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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
PHOENIX, ARIZONA

Henry Luceno Becerra Suarez

Petitioner,

v.

Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States, Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR); Corina Almeida, Chief Counsel, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of Principal Legal Advisor, Florence; Christopher McGregor, Field Office Director, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations, Florence; Luis Rosa, Jr, Warden, Florence Service Processing Center,

Respondents.

Case No._____

Immigration Number: A[redacted]

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Henry Luceno Becerra Suarez (A[redacted], by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully requests this Honorable Court respectfully requests this Honorable Court order Respondents to immediately release Petitioner or, in the alternative, schedule a bond custody hearing within five (5) days and failure to do so, order Petitioner's release. Respondents deny Petitioner's release by asserting he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), a new policy argument contrary to decades of EOIR

and ICE practice of releasing similarly situated non-citizens pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondents' action during the pendency of Petitioner's civil immigration proceedings subjects Petitioner to prolonged detention in violation of law. By the plain language of the statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) only applies to persons being inspected by immigration officers at the time of seeking admission. Admission being defined by the lawful entry into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Without directly interpreting the statutory definition of "admission", Respondents issued *Matter of Yajure Hurtado,* 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), holding that all non-citizens present without inspection, regardless of how many years they have been in the country, are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Pursuant to *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,* 603 U.S. 369 (2024), this Court is not bound by the Agency's interpretation of the INA. Indeed, one Federal District Court already interpreted the statute, making contrary findings to *Yajure Hurtado. See Rodriguez v. Bostock, et al.*, Case No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC Preliminary Injunction (W.D. Wash., April 24, 2025). Petitioner's detention is unlawful.

2. Petitioner is a 38-year-old male, citizen of Venezuela, who is eligible for relief from removal in the form of asylum pursuant to INA §208, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention against Torture.

3. Petitioner first entered the United States on or about December 20, 2021. Shortly after which he was apprehended and detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). On or about December 30, 2021, a custody determination was made, and Petitioner was released on his own recognizance for the purpose of continuing his removal proceedings. As a condition of his release, Petitioner was required to report for

routine chick ins with ICE, which he has consistently and diligently complied.

4. Subsequent to his release, Petitioner fulfilled his conditions of release, reunited with family members residing in the community, attended removal proceedings, obtained an Employment Authorization Document ("EAD"), and built a life in the United States.

5. Petitioner previously applied for Temporary Protected Status ("TPS") for Venezuelans. As recent as January 28, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision in *National TPS Alliance v. Noem*, that Respondent DHS and Respondent DHS Security Kristi Noem's actions were unlawful as her determination that each country no longer continues to meet the conditions for TPS designation was not reached in accordance with procedures established by Congress under the relevant TPS statue (8 U.S.C. § 1254a)[1].

6. Over two (2) years old, on January 17, 2023, Petitioner was placed into removal proceedings by filing a Notice to Appear (NTA). Petitioner dutifully attended all required court hearings.

7. Despite Petitioner's full compliance with the conditions of his release. Petitioner was abruptly and unlawfully re-detained by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") on or about January 20, 2026. Petitioner was detained without explanation or justification and subsequently transferred to the Florence Service Processing Center, located

[1] However, despite this recent decision, it does not have an immediate impact on Petitioner's TPS status in light of October 2025 Order in *Noem v. National TPS Alliance*, 606 U. S. ____ (2025), which stayed the district court's previous orders that provided emergency relief to TPS beneficiaries.

at 3250 N Pinal Parkway, Florence, Arizona 85132.

8. Prior to his detention, Petitioner resided in Phoenix, Arizona with his partner and two (2) month old daughter.

9. Petitioner had been at liberty in the United States for over four (4) years prior to his detention.

10. On or about January 20, 2026, ICE took Petitioner into custody. He was then transferred to the Florence Service Processing Center located at 3250 N Pinal Pkwy Ave, Florence, Arizona 85132. Petitioner has not requested a bond redetermination, as he asserts it would be futile, as the Immigration Judges are saying that they are compelled by the recent decision of *Matter of Yajure Hurtado,* 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) ("*Matter of Hurtado*"). Respondents continue to detain the Petitioner in violation of law.

