

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION**

Darvin Tobias Vasquez Chavarria


Case No.: 5:26-CV-1154

Petitioner,

v.

Warden of South Texas Detention Facility;

Sylvester Ortega, in his official capacity as Acting Field Office Director of San Antonio, Texas Field Office of Enforcement And Removal Operations, Immigration And Customs Enforcement;

Todd Lyons, in his official capacity as Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of Immigration And Customs Enforcement;

Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security;

Pamela Bondi, in her official capacity as U.S. Attorney General; and

Daren Margolin, in his official capacity as Director, Executive Office For Immigration Review.

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner, Darvin Tobias Vasquez Chavarria, is in the physical custody of Respondents at the South Texas Detention Facility. Petitioner now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and the Executive Office of Immigration Review ("EOIR") have misapplied statute and erroneously concluded that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.

2. Petitioner, upon information and belief, is charged with, *inter alia*, having entered the United States without inspection or admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
3. Respondents have denied Petitioner's release from immigration custody, consistent with a DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") employees to consider anyone inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the U.S. without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond. This policy also instructed that "section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), rather than section 236, is the applicable immigration detention authority for all applicants for admission." *ICE Issues Memo Eliminating Bond for All Applicants for Admission*, Immigr. Pol'y Tracking Project, <https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/ice-issues-memo-eliminating-bond-hearings-for-undocumented-immigrants/#/tab-policy-documents> (last visited Dec. 30, 2025).
4. Similarly, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or "Board") issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges, holding that an immigration judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the U.S. without admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond. *Id.*
5. Petitioner's detention on this basis violates the plain language of the INA. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the U.S.
6. Individuals like Petitioner are subject to a different statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), that allows

- for release on conditional parole or bond. Section 1226(a) expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the U.S. without inspection.
7. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner.
 8. Petitioner contends that he is not subject to the mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and asserts that his detention without an individualized bond hearing violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and the INA.
 9. On February 6, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit endorsed Respondents' statutory interpretation found in the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N 216 (BIA 2025), which held that Immigration Judges have no jurisdiction to grant bond to individuals who are found in the interior of the United States if those individuals entered the United States without inspection. *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, Nos. 25-20496 & 25-40701 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026). With its decision, the Fifth Circuit foreclosed purely statutory claims to bond hearings under § 1226(a) within this Circuit.
 10. Neither *Yajure Hurtado* nor *Buenrostro-Mendez* addressed—much less resolved—the independent constitutional, administrative-law, equal-protection, Suspension Clause, or *Accardi*-based limitations on prolonged civil detention without individualized review. As the Supreme Court made clear in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 302–03 (2018), the absence of a statutory bond entitlement does not eliminate constitutional constraints on detention or foreclose habeas review.
 11. Accordingly, even where § 1225(b)(2)(A) is assumed to govern detention, continued civil

confinement, with no recourse to review for executive branch overreach, remains subject to the Due Process Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Suspension Clause, and binding agency regulations. Detention that becomes prolonged, indefinite, arbitrary, or wholly insulated from meaningful review exceeds the lawful authority conferred by Congress and violates fundamental constitutional guarantees.

12. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring his release unless Respondents provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

13. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents and is detained at the South Texas Detention Facility located at 566 Veterans Drive, Pearsall, Texas 78061.
14. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (Suspension Clause).
15. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.* (Declaratory Judgment Act), and 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act).
16. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in Pearsall, Texas – housed in the Western District of Texas.

