

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA**

ANDRES EDUARDO JEREZ
SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the
United States,

Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security,

U.S. Department of Homeland Security,

Joel D. Garcia, in his official capacity as
Field Office Director, El Paso Field
Office,

Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and

David Easterwood, Acting Director, St.
Paul Field Office Immigration and
Customs Enforcement,

Respondents.

Case No. 26-913

**VERIFIED PETITION
FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

Expedited Handling Requested

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner, Andres Eduardo Jerez Sanchez (“Petitioner” or “Jerez Sanchez”), by and through counsel, hereby files this petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief to require U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) to release Petitioner from ICE detention.

2. Jerez Sanchez is a 20 year old man who has lived in Minnesota for over a year. After Petitioner’s mother came to the United States and applied for political asylum, Petitioner followed at age 18 to apply for derivative asylum status. He works as a mechanic for Car-X Tire & Auto and was authorized to work by USCIS. He was detained by ICE on the highway in St. Paul on his way to work. He is currently being unlawfully detained by ICE in ERO El Paso Camp East Montana in Texas.

3. Jerez Sanchez was moved from Minnesota to Texas, where he was subjected to removal proceedings. This transfer from the State of Minnesota is an attempt to deprive this court of jurisdiction and to thwart the ability of his lawyers to provide effective counsel that would provide protections against an unconstitutional removal.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (federal employee mandamus action); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus); Art. I, § 9, c. 2 of the U.S. Constitution (“Suspension Clause”); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (waiver of sovereign immunity); and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Declaratory Judgment Act).

5. Federal question jurisdiction exists because Petitioner seeks to challenge Petitioner's custody as a violation of the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

6. Federal district courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear habeas petitions by noncitizens challenging the lawfulness or constitutionality of their detention by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). *Denmore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510 516-17 (2003); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830, 839-41 (2018); and *Nielsen v. Preap*, 139 S. Ct. 954, 961-63 (2019).

7. This Court has jurisdiction, even though Petitioner has been removed from the state of Minnesota, because "habeas jurisdiction attaches at the time of the Petitioner's apprehension," and is "not defeated by any subsequent decision by Respondents to transfer Petitioner to another state." Slip Op. 2-3, *Sue H. v. Donald Trump*, No. 26-cv-416 (D. Minn. Jan. 20, 2026).

8. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), (e)(1)(B), and 2241(d) because Petitioner was detained within the District of Minnesota.

9. Venue is also proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A), because Respondents are operating in this District.

PARTIES

10. Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela and a resident of St. Paul, Ramsey County, Minnesota being detained by ICE in Texas. Petitioner is under the direct control of the Respondents. Petitioner was originally detained under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement St. Paul Field Office at Fort Snelling in Minnesota.

11. Jerez Sanchez has been living peacefully in Minnesota for more than one year and, at the time of his detention, had a pending application for political asylum. After his unlawful detention, an immigration judge in El Paso, Texas summarily denied his asylum application and ordered removal on January 29, 2026. Petitioner has preserved his right to appeal that decision and may appeal the decision within 30 days. Therefore, Petitioner remains in immigration proceedings and is not subject to a final order of removal.

12. Respondent Pamela Bondi is being sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the head of the Department of Justice. Attorney General Bondi shares responsibility for implementation and enforcement of the immigration detention statutes, along with Respondent Noem. Attorney General Bondi is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

13. Respondent Kristi Noem is being sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, Secretary Noem is responsible for the administration of the immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a), routinely transacts business in the District of Minnesota, supervises the Fort Snelling ICE Field Office, and is legally responsible for pursuing Petitioner's detention and removal. As such, Respondent Noem is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

14. Respondent U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") is a federal agency headquartered in Washington, DC, and the parent agency of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

15. Respondent Joel D. Garcia is sued in his official capacity as Field Office Director, El Paso Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Respondent Joel D. Garcia is the current custodian of Petitioner.

16. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and is sued in his official capacity. Defendant Lyons is responsible for Petitioner's detention.

17. Respondent U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") is a component agency of DHS.

18. Respondent David Easterwood is being sued in his official capacity as the Acting Field Office Director for the Fort Snelling Field Office for ICE within DHS. In that capacity, Field Director Easterwood has supervisory authority over the ICE agents responsible for detaining Petitioner. The address for the St. Paul Field Office at Fort Snelling is 1 Federal Drive, Fort Snelling, Minnesota 55111.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

19. Petitioner arrived in the United States on or about September 6, 2024 at San Ysidro, California. Petitioner was 18 years old when he arrived. Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela.

