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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

JESUS RAMOS-ROBLES,

Petitioner,

v.

Kristi NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Thomas HOGAN, Field
Office Director of Enforcement and Removal
Operations, Las Vegas Field Office,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Pamela BONDI, U.S. Attorney General;
John MATTOS, Warden of Nevada Southern
Detention Center, Todd LYONS, Acting
Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE; and Sirce OWEN, Acting Director
for Executive Office for Immigration Review,

Respondents.

Case no. 2:26-cv-00333-RFB-NJK

**Federal Respondents' Response to
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(ECF No. 1) and Motion for
Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2)**

Federal Respondents Kristi Noem, Thomas Hogan, Pamela Bondi, Todd Lyons,
Department of Justice and Sirce Owen ("Federal Respondents"), through undersigned
counsel, hereby respond to Petitioner Jesus Ramos-Robles' Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus ("Petition") and Motion for Preliminary Injunction ("Motion") per this Court's
Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 4. The petition and motion should be denied for the
reasons stated below in the memorandum of points and authorities.

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Memorandum of Points and Authorities

I. INTRODUCTION

Based on the language in the petition, Federal Respondents' interpretation of the basis for the Petitioner's writ is rooted into the distinctions between 8 USC § 1225(b)(2) and § 1226(a) framework, post *Hurtado*. Before 1996, the federal immigration laws required the detention of aliens who presented at a port of entry but allowed aliens who were already unlawfully present in the United States to obtain release pending removal proceedings. Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") specifically to stop conferring greater privileges and benefits on aliens who enter the United States unlawfully as compared to those who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry.

As relevant here, Congress enacted what is now 8 U.S.C. § 1225, which requires the detention of any alien "who is an applicant for admission" and defines that term to encompass any "alien present in the United States who has not been admitted" following inspection by immigration authorities. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), (b)(2)(A). The statute makes no exception for how far into the country the alien traveled or how long the alien managed to evade detection. Unless the Secretary exercises the narrow and discretionary parole authority, detention is the rule for aliens who have never been lawfully admitted. There is no dispute that Petitioner is an "applicant for admission" under Section 1225(a), because he entered the United States without inspection at an unknown place and time. *See* Notice to Appear and I-213 collectively attached as **Exhibit A**. He was neither admitted nor paroled into the United States. Exhibit A. This clear statutory text means that Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing and potential release. Despite the clear statutory text, this Court has held in prior cases before it that Petitioners are entitled to bond hearings, bond, and release. *Torralba et al v. Wright et al*, 2:25-cv-1366; *Maldonado Vasquez v. Feely*, 2:25-cv-01542; *Berto Mendez v. Noem et al*, 2:25-cv-02062; *Alvarado Gonzalez v. Mattos et al.*, 2:25-cv-01599; *Serrano Gonzalez v. Knight et al.*, 2:25-cv-02081; *Sanchez Aparicio v. Noem et al.*, 2:25-cv-01919; *Cornejo-Meijia v. Bernacke et al.*, 2:25-cv-02139; *E.C. v. Noem et al.*, 2:25-cv-01789. The Court

1 reasoned that this narrow construction is necessary to avoid surplusage, but “[r]edundancies
2 are common in statutory drafting,” and are “not a license to rewrite or eviscerate another
3 portion of the statute contrary to its text.” *Barton v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 222, 223 (2020).

4 Besides, that canon has no relevance where, as here, portions of a statute are
5 superfluous under any interpretation. Nor is the district court’s atextual reading necessary to
6 give meaning to the separate detention authority in Section 1226. On its face, that provision
7 applies to numerous aliens *not* subject to Section 1225(b)(2)(A), including all *admitted* aliens
8 who are now removable, and the mere fact of partial overlap is not a reason to rewrite clear
9 statutory text. Although the Government has previously operated under a different
10 understanding of the law, this Court must apply the language of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) as
11 written. The Court’s interpretation in the above referenced cases and most likely in this case,
12 is not only contrary to text, but it would reimpose the same perverse regime that IIRIRA
13 was meant to eliminate — requiring the detention of aliens who present at a port of entry as
14 the law requires, but authorizing the release of those aliens who enter the United States in
15 violation of law. The Court should not endorse such a backwards outcome — particularly
16 one that is so plainly subversive of congressional intent. For the same reasons, Petitioner’s
17 due process arguments fail, because they are based entirely derivative of his mistaken
18 interpretation of Section 1225. In addition, Petitioner’s reliance on *Maldonado Bautista v.*
19 *Noem*, 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.), is misplaced, because the Court in that case did
20 not issue a class-wide declaratory judgment. A class-wide injunction is not permitted by law.

21 II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

22 a. The Pre-IIRIRA Framework Gave Preferential Treatment to Aliens 23 Unlawfully Present in the United States.

24 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), as amended, contains a
25 comprehensive framework governing the regulation of aliens, including the creation of
26 proceedings for the removal of aliens unlawfully in the United States and requirements for
27 when the Executive is obligated to detain aliens pending removal.