PARTIES

17. Petitioner, Darvin Tobias Vasquez Chavarria, is a citizen of Guatemala who has been in immigration detention since Saturday, January 24, 2026. After detaining Petitioner, ICE did not make a bond determination, and Petitioner is unable to obtain review of his custody by an Immigration Judge, pursuant to the decision of the BIA in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I

& N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

18. Respondent, Warden of South Texas Detention Facility, is the Warden where Petitioner is detained, and has immediate physical custody of Petitioner. Warden of South Texas Detention Facility is sued in his official capacity.
19. Respondent, Kristi Noem, is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Secretary Noem is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the INA, and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Secretary Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.
20. Respondent, Sylvester Ortega, is the Acting Field Office Director of the San Antonio, Texas Field Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement. As such, Mr. Ortega is Petitioner's constructive custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Mr. Ortega is sued in his official capacity.
21. Respondent, Todd Lyons, is the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Mr. Lyons is sued in his official capacity.
22. Respondent, Pamela Bondi, is the Attorney General of the United States. Ms. Bondi is responsible for the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and the immigration court system it operates, is a component agency. Ms. Bondi is sued in her official capacity.
23. Respondent, Daren Margolin, is the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review. Mr. Margolin is sued in his official capacity.
24. The Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redeterminations in bond hearings.

25. DHS is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

26. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.
27. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens who are in “standard” Removal Proceedings before an Immigration Judge. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. In these “standard” removal proceedings, individuals are entitled to full due process rights afforded by the Constitution, including the right to have an attorney represent them, the right to present evidence, call witnesses on their behalf, cross examine witnesses, testify on their own behalf, and appeal an adverse decision.
28. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1 (d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
29. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).
30. Third, the INA provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).
31. A Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the proper vehicle to challenge the legality of immigration detention and to seek release or a bond hearing where custody violates the Constitution or federal law. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 521

(2018); *Vieira v. De Anda-Ybarra*, No. EP-25-CV-00432-DB, 2025 WL 2937880, at *2-3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025).

32. While the REAL ID Act limits district court jurisdiction to review removal orders, it does not bar review of detention claims or constitutional challenges to custody. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); *Vieira*, 2025 WL 2937880, at *3-4.
33. The district court reviews such claims de novo, exercising independent judgment over statutory interpretation and constitutional questions. *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).
34. Section 1226(a) sets out the “default rule” for the discretionary detention of citizen noncitizens “already present in the United States.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 303.
35. Under § 1226(a) immigration authorities may make an initial determination as to detention, but noncitizens may then request a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) and 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1).
36. At that hearing, the noncitizen “may secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.” *Nielsen v. Preap*, 586 U.S. 392, 397-98 (2019) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) and (d)(1)).
37. By contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 governs the detention of those “seeking admission”. An applicant for admission is defined as a noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(1).
38. Applicants for admission “fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287.
39. The second category creates a catchall mandatory detention provision: “If the examining

immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for [full removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229].” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

40. Unlike noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), those detained under § 1225 may only be released via parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
41. The detention provisions at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).
42. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under §1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).
43. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were placed in § 1229(a) removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an Immigration Judge or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority

previously found at § 1252(a)).

44. On July 8, 2025, ICE, in coordination with the DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected the well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice.
45. The new policy, entitled *Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission*, claims that all persons who entered the U.S. without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in the U.S. for months, years, and even decades.
46. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a published decision. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the U.S. without admission or parole are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for Immigration Judge bond hearings.
47. Since Respondents adopted this new erroneous policy, dozens of federal courts rejected DHS's new interpretation of INA's detention authorities and Courts have likewise rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE.
48. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS's and EOIR's new interpretation because it defies the INA.
49. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to "decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen]." *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).
50. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including

those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)’s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, “[w]hen Congress creates ‘specific exceptions’ to a statute’s applicability, it ‘proves’ that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies.” 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)).

51. Section 1226 therefore applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.
52. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the U.S. The statute’s entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are “seeking admission” to the U.S. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
53. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).
54. Prolonged civil detention without an individualized bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. at 340-42; *Matthews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). DHS must justify continued detention as necessary to ensure appearance at hearings or public safety, and less restrictive alternatives must be considered.

FACTS

55. Petitioner is a citizen of Guatemala who last entered the United States without inspection in 2016. Since last his arrival, Petitioner has not left the United States. Petitioner had been

present without inspection in the United States from 2007 through 2009, however Petitioner departed the United States and did not return until 2016. He has been in the United States ever since.

