IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

Miguel Gustavo GONZALEZ BARRETO	§	
	§	
Petitioner,	§	
	§	
v.	§	
	§	
KRISTI NOEM, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,	§	**Case No. 5:26-cv-513**
	§	
PAMELA BONDI, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,	§	
	§	
TODD LYONS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,	§	
	§	
MIGUEL VERGARA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE ICE SAN ANTONIO FIELD OFFICE, and	§	
	§	
WARDEN OF THE KARNES COUNTY IMMIGRATION PROCESSING CENTER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY.	§	
Respondents.	§	

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

COMES NOW Miguel Gustavo Gonzalez Barreto ("Petitioner"), by and through undersigned counsel, and respectfully petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, requesting that the Court order his immediate release from custody, or, in the alternative, order that he be afforded a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge ("IJ"). In support thereof, Petitioner states as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Miguel Gustavo Gonzalez Barreto is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center, in Karnes City, Texas. He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have concluded Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.

2. Petitioner is charged, inter alia, with having entered the United States without inspection, that is, without having been admitted or paroled, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Based solely on this allegation, Respondents have taken the position that Immigration Judges lack authority to conduct a bond hearing in Petitioner's case and have therefore denied him access to any individualized custody determination.

3. Accordingly, the Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus ordering his immediate release from custody or, in the alternative, that he be provided a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days, at which DHS bears the burden of establishing the necessity of the Petitioner's continued detention.

JURISDICTION

4. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Karnes County Immigration Processing Center, in Karnes City, Texas.

5. This action arises under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, Cl. 2 (the Suspension Clause), and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

6. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause). Jurisdiction is proper in this District because

Petitioner is presently detained here and his immediate custodian is subject to this Court's jurisdiction. See Order, *Armstrong v. Warden, et al.*, No. 25-cv-203-H (W.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2025), ECF No. 4.

VENUE

7. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

8. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Western District of Texas.

9. Petitioner has exhausted all administrative remedies to the extent feasible, and any further exhaustion is excused. The Fifth Circuit has held that where a petitioner raises a due process claim that does not assert a procedural error correctable by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), the claim is not subject to an exhaustion requirement. *Lopez de Jesus v. INS*, 312 F.3d 155, 162 n.47 (5th Cir. 2002). Moreover, exhaustion is excused where delay would cause irreparable harm. See *Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.*, 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000). Here, further delay would subject Petitioner to continued months of unlawful detention and ongoing loss of liberty, which constitutes irreparable harm.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

10. The Court must grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause ("OSC") to the Respondents "forthwith," unless the petition demonstrates that

the Petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Court must require Respondents to file a return "within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed." *Id.* (emphasis added).

11. Courts have long recognized the critical role of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The Great Writ has been described as "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement." *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added).

PARTIES

12. **Petitioner, Miguel Gustavo Gonzalez Barreto,** is a citizen of Venezuela who has been in immigration detention since on or about September 2025. Prior to being detained, he was living in North Carolina. After arresting Petitioner, ICE did not set a bond. However, because of Respondents' new policies and case decisions, Petitioner also cannot request a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. Petitioner has resided in the United States since February 6, 2023.

13. **Respondent Warden of Karnes County Immigration Processing Center,** in Karnes City, Texas in their official capacity. In this capacity, they oversee the daily operations of the detention center where the Petitioner is in custody. As such, they are the immediate custodian of Petitioner.

14. **Respondent Miguel Vergara** is named in his official capacity as the Acting Director of the San Antonio Field Office of the Enforcement and Removal Operations of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In this capacity, he is responsible for the

execution of immigration confinement and the institution of removal proceedings within West Texas, in which the Petitioner is confined. Respondent Miguel Vergara is a legal custodian of Petitioner and has authority to release him.

15. **Respondent Todd Lyons** is named in the official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. As the senior official performing the duties of the Director of ICE, he is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws and is legally responsible for pursuing any effort to remove the Petitioner and to confine him pending removal. As such, he is a custodian of the Petitioner.

16. **Respondent Kristi Noem** is named in her official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, she is responsible for the administration of immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a); is legally responsible for pursuing any effort to confine and remove the Petitioner; and as such is a custodian of Petitioner.

17. **Respondent Pam Bondi** is named in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the senior official of the U.S. Department of Justice. In that capacity, she has the authority to adjudicate removal cases and to oversee the Executive Office for Immigration Review, which administers the Immigration Courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g). Respondent Bondi is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

18. Petitioner is a 25-year-old citizen of Venezuela who, according to Respondents' allegations, entered the United States without inspection on or about February 6, 2023. Since that date, Petitioner has continuously resided in the United States for more than two years.

19. During this period, Petitioner lived openly in the interior of the United States with the authorization of the Department of Homeland Security following the grant of parole. He also applied for Temporary Protected Status ("TPS"), where eligible, and timely filed an I-589 application for asylum and/or withholding of removal.

