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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLORADO

LOVEPREET SINGH Petitioner, v. JUAN BALTASAR, Warden of the Denver Contract Detention Facility; TODD LYONS, Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the United States Respondents.	Civil Action No. **VERIFIED PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS**

INTRODUCTION

1. This habeas action challenges the Government's abrupt revocation of liberty previously granted to Petitioner without providing any notice, individualized determination, or pre-deprivation hearing.

2. Petitioner Singh is a native and citizen of India who entered the United States on April 19, 2023, without inspection. Shortly after his entry, immigration authorities briefly detained him pursuant to Form I-200.

3. Following that brief detention, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") released

Petitioner on his own recognizance ("ROR"), subject to conditions of supervision that included participation in the Alternatives to Detention ("ATD") program and periodic reporting to Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE").

4. Petitioner fully complied with every condition imposed by DHS. He consistently reported to ICE as directed, complied with ATD monitoring, and never violated any supervision requirement.

5. On April 22, 2023, DHS served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear charging him solely under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) as a noncitizen present in the United States without admission or parole. Petitioner has remained in ongoing removal proceedings and has complied with all immigration court requirements.

6. Petitioner has no criminal history. He has never been arrested, charged, or convicted of any criminal offense.

7. During the period following his release, Petitioner maintained lawful employment pursuant to a valid Employment Authorization Document issued in connection with his pending asylum application. Petitioner works as a commercial truck driver and supports himself through lawful employment.

8. For nearly three years, Petitioner lived and worked in the United States while complying with all immigration requirements and supervision conditions. At no time did DHS allege that Petitioner violated any condition of release, failed to appear for proceedings, or engaged in any criminal conduct.

9. On March 5, 2026, while working as a commercial truck driver, Petitioner was involved in a traffic accident during the course of his route. Petitioner contacted local law enforcement and requested assistance.

10. When sheriff's deputies arrived at the scene, Petitioner cooperated fully and informed the officers that he had previously been released by immigration authorities on his own recognizance and that he had been complying with all ICE supervision requirements.

11. Instead of providing assistance related to the accident, the responding officer detained Petitioner and contacted immigration authorities.

12. Petitioner was then taken into custody by immigration authorities despite the fact that he had committed no crime, violated no immigration condition, and had fully complied with all supervision requirements.

13. Officers did not identify any criminal conduct, immigration violation, or violation of release conditions. Petitioner was detained without notice, without any alleged violation of supervision requirements, and without any individualized custody determination.

14. Petitioner was also not provided any pre-deprivation hearing or opportunity to contest the Government's decision to revoke his previously granted liberty.

15. Once the Government grants liberty through a custody determination and permits a noncitizen to live and work in the community under supervision, that liberty interest cannot be revoked summarily without constitutionally adequate procedures. Courts have repeatedly recognized that the revocation of conditional liberty requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before the deprivation occurs.

16. Respondents now appear to justify Petitioner's detention by invoking mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), relying in part on the Department of Homeland Security's July 8, 2025 Interim Guidance and the Board of Immigration Appeals' decisions in *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado* and *Matter of Q. Li.*

17. However, Petitioner had already been released from custody and had relied on that

liberty for an extended period of time while fully complying with all supervision conditions. At the time of his re-detention, the governing detention authority is disputed because Respondents attempt to apply § 1225(b) despite the fact that Petitioner had long been released into the community and was subject to supervision consistent with INA § 1226(a).

18. The Government nevertheless revoked Petitioner's liberty without providing any pre-deprivation hearing, individualized determination, or procedural safeguards.

19. This case therefore presents a straightforward constitutional question: whether the Government may revoke previously granted liberty—after years of full compliance—without providing any pre-deprivation hearing or individualized determination.

20. Because Petitioner has complied with all conditions of release, maintained lawful employment, appeared for immigration proceedings, and committed no violations or criminal acts, his continued detention is unlawful.

21. Petitioner therefore seeks habeas relief ordering his immediate release or, at minimum, a prompt bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.

JURISDICTION

22. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.*

23. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause).

24. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 *et seq.*, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

25. Venue is proper because Petitioner is detained in Denver Contract Detention Facility, which is within the jurisdiction of this District. Venue is also proper in this District because Respondents are officers, employees, or agencies of the United States. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

PARTIES

26. Respondent Juan Baltasar is sued in his official capacity as Warden of the Denver Contract Detention Facility. Respondent Baltasar is the physical custodian of Petitioner.

27. Respondent Todd Lyons is sued in his official capacity as the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Respondent Lyons is a legal custodian of Petitioner and has authority to release him.

28. Respondent Markwayne Mullin is sued in his official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, Respondent Mullin is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the INA, and oversees ICE, the component agency responsible for Petitioner's detention and custody. Respondent Mullin is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

29. Respondent Pamela Bondi is sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the senior official of the U.S. Department of Justice. In that capacity, she has the authority to adjudicate removal cases and to oversee the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"), which administers the immigration courts and the BIA. Respondent Bondi is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

30. Petitioner Singh is a native and citizen of India.

31. Petitioner entered the United States on April 19, 2023, without inspection.

32. Shortly after his entry, immigration authorities briefly detained Petitioner pursuant to Form I-200.

33. Following that brief detention, DHS released Petitioner on his own recognizance ("ROR"), subject to conditions of supervision.

34. As conditions of release, Petitioner was required to participate in the Alternatives to Detention ("ATD") program and comply with periodic reporting requirements to ICE.

35. Petitioner complied fully with all conditions of release. He consistently reported to ICE as directed and maintained perfect compliance with all ATD supervision requirements.

36. Petitioner has no criminal history. He has never been arrested, charged, or convicted of any criminal offense.

37. On April 22, 2023, DHS served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear charging him solely under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) as a noncitizen present in the United States without admission or parole.

38. Petitioner has remained in ongoing removal proceedings before the Immigration Court and has complied with all court-related requirements.

39. Petitioner obtained a valid Employment Authorization Document based on his pending asylum application.

40. Petitioner works as a commercial truck driver and supports himself through lawful employment.

41. For nearly three years following his release, Petitioner remained fully compliant with all immigration supervision requirements.

42. At no point during this period did DHS allege that Petitioner violated any condition of release or failed to comply with immigration requirements.

43. On March 5, 2026, while working as a commercial truck driver, Petitioner was involved in a traffic accident and contacted local law enforcement to request assistance.

44. When sheriff's deputies arrived at the scene, Petitioner cooperated fully and explained

that he had previously been released by immigration authorities on his own recognizance and had been complying with all ICE supervision requirements.

45. Instead of providing assistance related to the accident, the responding officer detained Petitioner and contacted immigration authorities.

46. Immigration authorities subsequently took Petitioner into custody.

47. Officers did not allege any criminal conduct, immigration violation, or violation of supervision conditions.

48. Petitioner was detained without prior notice, without any alleged violation, and without any individualized custody determination.

49. Petitioner was not provided any pre-deprivation hearing or opportunity to contest the revocation of his previously granted liberty.

50. Respondents appear to justify Petitioner's detention by invoking mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), relying in part on the Department of Homeland Security's July 8, 2025 Interim Guidance and the Board of Immigration Appeals' decisions in *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado* and *Matter of Q. Li*.

51. However, Petitioner had already been released by immigration authorities and had relied on that liberty while living and working in the United States in full compliance with all supervision requirements.

52. Respondents nevertheless revoked Petitioner's liberty without providing any pre-deprivation hearing or individualized determination.