28 Prior to 1996, the INA treated aliens differently based on whether the alien had

1 physically “entered” the United States. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 222–
2 223 (BIA 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a), 1251 (1994)); see *Hing Sum v. Holder*, 602 F.3d
3 1092, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). “Entry” referred to “any coming of an alien into
4 the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994), and whether an alien had physically
5 entered the United States (or not) “dictated what type of [removal] proceeding applied” and
6 whether the alien would be detained pending those proceedings, *Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at
7 1099.

8 At the time, the INA “provided for two types of removal proceedings: deportation
9 hearing and exclusion hearings.” *Hose v. I.N.S.*, 180 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
10 An alien who arrived at a port of entry would be placed in “exclusion proceedings and
11 subject to mandatory detention, with potential release solely by means of a grant of parole.”
12 *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223; see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)-(b) (1995); *id.*
13 § 1226(a) (1995). By contrast, an alien who physically entered the United States unlawfully
14 would be placed in deportation proceedings. *Id.*; *Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1100. Aliens in
15 deportation proceedings, unlike those in exclusion proceedings, “were entitled to request
16 release on bond.” *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223 (citing 8 U.S.C. §
17 1252(a)(1) (1994)).

18 Thus, the INA’s prior framework distinguishing between aliens based on physical
19 “entry” had the “‘unintended and undesirable consequence’ of having created a statutory
20 scheme where aliens who entered without inspection ‘could take advantage of the greater
21 procedural and substantive rights afforded in deportation proceedings,’ *including the right to*
22 *request release on bond*, while aliens who had ‘actually presented themselves to authorities for
23 inspection’ ... were subject to mandatory custody.” *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec.
24 at 223 (emphasis added) (quoting *Martinez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S.*, 693 F.3d 408, 413 n.5 (3d
25 Cir. 2012)); see also *Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1100 (similar); H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at
26 225 (1996) (“House Rep.”) (“illegal aliens who have entered the United States without
27 inspection gain equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to
28 aliens who present themselves for inspection”).

1 **b. IIRARA Eliminated the Preferential Treatment of Aliens Unlawfully Present**
 2 **in the United States and Mandated Detention of all “Applicants for**
 3 **Admission.”**

4 Congress discarded that regime through enactment of IIRIRA, Pub. L. 104-208, 110
 5 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996). Among other things, that law had the goal of “ensur[ing] that all
 6 immigrants who have not been lawfully admitted, regardless of their legal presence in the
 7 country, are placed on equal footing in removal proceedings under the INA.” *Torres v. Barr*,
 8 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).

9 To that end, IIRIRA replaced the focus on physical “entry” with a focus on lawful
 10 “admission.” IIRIRA defined “admission” to mean “the *lawful* entry of the alien into the
 11 United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.
 12 § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). In other words, the immigration laws would no longer
 13 distinguish aliens based on whether they had managed to evade detection and enter the
 14 country without permission. Instead, the “pivotal factor in determining an alien’s status”
 15 would be “whether or not the alien has been *lawfully* admitted.” House Rep., *supra*, at 226
 16 (emphasis added); *Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1100 (similar). IIRIRA also eliminated the
 17 exclusion-deportation dichotomy and consolidated both sets of proceedings into “removal
 18 proceedings.” *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223.

19 IIRIRA effected these changes through several provisions codified in Section 1225 of
 20 Title 8:

21 **Section 1225(a):** Section 1225(a) codifies Congress’s decision to make lawful
 22 “admission,” rather than physical entry, the touchstone. That provision states that an alien
 23 “present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United
 24 States” “shall be deemed ... an applicant for admission”:

25 An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in
 26 the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who
 27 is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States
 28 waters) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission. 8 U.S.C.
 § 1225(a)(1) (emphasis added). “All aliens ... who are applicants for admission or otherwise

1 seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United States” are required to
 2 “be inspected by [an] immigration officer[.]” *Id.* § 1225(a)(3). The inspection by the
 3 immigration officer is designed to determine whether the alien may be lawfully “admitted”
 4 to the country or, instead, must be referred to removal proceedings.

5 **Section 1225(b):** IIRIRA also divided removal proceedings into two tracks —
 6 expedited removal and normal “Section 240” proceedings — and mandated that applicants
 7 for admission be detained pending those proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)-(2).

8 Section 1225(b)(1) provides for so-called “expedited removal proceedings,” *Dep’t of*
 9 *Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 109-113 (2020), which apply to a subset of
 10 aliens — those who (1) are “arriving in the United States,” or who (2) have “not been
 11 admitted or paroled into the United States” and have “not affirmatively shown, to the
 12 satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been physically present in the
 13 United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the
 14 determination of inadmissibility.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). As to these aliens, the
 15 immigration officer shall “order the alien removed from the United States without further
 16 hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum ... or a
 17 fear of persecution.” *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). In that event, the alien “shall be detained
 18 pending a final determination of credible fear or persecution and, if found not to have such
 19 fear, until removed.” *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 235.5(b)(4)(ii). An alien
 20 processed for expedited removal who does not indicate an intent to apply for a form of relief
 21 from removal is likewise detained until removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(iii)(IV); *see*
 22 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(iii).

