Cantu-Cortes v. O'Neill*, No. 25-cv-6338, 2025 WL 3171639, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (Kenney, J.); *Kashranov,* 2025 WL 3188399, at *7 (Wolson, J.); *Demirel*, 2025 WL 3218243, at *5 (Diamond, J.); *Patel v. O'Neil*, 2025 WL 3516865 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (Mariana, R.); *see, e.g.*, *Vasquez Mejia v. Noem*, 2025 WL 3546427 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2025) (Brown, C.); *Del Cid Del Cid v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 2985150 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2025) (Haines, S.) (granting preliminary injunction for Petitioners with Special Immigrant Juvenile Status).

50. Courts have overwhelmingly rejected DHS's and EOIR's new interpretation because it defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

51. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to "decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen]."

52. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, "[w]hen Congress creates 'specific exceptions' to a statute's applicability, it 'proves' that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies." *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); *see also Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7.

53. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

54. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention

scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

55. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to people like Petitioner, who have already entered and were residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended.

II. The BIA's Application of Mandatory Detention to Noncitizens like Petitioner Violates Substantive and Procedural Due Process

56. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. "It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in deportation proceedings." *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (quoting *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). Substantive due process requires that immigration detention without a bond hearing be reasonably related to the goals of ensuring the appearance of noncitizens at future proceedings and preventing danger to the community. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

57. The BIA's application of mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) is not reasonably related to those goals and thus violates substantive due process. Absent adequate procedural protections, substantive due process requires a "special justification" that "outweighs the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690; *accord, e.g.*, *Torralba v. Knight*, No. 2:25-cv-1366,

2025 WL 2581792, at *12 (D. Nev. Sept. 5, 2025) (describing the standard for a substantive due process violation); *Fernandez v. Lyons*, No. 8:25-cv-506, 2025 WL 2531539, at *4 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (same). In the immigration context, the Supreme Court has recognized only two valid purposes for civil detention—to mitigate the risks of danger to the community and to prevent flight. *Id*.; *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 528. Thus, to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the nature and duration of mandatory immigration detention must be reasonably related to these purposes.

58. In *Demore*, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of § 1226(c) against a facial challenge, specifically citing evidence that had been before Congress about noncitizens with criminal convictions. 538 U.S. at 518-520. This justification does not apply, however, to noncitizens with no criminal record whatsoever who have lived in the community for years. The broad policy set forth in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* is not reasonably related to the purposes of prevent danger to the community or flight risk and violates substantive due process.

59. Additionally, the due process clause protects noncitizens against deprivation of liberty without adequate procedural protections, including notice and the opportunity to be heard. *A.A.R.P. v. Trump*, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025); *Trump v. J.G.G.*, 145 S. Ct. 1003, 1006 (2025); *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020). In determining the proper procedure to protect a detained noncitizen's procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, courts apply the three-part balancing test in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), weighing (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action;" (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

procedural safeguards;" and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." *Black v. Decker*, 103 F.4th 133, 147-48 (2d Cir. 2024); *Gayle v. Warden Monmouth C'ty Corr. Facility*, 12 F. 4th 321, 331 (3d Cir. 2021); *Hernandez-Lara*, 10 F.4th at 28; *Velasco Lopez*, 978 F.3d at 851 (all quoting *Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 335). Here, the BIA's interpretation of the statute to require detention of all people in the United States without having been admitted deprives them of their liberty without any individualized process to determine whether such detention is necessary to prevent flight risk or danger to the community, and violates due process.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT 1

Violation of the INA

60. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

61. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who have been residing in the United States at liberty after being briefly detained at or near the border. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

62. Respondents' authority to detain Mr. Souza Santos is derived from 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as Mr. Souza Santos is already present in the United States, with no final order of removal.

63. Respondents' position that Mr. Souza Santos is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is erroneous. He cannot be said to be "seeking admission" under Section 1225(b)(2)(A), as Respondents now argue, after living in the United States for over a year and two months.

66. Respondents have detained Mr. Souza Santos without making an individualized determination regarding whether he posed a danger or flight risk as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its regulations.