20. On or about September 30, 2025, Petitioner was traveling as a passenger in a vehicle in Abilene, Texas, when the driver was stopped by local law enforcement for speeding. Petitioner was seated in the passenger seat and presented a valid Real ID issued by the State of North Carolina. Nevertheless, after inquiring into the occupants' immigration status, the sheriff contacted Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). As a result, Petitioner was apprehended by ICE. Despite having a pending asylum application, Petitioner was taken into custody.

21. Following Petitioner's arrest and transfer to the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center, ICE issued a custody determination to continue Petitioner's detention without an opportunity to post bond or be released on other conditions.

22. The Petitioner remains in detention. Absent relief from this Court, he faces prolonged immigration detention while litigating his claims for asylum and withholding of removal in removal proceedings.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Statutory Framework for Immigration Detention

23. The Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), codified at Title 8 of the United States Code, establishes three principal statutory regimes governing the detention of most noncitizens in removal proceedings, principally set forth in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226, and 1231.

24. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals detained under § 1226(a) are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see*

8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain enumerated offenses are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

25. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

26. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

27. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

28. The detention provisions codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-582 to 3009-583, 3009-585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended in 2025 by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

29. Following the enactment of IIRIRA, the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") promulgated regulations explaining that, as a general matter, individuals who entered the United States without inspection are not detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, but rather are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See *Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures*, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

30. Thus, in the decades following IIRIRA's enactment, most individuals who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings were afforded bond

hearings, unless they were subject to criminal mandatory detention or other statutory bars. That practice was consistent with longstanding pre-IIRIRA procedures, under which noncitizens who were not classified as "arriving aliens" were entitled to custody determinations before an Immigration Judge or other neutral hearing officer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (explaining that § 1226(a) largely "restates" the detention authority previously codified at § 1252(a)).

31. Most recently, on July 8, 2025, DHS, in coordination with the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), issued a new policy instructing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officers to treat any individual charged as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), that is, anyone alleged to have entered the United States without inspection, as an "applicant for admission" subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and therefore ineligible for release on bond.

32. Prior to this policy change, the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"), which administers the Immigration Courts, acting through the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), a component of the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), had already begun laying the groundwork for this abrupt shift in detention policy. On May 15, 2025, the BIA issued a precedential decision holding that an individual who enters without inspection, is apprehended and detained without a warrant while arriving in the United States, and is thereafter placed in removal proceedings is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond. *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66 (BIA 2025).

33. Then, on September 5, 2025, the BIA completed this new mandatory-detention framework by issuing an additional precedential decision that effectively converted DHS

policy into binding agency law. In that decision, the BIA held that Immigration Judges "do not have the authority" to adjudicate bond hearings for individuals who entered the United States without inspection. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 218 (BIA 2025). The Board expressly stated that "Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission." *Id.* In stark contradiction to decades of statutory interpretation, regulatory guidance, and settled practice, the BIA stripped Immigration Judges of jurisdiction to conduct bond hearings for individuals alleged to have entered without inspection.

34. In light of these BIA decisions and DHS policy, Petitioner cannot seek a bond hearing before the Immigration Court of the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") because Immigration Judges are deemed to lack jurisdiction to review his custody status or conduct a bond hearing in his case.

35. Respondents have concluded that, notwithstanding Petitioner's nearly three years of residence in the United States, and the government's decision to allow him to enter the United States to seek protection, he is nevertheless an "applicant for admission" who is "seeking admission" and therefore subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).

36. Petitioner's detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act codified at Title 8 of the United States Code. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like the Petitioner who have already entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes release on bond or conditional parole. That statute expressly applies to individuals who, like the Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without inspection.

37. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly inconsistent with the statutory structure and decades of settled agency practice, under which individuals apprehended in the interior and charged as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) were detained—and eligible for release on bond—pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).

38. Detention authority for those who have not yet been issued final removal orders is divided between two sections of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. The Supreme Court recently analyzed the interplay between §§ 1225 and 1226 in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*. The first sentence of the Court's decision distinguishes between decisions made at the border and those made internally:

> Every day, immigration officials must determine whether to admit or remove the many [non-citizens] who have arrived at an official "port of entry" (e.g., an international airport or border crossing) or who have been apprehended trying to enter the country at an unauthorized location. Immigration officials must also determine on a daily basis whether there are grounds for removing any of the [non-citizens] who are already present inside the country.

583S. at 285

39. The Court subsequently explained: "In sum, U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain [noncitizens] seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain [noncitizens] already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c)." *Id.* at 289 (emphasis added). The Court further noted that § 1225(b), the provision at

issue in the instant habeas petition, "applies primarily to [noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States." *Id.* at 297.

40. The Court also explained that § 1226 "applies to [non-citizens] already present in the United States" and "creates a default rule for those [non-citizens] by permitting – but not requiring – the Attorney General to issue warrants for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings. Section 1226(a) also permits the Attorney General to release those [non-citizens] on bond, 'except as provided in subsection (c) of this section.'" *Id.* at 303. "Federal regulations provide that [non-citizens] detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention." *Id.* at 306.