23 Section 1225(b)(2) is a “catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission
 24 not covered by [subsection (b)(1)].” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). It
 25 requires that those aliens be detained pending Section 240 removal proceedings:

26 Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
 27 admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission
 28 is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien *shall be detained* for a

proceeding under section 1229a of this title [Section 240]. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).¹ See 8 C.F.R. § 253.3(b)(1)(ii) (mirroring Section 1225(b)(2) detention mandate); *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 302 (holding that Section 1225(b)(2) “mandate[s] detention of aliens throughout the completion of applicable proceedings and not just at the moment those proceedings begin”).

While Section 1225(b)(2) does not allow for aliens to be released on bond, the INA grants DHS discretion to temporarily release an applicant for admission “only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Parole, however, “shall not be regarded as admission of the alien.” *Id.*; *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288 (discussing parole authority). Moreover, when the Secretary determines that “the purposes of such parole ... been served,” the “alien shall ... be returned to the custody from which he was paroled” and be “dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).

Section 1226: IIRIRA also created a separate authority addressing the arrest, detention, and release of aliens generally (versus applicants for admission specifically). See 8 U.S.C. § 1226. This is the only provision that governs the detention of aliens who, for example, lawfully enter the country but overstay, otherwise violate the terms of their visas, or later determined to have been improperly admitted. The statute provides that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” *Id.* § 1226(a). Detention under this provision is generally discretionary: The Attorney General “may” either “continue to detain the arrested alien” or release the alien on bond or conditional parole. *Id.* § 1226(a)(1)-(2).²

That “default rule,” however, does not apply to certain criminal aliens who are being

¹ Subsection (b)(2) does not apply to (1) aliens subject to expedited removal, (2) crewman, (3) stowaways, or (4) aliens who “arriv[e] on land (whether or not at a designated port of arrival) from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B)-(C).

² Conditional parole under Section 1226(a) is broader than parole under Section 1182(d)(5)(A).

1 released from detention by another law enforcement agency. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288; *see* 8
2 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Section 1226(c) provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall take into
3 custody” certain classes of criminal aliens — those who are inadmissible or deportable
4 because the alien (1) “committed” certain offenses delineated in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 and 1227;
5 or (2) engaged in terrorism-related activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). The Executive must
6 detain these aliens “when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is
7 released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien
8 may be arrested or imprisoned against for the same offense.” *Id.*

9 Congress recently amended Section 1226(c) through the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L.
10 No. 119-1, § 2, 139 Stat. 3, 3, (2025), which requires detention of (and prohibits parole for)
11 aliens who (1) are inadmissible because they are physically present in the United States
12 without admission or parole, have committed a material misrepresentation or fraud, or lack
13 required documentation; and (2) are “charged with, arrested for, [] convicted of, admit[]
14 having committed, or admit[] committing acts which constitute the essential elements of”
15 certain listed offenses. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E).

16 **III. STANDARD OF REVIEW**

17 In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner is challenging the legality of
18 his restraint or imprisonment. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The burden is on the petitioner to show
19 the confinement is unlawful. *See Walker v. Johnston*, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941). Specifically,
20 here, Petitioner challenges his temporary civil immigration detention pending his removal
21 proceeding.

22 Judicial review of immigration matters, including detention issues, is limited. *I.N.S.*
23 *v. Aguirre-Aguirre*, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999); *Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525
24 U.S. 471, 489-492 (1999); *Miller v. Albright*, 523 U.S. 420, 434 n.11 (1998); *Fiallo v. Bell*, 430
25 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993); *Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong*,
26 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) (“the power over aliens is of a political character and therefore
27 subject only to narrow judicial review”). The Supreme Court has thus “underscore[d] the
28 limited scope of inquiry into immigration legislation,” and “has repeatedly emphasized that

1 over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is
2 over the admission of aliens.” *Fiallo*, 430 U.S. at 792 (internal quotation omitted); *Matthews*
3 *v. Diaz*, 426 U.S. 67, 79-82 (1976); *Galvan v. Press*, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).

4 The plenary power of Congress and the Executive Branch over immigration
5 necessarily encompasses immigration detention, because the authority to detain is elemental
6 to the authority to deport, and because public safety is at stake. See *Shaughnessy v. United*
7 *States ex rel. Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (“Courts have long recognized the power to
8 expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's
9 political departments largely immune from judicial control.”); *Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S.
10 524, 538 (1952) (“Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure.”); *Wong*
11 *Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (“Proceedings to exclude or expel would be
12 vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true
13 character, and while arrangements were being made for their deportation.”); *Demore v. Kim*,
14 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (“Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally
15 permissible part of that process.”).

