UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

CARLOS MARGARITO MEDINA,

Petitioner,

v.

MIGUEL VERGARA, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, San Antonio Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW; WARDEN OF KARNES COUNTY IMMIGRATION PROCESSING CENTER,

Respondents.

Case No.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner, CARLOS MARGARITO MEDINA, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek enforcement of their rights as members of the Bond Denial Class certified in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.) Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center. He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) have refused to abide by the declaratory judgment issued on behalf of the certified class in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*.

2. On November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary judgment on behalf of individual plaintiffs and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide class and extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).

3. The declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11.

4. Nonetheless, the Executive Office for Immigration Review and its subagency the Immigration Court and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have blatantly refused to

abide by the declaratory relief and have unlawfully ordered that Petitioner be denied the opportunity to be released on bond.

5. Petitioner, CARLOS MARGARITO MEDINA, is a member of the Bond Eligible Class, as he:

a. is a noncitizen without lawful status detained at the Port Isabel Detention Center;

b. entered without inspection and was not apprehended upon entry; and

c. is not detained under §§ 1226(c), 1225(b)(1), or 1231.

6. After apprehending Petitioner on, the DHS placed him in removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. DHS has charged Petitioner as being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as someone who entered the United States without inspection.

7. The Court should expeditiously grant this petition.

8. Respondents are bound by the judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*, as it has the full "force and effect of a final judgment." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Nevertheless, Respondents continue to flagrantly defy the judgment in that case and continue to subject Petitioner to unlawful detention despite his clear entitlement to consideration for release on bond as a Bond Eligible Class member.

9. Immigration judges have informed class members in bond hearings that they have been instructed by "leadership" that the declaratory judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* is not controlling, even with respect to class members, and that instead IJs remain bound to follow the agency's prior decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

10. Because Respondents are detaining Petitioner in violation of the declaratory judgment issued in *Maldonado Bautista,* the Court should accordingly order that within one day, Respondent DHS must release Petitioner.

11. Alternatively, the Court should order Petitioner's release unless Respondents provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days.

JURISDICTION

12. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center at Karnes City, Texas.

13. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

14. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

15. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

16. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Western District of Texas.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

17. The Court should grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus "forthwith," as the legal issues have already been resolved for class members in *Maldonado Bautista.*

18. Habeas corpus is "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or

confinement." *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). "The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application." *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

IRREPARABLE HARM AND NEED FOR EXPEDITED RELIEF

19. Petitioner continues to suffer irreparable harm each day he remains unlawfully detained, including loss of liberty, separation from family, and the ongoing deprivation of a statutorily guaranteed bond hearing. Monetary damages cannot remedy these injuries.

PARTIES

20. Petitioner, CARLOS MARGARITO MEDINA, is a citizen of Honduras who is in immigration detention. After Petitioner was arrested in, ICE did not set bond, and Petitioner requested review of his custody by an IJ. On December 12, 2025, Petitioner was denied bond by an IJ at the Pearsall Immigration Court because he is deemed an "applicant for admission." Petitioner has resided in the United States since 1997.

21. Respondent, MIGUEL VERGARA, is the Director of the San Antonio Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, MIGUEL VERGARA is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

22. Respondent, KRISTI NOEM, is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

23. Respondent, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS), is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.

24. Respondent, PAMELA BONDI, is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

25. Respondent, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (EOIR). is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redeterminations in bond hearings.

26. Respondent, WARDEN OF THE KARNES COUNTY IMMIGRATION PROCESSING CENTER, has immediate physical custody of Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violation of the INA:
Request for Relief Pursuant to *Maldonado Bautista*

1. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

2. As a member of the Bond Eligible Class, Petitioner is entitled to consideration for release on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

3. The order granting partial summary judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* holds that Respondents violate the INA in applying the mandatory detention statute at § 1225(b)(2) to class members.

4. The order granting class certification in *Maldonado Bautista* further orders that "[w]hen considering this determination with the MSJ Order, the Court extends the same declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the Bond Eligible Class as a whole."

5. Respondents are parties to *Maldonado Bautista* and bound by the Court's declaratory judgment, which has the full "force and effect of a final judgment." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

27. By denying Petitioner a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and asserting that he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), Respondents violate Petitioner's statutory rights under the INA and the Court's judgment in *Maldonado Bautista.*

28. Alternatively, Respondents' refusal to provide a bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Prolonged civil detention without an individualized custody determination is constitutionally suspect and requires heightened procedural safeguards. See *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;

b. Order Respondents to recognize Petitioner as a Bond Eligible Class member;

c. Issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring that within one day, Respondents release Petitioner;

d. Alternatively, issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring Respondents to release Petitioner unless they provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;

e. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and

f. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 30th day of January 2026.

Lorena Villalon
Lorena Villalon
TX Bar No. 24115907
222 N. Expressway 77, Suite 172
Brownsville, Texas 78521
lorena@villalonlawfirm.com
956-639-9264

Attorney for Petitioner