

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA**

Alison Mishell Moreno Ronquillo,

Petitioner,

v.

Pamela Bondi, Attorney General,

Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security,

Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
and

David Easterwood, Acting Director, St.
Paul Field Office Immigration and
Customs Enforcement..

Respondents.

Case No. **26-624**

**VERIFIED PETITION
FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

Expedited Handling Requested

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Alison Mishell Moreno Ronquillo by and through the undersigned attorney, hereby files this petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief to require U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) to release Ms. Moreno Ronquillo from ICE detention, or in the alternative to enjoin Petitioner’s transfer to a facility outside of Minnesota and to provide a bond hearing pending the completion of any immigration proceedings.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (federal employee mandamus action); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus); Art. I, § 9, c. 2 of the U.S. Constitution (“Suspension Clause”); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (waiver of sovereign immunity); and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Declaratory Judgment Act).

3. Federal question jurisdiction exists because Ms. Moreno Ranquillo seeks to challenge this custody as a violation of the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

4. Federal district courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear habeas petitions by noncitizens challenging the lawfulness or constitutionality of their detention by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510 516-17 (2003); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830, 839-41 (2018); and *Nielsen v. Preap*, 139 S. Ct. 954, 961-63 (2019).

5. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), (e)(1)(B), and 2241(d) because Ms. Moreno Ranquillo is detained within the District of Minnesota.

6. Venue is also proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A), because Respondents are operating in this district.

PARTIES

7. Petitioner is a resident of Minneapolis, Minnesota. Petitioner is currently under the direct control of Respondents and has no scheduled release date. Petitioner was arrested and detained in Minnesota before Respondent's quickly moved her to El Paso, TX—away from her family, friends, and resources. Petitioner continues to be held in custody at the ERO El Paso Camp East Montana in El Paso, TX. Petitioner is under the direct control of the respondents and has no scheduled release date.

8. Respondent Pamela Bondi is being sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the head of the Department of Justice. Attorney General Bondi shares responsibility for implementation and enforcement of the immigration detention statutes, along with Respondent Noem. Attorney General Bondi is a legal custodian of Ms. Moreno Ranquillo.

9. Respondent Kristi Noem is being sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, Secretary Noem is responsible for the administration of the immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a), routinely transacts business in the District of Minnesota, supervises the Fort Snelling ICE Field Office, and is legally responsible for pursuing Petitioner's detention and removal. As such, Respondent Noem is a legal custodian of Ms. Moreno Ranquillo.

10. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and is sued in his official capacity. Defendant Lyons is responsible for Petitioner's detention.

11. Respondent David Easterwood is being sued in his official capacity as the Acting Field Office Director for the Fort Snelling Field Office for ICE within DHS. In that capacity, Field Director Easterwood has supervisory authority over the ICE agents responsible for detaining Ms. Moreno Ranquillo. The address for the Fort Snelling Field Office is 1 Federal Drive, Fort Snelling, Minnesota 55111.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

12. Ms. Moreno Ronquillo came to the United States in November 2023 and has lived in Minneapolis, Minnesota since that time. She is a citizen of Ecuador.

13. Ms. Moreno Ronquillo lives in Minneapolis with her partner and their four-year-old daughter, who depends on her and her partner for her well-being. Ms. Moreno Ronquillo also lives with her partner's parents.

14. Ms. Moreno Ronquillo and her partner are dedicated and active members of the community. Ms. Moreno Ronquillo attends regularly attends church services with her young family and participates in church activities.

15. Ms. Moreno Ronquillo has a permit to work in the United States and works for a local hotel. She has paid her state and federal taxes.

16. Ms. Moreno Ronquillo has no criminal history.

17. In other words, Ms. Moreno Ronquillo is a positive and vital member of our Minnesota community.

18. Ms. Moreno Ronquillo has a pending asylum application and does not have a final order of removal.

19. On January 23, 2026, Ms. Moreno Ronquillo was driving with her partner and her partner's mother. She was on her way to work.

20. Respondent ICE stopped the vehicle. Upon information and belief, there was no reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct the stop. Upon information and belief, Respondent ICE did not identify themselves and did not provide Ms. Moreno Ronquillo or any of the other passengers with the reason for their stop.

21. Respondent ICE proceeded to forcibly remove both Ms. Moreno Ronquillo and her partner from the vehicle. Ms. Moreno Ronquillo did not offer any physical resistance and complied with Respondent ICE's commands. She was taken into custody and detained in Minnesota. Mr. Moreno Ronquillo's partner was also taken into custody—leaving their four-year-old daughter in Minnesota without either of her parents.