16 **IV. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

17 Petitioner admits that he is a national and citizen of Mexico, who entered without
18 inspection the United States sometime in 2015 at an unknown location. ECF No. 1, p. 6.
19 On December 20, 2025, Petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence. Exhibit A.
20 He had a master calendar hearing before an Immigration Judge on February 13, 2026,
21 where he admitted to the factual allegations contained within the Notice to Appear and
22 conceded removability. The Petitioner has another hearing on March 5, 2026. There is no
23 dispute that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” under Section 1225(a), because he
24 entered the United States without inspection at an unknown place in 2015. ECF No. 1, p. 6;
25 see also Notice to Appear, and I-213 attached as **Exhibit A**. He was neither admitted nor
26 paroled into the United States. Exhibit A. Petitioner submits an approval notice for a I-130,
27 this does not confer status upon him by the United States and is merely an initial and
28

1 necessary step to begin adjustment of status.³

2 V. ARGUMENT

3 a. Section 1225(b)(2) Mandates Detention of Aliens, Like Petitioner, Who Are 4 Present in the United States Without Having Been Lawfully Admitted.

5 Under the plain language of Section 1225(b)(2), DHS is required to detain all aliens,
6 like Petitioner, who are present in the United States without admission and are subject to
7 removal proceedings — regardless of how long the alien has been in the United States or
8 how far from the border they ventured. That unambiguous language resolves this case. *See*
9 *Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania*, 591 U.S. 657, 676 (2020)
10 (“Our analysis begins and ends with the text.”).

11 1. *The Plain Language of Section 1225(b)(2) Mandates the Detention of the Petitioner* 12 *Who is an Applicant for Admission.*

13 Section 1225(a) defines “applicant for admission” to encompass an alien who either
14 “arrives in the United States” or who is “present in the United States who has not been
15 admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). And “admission” under the INA means not physical
16 entry, but lawful entry after inspection by immigration authorities. 8 U.S.C.
17 § 1101(a)(13)(A). Thus, an alien who enters the country without permission is and remains
18 an applicant for admission, regardless of the duration of the alien’s presence in the United
19 States or the alien’s distance from the border.

20 In turn, Section 1225(b)(2) provides that “an alien who is an applicant for
21 admission” “shall be detained” pending removal proceedings if the “alien seeking admission
22 is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1125(b)(2)(A)
23 (emphasis added). The statute’s use of the term “shall” makes clear that detention is
24 mandatory, *see Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach*, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998),
25 and the statute makes no exception for the duration of the alien’s presence in the country or
26 where in the country he is located. Therefore, the statute’s plain text mandates that DHS

27 ³ Petitioner has not filed a I-485 for adjustment of status; additionally, it appears U.S.
28 Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) does not have record of the I-130 that the
Petitioner submits. *See* Exhibit A.

1 detain all “applicants for admission” who do not fall within one of its exceptions.

2 Petitioner falls squarely within the statute. He was “present in the United States,”
 3 and there is no dispute that he has “not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a). Petitioner
 4 admitted that he has entered without an inspection the United States sometimes in 2015.
 5 ECF No. 1, p. 6. Moreover, Petitioner cannot — and did not — establish that he is “clearly
 6 and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Therefore, Petitioner
 7 is appropriately detained and “shall be detained for a proceeding under [8 U.S.C. § 1229a].”
 8 Simply being married to a U.S. Citizen (USC) does not grant the petitioner a legal right to
 9 enter the United States or remain in the United States without authorization.

10 **2. Section 1225(b)(2)’s Reference to Aliens “Seeking Admission” Does Not Narrow Its**
 11 **Scope.**

12 There is no denial that Petitioner (and others like him) are “applicants for
 13 admission” under Section 1225(b)(2). Petitioner has neither referenced nor pointed out, that
 14 he is anything else but an applicant for admission under Section 1225(b)(2). The statute
 15 itself makes clear that an alien who is an “applicant for admission” is necessarily “seeking
 16 admission.” Moreover, an alien like Petitioner, who is identified by immigration authorities
 17 as unlawfully present, and who does not choose to depart from the United States
 18 voluntarily, is “seeking admission” under any interpretation of that phrase. Here, the
 19 Petitioner entered the United States without an inspection.

20 Section 1225(b)(2) requires the detention of an “applicant for admission, if the
 21 examining officer determines that [the] alien *seeking admission* is not clearly and beyond a
 22 doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The statutory
 23 text and context show that being an “applicant for admission” is a means of “seeking
 24 admission” — no additional affirmative step is necessary. In other words, every “applicant
 25 for admission” is inherently and necessarily “seeking admission,” at least absent a choice to
 26 pursue voluntary withdrawal or voluntary departure.

27 Section 1225(a) provides that “[a]ll aliens ... who are applicants for admission *or*
 28 *otherwise seeking admission or readmission* ... shall be inspected.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3)

(emphasis added). The word “[o]therwise’ means ‘in a different way or manner[.]’” *Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.*, 576 U.S. 519, 535 (2015) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1598 (1971)); *see also Att’y Gen. of United States v. Wynn*, 104 F.4th 348, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (same); *Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 839 F.3d 958, 963–64 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“or otherwise” means “the first action is a subset of the second action”); *Kleber v. CareFusion Corp.*, 914 F.3d 480, 482–83 (7th Cir. 2019). Being an “applicant for admission” is thus a particular “way or manner” of seeking admission, such that an alien who is an “applicant for admission” is “seeking admission” for purposes of Section 1252(b)(2)(A). No separate affirmative act is necessary. *See Matter of Lemus-Losa*, 25 I. & N. Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012) (“[M]any people who are not actually requesting permission to enter the United States in the ordinary sense are nevertheless deemed to be ‘seeking admission’ under the immigration laws”).

