

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND	7
II.	JURISDICTION AND VENUE	9
III.	REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243	10
IV.	PARTIES	10
V.	FACTS	12
VI.	LEGAL FRAMEWORK	13
VII.	ARGUMENT	14
	A. Text, Practice, and Precedent Confirm § 1226(a) Applies to Interior Arrests.....	14
	B. Section 1226(a) governs this interior arrest. DHS's § 1225(b) theory fails on the text and in practice.....	21
	C. Petitioner's Position On <i>Maldonado-Bautista</i> Class Action.....	24
VIII.	RELIEF SOUGHT.....	30
IX.	CLAIMS FOR RELIEF	26
	PRAYER FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION.....	31
	VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242	32

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

<i>Alvarez-Chavez v. Kaiser</i> , No. 25-cv-06984-LB, 2025 WL 2909526 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025).....	16
<i>Alvarez Martinez v. Noem</i> , No. 5:25-cv-01007-JKP, 2025 WL 2598379 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2025).....	17
<i>Arizona v. United States</i> , 567 U.S. 387 (2012).....	23
<i>Au Yi Lau v. INS</i> , 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1971).....	23
<i>Babula v. INS</i> , 665 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1981).....	23
<i>Becerra Vargas v. Bondi</i> , No. 5:25-CV-01023-FB-HJB (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2025).....	18
<i>Belsai v. Bondi</i> , No. 25-cv-3862 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025)	16
<i>Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi</i> , No. CV H-25-3726, 2025 WL 2886346 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025).....	16
<i>Cardin-Alvarez v. Rivas</i> , No. CV 25-02943-PHX-GMS (CDB), 2025 WL 2898389 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2025).....	16
<i>Cerritos-Echevarria v. Bondi</i> , No. CV-25-03252-PHX-DWL (ESW), 2025 WL 2821282 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025)	16
<i>Chávez v. Noem</i> , No. 3:25-cv-02325-CAB-SBC, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025)	16
<i>Chanaguano Caiza v. Scott</i> , No. 25-cv-00500, 2025 WL 2806416 (D. Me. Oct. 2, 2025)	16
<i>Cruz-Momblas v. Bondi</i> , No. 5:26-cv-00196 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2026).....	19
<i>Demore v. Kim</i> , 538 U.S. 510 (2003)	14, 21, 23
<i>Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam</i> , 591 U.S. 121, 130 n.2 (2020).....	22
<i>Dominguez Vega v. Thompson</i> , No. 5:25-cv-01439-XR (W.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2025).....	18
<i>Erazo Rojas v. Noem</i> , No. 3:25-cv-443-KC (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2025).....	17
<i>Fay v. Noia</i> , 372 U.S. 391 (1963)	10
<i>Giron Reyes v. Lyons</i> , No. C25-4048-LTS-MAR, 2025 WL 2712417 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025)	16
<i>Gomes v. Hyde</i> , No. 1:25-cv-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025)	20, 21
<i>Gonzalez-Avelino</i> , No. 5:25-cv-01897-OLG (W.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2026).....	19

<i>Gonzalez Guerrero v. Noem</i> , No. 1:25-cv-01334-RP (W.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2025).....	16
<i>Hernandez-Fernandez v. Lyons</i> , No. 5:25-cv-00773-JKP, 2025 WL 2976923 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025).....	17
<i>Hernandez-Hervert v. Bondi</i> , No. 1:25-cv-01763-RP (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025).....	18
<i>Hernandez-Lucero v. Bondi</i> , No. 4:25-cv-03981 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2025)	16
<i>Hernandez-Ramiro v. Bondi</i> , No. 5:25-cv-01207-XR (W.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2025)	16
<i>J.U. v. Maldonado</i> , No. 25-cv-04836, 2025 WL 2772765 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025)	16
<i>Jennings v. Rodriguez</i> , 583 U.S. 281 (2018)	passim
<i>Lepe v. Andrews</i> , No. 1:25-cv-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025)	16
<i>Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo</i> , 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024)	21, 23
<i>Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa</i> , No. EP-25-cv-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2025)	
<i>Lopez Benitez v. Francis</i> , No. 25-cv-5937 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025)	17
<i>Lopez v. Hardin</i> , No. 25-cv-830, 2025 WL 2732717 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2025)	16
<i>Luna Quispe v. Crawford</i> , No. 1:25-cv-1471-AJT-LRV, 2025 WL 2783799 (E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2025)	16
<i>Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz</i> , No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, at 2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (order).....	passim
<i>Martinez v. Noem</i> , No. 3:25-cv-430-KC, 2025 WL 2965859 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025).....	17
<i>Mathews v. Eldridge</i> , 424 U.S. 319 (1976)	17, 21, 24, 25
<i>Monsalvo v. Bondi</i> , 604 U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 1232 (2025)	22
<i>Morales v. Chadbourne</i> , 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015).....	23
<i>Mountain High Knitting, Inc. v. Reno</i> , 51 F.3d 216 (9th Cir. 1995).....	24
<i>Narvaez San Elias v. Bondi</i> , No. 5:25-cv-01736-JKP (W.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2025).....	18
<i>Navarrete Perdomo v. Bondi</i> , No. 5:25-cv-01398 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2025).....	18
<i>Ortiz-Ortiz v. Bondi</i> , No. 5:25-cv-00132 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2025)	16
<i>Padron-Covarrubias v. Vergara</i> ,	