41. Section 1225(a)(1) defines "applicants for admission" to include noncitizens who are "present in the United States who have not been admitted." Relevant here, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that, "in the case of a [noncitizen] who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that a [noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the [noncitizen] shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Section 1229a, in turn, governs standard (non-expedited) removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge.

42. ICE and EOIR have adopted this position notwithstanding that federal courts have rejected the same interpretation of the INA. For example, after Immigration Judges in Tacoma, Washington ceased providing bond hearings to individuals who had entered the United States without inspection and were later apprehended in the interior, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington held that such an interpretation of the detention statutes is likely unlawful and that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b),

governs the detention of noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival in the United States. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2025 WL 1193850, at [pin cite] (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2025).

43. Since then, federal courts across the United States have agreed with the Western District of Washington and have granted preliminary injunctive relief to petitioners who entered the United States without inspection. *See Padron Covarrubias v. Vergara*, No. 5:25-cv-112 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025) (citing an extensive list of federal courts reaching the same conclusion as the Western District of Washington).

44. DHS's and DOJ's interpretation is contrary to the Immigration and Nationality Act. The plain text and structure of the statutory scheme demonstrate that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), governs the detention of individuals who entered the United States without inspection and were released into the interior to complete standard removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.

45. Section 1226(a) applies by default to noncitizens who are detained "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Such determinations are made in removal proceedings conducted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, which governs proceedings to "decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen]."

46. The text of § 1226 also expressly contemplates detention of individuals charged as inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s specific inclusion of such individuals confirms that, absent a mandatory-detention trigger, they are detained pursuant to § 1226(a) and are therefore eligible for bond consideration. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained,

"[w]hen Congress creates 'specific exceptions' to a statute's applicability, it 'proves' that, absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies." *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock,* 2025 WL 1193850, at *12 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2025) (quoting *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)).

47. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to individuals who face charges of inadmissibility to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

48. By contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) applies to individuals arriving at U.S. ports of entry or at the U.S. border. The framework of § 1225(b)(2) is premised on border inspections of "applicant[s] for admission" who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

49. Furthermore, the INA defines "admission" as "the lawful entry… into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). As courts have recognized, although an applicant for admission has not been "admitted" to the United States, that does not mean the individual necessarily continues to be actively seeking entry. *See Jimenez v. FCI Berlin, Warden*, 2025 WL 2639390, at *21 (D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025). An applicant for admission may already have entered the country and therefore no longer be seeking entry, but instead be seeking "a lawful means to remain here." *Id.* at *22.

50. Accordingly, § 1225(b)(2)(A) cannot apply to an individual who has already entered the United States and has been residing in the country for a period of time.

51. An applicant for admission may be permitted to enter the country and no longer be "seeking admission" is further supported by DHS's longstanding practice of releasing individuals on their own recognizance after detention at the border. DHS Form I-220A, which is used to release an individual on recognizance, expressly provides: "In accordance with section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the applicable provisions of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, you are being released on your own recognizance...." Section 236 of the INA corresponds to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not § 1225.

52. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to individuals like the Petitioner, who have already entered the United States following release by DHS and have been residing in the United States for a period of time.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

Fifth Amendment Substantive Due Process
28 U.S. § 2241; U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2; amend. V

53. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

54. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). Detention for non-criminal purposes is only allowed "in narrow nonpunitive circumstances, where a special justification . . . outweighs the

individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint." *Id.* (internal quotations and citations omitted). With respect to immigration detention, the Supreme Court has recognized two special justifications: preventing flight risk and preventing danger to the community. See *id.*

55. Substantive due process "forbids the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993). "Substantive due process analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted right." *Id.* at 302.

56. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

57. The government's detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to assess whether she poses a flight risk or a danger to the community violates her right to due process.

COUNT II

Violation of the INA

58. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

59. The mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to individuals who previously entered the country without inspection and have been residing in the United States after being released by Respondents and placed in removal proceedings. Such individuals are instead detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), unless they are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

60. Applying 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to the Petitioner unlawfully mandates her continued detention and is contrary to the plain text and structure of the INA.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;

b. Declare that the actions of Respondents as set forth in this Petition violate the Fifth Amendment, of the United States Constitution, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the APA, and the INA;

c. Issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering that Respondents immediately release the Petitioner or, in the alternative, provide the Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven (7) days, at which DHS bears the burden of establishing the necessity of the Petitioner's continued detention and the Court considers alternatives to detention that would mitigate any risk of flight;

d. Declare that Petitioner's detention without bond violates the Fifth Amendment;

e. Enjoin Respondents from denying Petitioner's bond under U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2);

f. Enjoin the Respondents from transferring Petitioner to another detention facility;

g. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and

h. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 28th day of January 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Felix L. Galvez

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VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I represent Petitioner, Miguel Gustavo Gonzalez Barreto, and submit this verification on his behalf. I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated this 28th day of January, 2026.

/s/ Felix L. Galvez
Felix L. Galvez