53. Petitioner remains detained without access to bond or any meaningful individualized custody review.

54. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks habeas relief ordering his immediate release or, at

minimum, a prompt bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

55. The Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") prescribes three principal statutory authorities governing the detention of noncitizens in removal proceedings. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) authorizes the arrest and detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings pending before an Immigration Judge. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), 1229a. Individuals detained under § 1226(a) are entitled to an individualized custody determination and may seek release on bond before an Immigration Judge. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d). Certain noncitizens with specified criminal convictions are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

56. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of certain applicants for admission placed in expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

57. Third, the INA authorizes detention of noncitizens who are subject to final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), including individuals in withholding-only proceedings. The detention provisions contained in §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546. Section 1226(c) was most recently amended by the Laken Riley Act ("LRA"), Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

58. Following enactment of IIRIRA, the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") promulgated regulations recognizing that individuals who entered the United States without inspection but were placed in removal proceedings were generally detained under § 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b). See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997). For

decades following enactment of IIRIRA, noncitizens who entered without inspection but were placed into removal proceedings were routinely treated as § 1226(a) detainees and were entitled to bond hearings before Immigration Judges

59. On July 8, 2025, DHS issued a memo to all employees of ICE stating that "[t]his message serves as notice that DHS, in coordination with the Department of Justice (DOJ), has revisited its legal position on detention and release authorities. DHS has determined that section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) [8 U.S.C. § 1225], rather than section 236 [8 U.S.C. § 1226], is the applicable immigration detention authority for all applicants for admission. The following interim guidance is intended to ensure immediate and consistent application of the Department's legal interpretation while additional operational guidance is developed." The memo further stated DHS' new position with regard to custody determinations as follows:

> An "applicant for admission" is an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States, whether or not at a designated port of arrival. INA § 235(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)]. **Effective immediately, it is the position of DHS that such aliens are subject to detention under INA § 235(b) [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)] and may not be released from ICE custody except by INA § 212(d)(5) parole.** These aliens are also ineligible for a custody redetermination hearing ("bond hearing") before an immigration judge and may not be released for the duration of their removal proceedings absent a parole by DHS. For custody purposes, these aliens are now treated in the same manner that "arriving aliens" have historically been treated. **The only aliens eligible for a custody determination and release on recognizance, bond, or other conditions under INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] during removal proceedings are aliens admitted to the United States and chargeable with deportability under INA § 237, with the exception of those subject to mandatory detention under INA § 236(c) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)].**
>
> Moving forward, ICE will not issue Form I-286, Notice of Custody Determination, to applicants for admission because Form I-286 applies by its terms only to custody determinations under INA § 236 and part 236 of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations. With a limited exception for certain habeas petitioners, on which the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) will individually advise, if Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) previously conducted a custody determination for an applicant for admission still detained in ICE custody, ERO will affirmatively cancel the Form I-286.
>
> *See* https://www.aila.org/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission (last accessed October 18, 2025) (emphasis original).

60. As a result, DHS now considers all noncitizens who have entered the United States without inspection and are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility, including long-time U.S. residents, to be subject to mandatory detention under section 1225(b) and ineligible for release on bond. Conversely, according to DHS "[t]he only aliens eligible for a custody determination and release on recognizance, bond, or other conditions under INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] during removal proceedings are aliens admitted to the United States and chargeable with deportability under INA § 237, with the exception of those subject to mandatory detention under INA § 236(c) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)]." *Id.*

61. Shortly thereafter, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") issued decisions reflecting the same interpretation. In *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), and *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), the Board concluded that Immigration Judges lack bond jurisdiction over certain noncitizens present in the United States without admission because, in the Board's view, § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates detention of such individuals as "applicants for admission."

62. Federal courts, however, have rejected DHS's attempt to retroactively reclassify noncitizens who have already been placed in removal proceedings and released into the community as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b). Courts have recognized that such individuals remain properly detained, if at all, under § 1226(a), which preserves the statutory right to seek release on bond before an Immigration Judge.

63. Petitioner falls squarely within this statutory framework. Petitioner entered the United States on April 19, 2023 and was shortly thereafter placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. DHS initially detained Petitioner pursuant to Form I-200 but subsequently determined that detention was unnecessary and released him on his own recognizance ("ROR"), subject to participation in the Alternatives to Detention ("ATD") program and periodic reporting to ICE.

64. Because Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings and released under supervision, any subsequent detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes discretionary detention and preserves eligibility for release on bond.