No. 5:25-cv-00112 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025)	16
<i>Palma Perez v. Berg</i> ,	
No. 8:25-cv-494 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025)	16
<i>Pablo Sequen v. Kaiser</i> ,	
No. 25-cv-06487, 2025 WL 2650637 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2025)	16
<i>Paredes Quintero v. Bondi</i> ,	
No. 5:25-cv-01697-JKP (W.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2025)	18
<i>Pereira-Verdi v. Lyons</i> ,	
No. 5:25-cv-01187-XR (W.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2025)	16
<i>Perez Reyes v. Bondi</i> ,	
No. 5:25-cv-01302-XR (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2025)	18
<i>Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft</i> ,	
No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025)	16
<i>Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser</i> ,	
No. 25-cv-06248-BLF (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025)	16
<i>Rios-Altamirano v. Bondi</i> ,	
No. 1:26-cv-00099 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2026)	19
<i>Rivera Zumba v. Bondi</i> ,	
No. 25-cv-14626, 2025 WL 2753496 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025)	16
<i>Rodriguez Miranda v. Bondi</i> ,	
No. 1:25-cv-02005-RP (W.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2025)	18
<i>Rodriguez Rivera v. Bondi</i> ,	
No. 1:25-cv-01979-RP (W.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2025)	18
<i>Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock</i> ,	
779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025)	19
<i>Rojas Vargas v. Bondi</i> ,	
No. 1:25-cv-01699-DAE, 2025 WL 3251728 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2025)	18
<i>Salazar v. Dedos</i> ,	
No. 1:25-cv-00835-DHU-JMR, 2025 WL 2676729 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025)	16
<i>Santiago-Santiago v. Bondi</i> ,	
No. EP-25-cv-361-KC, 2025 WL 2792588 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025)	16, 17
<i>Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.</i> ,	
559 U.S. 393 (2010)	20
<i>Siac Guzman v. Bondi</i> ,	
No. 1:25-cv-02055-RP (W.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2025)	18
<i>Singh v. Lewis</i> ,	
No. 25-cv-96, 2025 WL 2699219 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025)	16
<i>Souza Vieira v. De-Anda Ybarra</i> ,	
No. 3:25-cv-00432-DB, 2025 WL 2937880 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025)	17
<i>Tejeda-Mata v. INS</i> ,	
626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980)	
<i>Trejo Enriquez v. Bondi</i> ,	
No. 1:25-cv-02012-ADA-DH(W.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2025)	18
<i>Vargas-Lopez v. Trump</i> ,	
No. 8:25-cv-526, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 29, 2025)	16
<i>Van Buren v. United States</i> ,	

593 U.S. 374 (2021)	22
<i>Vazquez v. Bostock</i> , No. 25-cv-05240, 2025 WL 2782499 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025)	16
<i>Zadvydas v. Davis</i> , 533 U.S. 678 (2001)	passim

Administrative & Immigration Decisions

<i>Matter of Yajure-Hurtado</i> , 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025)	passim
<i>Matter of Mariscal-Hernandez</i> , 28 I. & N. Dec. 666 (B.I.A. 2022)	23

Statutes

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)	14
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)	passim
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)	passim
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)	passim
8 U.S.C. § 1229a	passim
8 U.S.C. § 1229b	14, 16, 20, 21
8 U.S.C. § 1231	14
8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)	23
28 U.S.C. § 1331	10
28 U.S.C. § 1651	10
28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq.	10
28 U.S.C. § 2241	9, 10
Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025)	15, 22

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (Suspension Clause)	10, 27
U.S. Const. amend. V	passim

Regulations

8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b)(1)	24
8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii)	24
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(a)	14
8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)	14

Other Authorities

Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,323 (Mar. 6, 1997)	15
H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996)	15

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1. This petition challenges the unlawful detention of Petitioner Juan Carlos Menjivar-Araujo (“Mr. Menjivar-Araujo”), a 46-year-old native and citizen of El Salvador. Mr. Menjivar-Araujo last entered the United States without inspection in or about March 2005 and has lived in the United States continuously for over 20 years. He is currently confined at the T. Don Hutto Detention Center in Taylor, Texas, without a meaningful opportunity to seek release. *See* Exh. 1 (ICE Locator Results).
2. On January 27, 2026, Petitioner pulled over by ICE officers while on his way to work because they were “checking vans.” DHS then took him into custody and transferred him to the T. Don Hutto Detention Center in Taylor, Texas, where he remains detained. *See* Exh. 1. DHS then initiated removal proceedings against him under 8 U.S.C. 1229a by serving him with a notice to appear. Exh. 3 (Form I-862, Notice to Appear).
3. Petitioner has only been arrested one other time in his life, namely in Travis County, Texas in December 25, 2017 for DWI, for which he has completed probation and complied with all order. He has no other arrests or convictions.
4. Petitioner is currently scheduled for a master calendar removal hearing on February 12, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. Exh. 2 (Automated Case Information System).
5. Petitioner has continuously resided in the United States since March 2003. He is married to U.S. citizen to Karla, and is the father of two U.S. citizen children:  (age 10), and  (age 3).
6. Petitioner is currently pursuing lawful permanent residence through consular process. His U.S. citizen wife has submitted an I-130 family petition for him, which USCIS approved

on September 10, 2019. Exh. 4 (I-130 Approval Notice). He currently also has an I-601A waiver of inadmissibility pending before USCIS. Exh. 5 (I-601A Biometrics Notice).