20. Petitioner came to the United States to follow his mother, who is also a citizen of Venezuela. Petitioner's mother has a pending application for political asylum and her next hearing date is scheduled for August 2027.

21. In April 2025, Petitioner filed an application for asylum. Both Petitioner and his mother intend to consolidate the applications, such that Petitioner's application is derivative of his mother's asylum application under the Child Status Protection Act.

22. Petitioner had a previously scheduled hearing before an immigration judge in August 2025, but the hearing was cancelled due to his pending asylum application.

23. Petitioner was stopped and detained by ICE on January 12, 2026, at the intersection of Highway 10 and Lower Afton Road in St. Paul, Minnesota while on his way to work at Car-X Tire & Auto. He has been gainfully employed as an auto mechanic and contributing to the Twin Cities community. He was authorized to work by USCIS.

24. At the time of Petitioner's detention by ICE, he was not subject to a final order of removal and was lawfully present in the United States due to his pending asylum application.

25. Upon information and belief, Petitioner was taken into custody to the Fort Snelling immigration building on 1 Federal Drive, St. Paul, Minnesota. After being held in Minnesota for a few hours, Petitioner was sent to Texas later the same day.

26. This arrest is part of an operation in Hennepin County and Ramsey County called "Operation Metro Surge." This operation has involved hundreds of masked, unidentified individuals in unmarked vehicles (many with illegally covered or mismatched license plates) holding themselves out as ICE agents but largely refusing to identify themselves by name or to present warrants, physically assaulting pedestrians, pepper spraying and arresting citizen observers, hitting passersby with vehicles, and generally attempting to take as many immigrants as possible into custody, regardless of the

constitutionality of their actions. *See, e.g., Compl., Tincher et. al. v. Noem*, No. 0:25-cv-04669. (D. Minn. 12/17/2025).

27. At the time of this filing, Petitioner is in federal detention at ERO El Paso Camp East Montana.

28. Petitioner poses no risk to society and has strong connections to his community. He is well-liked in his community and has received unwavering support from his mother, who also lives in Minnesota, and has a pending application for political asylum.

29. After Petitioner's detention and transfer to Texas, an immigration hearing was scheduled and held on January 29, 2026.

30. At this hearing, an immigration judge ordered removal. Although Petitioner had a pending asylum application, and his asylum application was eligible to be derivative of his mother's application under the Child Status Protection Act, the immigration judge told him he had no right to be in this country.

31. Petitioner reserved his right to appeal the decision and is in the process of filing an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals. His efforts to do so have been impeded by his detention in Texas, away from his family and legal counsel. Petitioner is not subject to a final order of removal.

32. After filing the appeal, Petitioner intends to move to consolidate his asylum case with his mother's case. Under the Child Status Protection Act, Petitioner is eligible to apply for derivative asylum based on his mother's asylum case because he was under the age of 21 when his mother's asylum application was filed.

33. Detaining Petitioner is an expensive and pointless endeavor. Petitioner respectfully seeks the opportunity to return home and to continue following the legal processes set up by Congress and DHS for immigrants to seek status in this country.

34. Pending the adjudication of his Petition, Petitioner further seeks an order requiring his return to the State of Minnesota and prohibiting his deportation, so that he may remain within the jurisdiction of this Court and accessible to his legal counsel and family support networks during immigration proceedings while he appeals the removal order and consolidates his derivative asylum application with his mother's.

STANDARD OF LAW

35. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The “Great Writ” has been referred to by United States Courts as “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). A petitioner may seek a writ of habeas corpus when their custody violates the US Constitution or a federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The writ should be granted if petitioner can show that their detention is unlawful by a preponderance of evidence. *Aditya W. H. v. Trump*, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn. 2025).

36. The Court must grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause to the respondents “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Court must require respondents to

file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

37. Detained immigrants petitioning under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 face no statutory exhaustion requirements. *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 965 (D. Minn. 2025). Nor is a judicially imposed prudential exhaustion requirement appropriate where, as here: time is of the essence, facts are largely undisputed, and the parties’ disagreement is based on a legal conclusion. *Id.* at 967-68.