65. Respondents nevertheless rely on DHS's July 8, 2025 guidance and the Board's decisions in *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado* and *Matter of Q. Li* to claim that Petitioner is categorically subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b) and therefore ineligible for a bond hearing. That interpretation conflicts with the statutory structure of the INA and unlawfully deprives Petitioner of the procedural protections guaranteed under § 1226(a).

66. The government's re-detention of Petitioner conflicts not only with the statutory framework of the INA but also with fundamental due process protections governing the revocation of previously granted liberty.

67. DHS initially determined that detention was unnecessary and released Petitioner on his own recognizance subject to ATD supervision and periodic ICE reporting requirements. Petitioner relied on that custody determination and complied fully with every condition imposed by DHS.

68. Once the government grants liberty through a custody determination releasing a noncitizen into the community under supervision, that liberty interest cannot be revoked arbitrarily or without constitutionally adequate procedures.

69. The Supreme Court has long recognized that once the government grants conditional liberty, that liberty interest cannot be revoked without due process. See *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (holding that revocation of parole requires procedural protections because conditional liberty "includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty").

70. Courts have similarly recognized that when the government seeks to revoke previously granted liberty, due process ordinarily requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral

decisionmaker prior to the deprivation. See *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); *Fuentes v. Shevin*, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).

71. Here, DHS provided no such process. On March 5, 2026, while working as a commercial truck driver, Petitioner was involved in a traffic accident and contacted local law enforcement for assistance. When deputies arrived, Petitioner fully cooperated and explained that he had been released on recognizance and was in full compliance with ICE supervision. Instead of providing assistance, deputies detained Petitioner and contacted immigration authorities, who subsequently took him into custody.

72. DHS did not allege any violation of Petitioner's ATD conditions, any failure to comply with ICE reporting requirements, any criminal conduct, or any changed factual circumstances that could justify revocation of Petitioner's liberty.

73. Petitioner was provided no advance notice that his release status would be reconsidered, no opportunity to contest the legal basis for detention, and no hearing before a neutral decisionmaker prior to being taken into custody.

74. Revoking liberty previously granted through DHS's custody determination—after nearly three years of full compliance and without any alleged violation—based solely on a retroactive policy reinterpretation violates the core protections of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. At all times, DHS was aware of Petitioner's identity, location, and full compliance through ATD monitoring and ICE reporting.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Substantive Due Process

75. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

76. Petitioner is challenging DHS' unlawful custody determination that Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and is ineligible for bond and his continued detention under the automatic stay provision at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2), which violates Petitioner's right to substantive due process of law afforded him through the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

77. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]" U.S. Const. amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

78. On March 5, 2026, DHS re-detained Petitioner solely based on a revised legal interpretation announced in its July 8, 2025 Interim Guidance and later reflected in Matter of Q. Li. The re-detention was not based on any new conduct, violation, or changed factual circumstance.

79. If Petitioner is detained at all, the governing authority is 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes discretionary detention and provides for eligibility for release on bond. By categorically treating Petitioner as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), Respondents have eliminated any individualized assessment of necessity.

80. Continued detention under these circumstances—without individualized findings and without statutory authorization—bears no reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose and therefore violates substantive due process.

81. Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court order his release or, in the alternative, require Respondents to provide a prompt and constitutionally adequate bond hearing

82. As a remedy, the Court should order Petitioner's immediate release. In the alternative, the Court should order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a prompt and constitutionally adequate bond hearing before an Immigration Judge at which the government bears the burden of justifying

continued detention.

COUNT TWO

Violation of Petitioner's Procedural Due Process Rights

83. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

84. In *Mathews v. Eldridge*, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the factors to consider in determining if government action deprives an individual's Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process or whether the government process is constitutionally adequate. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) The *Mathews* factors are as follows: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; [S]econd, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; Third, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. *Id.* at 335.

85. The risk of erroneous deprivation is substantial. DHS re-detained Petitioner without any individualized custody review, without alleging any violation or changed circumstance, and without affording him access to a bond hearing. The probable value of additional safeguards—namely, an individualized bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator—is immense.