7. Petitioner has worked in construction since arriving in the United States, supporting his household. His detention has caused immediate and ongoing hardship to his family.
8. DHS contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) mandates his detention. Congress created a separate detention framework in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) that governs interior arrests and provides for discretionary bond and immigration judge (IJ) review. That is the statute that applies here. DHS's novel position—recently endorsed in *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 2020 (B.I.A. 2025)—contradicts the INA's text and structure and Due Process. It collapses Congress's dual-track detention scheme and imposes categorical detention on long-time residents who present no danger or flight risk.
9. On December 18, 2025, the Central District of California entered final judgment in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, declaring that the nationwide "Bond Eligible Class" is detained under INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), "not subject to mandatory detention" under INA § 235(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and vacating DHS's July 8, 2025 "Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission." Final Judgment at 1–2, *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025).
10. Petitioner falls within the *Maldonado Bautista* Bond Eligible Class because he entered without inspection, was not apprehended upon arrival, and—at the time DHS made its initial custody determination—was not detained under INA §§ 236(c), 235(b)(1), or 241, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c), 1225(b)(1), or 1231. See *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). Nevertheless,

Respondents continue to take the position that § 1225 controls Petitioner's custody, and they rely on that theory to deny him the § 1226(a) bond process that *Maldonado Bautista* held governs for class members.

11. Moreover, on January 13, 2026, Chief Immigration Judge Teresa L. Riley issued nationwide guidance instructing all immigration judges that: "*Maldonado Bautista* is not a nationwide injunction and does not purport to vacate, stay or enjoin *Yajure Hurtado*." Immigration judges are instructed to follow the BIA's decision in *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), as binding precedent. Exh 6 (EOIR Email to immigration judges). The EOIR guidance further states that a "declaratory judgment" is not binding and does not have the authority to compel specific action. The human consequences are immediate and severe. Detention has upended the family's finances and caregiving. It has deprived the household of Petitioner's income as a construction worker, and his daily support. The Constitution, the INA, and basic principles of fairness do not permit detention under these circumstances.

12. Petitioner respectfully requests this Court grant the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and order his release. In the alternative, he respectfully requests the Court order Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

13. Petitioner is detained in civil immigration custody in Williamson County at the T. Don Hutto Detention Center, Taylor, Texas. *See* Exh. 1 (ICE Locator Results). He has been detained since or about, January 27, 2026.

14. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

15. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and where applicable Article I § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause). This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

16. Venue is proper in the Western District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because at least one Respondent is in this District, Petitioner is detained in this District, and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims in this action took place in this District. Venue is also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 because the immediate custodians of Petitioner reside in this District.

III. REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243, WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ISSUANCE, RETURN, HEARING, AND DECISION

17. The Court either must grant the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause to Respondents, unless Petitioner is not entitled to relief. If the Court issues an order to show cause, Respondents must file a response “within three days” unless this Court permits additional time for good cause, which is not to exceed twenty days. 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

18. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963). The writ of habeas corpus, challenging illegality of detention, is reduced to a sham if the trial courts do not act within a reasonable time. *Rhueark v. Wade*, 540 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976); *Jones v. Shell*,

572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978). Due to the nature of this proceeding, Petitioner asks this Court to expedite proceedings in this case as necessary and practicable for justice.

IV. PARTIES

19. Petitioner Juan Carlos Menjivar-Araujo is a 46-year-old citizen of El Salvador. He last entered the United States in or about March 2005 without inspection and has resided here continuously for over two decades.
20. Respondent Pamela Bondi is named in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the administration of the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"), including policies that bear on immigration judges' jurisdiction over custody.
21. Respondent Kristi Noem is named in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). DHS is the department charged with administering and enforcing federal immigration laws. Secretary Noem is ultimately responsible for the actions of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and is a legal custodian of Petitioner.
22. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is named in his official capacity as Acting Director of ICE. He oversees ICE operations, including detention and removal, and is a legal custodian of Petitioner.
23. Respondent Sylvester Ortega is named in his official capacity as Field Office Director of the San Antonio ICE Field Office. He is responsible for ICE enforcement in this District and is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

24. Respondent Charlotte Collins is named in her official capacity as Warden of the T. Don Hutto Detention Center, in Taylor Texas. He has immediate physical custody of Petitioner pursuant to an agreement with ICE to detain noncitizens.
25. Each Respondent is sued in his or her official capacity as a custodian and/or policymaker responsible for Petitioner's continued detention.

V. FACTS

26. Petitioner Juan Carlos Menjivar-Araujo ("Mr. Menjivar-Araujo") is a 46-year-old native and citizen of El Salvador. He last entered the United States without inspection in or about March 2005 and has lived in the United States continuously for over twenty years. He is currently confined at the T. Don Hutto Detention Center in Taylor, Texas, without a meaningful opportunity to seek release. See Exh. 1 (ICE Locator Results).
27. On January 27, 2026, ICE officers pulled Petitioner over while he was on his way to work, stating they were "checking vans." DHS took Petitioner into custody and transferred him to the T. Don Hutto Detention Center in Taylor, Texas, where he remains detained. See Exh. 1. DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a by serving Petitioner with a Notice to Appear. See Exh. 3 (Form I-862, Notice to Appear).
28. Petitioner has only one prior arrest, which occurred in Travis County, Texas on December 25, 2017 for DWI. He completed probation and complied with all court-ordered requirements. He has no other arrests or convictions.
29. Petitioner is scheduled for a master calendar hearing on February 12, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. See Exh. 2 (Automated Case Information System).