56. On Saturday, January 24, 2026, Petitioner was arrested by ICE and is now detained by Respondents at the South Texas Detention Facility.
57. DHS has placed Petitioner in removal proceedings before the Pearsall Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
58. Upon information and belief, Petitioner is charged with, *inter alia*, inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without admission or inspection.
59. Petitioner is married and has two children, ages 13 and 4. The four-year-old is a United States Citizen. Petitioner works full-time to support his wife and children.
60. Petitioner is not a danger to the community. Other than his ICE arrest on January 24, 2026, he has had no contact with law enforcement. He is dedicated to his family and employment.
61. Petitioner is not a flight risk, as he has been living with his family at the same address, [REDACTED] since approximately 2020. His children attend the local public schools; the [REDACTED] is in seventh grade at [REDACTED] and is achieving A's and B's. The [REDACTED] attends [REDACTED]
62. Petitioner works for a local recycler, Ecological Services, collecting trash and recycling. He also has a second job at a company that washes heavy commercial trucks. Petitioner and his family attend [REDACTED] Their son, [REDACTED] received his First Communion there.

63. Petitioner is not subject to INA § 236(c) as he has no convictions for any crime, let alone a crime involving moral turpitude or any aggravated felony, or any other ground of mandatory detention in INA § 236(c).
64. Without relief from this court, he faces the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his family and community.

**CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT ONE**

Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act

65. Petitioner incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-64 as if fully set forth herein.
66. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility.
67. The application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA. The mandatory-detention clause at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to arriving aliens or to noncitizens caught in the act of seeking admission at a port of entry.
68. By its plain terms, it does not extend to individuals who entered the United States and were apprehended within the interior. Such individuals are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes discretionary custody and release on bond, unless they fall within the narrow mandatory-detention categories of § 1225(b)(1) (expedited removal), § 1226(c) (certain criminal aliens), or § 1231 (post-order detention).
69. Respondents' reliance on § 1225(b)(2)(A) to mandate Petitioner's detention contradicts the statutory text, structure, and history of the INA. Congress deliberately separated the detention provisions for arriving and present noncitizens; reading § 1225(b) to subsume § 1226(a) renders that distinction meaningless, violating the canon against surplusage.

70. Petitioner acknowledges the ruling in *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, Nos. 25-20496 & 25-40701 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026), binding on this Court, and identifies Count One as a preservation of rights.

COUNT TWO
Violation of the Bond Regulations,
8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19

71. Petitioner incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-70 as if fully set forth herein.
72. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through the IIRIRA, the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret and apply the IIRIRA.
73. Specifically, under the heading of “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of Aliens,” the agency explained that “[t]he effect of this change is that inadmissible aliens, except for arriving aliens, have available to them bond redetermination hearings before an immigration judge, while arriving aliens do not.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323.
74. Nonetheless, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, EOIR has a policy and practice of applying the mandatory detention provisions at § 1225(b)(2) to individuals like Petitioner. 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
75. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.
76. Petitioner acknowledges the ruling in *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, Nos. 25-20496 & 25-40701 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026), binding on this Court, and identifies Count Two as a preservation of rights.

COUNT THREE
Violation of the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution,
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2

77. Petitioner incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-76 as if fully set forth herein.

78. “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
79. This constitutional safeguard predates the Bill of Rights and stands as the fundamental guarantee that government officials may not imprison individuals without accountability to an independent judiciary. The Great Writ is not a mere procedural device; it is the constitutional mechanism through which the people ensure that executive detention remains subject to law. *INS v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 739–46 (2008).
80. By classifying Petitioner as subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)—a provision that forecloses any individualized custody determination and disclaims Immigration Judge jurisdiction—Respondents have effectively extinguished all statutory and administrative avenues for review of Petitioner’s confinement.
81. The Board of Immigration Appeals does not entertain bond appeals where the Immigration Judge finds no jurisdiction, and no other administrative process exists to test the legality of detention. Absent Habeas review in this Court, Petitioner would have no forum in which to challenge the basis of his custody or the agency’s misapplication of the law. Such a regime amounts to an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
82. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the writ must remain available to test the legality of executive detention, even in the immigration context. In *INS v. St. Cyr*, the Court reaffirmed that “a serious Suspension Clause issue would be presented if a federal court were denied jurisdiction to hear a pure question of law” regarding detention or removal. 533 U.S. at 305–06.
83. Likewise, in *Boumediene v. Bush*, the Court emphasized that the Writ’s core function is to

