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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN WASHINGTON

Adrian Alcaraz Garcia, Petitioner, v. Laura HERMOSILLO, Seattle Acting Field Office Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Pamela BONDI, U.S. Attorney General; Todd LYONS, Acting Director of ICE; Bruce SCOTT, Warden, Northwest ICE Processing Center; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Respondents.	Case No. 2:26-cv-281 Agency No. A [redacted] **PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

INTRODUCTION

1. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

2. Petitioner, Adrian Alcaraz Garcia, is an adult man, citizen of Mexico, father to four U.S. citizen children, the oldest of whom is 22. Respondent is now in the physical custody

of Respondents at the Northwest ICE Processing Center (NIPC), operated by GeoGroup, following his arrest by ICE on December 29, 2025, in Beaverton Oregon. Petitioner is assigned A number [redacted] He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) have concluded Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.

3. On or about December 29, 2026, Petitioner was arrested and detained by ICE officers in Beaverton, Oregon. Petitioner asserts that Respondents detained him not based on his personal circumstances or individualized facts, but because of Respondents' interpretation of President Trump's order that they "to do all in their power to achieve the very important goal of delivering the single largest Mass Deportation Program in History."[1] But Respondents' power to detain remains checked by law, as this country remains "a government of laws and not of men." *Cooper v. Aaron,* 358 U.S. 1, 23 (1958) (Frankfurter, J. Concurring) (cleaned up).

4. Petitioner understands that he is charged with, inter alia, having entered the United States without admission or inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

5. Based on this allegation in Petitioner's removal proceedings, DHS has denied or will deny Petitioner release from immigration custody, consistent with the DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and

[1] *See,* "Statement on Immigration Enforcement Actions," *Administration of Donald J. Trump, 2025, DCPD Number* DCPD202500695, found at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202500695/html/DCPD-202500695.htm#:~:text=ICE%20officers%20are%20herewith%20ordered,mass%20deportation%20program%20in%20history.

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therefore ineligible to be released on bond, and consistent with a memo emailed to all Immigration Judges on January 13, 2026.

6. Similarly, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges, holding that an immigration judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

7. Petitioner has not yet requested bond, but fully anticipates that the Immigration Judge will deny bond based on the current policy, without a habeas order.

8. Petitioner's detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without inspection. *Vazquez v. Bostock*, No. 3:24-cv-05240-TMC, Dkt. 65 (W.D. Wash. September 30, 2025).

9. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner.

10. Moreover, warrantless arrest without probable cause violates both 8 U.S.C. § 1357, which requires reason to believe the person "is likely to escape" before a warrant could be obtained, and ICE's own nationwide policy, to which it is bound pursuant to a settlement

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agreement in *Castañon Nava et al. v. Dep't of Homeland* Sec., No. 18-cv-3757 (N.D. Ill.), which requires consideration of specific factors to determine if someone is likely to escape and documentation of these "specific particularized facts" in the I-213.[2] Pursuant to the October 7, 2025, order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Respondent ICE reissued its Broadcast of this policy (hereafter, "Nava Broadcast Policy") to all ICE officers nationwide on October 22, 2025, with the instruction that the Nava Broadcast Policy shall remain in effect through February 2, 2026. See id. at Dkt. 224, 224-1 at 5.

11. Accordingly, Petitioner asks that this court find that Respondents' detention without judicial process or a warrant of arrest violates his rights. Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be released unless Respondents provide a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days.

JURISDICTION

12. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the Northwest ICE Processing Center in Tacoma, Washington, after his detention by ICE officers in Beaverton, Oregon.

13. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

14. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

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[2] Form I-213, known as a "Record of Deportable/Inadmissible [Noncitizen]" . . . is an 'official record' prepared by immigration officials when initially processing a person suspected of being in the United States without legal permission." *Punin v. Garland,* 108 F.4th 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).

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VENUE

15. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court of Western Washington, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

16. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Federal District Court of Western Washington.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

17. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause "forthwith," unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return "within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed." *Id.*

18. Habeas corpus is "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement." *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). "The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application." *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

PARTIES

19. Petitioner has been in immigration detention since approximately December 29, 2025, when he was arrested and detained in Beaverton, Oregon. He has resided in the United States since approximately March, 2003. ICE has not set bond and Petitioner is unable to obtain

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review of his custody by an IJ, pursuant to the Board's decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) and the EOIR email memo of January 13, 2026.

20. Respondent Laura Hermosillo is the Acting Field Office Director of the Seattle Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, she is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. She is named in her official capacity.

21. Respondent Todd Lyons is the Acting Director of ICE and responsible for the means by which the immigration laws of the United States are enforced. He is sued in his official capacity.

22. Respondent Bruce Scott is the warden of the Northwest Detention Center, a facility owned by GeoGroup and used by ICE to detain individuals in removal proceedings. As such, Mr. Scott is also Petitioner's custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention. He is named in his official capacity.

23. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

24. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

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25. Respondent U.S. Department of Homeland Security is an agency of the United States with responsibility for the enforcement of the nation's immigration laws. It is under the direction of Respondent Kristi Noem.