30. Petitioner has resided continuously in the United States since March 2005. He is married to Karla, a U.S. citizen, and they have two U.S. citizen children: [REDACTED] (age 10) and [REDACTED] (age 3).
31. Petitioner is pursuing lawful permanent residence through consular processing. His U.S. citizen wife filed a Form I-130 family-based petition on his behalf, which USCIS approved on September 10, 2019. See Exh. 4 (I-130 Approval Notice). Petitioner also has a Form I-601A provisional unlawful presence waiver pending before USCIS. See Exh. 5 (I-601A Biometrics Notice).
32. Petitioner has worked in construction since arriving in the United States and has supported his household through steady employment. His detention has caused immediate and ongoing hardship to his wife and children.
33. Petitioner is eligible to apply for nonpermanent resident cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (“cancellation of removal” or “42B”). Petitioner has been physically present in the United States for well over ten years, has no disqualifying criminal history, and can establish good moral character for the statutory period. He is also able to demonstrate that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives, including his U.S. citizen spouse and U.S. citizen children.
34. Despite these equities, DHS has classified Petitioner as subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and, on that basis, has refused to provide a custody hearing before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). As a result, since his arrest on January 23, 2026, Petitioner has not received any bond hearing or other individualized

determination of whether continued detention is necessary to prevent flight or protect the community.

VI. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. Due Process

35. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause applies to "all persons" within the United States, including noncitizens. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects." *Id.* at 690. In the immigration context, detention is constitutionally justified only to prevent flight or protect the community. *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 528 (2003).

B. Statutory Scheme

36. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.
37. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an immigration judge. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of detention. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d). Noncitizens arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
38. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred under § 1225(b)(2).
39. Last, the INA provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

VII. ARGUMENT

A. Text, Practice, and Precedent Confirm § 1226(a) Applies to Interior Arrests

40. This case concerns the detention provisions at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).
41. Congress enacted §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2) in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104–208, div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Congress most recently amended § 1226 in the Laken Riley Act. Pub. L. No. 119–1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).
42. After IIRIRA, EOIR promulgated regulations clarifying that, in general, people who entered without inspection and were placed in § 240 (8 U.S.C. § 1229a) proceedings are detained under § 1226(a), not § 1225. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,323 (Mar. 6, 1997).
43. For decades thereafter, noncitizens who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings unless covered by § 1226(c). That practice aligned with earlier law in which non-arriving noncitizens were entitled to a custody hearing before an immigration judge or other officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); H.R. Rep. No. 104–469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting § 1226(a) “restates” prior detention authority).
44. In *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, DHS acknowledged that individuals already in the United States who are not apprehended near the border or immediately after entry fall under § 1226(a), not § 1225(b). *See* Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–8, *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) (No. 15–1204) (Solicitor General confirming that those not detained within 100 miles or within 14 days are held under § 1226(a) and receive bond hearings). Having

prevailed while advancing that position, DHS's new litigation stance to the contrary lacks persuasive force.

45. On July 8, 2025, ICE announced new "Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,"¹ reversing longstanding understanding and practice.

46. That guidance asserts that all persons who entered without inspection are subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandatory detention regardless of when or where apprehended and even after years of residence. *See* Todd M. Lyons, Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission (July 8, 2025).

47. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted the same position in *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado*, holding that noncitizens who entered without admission or parole fall under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for immigration-judge bond hearings. 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025).

48. A "tsunami" of federal courts have rejected this new interpretation and have declined to follow *Yajure-Hurtado* where it conflicts with the INA's text and structure.²

¹ Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission>.

² *See, e.g., Belsai v. Bondi, et al.*, No. 25-cv-3862 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025); *Lepe v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-CV-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); *Giron Reyes v. Lyons*, No. C25-4048-LTS-MAR, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2025 WL 2712417 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025); *Salazar v. Dedos*, No. 1:25-cv-00835-DHU-JMR, 2025 WL 2676729 (D. N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Chanaguano Caiza v. Scott*, 25-cv-00500, 2025 WL 2806416, at *3 (D. Me. Oct. 2, 2025); *Luna Quispe v. Crawford, et al.*, No. 1:25-CV-1471-AJT-LRV, 2025 WL 2783799, at *6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2025); *Vazquez v. Bostock*, No. 25-cv-05240, 2025 WL 2782499, at *27 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025); *J.U. v. Maldonado*, 25-CV-04836, 2025 WL 2772765, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025); *Rivera*, 2025 WL 2732717, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2025); *Giron Reyes v. Lyons*, No. C25-4048, 2025 WL 2712427, at *5 (N.D. Iowa, Sept. 23, 2025); *Singh v. Lewis*, No. 25-cv-96, 2025 WL 2699219, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025); *Pablo Sequen v. Kaiser*, No. 25-cv-06487, 2025 WL 2650637, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2025); *Alvarez-Chavez v. Kaiser*, 25-cv-06984-LB 2025 WL 2909526 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 9, 2025); *Cerritos-Echevarria v. Bondi*, No. CV-25-03252-PHX-DWL (ESW), 2025 WL 2821282 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025); *Padron-Covarrubias v. Vergara*, 5:25-cv-00112, (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025); *Santiago-Santiago v. Bondi*, EP-25-CV-361-KC, 2025 WL 2792588, (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025); *Cardin-Alvarez v. Rivas*, CV 25-02943 PHX GMS (CDB), 2025 WL 2898389 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2025); *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, et al.*, No. CV H-25-3726, 2025 WL 2886346, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025); *Rodriguez Lucero v. Bondi*, No. 4:25-cv-03981 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2025); *Ortiz-Ortiz v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-cv-00132 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2025). *But see Chavez v. Noem*, 3:25-cv-02325-CAB-SBC, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025 ("by the plain language of