This reading is consistent with the everyday meaning of the statutory terms. One may “seek” something without “applying” for it — for example, one who is “seeking” happiness is not “applying” for it. But one *applying* for something is necessarily *seeking* it. *Compare* Webster’s New World College Dictionary 69 (4th ed.) (“apply” means “To make a formal request (to someone for something)”), *with id.* at 1299 (“seek” means “to request, ask for”). For example, a person who is “applying” for admission to a college or club is “seeking” admission to the college or club. *See* The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 63 (1980) (“American Heritage Dictionary”) (“apply” means “[t]o request or *seek* employment, acceptance, or *admission*”) (emphasis added). Likewise, an alien who is “applying” for admission to the United States (*i.e.*, an “applicant for admission”) is “seeking admission” to the United States.

None of this is to say, however, that “seeking admission” has no meaning beyond “applicant for admission.” As Section 1225(a)(3) shows, being an “applicant for admission” is only *one* “way or manner” of “seeking admission,” not the exclusive way. For example, lawful permanent residents returning to the United States are not “applicants for admission” because they are already admitted, but they still may be “seeking admission.” *See* 8 U.S.C.

§ 1103(A)(13)(C). But for purposes of Section 1225(b)(2) and its regulation of “applicants for admission,” the statute unambiguously provides that an alien who is an “applicant for admission” is “seeking admission,” even if the alien is not engaged in some separate, affirmative act to obtain lawful admission.

To be sure, the Government previously operated under a narrower understanding of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). But past practice does not justify disregard of clear statutory language. A court must always interpret the statute “as written,” *Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.*, 586 U.S. 63, 68 (2019), and here the statute as written requires detention of *any* applicant for admission, regardless of whether the applicant is taking affirmative steps toward admission.

That is the case here with this Petitioner. Under a straightforward reading of the statute, being an “applicant for admission” is “seeking admission.” Although that reading may lead to some redundancy in Section 1225(b)(2)(A), that is “not a license to rewrite” Section 1225 “contrary to its text.” *Barton*, 590 U.S. at 223; *see Heyman v. Cooper*, 31 F.4th 1315, 1322 (11th Cir. 2022) (“The principle [that drafter do repeat themselves carries extra weight where ... the arguably redundant words that the drafters employed ... are functional synonyms”). And that is especially true, where that re-writing would be so clearly contrary to Congress’s objective in passing the law.

Even if “seeking admission” required some separate affirmative conduct by the alien, an applicant for admission who attempts to avoid removal from the United States, rather than trying to voluntarily depart, is by any definition “seeking admission.” Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to an alien who is present in the United States unlawfully, even for years. Although the alien may not have been affirmatively seeking admission during those years of illegal presence, Section 1225(b)(2) is not concerned with the alien’s pre-inspection conduct. Rather, the statute’s use of present tense language (“seeking” and “determines”) shows that its focus is a specific point in time — when “the examining immigration officer” is making a “determin[ation]” regarding the alien’s admissibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). At *that* point, the alien is “seeking” — *i.e.*, presently “endeavor[ing] to obtain,” American

1 Heritage Dictionary, *supra*, at 1174 — admission into the United States; if it were otherwise,
2 the applicant would not attempt to show that he is “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to
3 be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). That inference is confirmed by Section 1225(a)(4),
4 which authorizes an alien to voluntarily “depart immediately from the United States.” An
5 applicant who forgoes that statutory option and instead endeavors to prove admissibility
6 and opts for Section 240 removal proceedings — proceedings in which the alien has the
7 “burden of establishing that [he] is clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” *id.* §
8 1229a(c)(2)(A) — is plainly “endeavor[ing] to obtain” admission to the United States.
9 American Heritage Dictionary, *supra*, at 1174.

10 Here, Petitioner entered the United States without inspection and is in removal
11 proceedings, subject to mandatory detention. A contrary view would make mandatory
12 detention turn on the fortuity happenstance of when an alien attempts to prove
13 admissibility. *See United States v. Wilson*, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992) (courts must not “presume
14 lightly” that statute’s application will turn on “arbitrary” issue of timing). Aliens subject to
15 Section 1225(b)(2) must prove admissibility at two stages — first, at the time of inspection, 8
16 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); and second, during Section 240 removal proceedings if the alien
17 cannot show admissibility “clearly and beyond a doubt” at the time of inspection, *id.*
18 § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (alien has “burden of establishing that [he] is clearly and beyond a doubt
19 entitled to be admitted”). Petitioner has failed to meet these two stages. There is “no reason
20 why Congress would desire” the applicability of something so significant as mandatory
21 detention “to depend on the timing” of when an alien attempts to show admissibility,
22 *Wilson*, 503 U.S. at 334 — particularly given how susceptible that rule is to manipulation by
23 the alien.