26. Respondent Immigration and Customs Enforcement is an sub-agency of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security with responsibility for the enforcement of the nation's immigration laws and the arrest and detention of certain immigrants. It is under the direction of Respondents Todd Lyons (as Acting Director of ICE) and Kristi Noem (as Secretary of DHS).

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR BOND

27. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

28. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

29. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

30. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

31. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

32. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.

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104—208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

33. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

34. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed "arriving" were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply "restates" the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

35. On July 8, 2025, ICE, "in coordination with" DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice.

36. The new policy, entitled "Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,"[3] claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The

[3] *Available at* https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission.

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policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended, and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

37. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a published decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for IJ bond hearings. On January 13, 2026, Chief Immigration Judge Teresa L. Riley emailed ACIJs providing guidance to all Immigration Judges that *Yajure Hurtado* remains binding precedent on agency adjudicators.

38. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, dozens of federal courts have rejected their new interpretation of the INA's detention authorities. Courts have likewise rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE. *See, e.g.*, *Vazquez v. Bostock*, No. 3:24-cv-05240-TMC, Dkt. 65 (W.D. Wash. September 30, 2025).

39. Even before ICE or the BIA introduced these nationwide policies, Immigration Judgess in the Tacoma, Washington, immigration court stopped providing bond hearings for persons who entered the United States without inspection and who have since resided here. There, the U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the United States. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

40. Subsequently, court after court has adopted the same reading of the INA's detention authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation. *See, e.g., Cruz Vega v. Larose, et al,* 3:25-cv-2725-CAB-MSB (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order issuing preliminary injunction); *Perez Camacho v. Hollinshead, et al,* 1:25-cv-00593-BLW (D. Idaho Nov. 19,

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2025); *Delgado Avila v. Crowley,* No. 2:25-cv-00533-MPB-MJD, (S.D. Ind. Nov. 13, 2025); *Alvarez Ortiz v. Freden,* No. 25-CV-960, 2025 WL 3085032, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025); *Hyppolite v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2829511 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025); *Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz*, —– F. Supp. 3d ——, 2025 WL 2809996 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025); *Vazquez v. Bostock,* No. 3:24-cv-05240-TMC, Dkt. 65 (W.D. Wash. September 30, 2025)*; Lepe v. Andrews*, —– F. Supp. 3d ––, 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); *Barrera v. Tindall*, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); *Hasan v. Crawford*, —– F. Supp. 3d ——, 2025 WL 2682255 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Jimenez v. FCI Berlin, Warden*, —– F. Supp. 3d ——, 2025 WL 2639390 (D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025); *Mosqueda v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025)*; Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH), 2025 WL 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051

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(ECT/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *see also, e.g.*, *Palma Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that "[t]he Court tends to agree" that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

41. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS's and EOIR's new interpretation because it defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

42. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to "decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen]."

43. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, "[w]hen Congress creates 'specific exceptions' to a statute's applicability, it 'proves' that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies." *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove*

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Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); *see also Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7.

44. INA Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

45. By contrast, Section 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

46. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to people like Petitioner, who have already entered and were residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended.

LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STOPS AND ARRESTS

47. The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV.

48. Immigration detention is a form of civil confinement that "constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection." *Addington v. Texas*, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).

49. "Except at the border and its functional equivalents," immigration agents may stop individuals in public only after identifying "specific articulable facts, together with rational

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inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion" of a violation of immigration law. *United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,* 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).

50. Reasonable suspicion for an immigration stop cannot be based "on broad profiles which cast suspicion on entire categories of people without any individualized suspicion of the particular person to be stopped." *United States v. Rodriguez Sanchez*, 23 F.3d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1994). Rather, reasonable suspicion must be "particularized and objective," *United States v. Arvizu*, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002), meaning the officer has reasonable suspicion as to "the particular person being stopped." *United States v. Montero-Camargo*, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

51. Immigration officers may arrest an individual without a warrant in limited circumstances. See *Arizona v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387, 407–08 (2012) (noting strong Congressional preference, as expressed in INA, for immigration arrests to be based on warrants).

52. The INA permits warrantless arrest if an immigration officer has reason to believe that a noncitizen (1) is in the United States in violation of the immigration laws and (2) "is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest". 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2); accord 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(i)-(ii). An officer "has reason to believe" when they have the equivalent of "the constitutional requirement of probable cause." *Tejeda-Mata v. INS*, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980).

53. The Fifth Amendment right to remain silent may be properly invoked during a civil immigration arrest. See *Kastigar v. United States*, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) (The privilege against self-incrimination "can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory . . . This Court has been zealous to safeguard the values which underlie the privilege.").

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54. An immigration officer may not establish probable cause on the basis of a noncitizen's silence pursuant to his Fifth Amendment rights. See *Hurd v. Terhune*, 619 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming "the fundamental principle that a suspect's silence in the face of questioning cannot be used as evidence against him at trial").

55. If an immigration officer makes a warrantless arrest, at the time of an arrest and "as soon as it is practical and safe to do so," immigration officers must identify themselves as immigration officers authorized to make arrests, inform the person arrested that they are under arrests, and state the reason for the arrest. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(iii).