11. *Matter of Hurtado* is unlawful and cannot justify Petitioner's ongoing confinement: it misreads the statute, conflicts with binding regulations that limit expedited-removal custody to classes designated by Federal Register notice and raises grave constitutional concerns the avoidance canon requires courts to steer away from. *See* INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)-(2); 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,314, 10,318 (Mar. 6, 1997); 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,880-81 (Aug. 11, 2004); 84 Fed. Reg. 35,409, 35,412 (July 23, 2019); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018); *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); *Clark v. Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).

12. Respondents violated Petitioner's right to be released upon payment of a bond under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and agency regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d). Respondents' coordinated action to hold

Petitioner under mandatory detention is not in accordance with law and violates Petitioner's right to due process.

13. Prior to re-detaining Petitioner, Respondents did not provide any written notice explaining the basis for the revocation of his release. Likewise, Respondents did not assess whether Petitioner presented a flight risk or danger to the community prior to his re-arrest. Nor did Petitioner provide a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, where ICE was required to justify the basis for re-detention or to explain why Petitioner is not a flight risk or a danger to the community.

14. Various District Courts have held that due process demands a hearing *prior* to the government's decision to terminate a person's liberty. *See, e.g., E.A. T.-B v Wamsley,* --- F. Supp. 3d --- No. C25-1192-KKE 2025 WL 2402130, at *2-6 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2025), *Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley,* --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 2:25-CV-01723-MJP=TLF, 2025 WL 2637663, at *2-4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2025); *Ledesma Gonalez v. Bostock,* No. 2:25-CV-01404-JNW-GJL, 2025 WL 2841574, at *7-9 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2025); *Kumar v. Wamsley,* No. 2:25-CV-01772-JHC-BAT, 2025 WL 2677089, at *2-4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 2025); Report & Recommendation, *Lopez Reyes v. Wamsley,* No. 2:25-cv-01868-JLR-MLP (W.D. Wash. Oct. 15, 2025), Dkt. 13; *Y.M.M. v. Wamsley*, No. 2:25-CV-02075-TMC, 2025 WL 3101782, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 6, 2025). Many other courts have recently held the same.

15. By failing to provide such a hearing, Respondents have violated Petitioner's constitutional rights to due process.

16. Petitioner will suffer irreparable and immediate injury from continued

unlawful detention unless the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is granted.

I. JURISDICTION

17. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.*

18. This Court has jurisdiction over petitions for Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Petitioner is in the custody of the United States.

19. This Court has jurisdiction over civil actions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 which authorizes actions in district court, "to compel an officer or employee of the United States or agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the Petitioner."

20. The aid of the Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 2202, authorizing a declaratory judgement.

21. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) to set aside agency action not in accordance with law and order the agency to perform a duty owed to Petitioner under 5 U.S.C. § 706.

II. VENUE

22. Venue is proper because Petitioner is in the custody of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Florence, Arizona, which is within the jurisdiction of this District.

23. Venue is asserted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because the Petitioner is being detained in Florence, Arizona. Respondents are the U.S. Government, and no real

property is involved in the action.

III. EXHAUSTION

24. Exhaustion is a prudential rather than a jurisdictional requirement. *Singh v. Holder*, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2011). Waiver of exhaustion is appropriate "where administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void." *Laing v. Ashcroft*, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

25. In the instant case, Petitioner has not yet requested a bond hearing given that it would be futile in light of *Matter of Hurtado*. Likewise, while the Petitioner may file an appeal of the custody redetermination to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), the appellate division of EOIR, that would be futile in light of *Matter of Hurtado*. Petitioner has no other means of challenging his ongoing prolonged detention in violation of law.

IV. REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243 AND APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER OF SHOW CAUSE

26. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause (OSC) to the Respondents "forthwith," unless the Petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Court must require Respondents to file a return "within ***three days*** unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed." *Id.* (emphasis added).

27. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The Great Writ has been referred to as "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as

it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement." *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added).

28. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court issue an order to all Respondents requiring them to show cause why the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution; the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651; the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701; and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 should not be granted and why Respondents should not be ordered to release Petitioner from detention.