22. Respondent ICE did not have a warrant for Ms. Moreno Ronquillo's arrest.

23. This arrest is part of an operation in Hennepin and Ramsey counties called "Operation Metro Surge." Since the operation began on December 1, 2025, the number of immigration officials in the Twin City metro area has increased fourfold. The new agents have engaged in unconstitutional, unlawful, and violent behavior against law-abiding citizens and residents.

24. Despite several Orders from this Court ordering Respondents to ensure that detainees remain in Minnesota, ICE continues to move detainees to Texas and other states before they can file their petitions for a writ of habeas corpus or otherwise challenge Respondent's unlawful acts. Upon information and belief, this is a strategy

by Respondents to isolate detainees from their communities, loved ones, and counsel and a transparent attempt at forum-shopping.

25. Given the massive volume of perceived non-citizens being taken off the streets, Respondents are running out of physical space to continue detaining people. Detainees, like Ms. Moreno Ronquillo, are being held in cramped quarters at the federal building, before being quickly sent to remote locations across Minnesota or to facilities as far away as El Paso, Texas.

26. In Ms. Moreno Ronquillo's case, Petitioner has been brought to the ERO El Paso Camp East Montana, located at 6920 Digital Road, El Paso, TX 79936.

27. Ms. Moreno Ronquillo's continued and indefinite detention in Texas makes communication with her complicated for both her family and her undersigned counsel.

28. Additionally, detaining Ms. Moreno Ronquillo is an expensive and pointless endeavor. Ms. Moreno Ronquillo is a positive and valuable member of our community with no criminal record. She has a four-year-old daughter who relies on her and is surely missing her mother.

29. Ms. Moreno Ronquillo respectfully seeks the opportunity to return home and to continue following the legal processes set up by Congress and DHS for immigrants to seek status in this country.

30. Pending the adjudication of this Petition, Ms. Moreno seeks an order requiring Respondents to return her home to Minnesota.

STANDARD OF LAW

31. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The “Great Writ” has been referred to by US Courts as “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). A petitioner may seek a writ of habeas corpus when their custody violates the US Constitution or a federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), which should be granted if the petitioner meets their burden of proof—a preponderance of evidence. *Aditya W. H. v. Trump*, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn. 2025).

32. Detained immigrants petitioning under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 face no statutory exhaustion requirements. *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 965 (D. Minn. 2025). Nor is a judicially imposed prudential exhaustion requirement appropriate where, as here: time is of the essence, facts are largely undisputed, and the parties’ disagreement is based on a legal conclusion. *Id.* at 967-68.

33. Other courts in the Eighth Circuit have similarly declined to require prudential exhaustion when evaluating a detained immigrant’s habeas corpus petition under similar circumstances—to address a question of statutory interpretation that does not require developing a factual record, and where the agency is demonstrably unlikely to reverse its course. *Giron Reyes v. Lyons*, 2025 WL 2712427 at *3 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025).

34. “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [immigrants], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

35. In July of 2025, Respondent DHS began ignoring the decades-long consensus of how 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) should be interpreted, which the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) articulated in a subsequent ruling. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA Sept. 5, 2025). Respondents suddenly claim that individuals who have been residing within the United States for more than two years are somehow metaphorically “seeking admission,” simply because they may have pending claims for asylum or other forms of status.

36. However, this Court and the majority around the country have made clear that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) only authorizes detention for noncitizens who are at the border seeking physical entry at the time of detention, not those whose detention is discretionary and governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). *Eliseo A.A. v. Olson*, Civ. No. 25-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025 WL 2886729 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); *Mayamu K. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025); *Khalid B.Q. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4584 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 10 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2025); *Xuseen A. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4514 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 16 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025); *Vedat C. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4642 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 9 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025).

37. Indeed, nearly every Judge in this District has rejected Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225 in recent weeks. *See, e.g., Misael T. v. Bondi*, 26-cv-263 (D.