24 To be sure, the Laken Riley Act’s application to aliens who are inadmissible under
25 §1182(a)(6)(A) — for being “present ... without being admitted or paroled” — overlaps with
26 Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Both statutes mandate detention of “applicants for admission” who
27 fall within the specified grounds of inadmissibility. But again, “[r]edundancies are common
28 in statutory drafting,” and are “not a license to rewrite or eviscerate another portion of the

statute contrary to its text.” *Barton*, 590 U.S. at 223. That is particularly true here, where this portion of the Laken Riley Act overlaps with Section 1225(b)(2)(A) even under *Petitioner’s* reading, which recognizes that applicants for admission who are “seeking admission” must be detained under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). *See Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship*, 564 U.S. 91, 106 (2011) (“the canon against superfluity assists only where a competing interpretation gives effect to every clause and word of a statute”).

b. The Recent *Vargas Lopez v. Trump* Decision Is Highly Instructive and Supports *Petitioner’s* Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.

The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska’s decision denying the habeas corpus petition in *Vargas Lopez v. Trump* is particularly relevant here. In *Vargas Lopez*, the petitioner, an undocumented alien who had been residing in the United States since 2013, sought immediate release from detention. *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, 802 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (D. Neb. 2025). Prior to filing his petition, Vargas Lopez had received a bond hearing, and the immigration judge ordered that he be released from custody under bond of \$10,000. *Id.* at 3. DHS however appealed the bond determination, which automatically stayed Vargas Lopez’s release on bond. *Id.* Vargas Lopez then filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that the automatic stay was *ultra vires* and violated his due process rights. *Id.* He also alleged that application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 in his case was unlawful because 8 U.S.C. § 1226 should control his detention. *Id.*

First, the court denied the petition because Vargas Lopez failed to carry his burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that his detention was unlawful. *Id.* at *6. Vargas Lopez argued that he fell under § 1226, not 1225, but his petition and filings failed to provide proof of the “warrant for Vargas Lopez’s arrest” that § 1226 requires.

Second, the court concluded that Vargas Lopez was subject to detention without possibility of bond under § 1225(b)(2). To do so, the court analyzed the Supreme Court’s decision in *Jennings* to reject the notion that § 1225(b)(2) and § 1226(a) apply to two distinct groups of aliens; the two sections are not mutually exclusive. *Id.* at *6–8. The court then concluded that Vargas Lopez is an alien within the “catchall” scope of § 1225(b)(2), subject

1 to detention without possibility of release on bond through a proceeding on removal under §
 2 1229a. *Id.* at *9. The court found that Vargas Lopez was an “applicant for admission”
 3 because his counsel admitted that Vargas Lopez “wishe[d] to stay in this country.” *Id.* That
 4 finding, according to the court, was consistent with the conclusions of the BIA
 5 in *Hurtado* and *Jennings*.

6 Pursuant to the language of the statute and the holding of *Jennings*, the court said that
 7 “just because Vargas Lopez illegally remained in this country *for years* does not mean that he
 8 is suddenly not an ‘applicant for admission’ under § 1225(b)(2).” *Id.* “Even if Vargas Lopez
 9 might have fallen within the scope of § 1226(a),” the court found “he also certainly fit
 10 within the language of § 1225(b)(2) as well.” *Id.* “The Court thus conclude[d] that the *plain*
 11 *language* of § 1225(b)(2) and the “all applicants for admission” language
 12 of *Jennings* permitted the DHS to detain Vargas Lopez under § 1225(b)(2).” *Id.*

13 **c. The Recent *Chavez v. Noem* Decision Is Also Instructive.**

14 The United States District Court for the Southern District of California’s decision in
 15 *Chavez v. Noem*, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (S.D. Cal. 2025), is also instructive. In *Chavez*, the
 16 court denied a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) filed by the petitioners
 17 who were detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). *Chavez*, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1133, at 1. The
 18 *Chavez* petitioners argued they should not have been mandatorily detained and instead they
 19 should have received bond redetermination hearings under § 1226(a). *Id.* The *Chavez*
 20 petitioners filed a motion for TRO, seeking to “enjoin[] Respondents from continuing to
 21 detain them unless [they received] an individualized bond hearing . . . pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
 22 § 1226(a) within fourteen days of the TRO.” *Id.*

23 In denying the TRO, the *Chavez* court went no further than the plain language of §
 24 1225(a)(1). *Id.* at 4. Beginning and ending with the statutory text, the *Chavez* court correctly
 25 found that because petitioners did not contest that they are “alien[s] present in the United
 26 States who ha[ve] not been admitted,” then the *Chavez* petitioners are “applicants for
 27 admission” and thus subject to the mandatory detention provisions of “applicants for
 28 admission” under § 1225(b)(2). *Id.*; see also *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 221–

222 (finding that an alien who entered without inspection is an “applicant for admission” and his argument that he cannot be considered as “seeking admission” is unsupported by the plain language of the INA, and further stating, “[i]f he is not admitted to the United States . . . but he is not ‘seeking admission’ . . . then what is his legal status?”).

d. The BIA’s Decision in *Hurtado* Is Entitled to Significant Weight in Construing the Scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

While *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), eliminated Chevron deference, *Hurtado* nonetheless should be afforded substantial weight under *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Under *Skidmore*, the weight owed to an agency interpretation depends on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” *Id.* at 140. *Hurtado* scores highly on these factors.