67. Thus, the application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT II

Violation of 5th Amendment Due Process Clause

Substantive Due Process

68. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

69. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). Substantive due process requires that immigration detention without a bond hearing be reasonably related to the goals of ensuring the appearance of noncitizens at future proceedings and preventing danger to the community. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

70. The BIA's application of mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) is not reasonably related to those goals and thus violates substantive due process. Mr. Souza

Santos has a history of compliance with all conditions of his removal proceedings and ICE supervision program.

71. The circumstances of Mr. Souza Santos re-detention and application of mandatory detention provide him with no due process and no individualized assessment of flight risk or danger to the community as required by *Zadvydas*. 533 U.S. at 690. Were there to be such a process or individualized assessment, the government could not show that Petitioner is a public danger, as he has never been convicted of any crime. Likewise, the government could not clearly establish that he is a flight risk given his positive history of compliance with his ICE check-ins.

COUNT III

Violation of 5th Amendment Due Process Clause

Procedural Due Process

72. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

73. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the government from depriving any "person" of liberty "without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. Evaluating the adequacy of the process provided to a non-citizen requires a balancing of factors. "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

74. First, Mr. Souza Santos faces "the most significant liberty interest there is–the interest in being free from imprisonment." *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)). Second, Respondents have erroneously deprived Mr. Souza Santos of his liberty without any individualized assessment of his circumstances. BIA's interpretation of the statute does not permit any individualized determination of whether detention during removal proceedings is necessary. *See Ashley*, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 670. At a hearing, Mr. Souza Santos could show that his detention is not necessary because, as stated above, he has complied with all ICE check-ins. Because Respondents re-detained Mr. Souza Santos without any showing that circumstances have changed, a hearing at which the government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence would protect the substantial liberty interest at stake. *See German Santos*, 965 F.3d at 213–14. Third, Respondents did not make any individualized finding that Mr. Souza Santos was a danger or flight risk, so there does not appear to be a significant government interest in detaining Mr. Souza Santos.

75. The government's re-detention of Mr. Souza Santos without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

COUNT IV

Violation of Administrative Procedure Act as Contrary to Law and Arbitrary and Capricious Agency Policy

76. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference the above paragraphs.

77. The APA provides that a "reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

78. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to grounds of inadmissibility. Specifically, it does not apply to Mr. Souza Santos, who has been living in the United States since on or around January 18, 2025, and who had already been placed into removal proceedings by respondents. Mr. Souza Santos is detained under § 1226(a) and is eligible for release on bond.

79. In taking a contrary position, the BIA has reversed decades of prior practice, and endorsing this policy "would expand § 1225(b) far beyond how it has been enforced historically, potentially subjecting millions more undocumented immigrants to mandatory detention, while simultaneously narrowing § 1226(a) such that it would have extremely limited (if any) application." *Lopez Benitez*, 2025 2371588, at *8. Respondents have failed to articulate reasoned explanations for their decisions, which represent changes in the agencies' policies and positions; have changed the factors that Congress intended to be considered; have entirely failed to consider important aspects of the problem regarding mandatory detention; and have offered explanations for their decisions that run counter to the evidence before the agencies.

80. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law, and as such, it violates the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;

b. Issue an order administratively staying Respondents from transferring Petitioner outside of this Court's geographic jurisdiction pending the Court's adjudication of the petition;

c. Declare that Petitioner's continued detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and/or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution;

d. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus and order Petitioner's immediate release from custody;

e. In the alternative, conduct a custody hearing at which Respondents must establish by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner presents a risk of flight or danger, even after consideration of alternatives to detention that could mitigate any risk that Petitioner's release would present;

f. Issue an order requiring Respondents to return Petitioner's personal property, including identification and documents;[1]

g. Award Petitioner his costs and reasonable attorney fees in this action as provided for by the Equal Access to Justice Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law, *see Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Corr. Ctr.*, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 263483 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2026); and

h. Grant such further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: March 19, 2026 Respectfully submitted,

[1] *See, e.g.,* Order, ECF 20, *Abreu v. Baker et al.*, Civil No. 25-3088-BAH (D. Md) (Dec. 18, 2025) (ordering return of petitioner's personal property confiscated at the time of her detention); *Ortiz Martinez v. Wamsley*, No. 2:25-CV-01822-TMC, 2025 WL 2899116, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 10, 2025) (same).