49. In this District, courts have repeatedly ordered relief. *See, e.g., Gonzalez Guerrero v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-01334-RP (W.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2025) (granting preliminary injunction, vacating the BIA’s decision applying *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, and reinstating the IJ’s § 1226(a) bond order for a long-resident noncitizen arrested in the interior); *Pereira-Verdi v. Lyons*, No. 5:25-cv-01187-XR (W.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2025) (issuing a TRO requiring custody to be governed by § 1226(a) and enjoining re-detention without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing); *Hernandez-Ramiro v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-cv-01207-XR (W.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2025) (granting a TRO and requiring a prompt § 1226(a) bond hearing with the Government bearing the burden of showing danger or flight risk, or release if no hearing is provided); *Santiago v. Noem*, No. 3:25-cv-00361-KC, 2025 WL 2606118 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2025) (granting TRO and habeas relief to a DACA recipient misclassified under § 1225(b) and directing that custody be governed by § 1226(a)); *Alvarez Martinez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01007-JKP, 2025 WL 2598379 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2025) (granting habeas, holding that the automatic stay of an IJ’s bond order violates due process, and ordering compliance with the IJ’s bond decision); *Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, No. EP-25-cv-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2025) (granting a TRO under § 2243 and the All Writs Act, enjoining removal and transfer to preserve the court’s jurisdiction over a habeas challenge to detention under § 1225(b)); *Martinez v. Noem*, No. 3:25-cv-00430-KC, 2025 WL 2965859 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025) (even assuming § 1225(b) applies, holding under *Mathews v. Eldridge* that due process requires an individualized bond hearing with the Government bearing the burden); *Souza Vieira v. De-Anda Ybarra*,

§ 1225(a)(1) the petitioners are “applicants for admission” and thus subject to the mandatory detention provisions of “applicants for admission” under § 1225(b)(2)[.]”); *Vargas-Lopez v. Trump, et al.*, 8:25CV526 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 29, 2025) (the petitioner is an alien within the “catchall” scope of § 1225(b)(2) subject to detention without possibility of release on bond through a proceeding on removal under § 1229a, per 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).

No. 3:25-cv-00432-DB, 2025 WL 2937880 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025) (following *Lopez-Arevelo*'s jurisdictional analysis, rejecting §§ 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9) as bars, and granting habeas relief); *Hernandez-Fernandez v. Lyons*, No. 5:25-cv-00773-JKP, 2025 WL 2976923 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025) (granting habeas relief and holding that custody of a long-resident interior arrestee must be governed by § 1226 rather than § 1225(b)); *Erazo Rojas v. Noem*, No. 3:25-cv-00443-KC (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2025) (granting habeas in part and requiring the Government to provide a prompt § 1226(a) bond hearing at which it bears a clear-and-convincing burden or else release Petitioner under reasonable supervision); *Dominguez Vega v. Thompson*, No. 5:25-cv-01439-XR (W.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2025) (granting a TRO and directing a prompt individualized § 1226(a) bond hearing consistent with these precedents); *Hernandez-Hervert v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-cv-01763-RP (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025) (granting habeas relief, rejecting Respondents' reliance on *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, and requiring § 1226(a) custody process); *Rojas Vargas v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-cv-01699-DAE, 2025 WL 3251728 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2025) (granting a TRO, holding that § 1226(a) governs detention of long-resident noncitizens, and requiring a prompt bond hearing with a clear-and-convincing Government burden or release); *Melendez Hernandez v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-cv-01811-DAE (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2025) (granting a TRO and ordering a § 1226(a) bond hearing with the Government bearing the clear-and-convincing burden of flight risk or danger, or release if no timely hearing is provided); *Becerra Vargas v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-CV-01023-FB-HJB (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2025) (granting habeas in part and ordering release of petition from custody); *Navarrete Perdomo v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-cv-01398 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2025) (granting habeas relief for Petitioner with SIJ status and ordering release); *Perez Reyes v. Bondi*,

No. 5:25-cv-01302-XR (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2025)(granting habeas and ordering release); *Paredes Quintero v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-cv-01697-JKP (W.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2025) (granting habeas and ordering release within 24 hours); *Trejo Enriquez v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-cv-02012-ADA-DH (W.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2025)(granting habeas and ordering release); *Rodriguez Rivera v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-cv-01979-RP (W.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2025)(granting habeas and ordering immediate release); *Narvaez San Elias v. Bondi*, No. 5:25-cv-01736-JKP (W.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2025) (granting habeas relief and ordering release by December 24, 2025 no later than 1 p.m.); *Rodriguez Miranda v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-cv-02005-RP (W.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2025)(granting habeas and ordering immediate release); *Siac Guzman v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-cv-02055-RP (W.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2025)(granting habeas and ordering immediate release); *Rios-Altamirano v. Bondi*, No. 1:26-cv-00099 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2026); *Gonzalez-Avelino*, No. 5:25-cv-01897-OLG (W.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2026) *Cruz-Momblas v. Bondi*, No. 5:26-cv-00196 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2026)(granting habeas and ordering release by January 30, 2026).