First, the BIA applied its specialized expertise in immigration detention law, the very subject Congress charged it with administering. Its decision addressed the interplay between §§ 1225 and 1226 in detail, relying on statutory text, legislative history, and decades of experience resolving custody questions. Second, the BIA’s reasoning is thorough and well supported. It carefully explained why noncitizens who entered without inspection remain “applicants for admission” under § 1225(a)(1) and why reclassifying them under § 1226(a) would create statutory issues and undermine congressional intent. Third, the BIA’s interpretation is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, including *Jennings*, which recognized that detention under § 1225(b) is mandatory. Finally, adopting *Hurtado* promotes uniformity and coherence in federal immigration law by preventing detention outcomes from turning on the happenstance of when and where a noncitizen is apprehended.

e. Under *Loper Bright*, the Statute Controls, Not Prior Agency Practices.

Any argument that prior agency practice supports applying § 1226(a) to Petitioner is unavailing because under *Loper Bright*, the plain language of the statute and not prior practice controls. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 225–26. In overturning *Chevron*, the Supreme Court recognized that courts often change precedents and “correct[]

1 our own mistakes” *Loper Bright Enterprises*, 603 U.S. at 411 (overturning *Chevron, U.S.A.,*
2 *Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). *Loper Bright* overturned a decades
3 old agency interpretation of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
4 Act that itself predated IIRIRA by twenty years. *Loper Bright Enterprises*, 603 U.S. at 380.
5 Thus, longstanding agency practice carries little, if any, weight under *Loper Bright*. The
6 weight given to agency interpretations “must always ‘depend upon their thoroughness, the
7 validity of their reasoning, the consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
8 those factors which give them power to persuade.’” *Loper Bright Enterprises*, 603 U.S. at
9 432–33 (quoting *Skidmore*, 323 U.S. at 140 (cleaned up)).

10 The BIA’s recent precedent decision in *Hurtado* includes thorough reasoning. *Matter*
11 *of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 221–22. In *Hurtado*, the BIA analyzed the statutory
12 text and legislative history. *Id.* at 223–225. It highlighted congressional intent that aliens
13 present without inspection be considered “seeking admission.” *Id.* at 224. The BIA
14 concluded that rewarding aliens who entered unlawfully with bond hearings while
15 subjecting those presenting themselves at the border to mandatory detention would be an
16 “incongruous result” unsupported by the plain language “or any reasonable interpretation
17 of the INA.” *Id.* at 228.

18 To be sure, “when the best reading of the statute is that it delegates discretionary
19 authority to an agency,” the Court must “independently interpret the statute and effectuate
20 the will of Congress.” *Loper Bright Enterprises*, 603 U.S. at 395. But “read most naturally, §§
21 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention for applicants for admission until certain
22 proceedings have concluded.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297 (cleaned up). Prior practice does
23 not support Petitioner’s position that the plain language mandates detention under
24 § 1226(a).

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1 **f. Petitioner's Temporary Detention Does Not Offend Due Process.**

2 As mentioned above, Congress broadly crafted “applicants for admission” to include
 3 undocumented aliens present within the United States like Petitioner. *See* 8 U.S.C. §
 4 1225(a)(1). And Congress directed aliens like the Petitioner to be detained during their
 5 removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297 (“Read most
 6 naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) thus mandate detention of applicants for admission until
 7 certain proceedings have concluded.”). In so doing, Congress made a legislative judgment to
 8 detain undocumented aliens during removal proceedings, as they — by definition — have
 9 crossed borders and traveled in violation of United States law. As explained above, that is
 10 the prerogative of the legislative branch serving the interest of the government and the
 11 United States.

12 The Supreme Court has recognized this profound interest. *See Shaughnessy*, 345 U.S.
 13 at 210 (“Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental
 14 sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune
 15 from judicial control.”). And with this power to remove aliens, the Supreme Court has
 16 recognized the United States’ longtime Constitutional ability to detain those in removal
 17 proceedings. *Carlson*, 342 U.S. at 538 (“Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation
 18 procedure.”); *Wong Wing*, 163 U.S. at 235 (“Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain
 19 if those accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character,
 20 and while arrangements were being made for their deportation.”); *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 531
 21 (“Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that
 22 process.”); *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 286 (“Congress has authorized immigration officials to
 23 detain some classes of aliens during the course of certain immigration proceedings.
 24 Detention during those proceedings gives immigration officials time to determine an alien's
 25 status without running the risk of the alien's either absconding or engaging in criminal
 26 activity before a final decision can be made.”).