29. Pending adjudication of these claims, Petitioner asks for an order enjoining Respondents from transferring Petitioner from the jurisdiction of the Phoenix Field Office of the Immigration & Customs Enforcement ("ICE") Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations ("ERO") and this District.

V. PARTIES

30. Petitioner, Henry Luceno Becerra Suarez, is a native and citizen of Venezuela, and is currently detained by ICE in Florence, Arizona. He is not subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).

31. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), responsible for overseeing and directing Immigration and Customs Enforcement. DHS directed the policy to argue Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.

32. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. Respondent is the head of the United States Department of Justice and responsible for the

entire department, which includes the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"), including the BIA.

33. Respondent Corina Almeida, Chief Counsel of the ICE Office of Principal Legal Advisor oversees the ICE attorneys in Florence, Arizona.

34. Respondent Christopher McGregor, Field Office Director Office Enforcement and Removal Operations in Phoenix, Arizona is responsible for Petitioner's custody in Florence, Arizona. Respondent McGregor is also responsible for the acceptance and processing of the payment of bond and release of ICE detainees in Florence, Arizona.

35. Respondent Luis Rosa, Jr. is the Warden at the ICE contract facility Florence Service Processing Center, operated by CoreCivic. Respondent Luis Rosa, Jr. is responsible for Petitioner's physical custody

VI. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

36. Petitioner Henry Luceno Becerra Suarez is a citizen of Venezuela who last entered the United States on or about December 20, 2021. He has resided in the United States since that date- more than four (4) years.

37. On or about January 20, 2026, DHS took Petitioner into custody. He was previously placed into removal proceedings before EOIR by issuing a Notice to Appear charging him as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). The Notice to Appear does not allege Petitioner is an arriving alien, but rather that he is present in the United States without inspection. DHS detained Petitioner at the Florence Service Processing Center in Florence, Arizona.

38. Petitioner is eligible for relief in the form of asylum pursuant to INA §208,

withholding of removal and protection under the Convention against Torture.

39. Petitioner is currently in the custody of ICE, as he is detained at the Florence Service Processing Center in Florence, Arizona.

40. In the United States, Petitioner has worked to support his partner, himself and now his young daughter.

41. On July 8, 2025, DHS issued new policy instructing ICE to argue and hold anyone they alleged to be inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

42. On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), implementing the Respondents' concerted policy goal of holding that all persons who entered without inspection are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

43. On February 18, 2026, the United States District Court for the Central District of California issued an enforcement order vacating the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. See *Lazaro Maldonado Bautista et al. v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026).

44. Respondents are providing detainees with written notices and oral advisals concerning the February 18, 2026 order, including before Immigration Court proceedings. Yet, despite these advisals, Respondents continue to oppose release and to maintain detention even after Immigration Judges determine that bond jurisdiction exists and grant bond. This pattern demonstrates that the advisals do not translate into meaningful relief and that Petitioner remains detained notwithstanding the federal court's clarification of the

governing law.

45. Respondents continue to argue that he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

VII. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

46. Due process requires that when the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") seeks to re-arrest an individual such as Petitioner, Mr. Becerra-Suarez—who was released on his own recognizance, has lived at liberty for over four (4) years without incident, and has otherwise fully complied with the conditions of his release—the government must provide a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to determine whether re-detention is warranted based on a finding that the individual poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.

47. "Freedom from imprisonment- from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint- lies in the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." *Zadvydas v. Davis,* 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). As one District Court recently recognized, this is the "most elemental of liberty interests." *E.A. T. -B*, 2025 WL 2402130, at *3 (citation modified).

48. Consistent with this principle, individuals released on parole or other forms of conditional release have a liberty interested in their "continued liberty." *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).

49. The Supreme Court has consistently held that procedural due process requires: (a) Notice of action being taken; (b) an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner; and (c) an individualized assessment of risk before deprivation of

liberty. *See Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).

50. To protect against arbitrary re-detention and to ensure the right to liberty, due process requires "adequate procedural protections" that test whether the government's asserted justification for a noncitizens' physical confinement "outweighs the individuals' constitutionally protected interested in avoiding physical restraint." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (citation modified).