ensure that the Executive “does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.” 553 U.S. at 779.

84. These decisions confirm that the constitution minimum requires a judicial forum capable of determining whether the Government has lawful authority to detain a person and to order release if that authority is lacking.
85. The post-*Hurtado* detention framework deprives Petitioner of that constitutional protection. EOIR and ICE have erected a system in which a noncitizen apprehended in the interior can be held indefinitely under § 1225(b)(2) without a bond hearing and without access to any reviewing tribunal.
86. This administrative black hole is precisely what the Framers sought to forbid: Executive imprisonment unreviewable by the judiciary. As Professor Kamin explains in *The Great Writ as Popular Sovereignty*, the Suspension Clause embodies the principle that the legitimacy of government itself depends upon the continual availability of the writ to test the lawfulness of confinement. 77 Stan. L. Rev. 297 (2025). When the Government constructs a scheme that removes an entire category of persons from judicial review, it acts in derogation of the people’s reserved right to demand legal justification for state restraint, and the principles of popular sovereignty. *See Id.* at 302 (“[T]he principal purpose of American habeas is the vindication not of individual physical liberty, but of popular sovereignty. More simply put, we should understand American habeas as a Great Writ of Popular Sovereignty”).
87. Petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b)(2) thus violates not only the INA and the Administrative Procedure Act but the structural command of the Constitution. The Suspension Clause protects against exactly this scenario—where an individual is held by

executive order with no opportunity to obtain judicial scrutiny of the detention's legality.

88. Because Respondents' actions have eliminated all practical means for Petitioner to challenge his confinement, the statutory scheme as applied to him constitutes an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
89. Count Three was not addressed in *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, Nos. 25-20496 & 25-40701 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).

COUNT FOUR
Violation of Substantive Due Process,
U.S. Constitution, Amendment V

90. Petitioner incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-89 as if fully set forth herein.
91. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. Freedom from physical restraint lies "at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
92. This protection extends to all persons within the U.S., including noncitizens, regardless of manner of entry. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
93. At the core of the liberty the Due Process Clause protects is freedom from physical restraint by the government, a right that may be curtailed only in the most exceptional circumstances and for purposes consistent with law. *Id.* at 690.
94. Immigration detention, though civil in form, must remain regulatory in purpose—it may not become punitive. Detention is justified only to ensure attendance at proceedings or to protect the community from danger. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 521, 540–41 (2018).
95. When detention extends beyond the period reasonably necessary to achieve those purposes, or when it occurs without any individualized determination of necessity, it violates the

substantive due process guarantee that government action not be arbitrary, excessive, or purposeless. *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 528 (2003); *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

96. Petitioner has now been detained since January 24, 2026, without any opportunity to seek release or to demonstrate that he poses no risk of flight or danger. Petitioner has resided in the U.S. since 2011, has no criminal history, and has deep ties to his community. There is no rational justification for treating him as a mandatory-detention case under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(2), a provision intended for arriving aliens at ports of entry.
97. Petitioner's continued confinement—after the initiation of removal proceedings and in the absence of any bond hearing—has lost any legitimate regulatory purpose and has become arbitrary and punitive in violation of substantive due process.
98. Courts across the country have recognized that prolonged detention under §1225(b)(2) or §1226(a) without a bond hearing offends the Constitution.
99. Petitioner's detention bears all the hallmarks of unconstitutionality: indefinite duration, categorical denial of process, and complete disregard for his individual circumstances. It imposes an excessive restraint on liberty that is not narrowly tailored to any legitimate governmental interest.
100. The Due Process Clause forbids the Government from detaining a person indefinitely and without justification. As the Supreme Court held in *Zadvydas*, “once detention’s purpose no longer bears a reasonable relation to the Government’s goal, the detention may not continue.” 533 U.S. at 690.
101. Accordingly, Petitioner's continued mandatory detention under §1225(b)(2) violates the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court declare his detention unconstitutional and order his