38. In *Mayamu K. v. Bondi*, No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260661 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025) this Court held that: 1) 28 U.S.C. 1441 does not require exhaustion; 2) exhaustion “serves no purpose” because the Board of Immigration Appeals cannot decide constitutional questions; 3) the administrative process would be futile and risks irreparable harm because an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals is a “long, months-long process” and 4) administrative review would be futile “in light of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ recent decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* which held that immigration judges ‘lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission. 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 225 (B.I.A. 2025).”

39. Other courts within the Eighth Circuit have similarly declined to require prudential exhaustion when evaluating a detained immigrant’s habeas corpus petition under similar circumstances—to address a question of statutory interpretation that does not require developing a factual record, and where the agency is demonstrably unlikely to reverse its course. *E.g., Giron Reyes v. Lyons*, No. C25-4048, 2025 WL 2712427, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025).

40. “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [immigrants], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

41. Only under certain circumstances are immigrants subject to ongoing detention without a bond hearing. *See, e.g.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (individuals with certain criminal convictions may be detained without a bond hearing for the pendency of removal proceedings¹) and 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (authorizing mandatory detention of immigrants seeking admission from outside the United States, who are “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”).

42. In order to bring a detained individual under the purview of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), an individual’s criminal conviction must be one enumerated in the INA under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1182(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i-iii), and 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(B-D).

43. These specified offenses include crimes of moral turpitude, violations of laws regulating controlled substances, terroristic activities, firearm offenses, espionage, treason, and other serious crimes. *Id.* Crimes of moral turpitude do not apply in situations where the maximum sentence for the crime was less than one year, and the person was sentenced to less than six months of imprisonment. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(III).

¹ Even when detained under 1226(c), immigrants retain due process rights and are entitled to a hearing if the period of detention becomes unreasonable. *See, e.g., Pedro O v. Garland*, 543 F.Supp.3d 733 (D. Minn. 2021) (finding a year-long mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) without an individualized hearing to violate an immigrant’s due process rights).

44. Petitioner has never been convicted of a crime that would bring Petitioner under the purview of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

45. Otherwise, the “default rule” is that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations apply to immigrants “already present in the United States” and subject to pending removal proceedings. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018). Under this default rule, immigrants are constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing. *R.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 3146312 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025).

46. Here, Petitioner fits the ‘default rule’: Petitioner has been in the United States for more than one year and does not have criminal convictions that fall under the purview of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Thus, Petitioner is entitled to release.

47. The immigration judge’s recent decision (while he was detained) did not make his detention lawful because Petitioner is not subject to a final order of removal and remains in immigration proceedings. Petitioner is actively working to file an appeal of the immigration judge’s decision. “Even if the Board of Immigration Appeals upholds the Immigration Judge’s decision and Petitioner’s original removal proceedings are dismissed, Petitioner is still neither arriving nor seeking admission, and § 1226 thus remains the appropriate governing statute for future removal proceedings.” *Mayamu K.*, 2025 WL 3641819, at *4; *accord. Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 967 (D. Minn. 2025).

48. Immigration detention is civil in nature, and as a result Congress must have expressly authorized it by statute, and the detention must be reasonably related to its statutory purpose. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687, 690 (2001) (quoting *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).

49. A noncitizen seeking only to challenge the legality of their detention, not the substance of their removal proceedings in immigration court, may properly ask a federal court to find jurisdiction over such a request pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. *See, e.g., Mohammed H. v. Trump*, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1154–55 (D. Minn. 2025).

50. Since Section 1225 does not apply to noncitizens who are in Petitioner’s situation—those who have previously been released pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, as opposed to those who are detained while in the process of physically entering the United States—the law that Respondents are using to detain Petitioners simply does not apply so as to authorize Petitioners’ detention. *See Dwine L. v. Bondi*, No. 26-cv-627 (KMM/DLM), 2026 WL 234188 (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 2026); *Eliseo A.A. v. Olson*, Civ. No. 25-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025 WL 2886729 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); *Mayamu K. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025); *Khalid B.Q. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4584 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 10 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2025); *Xuseen A. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4514 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 16 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025); *Vedat C. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4642 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 9 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025).

51. When a habeas petitioner’s detention is without legal basis, the typical remedy is release. *Munaf v. Geren*, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (describing release as the “typical remedy” for “unlawful executive detention”).