50. Even before the nationwide shift, the Tacoma immigration court had ceased providing bond hearings to long-resident noncitizens who had entered without inspection (EWI). The Western District of Washington found that reading likely unlawful and held that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens not apprehended upon arrival. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

51. These decisions reflect a clear judicial consensus that the government's reliance on § 1225(b)(2) is misplaced where § 1226(a) applies.

52. The plain text confirms that outcome. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed.” Hearings to decide inadmissibility or deportability occur under § 1229a.

53. Section 1226 also expressly addresses persons charged as inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Specific mandatory carve-outs confirm that, absent those exceptions, § 1226(a) governs and bond is available. *See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010); *Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7.

54. Section 1226 therefore applies to people charged as inadmissible who are already in the interior, including those present without admission or parole.

55. By contrast, § 1225(b) addresses inspection at the border and recent arrivals who are “seeking admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Supreme Court has described that mandatory detention scheme as operating “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287, 846 (2018). That is not this case.

56. Section 1226(a) is the default custody authority “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed,” which describes § 240 proceedings like Petitioner’s. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Section 1226(c) then carves out narrow mandatory categories, some tied to inadmissibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Reading § 1225(b)(2) to control here would render § 1226(a)’s bond framework and § 1226(c)’s carve-outs superfluous.

57. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) uses present-tense inspection language. It applies when an officer determines a person “is seeking admission” and “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Jennings* confirms this scheme operates at the border. 583 U.S. at 287, 846.

58. Deference does not salvage Respondents' reading. After *Loper Bright*, courts do not defer to agency interpretations simply because a statute is complex. They apply the best reading. *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2262–63 (2024). *Yajure-Hurtado* is unpersuasive because it treats anyone never “admitted” as forever “seeking admission,” contrary to § 1225's present-tense text and § 1226's structure. 29 I. & N. Dec. at 221.
59. The constitutional backdrop points the same direction. Civil immigration detention is constrained by the Fifth Amendment. Persons facing significant restraints on liberty retain a protected interest and are entitled to meaningful process. At minimum, detention under § 1226 requires a prompt, individualized bond hearing with the Government bearing a clear and convincing burden. See *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690–96 (2001); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 528–31 (2003); *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333–35, 343–49 (1976).
60. The Court should hold that § 1226(a) governs Petitioner's custody and order his immediate release, or at minimum require a prompt § 1226(a) bond hearing with the Government bearing the clear-and-convincing burden. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297, 302–03; *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690–96.
- B. Section 1226(a) governs this interior arrest. DHS's § 1225(b) theory fails on the text and in practice.**
61. Mr. Menjivar-Araujo was arrested in the interior and is in regular removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. He was pulled over by ICE officers in Austin, Texas and transferred to Taylor, Texas. He was not apprehended at or near the border, and he was not processed under expedited removal. Section 1226(a) therefore controls and supplies bond jurisdiction. See *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297, 302–03.

62. Federal courts confronting DHS's new theory have rejected it and ordered relief, concluding that § 1226(a) governs noncitizens already in the country. *See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Bostock*, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 1193850, at *11–16 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2025); *Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at *4–7; *Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2267803, at *4–7.

63. The Laken Riley Act confirms that Congress preserved § 1226(a)'s discretionary bond regime for most inadmissible entrants arrested in the interior by adding a narrow new mandatory category under § 1226(c)(1)(E). If § 1225(b) already mandated detention for all inadmissible entrants, § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be redundant. *See Corley v. United States*, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009); *Van Buren v. United States*, 593 U.S. 374, 393 (2021). Congress legislated against decades of practice applying § 1226(a) to interior arrests, and courts presume amendments harmonize with that practice. *Monsalvo v. Bondi*, 604 U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 1232, 1242 (2025).

64. *Yajure-Hurtado* does not compel a different result. *Jennings* construed statutory text and left open constitutional claims. 583 U.S. at 303. Post-*Loper Bright*, courts interpret the INA de novo. *Loper Bright*, 144 S. Ct. at 2262–63.

65. Longstanding agency materials confirm that interior encounters without admission were treated under § 1226(a)'s predecessor, INA § 236(a), and were “eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10,323. DHS historically limited “applicant for admission” to encounters within a short time and distance from the border. *See Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 121, 130 n.2 (2020) (describing the 14-day/100-mile policy).

66. Arrest authority reinforces the statutory divide. For noncitizens who are already present in the United States and placed in removal proceedings, INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), supplies the default detention framework: “On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained” pending a removal decision, and (absent § 1226(c)) the Attorney General “may release” the noncitizen on bond or conditional parole. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287–88 (2018) (describing § 1226(a) as the “default rule” for detention pending removal). DHS implements that warrant-based arrest authority through administrative warrants, including Form I-200 (Warrant for Arrest of Alien). *See* 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b)(1) (authorizing issuance of a “warrant of arrest” on Form I-200).
67. Warrantless interior arrests are the exception, not the rule. Congress sharply limited DHS’s authority to arrest without a warrant in the interior. Under INA § 287(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), a warrantless arrest is permissible only when the officer has “reason to believe” the person is unlawfully present and “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” The Supreme Court has emphasized that this “likely to escape” limitation is a central constraint on federal arrest power when no warrant has issued. *Arizona v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387, 407–10 (2012). The governing regulations likewise direct that a warrant “shall be obtained” except in that narrow escape-risk circumstance. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii).
68. Courts require probable cause plus an individualized escape-risk determination. Multiple courts have held that the “reason to believe” standard in § 1357(a)(2) tracks the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement. *See, e.g., Morales v. Chadbourne*, 793 F.3d 208, 216 (1st Cir. 2015); *Babula v. INS*, 665 F.2d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 1981); *Tejeda-Mata v. INS*, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980); *Au Yi Lau v. INS*, 445 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir.