51. Due process thus guarantees notice and an individualized hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to assess danger or flight risk before the revocation of an individual's release. *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) ("The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard … at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner." (citation modified); *see also, e.g. Morrissey*, 408 U.S. at 485 (requiring "preliminary hearing to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed … a violation of parole conditions" and that such determination be made "by someone not directly involved in the case" (citation modified)).

52. Several courts have recognized that these principles apply with respect to the re-detention of the many non-citizens that DHS has arbitrarily begun taking back into custody, often after such persons have been released for months and years.

53. For example, in *E.A. T.-B*, this court applied the *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), framework to hold that even in a case where the government asserted that mandatory detention initially applied, a person's re-detention could not occur absent a hearing. The Court did the same in *Ramirez Tesara, Kumar,* and *Ledesma Gonzalez. See*

Ramirez Tesara, 2025 WL 2637663, at *2-3; *Kumar*, 2025 WL 2677089, at *2-3; *Ledesma Gonazlez,* 2025 WL 2841574, at *7-8.

54. In applying the three *Mathews* factors, the E.A. T.-B court held that the petitioner had "undoubtedly [been] deprive[d] … of an established interest in his liberty," 2025 WL 2402130, at *3, which, as noted, "is the most elemental of liberty interests," *id.* (citation modified). The Court further explained that even if detention was mandatory, the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty without a hearing was high because a hearing serves to ensure that purposes of detention- the prevention of danger and flight risk- are properly served. *Id. at *4-5.* Finally, the Court explained that "the Government's interest in re-detaining non-citizens previously released without a hearing is low: although it would have required the expenditure of finite resources (money and time) to provide Petitioner notice and a hearing on [ISAP] violations before arresting and re-detaining him, those costs are far outweighed by the risk of erroneous deprivation of the liberty interest at issue." *Id.* at *5. As a result, the Court ordered the petitioner's immediate release. *Id.* at *6.

55. The Court's decisions in *E.A. T.-B., Ramirez Tesara, Kumar,* and *Ledesma Gonzalez* are consistent with many other district court decisions addressing similar situations. *See, e.g., Valdez v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 4627 (GBD), 2025 WL 1707737 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025) (ordering immediate release due to lack of pre-deprivation hearing); *Garro Pinchi v. Noem,* --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 5:25-CV-056-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (similar); *Maklad v. Murray*, No. 1:25-CV-00946 JLT SAV, 2025 WL 2299376 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2025) (similar); *Garcia v. Andrews,* No. 1:25-CV-01006 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2420068 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025) (similar).

56. The same framework and principles apply here and compel Petitioner's immediate release.

57. The Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

58. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge ("IJ"). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.

59. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs the general detention and release of non-citizens in removal proceedings: "an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States . . . and (2) may release the alien on- (A) bond of at least $1500 . . . or (B) conditional parole."

60. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), amended by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), provides for the mandatory detention of inadmissible non-citizens with certain criminal convictions and conduct. The statute and the amendments made by the Laken Riley Act intentionally precludes some, but not all, aliens inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) from being granted bond. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), provide the parameters for EOIR to provide bond hearings to non-citizens pending removal proceedings.

61. The INA provides for mandatory detention of certain non-citizens with final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, suspected terrorists under 8 U.S.C. § 1226a, noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), and those "seeking

admission" and being reviewed for admissibility at the time of arrival under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

62. Petitioner seeks release under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as a non-citizen domiciled in the United States subject to removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Respondents purport to deny Petitioner release under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

63. Petitioner's case concerns important distinctions between § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2). Those provisions were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § § 302-03, 110 Stat. 2009-546, 3009-582 to 3009-583, 3009-585. Section 1226 was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

64. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) ("Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.")

65. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were thereafter arrested and placed in standard removal proceedings were considered for release on bond and also received bond hearings before an IJ, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible. That practice is consistent with many more

decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who had entered the United States, even if without inspection, were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. In contrast, those who were stopped at the border were only entitled to release on parole. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply "restates" the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

66. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 governs the processing of arriving aliens and recent entrants and is not a detention statute. The only mention of "mandatory detention" comes under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(IV) stating that applicants for admission pending asylum interviews "subject to the procedures under this clause shall be detained pending final determination of credible fear of persecution . . . ." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) explicitly excludes from expedited removal non-citizens who can show they have been "physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility."

67. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to a non-citizen "who is an applicant for admission, if the examining officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under 1229a of this title."

68. In July 2025, Respondents adopted an entirely new interpretation of the statute, concluding that all noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are considered applicants for admission, and are therefore ineligible for bond hearings before an Immigration Judge under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Around the same time, ICE "in coordination with the Department of Justice" announced a corresponding policy that

rejected the well-established understanding of the statutory and regulatory framework and reversed decades of practice. That policy claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection shall now be deemed to be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regarding of when a person is apprehended, the section of law under which they were previously released and affects those who have resided in the United States for years.

69. Cementing the policy and making it binding on all IJs, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") recently issued a precedent decision: *Matter of Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). In *Hurtado*, the BIA found that any noncitizen who is present in the United States without having been inspected and admitted is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), not §1226(a).

70. There is no Ninth Circuit precedent to support the Respondents' holding Petitioner subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

71. The Ninth Circuit has previously interpreted the statutes in question. In *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 923-926 (9th Cir. 2020)(en banc), the Ninth Circuit provides a thorough analysis, finding that applying for admission means doing so from outside the United States or at a port of entry, seeking physical entry into the country. The *Torres* decision holds that the idea of seeking admission is limited in time and cannot continue without limit once the non-citizen is already in the United States. *Id.* at 926. "Accordingly, inadmissibility must be measured at the point in time that an immigrant actually submits an application for entry into the United States." *Id*; *See also Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder*, 741 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2014) ("The definition refers expressly to entry into the United

States, denoting by its plain terms passage into the country from abroad at a port of entry.") Based on the Ninth Circuit's statutory analysis, the term "seeking admission" cannot apply to a person already inside the United States for over 3 years.

72. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, dozens of federal courts have uniformly rejected their newly invented misclassification as illegal and because it defies the INA's detention authorities. Courts have likewise rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE, ruling that the BIA's decision is not entitled to any deference under *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 412-13 (2024).[2]

73. As recent as January 27, 2026, the Central District Court for California collaterally estopped the Respondents from relitigating whether members of the Bautista

[2] See, e.g., *Alejandro v. Olson*, No. 1:25-cv-02027-JPH-MKK (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2025); *B.D.V.S. v. Forestal*, No. 1:25-cv-01968-SEB-TAB (S.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 2025); *Campos Leon v. Forestal*, No. 1:25-cv-01774-SEB-MJD, 2025 WL 2694763 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2025); *Ochoa Ochoa v. Noem*, No. 25 C 10865, 2025 WL 2938779 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025) (Jenkins, J.), *H.G.V.U. v. Smith*, No. 25 C 10931, 2025 WL 2962610 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2020) (Coleman, J.), *Mariano Miguel v. Noem*, No. 25 C 11137, 2025 WL 2976480 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2025) (Alonso, J.), and *G.Z.T. v. Smith*, No. 25 C 12802 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2025) (Ellis, J.), *Corona Diaz v. Olson, et al.*, No. 25-cv-12141 (N.D. Illinois 2025), *Belsai v. Bondi, et al.*, No. 25-cv-3862 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025); *Lepe v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-CV-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); *Giron Reyes v. Lyons*, No. C25-4048-LTS-MAR, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2025 WL 2712417 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025); *Salazar v. Dedos*, No. 1:25- cv-00835-DHU-JMR, 2025 WL 2676729 (D. N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25- cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW, 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Aguilar Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-3142, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Dos Santos v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-12052-JEK, 2025 WL 2370988 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2025); *Rocha Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157, 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), report and recommendation adopted 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25-Civ-5937, 2025 WL 2267803 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2025); *Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238, at *9 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-cv-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025).