56. The noncitizen must then "be taken without unnecessary delay for examination before an officer of the Service having authority to examine [noncitizens] as to their right to enter or remain in the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).

57. Within 48 hours of an immigration arrest (or within a reasonable time in the case of emergency or extraordinary circumstances), an immigration official must make an initial custody determination to decide whether the noncitizen should remain in custody or be released. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d). These procedures are essential to protect the arrested person's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.

FACTS

58. Petitioner is a Mexican citizen and longtime resident of the United States, since his last entry in 2003. He resides in Oregon state, and is currently detained in Tacoma, Washington. Petitioner is the father of four young U.S. citizen children, the oldest of whom is now 22 years old.

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59. On or about December 29, 2025, Petitioner was detained by ICE in Beaverton, Oregon. Petitioner was then transferred to the detention center in Tacoma, and remains detained at the NWIPC.

60. To Counsel's knowledge and belief, DHS placed Petitioner in removal proceedings before the immigration court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, and charging Petitioner with, *inter alia*, being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without inspection.

61. Petitioner has resided in the United States for over twenty years. He is the father of four U.S. citizen, the oldest of whom is 22. Petitioner has no recent criminal history and strong ties to the community. Petitioner is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.

62. Pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, and as affirmed by EOIR on January 13, 2026, an immigration judge is unable to consider Petitioner's bond request.

63. As a result, Petitioner remains in detention. Without relief from this court, he faces the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his family and community.

64. On January 20, 2025, the president of the United States issued several executive actions relating to immigration, including "Protecting the American People Against Invasion," an executive order (EO) setting out a series of interior immigration enforcement actions. The present administration, through this and other actions, has outlined sweeping, executive branch-led changes to immigration enforcement policy, establishing a formal framework for mass deportation.

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65. The "Protecting the American People Against Invasion" EO instructs the DHS Secretary "to take all appropriate action to enable" ICE, CBP, and USCIS to prioritize civil immigration enforcement procedures including through the use of mass detention.

66. In late May 2025, respondent Kristi Noem and White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller met with ICE leadership and set a arrest quota of 3,000 per day and reportedly threatening job consequences if officials failed to meet arrest quotas.[4]

67. On May 28, 2025 Deputy Chief of Staff Miller confirmed that "[u]nder President Trump's leadership, we are looking to set a goal of a minimum of 3,000 arrests for ICE every day, and President Trump is going to keep pushing to get that number up higher each and every single day."[5]

68. Following the directive from Noem and Miller, ICE agents were instructed in an email to "turn the creativity knob up to 11" and aggressively "push the envelope" in arrests, including by pursuing "collaterals." One email is reported to have said: "If it involves handcuffs on wrists, it's probably worth pursuing."[6]

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

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[5]Hannity, Sean, "Stephen Miller says the admin wants to create the strongest immigration system in US History", FOX NEWS (May 28, 2025), https://www.foxnews.com/video/6373591405112 (last visited Nov. 26, 2025).

[6]Olivares, José , "US immigration officers ordered to arrest more people even without warrants," The Guardian (Jun 4, 2025) https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jun/04/immigration-officials-increased-detentions-collateral-arrests

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Violation of the INA

69. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

70. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

71. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT II

Violation of Due Process

72. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

73. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

74. Except at the border and its functional equivalents, the Fourth Amendment prohibits respondents from stopping a person without reasonable suspicion to question as to whether he or she is unlawfully in the United States. The Fourth Amendment bars respondents

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from making an arrest without probable cause to believe that a person is a noncitizen unlawfully in the United States.

75. "A person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of [unlawful] activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search [or seize] that person." *Perez Cruz v. Barr*, 926 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). "'Reasonable suspicion' is no different." *Id.*

76. Respondents' stop of Petitioner without reasonable suspicion, and arrest of without probable cause, violates the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

77. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. V. Due process protects "all 'persons' within the United States, including [non-citizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

78. Due process requires that government action be rational and non-arbitrary. See *United States v. Trimble*, 487 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 2007). Due process also requires notice and "the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting *Armstrong v. Manzo*, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

79. Here, it appears that Petitioner has been stopped, arrested, and detained in an arbitrary manner, without any notice of the basis for his arrest and continued detention, and not based on a rational and individualized determination of whether he should be detained based on individual facts and circumstances pertaining to whether he was a flight risk or danger to the community.

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80. Respondents' stop, arrest, and continued detention of petitioner are violations of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;

b. Issue an immediate order barring Respondents from removing Petitioner from the state of Washington, without notice to the court and approval by the court;

c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three (3) days;

d. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner or, in the alternative, provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;

e. Declare that petitioner's stop and arrest without reasonable suspicion, and petitioner's continued detention, violates applicable regulations, the APA, the INA, and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States;

f. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and

g. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

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DATED this 24th day of January, 2026.

By: /s/ Shara Svendsen
Shara Svendsen
Law Office of Shara Svendsen PLLC
Attorney for Petitioner

I certify that this memorandum contains 5,234 words, in compliance with the Local Civil Rules.

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