1971). And § 1357(a)(2) demands more than generalized assumptions—it requires an individualized basis to believe the person is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained. *Mountain High Knitting, Inc. v. Reno*, 51 F.3d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring “grounds for a reasonable belief” that the individuals were “particularly likely to escape” before a warrant could be obtained).

69. Here, an interior arrest effectuated (or required to be effectuated) on an I-200 warrant aligns with § 1226(a). Petitioner was arrested in the interior, and there is no indication DHS relied on the narrow § 1357(a)(2) warrantless-arrest exception (which would require an individualized, contemporaneous escape-risk basis). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii); *Arizona*, 567 U.S. at 407–10; *Mountain High Knitting*, 51 F.3d at 218. Petitioner’s interior apprehension therefore should have been, and on information and belief was, executed pursuant to an administrative warrant on Form I-200 under 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b)(1). That arrest posture tracks § 1226(a)’s “warrant issued by the Attorney General” framework and reinforces that DHS is proceeding under INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the bond-eligible detention statute, rather than an arriving-alien mandatory detention provision. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287–88.

70. Statutes must be read in context and given effect to every clause and word. *Gundy v. United States*, 588 U.S. 128, 141 (2019); *United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc.*, 599 U.S. 419, 432 (2023). Respondents’ view collapses §§ 1225 and 1226, nullifies § 1226(c), and contradicts the statute’s structure.

C. Petitioner’s Position On Maldonado-Bautista Class Action

71. On December 18, 2025, the Central District of California entered final judgment in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, declaring that the nationwide “Bond Eligible Class” is

detained under INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), “not subject to mandatory detention” under INA § 235(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and vacating DHS’s July 8, 2025 “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission.” Final Judgment at 1–2, *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025).

72. Petitioner falls within the *Maldonado Bautista* Bond Eligible Class because he entered without inspection, was not apprehended upon arrival, and—at the time DHS made its initial custody determination—was not detained under INA §§ 236(c), 235(b)(1), or 241, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c), 1225(b)(1), or 1231. *See Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). Nevertheless, Respondents continue to take the position that § 1225 controls Petitioner’s custody, and they rely on that theory to deny him the § 1226(a) bond process that *Maldonado Bautista* held governs for class members.

73. In any event, Petitioner does not rely on *Maldonado Bautista* to establish this Court’s power to grant the immediate relief he seeks—release from unlawful detention. This Court retains independent habeas authority to remedy unlawful custody, including where Respondents continue to detain Petitioner under an inapplicable detention framework and deny him any meaningful bond process.

74. To the extent the Court concludes the class litigation is relevant, Petitioner asks the Court to find that he is a class member and to adopt the district court’s statutory analysis. But *Maldonado Bautista* does not moot Petitioner’s claims or require administrative exhaustion. Exhaustion remains futile for a practical, and now formally acknowledged, reason: On January 13, 2026, Chief Immigration Judge Teresa L. Riley issued nationwide

guidance instructing all immigration judges that “Maldonado Bautista is not a nationwide injunction and does not purport to vacate, stay or enjoin Yajure Hurtado,” directing immigration judges to follow *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado* as binding precedent, and asserting that a “declaratory judgment” is not binding and lacks authority to compel specific action. Exh. 5. Because *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado* is the very decision Immigration Judges are instructed to follow, and it is the decision DHS invokes to deny § 1226(a) custody redetermination jurisdiction for EWIs treated as § 1225(b)(2) detainees, continued denials are the predictable (and intended) result. Thus, even after *Maldonado Bautista*, Petitioner cannot obtain timely or meaningful administrative relief, and habeas remains necessary to remedy his ongoing unlawful detention; moreover, even perfect “implementation” of *Maldonado Bautista* would not resolve Petitioner’s independent due process claims or dictate the remedy this Court should order here.

75. For these reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court order his immediate release under conditions no more restrictive than prior to his arrest.

VIII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of the Due Process Clause (Fifth Amendment)

76. Petitioner incorporates all allegations above.

77. Civil immigration detention is permissible only to ensure appearance or protect the community, and due process requires meaningful procedures commensurate with the liberty at stake. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690–96 (2001); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 528–31 (2003).

78. Detaining Petitioner without a prompt, individualized bond hearing where the Government bears a clear-and-convincing burden violates substantive and procedural due

process. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690–96; *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333–35, 343–49 (1976).

79. The Fifth Amendment protects “all persons” in the United States, including long-resident noncitizens. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 693. Continued detention since January 23, 2026, without the required process or justification violates that protection.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)

80. Petitioner incorporates all allegations above.

81. Petitioner’s interior arrest places his custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2). *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 297, 302–03 (2018) (distinguishing detention of persons “already in the country” under § 1226 from border inspection under § 1225).

82. Section 1226(a) authorizes discretionary detention with bond; Congress created narrow mandatory carve-outs in § 1226(c). Applying § 1225(b)(2) here would render § 1226(a) and § 1226(c) superfluous, which the Court must avoid. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297, 302–03.