27 In another immigration context (aliens already ordered removed awaiting their
 28 removal), the Supreme Court has explained that detaining these aliens less than six months

1 is presumed constitutional. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). But even this
 2 presumptive constitutional limit has been subsequently distinguished as perhaps
 3 unnecessarily restrictive in other contexts. For example, in *Demore*, the Supreme Court
 4 explained Congress was justified in detaining aliens during the entire course of their removal
 5 proceedings who were convicted of certain crimes. *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 513. In that case,
 6 similar to undocumented aliens like Petitioner, Congress provided for the detention of
 7 certain convicted aliens during their removal in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). *See id.* The Court
 8 emphasized the constitutionality of the “definite termination point” of the detention, which
 9 was the length of the removal proceedings.⁴ *Id.* at 512.⁵ In light of Congress’s interest in
 10 dealing with illegal immigration by keeping specified aliens in detention pending the
 11 removal period, the Supreme Court dispensed of any Due Process concerns without
 12 engaging in the “*Mathews v. Eldridge* test” *See id. generally.*

13 Likewise, in the case at bar, Petitioner’s temporary detention pending his removal
 14 proceedings does not violate Due Process. Petitioner has been detained for less than two
 15 months, has already had an opportunity to be heard by an Immigration judge, and has an
 16 upcoming hearing before an Immigration Judge on March 5, 2026, and his *process* continues
 17 to unfold. Specifically, DHS’s narrow appeal on the issue of release on bond is before the
 18 BIA, and resolution one way or another is undoubtedly forthcoming. Petitioner’s ample
 19 available process in his current removal proceedings demonstrate no lack of Procedural Due
 20 Process — nor any deprivation of liberty “sufficiently outrageous” required to establish a
 21 Substantive Due Process claim. *See generally Reed v. Goertz*, 598 U.S. 230, 236 (2023); *Young*
 22 *v. City of St. Charles, Mo.*, 244 F.3d 623, 628 (8th Cir. 2001), *as corrected* (Mar. 27, 2001), *as*
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 25 ⁴ “In contrast, because the statutory provision at issue in this case governs detention of
 26 deportable criminal aliens *pending their removal proceedings*, the detention necessarily serves
 27 the purpose of preventing the aliens from fleeing prior to or during such proceedings.
 28 Second, while the period of detention at issue in *Zadvydas* was ‘indefinite’ and ‘potentially
 permanent,’ *id.*, at 690–691, 121 S.Ct. 2491, the record shows that § 1226(c) detention not
 only has a definite termination point, but lasts, in the majority of cases, for less than the 90
 days the Court considered presumptively valid in *Zadvydas*.”

⁵ In 2018, the Court again highlighted the significance of a “definite termination point” for
 detention of certain aliens pending removal. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 304.

1 *corrected* (May 1, 2001). Congress simply made the decision to detain him pending removal
2 which is a “constitutionally permissible part of that process.” *See Demore*, 538 U.S. at 531.

3 The temporary, automatic, and discretionary stays permit the United States an
4 opportunity to appeal an IJ bond decision to correct any errors by the Immigration Judge
5 while providing “an appropriate and less restrictive means whereby the government’s
6 interest in seeking a stay of the custody redetermination may be protected without unduly
7 infringing upon Petitioner’s liberty interest.” *Zavala v. Ridge*, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1077
8 (N.D. Cal. 2004); *El-Dessouki v. Cangemi*, No. CIV 063536 DSD/JSM, 2006 WL 2727191, at
9 *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 22, 2006); *Altayar v. Lynch*, No. CV-16-02479-PHX-GMS (JZB), 2016
10 WL 7383340, at *10–11 (D. Ariz. Nov. 23, 2016).

11 As explained in *Altayar*, purpose of the automatic stay is to “avoid the necessity of
12 having to decide whether to order a stay on extremely short notice with only the most
13 summary presentation of the issues.” Review of Custody Determinations, 71 FR 57873-01,
14 2006 WL 2811410; *Altayar*, 2016 WL 7383340 at *12-13. An automatic stay of up to 90
15 days does not violate due process because it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
16 United States interest. *Id.* In *Altayar*, the Court found there is no procedural due process
17 violation from § 1003.19(i)(2).

18 In this case, Petitioner, who is present in the United States without admission or
19 parole, is an applicant for admission in INA § 240 removal proceedings and is therefore
20 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225. As discussed above, his detention is mandatory and
21 the IJ does not have jurisdiction to issue a bond. As history has revealed, the BIA issued its
22 precedential decision in *Hurtado*, in which it ruled that Immigration Judges lacked
23 jurisdiction to grant bonds to illegal aliens like the Petitioner. The United States is aware of
24 prior rulings in this District and others rejecting these arguments, but the United States
25 respectfully maintains Petitioner has not been deprived of Due Process in light of the
26 aforementioned precedent.

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1 **VI. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, Federal Respondents respectfully request that the Court
3 deny the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
4 Alternatively, if the Court is inclined to grant the petition and motion, it should be in
5 accordance with the alternative bond set by the IJ.

6 Respectfully submitted this 17th day of February 2026.

7
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12 /s/ Martin J. Mayer
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