immediate release or, in the alternative, direct Respondents to provide a prompt, individualized custody hearing before a neutral immigration judge, at which the Government must justify continued detention by clear and convincing evidence.

102. Count Four was not addressed in *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, Nos. 25-20496 & 25-40701 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).

COUNT FIVE
Violation of Procedural Due Process,
U.S. Constitution, Amendment V

103. Petitioner incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-102 as if fully set forth herein.
104. Civil immigration detention is constitutionally permissible only when it is narrowly tailored to serve legitimate regulatory purposes—ensuring appearance at proceedings and protecting the community—and only when accompanied by meaningful procedural safeguards. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 540–41 (2018).
105. By classifying Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(2) and denying any opportunity for an individualized bond hearing, Respondents have imposed mandatory detention without process, thereby violating Petitioner’s substantive and procedural due process rights.
106. The application of §1225(b)(2) to a long-term resident apprehended in the interior bears no rational relation to Congress’s stated objectives and results in an arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Substantively, detention that continues for months without individualized review ceases to serve a regulatory purpose and becomes punitive, contrary to *Zadvydas* and *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 528 (2003).
107. Procedurally, Respondents’ categorical denial of a bond hearing fails the *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), balancing test. The private interest at stake—freedom from unlawful confinement—is of the highest order. The risk of erroneous deprivation is acute

where, as here, no hearing exists to assess flight risk or danger.

108. The government's interests can be fully satisfied through individualized bond determinations that safeguard both liberty and the integrity of removal proceedings. *See Chogllo Chafla v. Scott*, No. 2:25-cv-00437-SDN, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *333 (D. Me. Sep. 21, 2025) ("In sum, the Mathews factors weigh in favor of the Petitioners and compel a hearing on detention before an Immigration Judge where they may have the opportunity to be heard.").
109. Petitioner has been gravely prejudiced by this misapplication of law and by the government's refusal to afford a bond redetermination hearing. His detention—spanning months, despite strong family ties, community support, and an unblemished record—serves no lawful purpose and offends the fundamental guarantees of due process.
110. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court declare his continued mandatory detention unconstitutional and order his immediate release or, in the alternative, direct Respondents to provide a prompt, individualized custody hearing before a neutral immigration judge, at which the government must justify continued detention by clear and convincing evidence.
111. Count Five was not addressed in *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, Nos. 25-20496 & 25-40701 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Honorable Court grant the following relief:

- a) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b) Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the Western District of Texas while this habeas petition is pending;

- c) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause within three days as to why this Petition should not be granted;
- d) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner or provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1226(a) within seven days;
- e) Declare that Petitioner's detention is unlawful; and
- f) Grant all and any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of February, 2026,

/s/ Adam Luis Rodriguez
Adam Luis Rodriguez
Western District of Texas Bar No.: 1016191
Law Offices of Adam Rodriguez
PO Box 7616
Silver Spring, MD 20907
Tel: (202) 848-6669
Fax: (202) 894-7298
adam@arodlawfirm.com
Local Counsel for Petitioner

/s/ Kathy Rebecca Davis
Kathy Rebecca Davis, Esq.¹
Law Offices of Jay S. Marks, L.L.C.
10770 Columbia Pike, Suite 200
Silver Spring, MD 20901
Tel: (301) 578-4444
Fax: (301) 587-9397
kathy@marksjustice.com
Co-Counsel for Petitioner

¹ PHV Admission Pending, Western District of Texas Admission (scheduled for Oath Ceremony March 6, 2026).