86. Procedural due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the government deprives an individual of a protected liberty interest, except in extraordinary circumstances not present here.

87. Petitioner possessed a recognized liberty interest in remaining free from physical detention. That liberty interest was reinforced by DHS's prior decision to release him and permit him to remain at liberty under supervision for an extended period.

a. DHS re-detained Petitioner on March 5, 2026 without providing:

a. advance notice that his release would be revoked;

b. any opportunity to contest the legal basis for detention;

c. an individualized custody determination; or

d. a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

88. The re-detention was based solely on a change in agency interpretation, not on any alleged violation, changed circumstance, or individualized risk assessment.

89. Because Respondents revoked Petitioner's liberty without providing a pre-deprivation hearing and continue to deny him access to a meaningful custody determination, his detention violates procedural due process.

90. Petitioner respectfully requests an order directing Respondents to provide a prompt bond hearing before a neutral Immigration Judge at which the government bears the burden of justifying continued detention.

COUNT THREE

Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act

91. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

92. Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and released on an Order of Release on Recognizance. Under the statutory structure of the INA, detention in such proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), absent a separate mandatory detention provision not applicable here.

93. Section 1226(a) authorizes discretionary detention and expressly permits release on bond. Nothing in the statute authorizes DHS to retroactively reclassify a noncitizen already placed in § 1229a proceedings and previously released under § 1226(a) as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b).

94. Respondents' categorical denial of bond eligibility and reliance on § 1225(b) exceed statutory authority and are contrary to law.

95. Because Petitioner's detention is not authorized by the INA, habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is warranted.

COUNT FOUR

Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act

96. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs.

97. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 and 706 to review final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.

98. DHS's determination that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and its re-detention of him on March 5, 2026 based solely on that interpretation, constitute final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704. The custody determination is definitive, determines Petitioner's rights and obligations, and has immediate legal consequences—namely, his continued physical detention and categorical ineligibility for bond.

99. The Administrative Procedure Act directs courts to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action" that is contrary to law; in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations; or arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

100. DHS's application of § 1225(b) to Petitioner—who was arrested pursuant to a Form I-200, released on an Order of Release on Recognizance, and placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a—is contrary to the structure and plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Petitioner is subject, if at all, to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes discretionary detention and eligibility for release on bond.

101. By reclassifying Petitioner as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), DHS has

acted in excess of its statutory authority and effectively nullified the bond eligibility expressly provided under § 1226(a).

102. DHS's action is also arbitrary and capricious. The agency:

a. provided no individualized custody determination;
b. relied solely on a revised legal interpretation rather than any new conduct or changed factual circumstance;
c. disregarded Petitioner's approximately eighteen months of full compliance with supervision; and
d. failed to account for the reliance interests created by its prior decision to release him and permit him to remain at liberty under supervision.

103. An agency must provide a reasoned explanation when it changes course, particularly where prior action has created reliance interests. DHS offered no individualized or reasoned explanation for reversing its earlier custody determination that detention was unnecessary.

104. Because Respondents' custody determination is contrary to law, in excess of statutory authority, and arbitrary and capricious, it must be set aside pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

105. Petitioner respectfully requests declaratory and injunctive relief vacating the unlawful custody determination and restoring his eligibility for release under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), including access to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Petitioner requests this Court to grant the following:

1. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
2. Enjoin Respondents from transferring Petitioner during the pendency of the instant action;
3. Declare that Petitioner's continued detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); and/or the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution;
4. Order Immediate release from ICE custody; or
5. In the alternative, an individualized bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator within 7 days,

with the government bearing the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence;

6. Grant Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") fees and costs; and

7. Grant any other further relief this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully,

/s/Gurpreet Kaur

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VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I represent Petitioner, and I submit this verification on his behalf. Because Petitioner is detained at the Denver Contract Detention Facility and immediate relief is sought, counsel verifies this petition on his behalf pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242. I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated this 16th day of March, 2026.

/s/Gurpreet Kaur
Gurpreet Kaur, Esq.