/s/Marlee McCadden
Marlee McCadden, Esq. (PA 332430)
Clinic for Asylum, Refugee, and Emigrant Services
Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
299 N. Spring Mill Road
Villanova, PA 19085
cares@law.villanova.edu
Phone: 610-519-7586

LIST OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit	Description
A	Order of Release on Recognizance
B	U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, *Online Detainee Locator System*, https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/search (last accessed March 19, 2026).

VERIFICATION BY SOMEONE ACTING ON PETITIONER'S BEHALF PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I represent Petitioner, Amos Souza Santos, and submit this verification on his behalf. I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated: March 19, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Marlee McCadden
Marlee McCadden, Esq.
Pro Bono Counsel for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, undersigned counsel, hereby certify that on this date, I filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and all attachments using the CM/ECF system. I will furthermore send a courtesy copy via email to the office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Dated: March 19, 2026

/s/ Marlee McCadden
Marlee McCadden

JS 44 (Rev. 04/21)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. *(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)*

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

Souza Santos, Amos

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Philadelphia
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

(c) Attorneys *(Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)*
Marlee A. McCadden, Villanova Law CARES Clinic, 299 N. Spring Mill Rd., Villanova, PA 19085; phone: 610-519-7586

DEFENDANTS

*Please see attachment

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

Attorneys *(If Known)*

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION *(Place an "X" in One Box Only)*

- ☐ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff
- ☐ 3 Federal Question *(U.S. Government Not a Party)*
- ☒ 2 U.S. Government Defendant
- ☐ 4 Diversity *(Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)*

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES *(Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)*

(For Diversity Cases Only)

	PTF	DEF		PTF	DEF
Citizen of This State	☐ 1	☐ 1	Incorporated *or* Principal Place of Business In This State	☐ 4	☐ 4
Citizen of Another State	☐ 2	☐ 2	Incorporated *and* Principal Place of Business In Another State	☐ 5	☐ 5
Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country	☐ 3	☐ 3	Foreign Nation	☐ 6	☐ 6

IV. NATURE OF SUIT *(Place an "X" in One Box Only)*

Click here for: .

CONTRACT
- ☐ 110 Insurance
- ☐ 120 Marine
- ☐ 130 Miller Act
- ☐ 140 Negotiable Instrument
- ☐ 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment
- ☐ 151 Medicare Act
- ☐ 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excludes Veterans)
- ☐ 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits
- ☐ 160 Stockholders' Suits
- ☐ 190 Other Contract
- ☐ 195 Contract Product Liability
- ☐ 196 Franchise

REAL PROPERTY
- ☐ 210 Land Condemnation
- ☐ 220 Foreclosure
- ☐ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment
- ☐ 240 Torts to Land
- ☐ 245 Tort Product Liability
- ☐ 290 All Other Real Property

TORTS

PERSONAL INJURY
- ☐ 310 Airplane
- ☐ 315 Airplane Product Liability
- ☐ 320 Assault, Libel & Slander
- ☐ 330 Federal Employers' Liability
- ☐ 340 Marine
- ☐ 345 Marine Product Liability
- ☐ 350 Motor Vehicle
- ☐ 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability
- ☐ 360 Other Personal Injury
- ☐ 362 Personal Injury - Medical Malpractice

PERSONAL INJURY
- ☐ 365 Personal Injury - Product Liability
- ☐ 367 Health Care/ Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability
- ☐ 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability

PERSONAL PROPERTY
- ☐ 370 Other Fraud
- ☐ 371 Truth in Lending
- ☐ 380 Other Personal Property Damage
- ☐ 385 Property Damage Product Liability

CIVIL RIGHTS
- ☐ 440 Other Civil Rights
- ☐ 441 Voting
- ☐ 442 Employment
- ☐ 443 Housing/ Accommodations
- ☐ 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - Employment
- ☐ 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - Other
- ☐ 448 Education

PRISONER PETITIONS

Habeas Corpus:
- ☒ 463 Alien Detainee
- ☐ 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence
- ☐ 530 General
- ☐ 535 Death Penalty

Other:
- ☐ 540 Mandamus & Other
- ☐ 550 Civil Rights
- ☐ 555 Prison Condition
- ☐ 560 Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement

FORFEITURE/PENALTY
- ☐ 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881
- ☐ 690 Other

LABOR
- ☐ 710 Fair Labor Standards Act
- ☐ 720 Labor/Management Relations
- ☐ 740 Railway Labor Act
- ☐ 751 Family and Medical Leave Act
- ☐ 790 Other Labor Litigation
- ☐ 791 Employee Retirement Income Security Act