52. Respondents will no doubt argue, as they have in similar cases before this Court, that if the Court rules that Petitioners should have been detained pursuant to § 1226, instead of § 1225, then the remedy is a bond hearing as opposed to outright release. *See,*

e.g., *Ahmed A.*, Civ. No. 25-4776, Doc. No. 9. at 9-10. However, this Court rejected this argument, saying that:

[A] bond hearing presupposes lawful detention authority under § 1226. Where that authority has not been invoked or established, ordering a bond hearing would treat the absence of statutory authority as a mere procedural irregularity rather than a substantive defect ... Where the record shows Respondents have not identified a valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the remedy is not to supply one through further proceedings.

Id. at Doc. No. 10 at 6.

53. Here, where detention is unlawfully based on 8 U.S.C. § 1225, which does not apply to Petitioner, release is an appropriate remedy.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

Fifth Amendment Due Process

Petitioner is being deprived of an adequate and meaningful process to challenge his ongoing confinement.

54. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained above.

55. Petitioner has due process rights as a resident of the United States. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

56. Federal courts use the three-part test in *Mathews v. Eldridge* to determine whether civil detention violates a detainee's due process rights. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The elements of this test are: (1) the private interest that the official action affects; (2) the risk that the procedures used will result in an erroneous deprivation of the private interest, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the

Government's interest in following the existing procedures, both in achieving their objectives and in the potential burdens of an alternate procedure. *Id.* at 335.

57. Here, all three factors favor the Petitioner.

58. First, Petitioner has a significant private interest at stake. A person's interest in freedom from physical detention is "the most elemental of liberty interests." *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004); see also *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491 ("Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects."). Petitioner currently experiences the gambit of deprivations that come with physical detention.

59. Second, Petitioner will continue to be deprived of this interest if the current procedure (detaining Petitioner without a hearing) is followed. Petitioner has a strong likelihood of meeting the criteria for being released on bond. 8 CFR §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8) (2020); *In re Adeniji*, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1113 (BIA 1999). Even if Petitioners are not subsequently released, Petitioners still have a legal and constitutional interest in the hearing itself, in being heard.

60. Lastly, the Government has no legitimate interest in refusing to follow its own rules. Petitioners pose no safety threats to the community. Releasing Petitioner, or holding a hearing to release Petitioner on bond, would in fact *save* the government the resources and expense of continuing to imprison Petitioner.

61. The placement of Petitioner in detention pending the resolution of his asylum proceedings violates his constitutional rights to due process guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment.

COUNT TWO

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226

Petitioner's Ongoing Detention, without the Opportunity for a Bond Hearing, Violates his Statutory Right to a Hearing as Guaranteed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226

62. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above.

63. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231. Petitioner remains in removal proceedings, as he is not subject to a final order of removal and is actively working to file an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals.

64. Petitioner is not subject to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1), 1226(c), or § 1231.

65. Respondents' application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates their continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT THREE
Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act

66. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

67. The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

68. The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).

69. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens could properly be detained under § 1226(a), but would then be eligible for release on bond unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231. Petitioner remains in removal proceedings, as he is not subject to a final order of removal and is actively working to file an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals.

70. Nonetheless, the Board has adopted a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner and others in the same position.

71. Respondents through their recent administrative decision failed to articulate any reasoned explanations for new interpretation of the Act. The Board's decision represents a change in the agencies' policies and positions that negates the plain language of the Act, the will of Congress, and decades of administrative precedent.

72. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law, and as such, it violates the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

REQUEST FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

73. Within three days, unless good cause for a delay is shown, "[a] court, justice or judge entering a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto." 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

74. Petitioner, by and through counsel, respectfully request that the Court issue an Order to Show Cause directing Respondents to file a return within three days of the Court's order, showing cause, if any, why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief;

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Issue an immediate Order requiring Respondents to return Petitioner to this District within 48 hours and for the duration of these proceedings and prohibiting Petitioner's deportation from the United States;

- (3) Issue an Order to show cause as to why Petitioner should not be released immediately, or in the alternative afforded a bond hearing;
- (4) Alternatively, issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring Respondents to release Petitioners unless they provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days; and
- (5) Grant any other and further relief that this Court may deem just and proper.

DATED: January 31, 2026

/s/Derek C. Waller

Brian D. Clark (MN Bar # 390069)

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VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I am submitting this verification on behalf of Petitioner because his current detention makes them unable to submit one on their own behalf. On information and belief, I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the attached Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

DATED: January 31, 2026

/s/Derek C. Waller

Brian D. Clark (MN Bar # 390069)

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