

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

TONY RUIZ FONSECA,
Petitioner,

v.

MIGUEL VERGARA, Field Office Director of
Enforcement and Removal Operations, San
Antonio Field Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney
General; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW; WARDEN OF
KARNES COUNTY IMMIGRATION
PROCESSING CENTER,
Respondents.

Case No.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4

2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
0
1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

20
21
22
23
24

21
22
23
24

5. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.*

6. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause). This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

7. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, because Petitioner is detained at the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center in Karnes City, Texas, which is within the jurisdiction of this District.

8. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), because Respondents are officers, employees, or agencies of the United States, a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to her claims occurred in this district, and no real property is involved in this action.

PARTIES

9. Petitioner, TONY RUIZ FONSECA, is a citizen of Cuba. He has been detained since October 2025, and is currently detained at the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center in Karnes City, Texas. He is in the custody, and under the direct control, of Respondents and their agents.

10. Petitioner, MIGUEL VERGARA, is the Director of the San Antonio Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, MIGUEL VERGARA, is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

1 11. Respondent, KRISTI NOEM, is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
2 Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and
3 Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms.
4 Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

5 12. Respondent, THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS), is the
6 federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and
7 removal of noncitizens. DHS oversees ICE and the detention of noncitizens. DHS is a legal
8 custodian of Petitioner.

9 13. Respondent, PAMELA BONDI, is the Attorney General of the United States. She
10 is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration
11 Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her
12 official capacity.

13 14. Respondent, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (EOIR), is
14 the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings,
15 including for custody redeterminations in bond hearings.

16 15. Respondent, WARDEN OF THE KARNES COUNTY IMMIGRATION
17 PROCESSING CENTER, has immediate physical custody of Petitioner. He is sued in his official
18 capacity.

19 **LEGAL FRAMEWORK**

20 16. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, a federal court reviewing a petition for writ of
21 habeas corpus must either grant the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause
22 why the writ should not be granted. Habeas corpus is the proper vehicle to challenge unlawful
23 civil immigration detention that violates statutory or constitutional limits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

1 17. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects all “persons” within the
2 United States from arbitrary deprivation of liberty. U.S. Const. amend. V. This protection applies
3 to noncitizens in civil immigration detention, including those subject to final orders of removal.
4 See *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Freedom from physical restraint lies at the core of
5 the liberty protected by due process, and civil detention is permissible only when it serves a
6 legitimate, nonpunitive governmental purpose and is accompanied by adequate procedural
7 safeguards. See *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1997).

8 18. Following the entry of a final order of removal, the Immigration and Nationality
9 Act authorizes detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) solely for the purpose of effectuating removal.
10 Detention under this provision is not punitive and may not be imposed for its own sake. Rather,
11 continued confinement must bear a reasonable relation to the government’s asserted civil
12 objective and must remain justified by actual progress toward removal. See *Demore*, 538 U.S. at
13 528; *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).

14 19. Critically, neither the INA nor the Constitution authorizes the government to
15 detain a noncitizen post-order in the absence of meaningful procedural review or without an
16 individualized assessment demonstrating that continued detention is necessary to serve the
17 purpose of removal. When detention continues without a custody determination evaluating flight
18 risk, danger, or the realistic likelihood of removal, it becomes arbitrary and untethered from its
19 statutory justification.

20 20. Federal courts retain authority to review the constitutionality of prolonged or
21 unjustified immigration detention through habeas corpus, even where the governing statute does
22 not expressly provide procedural protections. See *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 308–09
23 (2018) (confirming availability of constitutional habeas challenges to immigration detention).

1 Due process requires that civil detention be supported by more than the mere existence of a
2 removal order; it requires ongoing justification and procedural safeguards sufficient to ensure
3 that confinement does not become excessive, arbitrary, or punitive in nature.

4 21. Accordingly, where DHS continues to detain a noncitizen after a final order of
5 removal without providing meaningful procedural review and without demonstrating that
6 removal is realistically forthcoming, such detention exceeds the limits of statutory authority
7 under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

8 **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

9 **COUNT ONE**

10 **Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process**

11 22. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as
12 though fully set forth herein.

13 23. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from
14 depriving any person of liberty without due process of law. This protection applies to noncitizens
15 in civil immigration detention, including those subject to final orders of removal.

16 24. Petitioner, Tony Ruiz Fonseca, a native and citizen of Cuba, has been detained at
17 the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center since approximately October 2025. On
18 January 14, 2026, an Immigration Judge issued a final order of removal against Petitioner.

19 25. Since the issuance of the final order of removal, Respondents have continued to
20 detain Petitioner without providing any meaningful individualized post-order custody
21 determination, hearing, or procedural review assessing whether continued detention is justified.

22 26. Respondents have not found that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a
23 flight risk, nor have they articulated any legitimate basis demonstrating that continued detention
24 meaningfully advances the civil purpose of effectuating removal.

27. Civil immigration detention is lawful only so long as it remains reasonably related to its nonpunitive purpose and is accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards. Where detention continues without individualized justification and without meaningful review, it becomes arbitrary and excessive in relation to its stated purpose.

28. By continuing to detain Petitioner without adequate procedural safeguards and without a demonstrated, realistic basis for believing that removal will occur in the reasonably foreseeable future, Respondents have violated Petitioner's right to due process under the Fifth Amendment.

COUNT TWO

Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)

29. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

30. The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes post-order detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) solely for the purpose of effectuating removal. Detention under this provision is not punitive and must bear a reasonable relationship to that limited statutory purpose.

31. Respondents have continued to detain Petitioner without demonstrating that her continued confinement is necessary to effectuate removal or that removal is realistically forthcoming.

32. Because Petitioner's continued detention no longer serves the statutory purpose of effectuating removal and is not supported by any individualized determination or procedural safeguards, her detention exceeds the authority granted by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).

33. Respondents' ongoing detention of Petitioner is therefore unlawful and not authorized by statute.