IMMIGRATION
- ☐ 462 Naturalization Application
- ☐ 465 Other Immigration Actions

BANKRUPTCY
- ☐ 422 Appeal 28 USC 158
- ☐ 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
- ☐ 820 Copyrights
- ☐ 830 Patent
- ☐ 835 Patent - Abbreviated New Drug Application
- ☐ 840 Trademark
- ☐ 880 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016

SOCIAL SECURITY
- ☐ 861 HIA (1395ff)
- ☐ 862 Black Lung (923)
- ☐ 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
- ☐ 864 SSID Title XVI
- ☐ 865 RSI (405(g))

FEDERAL TAX SUITS
- ☐ 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant)
- ☐ 871 IRS—Third Party 26 USC 7609

OTHER STATUTES
- ☐ 375 False Claims Act
- ☐ 376 Qui Tam (31 USC 3729(a))
- ☐ 400 State Reapportionment
- ☐ 410 Antitrust
- ☐ 430 Banks and Banking
- ☐ 450 Commerce
- ☐ 460 Deportation
- ☐ 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
- ☐ 480 Consumer Credit (15 USC 1681 or 1692)
- ☐ 485 Telephone Consumer Protection Act
- ☐ 490 Cable/Sat TV
- ☐ 850 Securities/Commodities/ Exchange
- ☐ 890 Other Statutory Actions
- ☐ 891 Agricultural Acts
- ☐ 893 Environmental Matters
- ☐ 895 Freedom of Information Act
- ☐ 896 Arbitration
- ☐ 899 Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
- ☐ 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes

V. ORIGIN *(Place an "X" in One Box Only)*

- ☒ 1 Original Proceeding
- ☐ 2 Removed from State Court
- ☐ 3 Remanded from Appellate Court
- ☐ 4 Reinstated or Reopened
- ☐ 5 Transferred from Another District *(specify)*
- ☐ 6 Multidistrict Litigation - Transfer
- ☐ 8 Multidistrict Litigation - Direct File

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing *(Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity)*:
28 USC § 2241

Brief description of cause:
Habeas petition challenging detention in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, implementing regulations, and 5th Amendment due process

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

☐ CHECK IF THIS IS A **CLASS ACTION** UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.

DEMAND $

CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:
JURY DEMAND: ☐ Yes ☐ No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY

(See instructions): JUDGE _____ DOCKET NUMBER _____

DATE
03/19/2026

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD
/s/ Marlee McCadden

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # _____ AMOUNT _____ APPLYING IFP _____ JUDGE _____ MAG. JUDGE _____

Respondents:

J.L. JAMISON, Warden, Federal Detention Center;

JOHN RIFE, Field Office Director of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Removal Operations Philadelphia Field Office;

TODD LYONS, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security;

PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DESIGNATION FORM

Place of Accident, Incident, or Transaction: Philadelphia, PA

RELATED CASE IF ANY: Case Number:_____ Judge:_____

1. Does this case involve property included in an earlier numbered suit? Yes ☐
2. Does this case involve a transaction or occurrence which was the subject of an earlier numbered suit? Yes ☐
3. Does this case involve the validity or infringement of a patent which was the subject of an earlier numbered suit? Yes ☐
4. Is this case a second or successive habeas corpus petition, social security appeal, or pro se case filed by the same individual? Yes ☐
5. Is this case related to an earlier numbered suit even though none of the above categories apply? If yes, attach an explanation. Yes ☐

I certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the within case ☐ **is** / ☒ **is not** related to any pending or previously terminated action in this court.

Civil Litigation Categories

A. Federal Question Cases:

- ☐ 1. Indemnity Contract, Marine Contract, and All Other Contracts)
- ☐ 2. FELA
- ☐ 3. Jones Act-Personal Injury
- ☐ 4. Antitrust
- ☐ 5. Wage and Hour Class Action/Collective Action
- ☐ 6. Patent
- ☐ 7. Copyright/Trademark
- ☐ 8. Employment
- ☐ 9. Labor-Management Relations
- ☐ 10. Civil Rights
- ☒ 11. Habeas Corpus
- ☐ 12. Securities Cases
- ☐ 13. Social Security Review Cases
- ☐ 14. Qui Tam Cases
- ☐ 15. Cases Seeking Systemic Relief ***see certification below***
- ☐ 16. All Other Federal Question Cases. *(Please specify)*:_____