Bond Eligible Class are entitled to bond hearings under INA § 236(a). In *Olga Sosa Inzuna v. Warden of Adelanto Detention Facility*, No. 5:26-cv-00078-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2026), the district court granted a temporary restraining order after finding that DHS has "continued to defy the final judgment entered in Bautista" and has engaged in a pattern of opposing habeas relief despite the fact that the legal issues were already conclusively resolved. The court held that DHS "is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue as to whether Bond Eligible Class members are entitled to the exact relief as provided in the Bautista final judgment," and ordered an individualized bond hearing within seven days. Id. at 4–5. As in *Sosa Inzuna*, Petitioner here alleges facts placing them squarely within the Bautista Bond Eligible Class, and Respondents therefore lack any lawful basis to continue detention without a § 236(a) bond hearing.

74. On December 18, 2025, the United States District court for the Central District of California issued a final nationwide declaratory judgment in *Maldonado Bautista et al. v Santacruz Jr. et al.*, Case No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), that directly governs the legality of Petitioenr's present detention. In that decision, the court held the underlying policy in the 2025 BIA precedent of *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which allowed DHS to classify all noncitizens who entered without admission or inspection as detained under INA § 235(b)(2)(A) regardless of where or how they were apprehended, is unlawful. The court further determined that DHS's long-standing policy mirroring that approach- treating every "EWI" ("entered without inspection") noncitizen as an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention- likely violates the statutory framework enacted by Congress.

75. As the district court explained, Congress drew a clear distinction between individuals apprehended at or near the border and those arrested inside the United States. For noncitizens who entered without inspection but were arrested in the interior and placed into regular § 240 removal proceedings, the statutory authority governing detention is INA § 236(a), not § 235(b)(2)(A). The court therefore held that such individuals are not subject to mandatory detention and are instead entitled to the bond procedures Congress created under § 236(a).

76. The Court entered an order of Final Judgment on December 18, 2025.

77. The Bond Eligible Class is nationwide and encompasses:

> All noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who (1) have entered or will enter the United States without inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.

Id.

78. Under the February 18, 2026 court order, DHS must treat all members of the certified nationwide class as eligible for individualized custody determination before an Immigration Judge.

79. Petitioner in this matter falls squarely within the class certified in *Maldonado Bautista*. First, Petitioner entered the United States without admission or inspection in December 2021. At that time, he was released by immigration authorities on his own recognizance and permitted to remain in the United States while his removal proceedings were pending. Second, Petitioner was not continuously detained following his entry, nor was he apprehended while arriving at the border in connection with the present detention. Instead, years later, in 2026, ICE arrested Petitioner in the interior of the United States, well

after his entry and after he had been living in the community. Third, DHS did not subject Petitioner to expedited removal or any other detention framework under INA § 235, but instead placed him in ordinary INA § 240 removal proceedings before the Immigration Court. These circumstances fall squarely within the conditions identified by the court in *Maldonado Bautista*, which held that individuals who entered without inspection but were later arrested in the interior after being released into the United States are detained under INA § 236(a) and are therefore entitled to bond consideration. Because Petitioner meets each element of the class definition, the nationwide judgment applies to him fully and directly. As a matter of binding Federal law, Petitioner cannot be detained under § 235(b)(2)(A) or any variant of the *Hurtado* framework. His detention must now be treated as arising under INA § 236(a), and he is entitled to the procedural protections associated with the statute, including an individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.

80. As the *Maldonado Bautista et al.* and *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

81. DHS's and DOJ's interpretation defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazequez* court explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner in this matter.

82. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to "decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen]."

83. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being

inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, "[w]hen Congress creates 'specific exceptions' to a statute's applicability, it 'proves' that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies." *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)). Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

84. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who very recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see also Diaz Martinez*, 2025 WL 2084238, at *8 ("'[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction between those [noncitizens] who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.'" (*quoting Leng May Ma v. Barber*, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958))). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