Minn. Jan. 20, 2026) (Hon. Tostrud, J.); *Ruben v. Noem*, 26-cv-289 (D. Minn. Jan. 20, 2026) (Hon. Bryan, J.); *Mahdi O. v. Noem*, 26-cv-0083 (D. Minn. Jan. 14, 2026) (Hon. Schiltz, J.); *Abdirashid H.M. v. Noem*, 25-4779 (D. Minn. Jan. 9, 2026) (Hon. Tunheim, J.); *Ramon R.C. v. Olson*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 269571, *13, 2025 WL 3900425 (D. Minn. Dec. 30, 2025) (Hon. Brisbois Maj. J.) (“Federal courts across the United States, including the overwhelming majority of Courts to consider the issue, have reached this same conclusion and rejected Respondents’ argument to the contrary more than 300 separate times.”); *Awaale v. Noem*, No. 25-04551, 2025 WL 3754012, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 266286 9D. Minn. Dec. 29, 2025) (“the weight of opinions in this District and in the rest of the country that have ruled against Respondents’ interpretation. This court is one of them.”) (Hon. Davis, J.); *Beltran v. Bondi*, No. 25-04604 (MJD/DTS), 2025 WL 3719856, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 2025) (“Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and is instead subject to detention, if at all, pursuant to the discretionary provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)”); *Hugo D.P. v. Olson*, 25-cv-4593, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2622404, *3, 2025 WL 3688074 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025) (Hon. Provinzino, J.) (“this Court and nearly every federal court to consider [Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225] have rejected [this] reasoning ... and ordered the Government to provide bond hearings to noncitizens”); *Belsai D.S. v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (“This Court joins that chorus. As these other courts have observed, Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) is unpersuasive.”).

38. Here, Petitioner was apprehended within the United States, not at a border while seeking entry. Petitioner previously presented at the border upon her arrival into the United States and was taken into, then released from, immigration custody—nothing in the alleged facts indicate there is any basis for a redetermination of custody or for redetaining Petitioner.

39. Respondents wrongly assert 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) as a basis for detaining Ms. Moreno Ronquillo without a hearing. Instead, any detention could only be pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which the Respondents are not purporting to invoke. Additionally, detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) requires a warrant, which Respondents did not have.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

Fifth Amendment Due Process

Respondents are Confining Petitioner without A Valid Legal Basis or any Semblance of Due Process.

40. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained above.

41. Ms. Moreno Ronquillo has due process rights as a resident of the United States. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

42. Federal courts use the three-part test in *Matthews v. Eldridge* to determine whether civil detention violates a detainee's due process rights. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The elements of this test are: (1) the private interest that the official action affects; (2) the risk that the procedures used will result in an erroneous deprivation of the private

interest, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest in following the existing procedures, both in achieving their objectives and in the potential burdens of an alternate procedure. *Id.* at 335.

43. Here, all three factors favor the petitioner.

44. First, Ms. Moreno Ronquillo has a significant private interest at stake. A person's interest in freedom from physical detention is “the most elemental of liberty interests.” *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004); see also *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”). Ms. Moreno Ronquillo is wrongfully confined, a direct attack on Petitioner’s liberty interests.

45. Second, Ms. Moreno Ronquillo will continue to be deprived of this interest if the current procedure (detaining Ms. Moreno Ronquillo without a legal basis) is followed. There is no rational explanation for detaining Ms. Moreno Ronquillo. Respondents’ purported basis for detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2) has been rejected time and time again in this court. *Ahmed A v. Bondi*, Case No. 25-4776 (JWB/DJF) (January 6, 2026); *Maldonado v. Olson*, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1142–48, 1150–52 (D. Minn. 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 968–970 (D. Minn. 2025); *Mayamu K. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819, at *7–8 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025); *R.E. v. Bondi*, No. 0:25-cv-3946-NEB, 2025 WL

3146312 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025); *Herrera Avila v. Bondi*, No. 0:25-cv-3741 (JRT), 2025 WL 2976539 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025).

46. Lastly, the Government has no legitimate interest in refusing to follow its own rules. Ms. Moreno Ronquillo poses no safety threats to the community. Releasing Petitioner, or at a minimum holding a bond hearing, would in fact *save* the government the resources and expense of continued imprisonment.

47. The placement of Ms. Moreno Ronquillo in detention pending the resolution of ongoing immigration proceedings violates Ms. Moreno Ronquillo's constitutional rights to due process guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment.

COUNT TWO

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)

Petitioner's Ongoing Detention Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) is Unlawful because Petitioner is not Seeking Admission and therefore cannot be held under that Authority

48. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above.

49. Respondents violate the Immigration and Nationality Act by attempting to apply mandatory detention through 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), to Petitioner. Petitioner was nowhere near the border and was not "seeking admission"

COUNT THREE

Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706

Detaining Petitioner Pursuant to an Unlawful Interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) violates the Administrative Procedure Act

50. Ms. Moreno Ronquillo re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

51. The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

52. The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).

53. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens could properly be detained under § 1226(a), but would then be eligible for release on bond unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

54. Nonetheless, the Board has adopted a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner and others in the same position.

55. Respondents through its recent administrative decision failed to articulate any reasoned explanations for new interpretation of the Act. The Board’s decision represents a change in the agencies’ policies and positions that negates the plain language of the Act, the will of Congress, and decades of administrative precedent.

56. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Ms. Moreno Ronquillo is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law, and as such, it violates the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

REMEDY

57. An available remedy for Respondents' unlawful conduct as outlined in this complaint is for Petitioner to be released.

58. Immigration detention is civil in nature, and as a result Congress must have expressly authorized it by statute, and the detention must be reasonably related to its statutory purpose. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687, 690 (2001) (quoting *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). Detention here serves no statutory purpose, there is no indication that Petitioner's detention was based on any facts that might indicate that Petitioner should be in custody for some reason.

59. Since Section 1225 does not apply to noncitizens who are in Petitioner's situation—who have been detained while residing within the United States for more than two years, as opposed to those who are detained while in the process of physically entering the United States, the law that Respondents are using to detain Petitioner simply does not apply so as to authorize Petitioner's detention. See *Eliseo A.A. v. Olson*, Civ. No. 25-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025 WL 2886729 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); *Mayamu K. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025); *Khalid B.Q. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4584 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 10 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2025); *Xuseen A. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4514 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 16 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025); *Vedat C. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4642 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 9 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025).

60. When a habeas petitioner's detention is without legal basis, the typical remedy is release. *Munaf v. Geren*, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (describing release as the "typical remedy" for "unlawful executive detention").

61. Respondents will no doubt argue, as they have in similar cases before this Court, that if the Court rules that Petitioner should have been detained pursuant to § 1226, instead of § 1225, then the remedy is a bond hearing as opposed to outright release. *See, e.g., Ahmed A.* Civ. No. 25-4776, Doc. No. 9. at 9-10. However, this Court rejected this argument, saying that:

[A] bond hearing presupposes lawful detention authority under § 1226. Where that authority has not been invoked or established, ordering a bond hearing would treat the absence of statutory authority as a mere procedural irregularity rather than a substantive defect ... Where the record shows Respondents have not identified a valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the remedy is not to supply one through further proceedings.

Id. at Doc. No. 10 at 6.

62. Nor here would § 1226(a) have supported a lawful detention in the first instance. Detention under § 1226(a) would require a warrant issued by the Attorney General. *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 961 (D. Minn. 2025). To put this plainly: "absent a warrant a noncitizen may not be arrested and detained under section 1226(a)." *See also Ahmed M. v. Bondi et al.*, 2026 WL 25627, *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (quoting *Choglo Chafila v. Scott*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 2:25-cv-00437-SDN, 2025 WL 2688541, at *11 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 2025)). Upon information and belief, Respondents had no such warrant.

63. Here, where detention is unlawfully based on 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2), which does not apply to Petitioner, release is an appropriate remedy.

64. Furthermore, a custody determination has already been made. Petitioner was released from custody over two years ago, as deemed appropriate by the Office of Refugee Resettlement. In that intervening time, no facts appear to indicate that this initial determination to release Petitioner was somehow insufficient, or that Petitioner's circumstances or actions have changed so as to now suddenly warrant re-detention. There is no legal basis for Respondents to attempt to reinstate mandatory detention, following a prior mandatory detention just by recharacterizing a previously released noncitizen as an applicant for admission. *See, e.g., Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 969–70 (D. Minn. 2025).

REQUEST FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

65. Within three days, unless good cause for a delay is shown, “[a] court, justice or judge entering a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

66. Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court issue an Order to Show Cause directing Respondents to file a return within three days of the Court's order, showing cause, if any, why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Ms. Moreno Ronquillo prays that this Court grant the following relief;

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Order that Petitioner be transferred back to the District of Minnesota pending the duration of these proceedings;
- (3) Issue an Order requiring Respondents to show cause as to why Petitioner should not be released immediately, or in the alternative afforded a bond hearing;
- (4) Alternatively, issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring Respondents to release Petitioner unless they provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;
- (5) Enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner on the same statutory theory; and
- (6) Grant any other and further relief that this Court may deem just and proper.

BLADES LAW PLLC

Dated: January 24, 2026

/s/Cody J. Blades
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Attorney for Petitioner

**Verification by Someone Acting on
Petitioner's Behalf Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242**

I am submitting this verification on behalf of Petitioner because I am Petitioner's attorney. I have discussed the factual assertions in this petition with another member of Petitioner's legal team, who has discussed Petitioner's matter directly with Petitioner's family and friends, who are also acting on Petitioner's behalf and who I understand to have personal knowledge of the facts alleged herein. I hereby verify that the statements made in the attached Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, including the statements regarding Petitioner's detention status, are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Date: January 24, 2026

/s/Cody J. Blades
Cody J. Blades