B. Diversity Jurisdiction Cases:

- ☐ 1. Insurance Contract and Other Contracts
- ☐ 2. Airplane Personal Injury
- ☐ 3. Assault, Defamation
- ☐ 4. Marine Personal Injury
- ☐ 5. Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
- ☐ 6. Other Personal Injury (*Please specify*):_____
- ☐ 7. Products Liability
- ☐ 8. All Other Diversity Cases: *(Please specify)*_____

I certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the remedy sought in this case ☐ **does** / ☒ **does not** have implications beyond the parties before the court and ☐ **does** / ☒ **does not** seek to bar or mandate statewide or nationwide enforcement of a state or federal law including a rule, regulation, policy, or order of the executive branch or a state or federal agency, whether by declaratory judgment and/or any form of injunctive relief.

ARBITRATION CERTIFICATION (CHECK ONLY ONE BOX BELOW)


I certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

☒ Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 53.2(3), this case is not eligible for arbitration either because (1) it seeks relief other than money damages; (2) the money damages sought are in excess of $150,000 exclusive of interest and costs; (3) it is a social security case, includes a prisoner as a party, or alleges a violation of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution, or (4) jurisdiction is based in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

☐ None of the restrictions in Local Civil Rule 53.2 apply and this case is eligible for arbitration.

NOTE: A trial de novo will be by jury only if there has been compliance with F.R.C.P. 38.

EXHIBIT A



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

ORDER OF RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE
(CONTINUATION PAGE)


Alien Name: SOUZA-SANTOS, AMOS
Picture
Right Index Print
File Number: [redacted]
Date: Jan 18, 2023
Alien's Signature: Amós Souza Santos
Alien's Telephone Number (if any): [redacted]
Alien's Address: [redacted]

PERSONAL REPORT RECORD

Date	Officer	Comment/Changes

Signature: [redacted] 1/18/2023 HECTOR G GARCIA JR
Title: Deportation Officer

ICE Form I-220A (10/20)
Page 2 of 5
Philadelphia BI Office 1015



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

ORDER OF RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE (ADDENDUM)

File No. [redacted]

Date: Jan 16, 2025

Name: SOUZA-SANTOS, AMOS

- [x] That you do not associate with known gang members, criminal associates, or be associated with any such activity.
- [ ] That you register in a substance abuse program within 14 days and provide ICE with written proof of such within 30 days. The proof must include the name, address, duration, and objectives of the program as well as the name of a counselor.
- [ ] That you register in a sexual deviancy counseling program within 14 days and provide ICE with written proof of such within 30 days. You must provide ICE with the name of the program, the address of the program, duration and objectives of the program as well as the name of a counselor.
- [ ] That you register as a sex offender, if applicable, within 7 days of being released, with the appropriate agency(s) and provide ICE with written proof of such within 10 days.
- [x] That you do not commit any crimes while on this Order of Release on Recognizance.
- [x] That you report to any parole or probation officer as required within 5 business days and provide ICE with written verification of the officer's name, address, telephone number, and reporting requirements.
- [ ] That you continue to follow any prescribed doctor's orders whether medical or psychological including taking prescribed medication.
- [x] That you provide ICE with written copies of requests to Embassies or Consulates requesting the issuance of a travel document.
- [x] That you provide ICE with written responses from the Embassy or Consulate regarding your request.
- [x] Any violation of the above conditions will result in revocation of your employment authorization document.
- [x] Any violation of these conditions may result in you being taken into ICE custody and you being criminally prosecuted.
- [ ] Other:

x Amos Souza Santos
(Signature of Alien)

ICE Form I-220A (10/20)

Page 3 of 5

EXHIBIT B

Official Website of the Department of Homeland Security

Report

Main Menu

Search Results: 1

AMOS SOUZA-SANTOS

Country of Birth : Brazil
A-Number: [redacted]
Status : In ICE Custody
State: PA
Current Detention Facility: Philadelphia Federal Detention Center

** Click on the Detention Facility name to obtain facility contact information*

BACK TO SEARCH >

Related Information

Helpful Info

Status of a Case

About the Detainee Locator

Brochure

ICE ERO Field Offices

ICE Detention Facilities

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