85. It must be restated, § 1225(b)(2)(A) expressly applies only to the "applicant for admission" "seeking admission." The BIA's interpretation of the law specifically holds

that applicants for admission are always "seeking admission," but if this were true, there would be no need for § 1225(b)(2)(A) to limit its application to those "seeking admission." It renders the language superfluous. Seeking admission explicitly indicates an affirmative request or action on the part of the applicant for admission. *Yajure Hurtado* repeatedly accuses non-citizens present without admission as evading inspection but then turns around to say they are seeking admission. It cannot be both ways, a person who evades inspection, cannot be considered seeking admission. *Yajure Hurtado* lacks any validity or persuasiveness due to its outright failure to interpret the statutory definition of "admission" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(4), (a)(13)(A). The BIA's decision in *Yajure Hurtado* is written with the outcome in mind, rather than with a sincere intent to explore and understand the law. The BIA, as a part of the Executive Branch, is a political creature, and the Courts must subject them to the law. Releasing non-citizens present without admission on a bond is not about "rewarding" the evasion of apprehension for more than two years, but rather about protecting the interests accrued in establishing domicile: property, children, family, friends, community, career, and economic interests. There is logic to mandatory detention of persons just arriving to the United States. They have not established any kind of record in the country, making it difficult to determine whether they pose a danger or flight risk while they face removal proceedings. However, people who have been in the United States for over two years should be given an opportunity to demonstrate they not a danger or flight risk, pending removal proceedings. There is a record of their behavior in the United States. Respondents' desired implementation of the law leads to absurd results very likely never intended by congress. Indeed, in the 28 years since the implementation of IIRIRA, congress

never stepped in to correct the ongoing practice and interpretation of the Immigration Courts, BIA, and Federal Courts allowing release under § 1226(a) of those present without admission.

86. Respondents' application of § 1225(b) to Petitioner renders all references to inadmissible non-citizens under § 1226 superfluous.

87. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to people like Petitioner, who have already entered and were residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended and detained. This is made clear by the nationwide judgment in *Maldonado Bautista,* that Petitioner must be treated as detained under INA § 236(a).

VIII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF.

88. Petitioner realleges paragraphs 1 through 87 herein as fully set forth.

89. Petitioner's continued detention is a violation of Due Process rights under the Fifth Amendment, which provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" along with the U.S. Constitution and not in accordance with the INA.

90. "Freedom from imprisonment – from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint – lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Moreover, "[t]he Due Process clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary or permanent." *Id.* at 693.

91. Pursuant to the APA, the Respondents refusal to release Petitioner on bond is

arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with the law.

92. The APA provides that a "reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

93. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a) and are eligible for release on bond, unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

94. Nonetheless, the DHS and the Immigration Court will apply § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner.

95. The application of 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner, who should be bond eligible, unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

96. This Court has jurisdiction to review the Respondents' action and order Petitioner's release on bond.

97. Respondents' mandatory detention of Petitioner without consideration for release on bond or access to a bond hearing violates his due process rights.

98. Petitioner is eligible for payment of attorney's fees, related expenses, and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.

IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court grant the following relief:

1) Assume jurisdiction over this cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241;
2) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days;
3) Order Respondents not to remove Petitioner from the State of Arizona;
4) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to provide an individualized bond hearing within five (5) days of this Court's order;
5) Declare that Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as well as the relevant statute and regulations governing detention of noncitizens;
6) Award Petitioner's attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, and on any other basis justified under law; and
7) That the Court grant further relief as this Court deems just and proper under the circumstances.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of March 2026.

By: s/ *Jessica Anleu, Esq.*

Jessica Anleu, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner

LIST OF ATTACHED EXHIBITS

Exhibit	Description
A	February 18, 2026 Order in *Lazaro Maldonado Bautista, et al. v. Santacruz, et al.* (C.D. Cal.)
B	Petitioner's Notice to Appear (noting that he is marked as present in the United States without inspection)
C	Screenshot of ICE Online Detainee Locator System Notice Regarding *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*
D	Sample Written Notice Provided to Immigration Detainees Regarding Potential Class Membership in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On the 3rd day of March 2026, I, Jessica Anleu, the undersigned, served via certified U.S. Mail, the attached **Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241**, on each person/entity listed below addressed as follows:

Civil Clerk
United States Attorney's Office
District of Arizona
Two Renaissance Square
40 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1200
Phoenix, AZ 85004-4408

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s/ *Jessica Anleu, Esq.*