83. DHS’s application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner contradicts the INA’s text, structure, and long-standing practice reflected in post-IIRIRA regulations recognizing bond eligibility for interior EWI respondents. *See* Inspection & Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Procedural Due Process — Denial of Opportunity to Contest Misclassification

84. Petitioner incorporates all allegations above.

85. By foreclosing IJ bond jurisdiction through a blanket § 1225(b)(2) designation, Respondents denied Petitioner a meaningful opportunity to contest mandatory detention

and to receive the individualized bond process Congress preserved in § 1226(a). *See Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 333–35; *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 303 (constitutional challenges preserved).

86. This denial of meaningful process violates the Fifth Amendment.

**FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT**

87. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above.

88. Respondents' continued efforts to deny him bond violate the INA, Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and the U.S. Constitution.

89. As set forth in Count Two and Three, federal regulations and case law provide the procedure for a respondent in removal proceedings like him to seek a bond redetermination by an immigration judge and be given a meaningful opportunity to present his claim.

90. In being denied the opportunity to return to his family, and pursue Cancellation of Removal in a non-detained court setting where he is free to gather the necessary hardship and good moral character evidence, Petitioner would be deprived of the right to freedom to lawfully pursue his rights in this civil matter. The Government's "no-review" provisions are a violation of his procedural and substantive due process and without any statutory authority. There is no time-frame or procedure for requesting DHS to itself review its custody decision, and removal proceedings in this case will proceed during that time while Petitioner remains in custody.

91. The actions by Respondents would improperly alter the substantive rules concerning mandatory custody status without the required notice-and-comment period and would be in violation of the INA and its regulations. These actions by Respondents violate the APA.

Under the APA, this Court may hold unlawful and set aside an agency action which is “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B). The regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(h)(1)(B) and 1003.19(h)(2)(B) providing no review of DHS custody decision for arriving aliens in removal proceedings are in violation of substantive and procedural due process as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is ultra vires because it exceeds the authority granted ICE by Congress at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). For these reasons, this Honorable Court should hold that Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a) not § 1225(b), and order his immediate release. Any contrary reliance on *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado* would unlawfully misapply the statute and deprive Petitioner of his rights under the INA, the APA, and the Due Process Clause.

**FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
SUSPENSION CLAUSE CLAIM**

92. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above.
93. If 8 U.S.C. § 1252 stripped the Court jurisdiction from this matter, it would be unconstitutional as applied because it would deny Petitioner the opportunity for meaningful review of the unlawfulness of his detention and removal.
94. To invoke the Suspension Clause, a petitioner must satisfy a three-factor test: “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.” *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008). Petitioner satisfies these three requirements and may invoke the Suspension Clause.
95. First, although Petitioner is not a U.S. citizen or resident, he has lived here for over two decades, and he qualifies under the INA to seek Cancellation of Removal, because he has

no disqualifying criminal history, because he has lived here longer than ten continuous years, because he can show ten years' good moral character, and because he can show his U.S. wife and citizen children will suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if he were removed to El Salvador. Petitioner has significant family connections in the United States, including his U.S. citizen children and his wife. All of which establishes a substantial legal relationship with the United States.

96. Petitioner satisfies the second factor because he was apprehended by DHS and remains detained in the United States.

97. Finally, there are no serious, practical obstacles to resolving this present matter. This Court is equipped to deciding whether Petitioner is entitled to the writ.

98. There is no adequate alternative to a habeas petition. The refusal of the immigration court to grant Petitioner the right to show he is mis-classified and that he is not subject to mandatory detention, such that he may return to his family and pursue cancellation, without proper notice or due process, deprives him of his constitutional rights. The BIA cannot adequately and expeditiously review these issues.

IX. RELIEF SOUGHT

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Declare that ICE's January 27, 2026 apprehension and detention of Mr. Menjivar-Araujo was an unlawful exercise of authority because the ICE officer provided no reason that he presents a danger to the community or is flight risk;
- (3) Issue an order directing Respondents to show cause why the writ should not be granted;

- (4) Order Respondents to file with the Court a complete copy of the administrative file from the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security;
- (5) Retain jurisdiction over this Petition notwithstanding any change in Petitioner's place of detention or immediate custodian and, pending final resolution of this case, direct Respondents to refrain from removing him from the United States or transferring Petitioner outside the Western District of Texas without prior leave of Court and to ensure that the Court can effectuate any relief ultimately granted, including by returning Petitioner to this District if necessary;
- (6) Grant the writ and order Petitioner's immediate release on conditions no more restrictive than those prior to his arrest;
- (7) Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

PRAYER FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, Petitioner respectfully requests expedited consideration. Each day of unlawful detention inflicts irreparable harm on Petitioner and his family, depriving them of his care, stability, and support. Prompt judicial intervention is necessary to protect Petitioner's constitutional rights and his family's well-being.

Respectfully submitted on January 30, 2025,

/s/ Maria Nereida Jaimes
Maria Nereida Jaimes
Counsel for Petitioner
Tex. Bar No. 24124936
O'Connor & Associates PLLC
7703 N. Lamar Blvd, Ste. 300
Austin, Texas 78752
Tel: (512) 617-9600
maria@oconnorimmigration.com

VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I represent Petitioner, Mr. Menjivar-Araujo, and submit this verification on his behalf. I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated this 30th day of January 2026.

/s/ Maria Nereida Jaimes

Maria Nereida Jaimes

Counsel for Petitioner

Tex. Bar No. 24124936

O'Connor & Associates PLLC

7703 N. Lamar Blvd, Ste. 300

Austin, Texas 78752

Tel: (512) 617-9600

maria@oconnorimmigration.com