**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**

**FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINA**

1. Mario Alberto LOPEZ PACHECO, (A[redacted]

Petitioner,

v.

1. Jeff Crawford, Warden, Farmville Detention Center;
2. Todd LYONS, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
3. Kristi NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
4. Pamela BONDI, U.S. Attorney General;
5. Daren MARGOLIN, EOIR Director, U.S. Department of Justice

In their official capacities,

Respondents.

Case No.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

## INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Mario Alberto Lopez Pacheco is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Farmville Detention Center in Farmville, Virginia. He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) have concluded Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention. Exhibit 1.

2. Petitioner is charged with, inter alia, having entered the United States without admission or inspection, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as an alien who, at the time of application for admission to the United States was not in possession of any valid entry document. See Exhibit 1, Notice To Appear(NTA)

3. The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") issued a new policy on July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

4. Thereafter, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges, holding that an immigration judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

The BIA determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

5. Petitioner's detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without inspection.

6. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner.

7. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be released unless Respondents provide a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within five days.

## JURISDICTION

8. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the Farmville Detention Center in Farmville, Virginia. See Exhibit 2.

9. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1), (3) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

10. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 *et seq.*, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

## VENUE

11. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

12. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Eastern District of Virginia.

## REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

13. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause "forthwith," unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return "within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed." *Id.*

14. Habeas corpus is "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement." *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). "The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application." *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

## PARTIES

15. Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico, born on [redacted] who has been in immigration detention since approximately December 4, 2025. After taking custody of Petitioner in Virginia and transferring him to Farmville detention facility, ICE did not set bond. Petitioner has a scheduled initial master calendar hearing before the immigration court on January 29 2026. See Exhibit 3.

16. Petitioner has resided in the United States since his entry on April 23 2005, when he was nine years old, at which time he was not apprehended. He has continuously resided in the United States since 2005 and has evidence of his residence including copies of birth certificate of his biological son, M[redacted] who was born in Virginia on [redacted], Custody order, USCIS approval notices for the approval of form I821D, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals(DACA) from 2013 onward, tax filings, Virginia Driver's License issued on March 15 2025, among some of the documents. See Exhibit 4.

17. Respondent Jeff Crawford is the Warden of the Farmville Detention Center, where Petitioner is currently being held. As such, he is the immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention. He is named in his official capacity.

18. Respondent Todd Lyons is the Acting Director Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). As such, Lyons is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

19. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

20. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

21. Respondent Daren Margolin is the Acting Director of the Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review, which includes the immigration court system. He is sued in his official capacity.

## LEGAL FRAMEWORK

22. The Immigration and Nationality Act prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

23. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an IJ. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

24. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

25. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

26. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

27. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

28. Following the enactment of the 1996 IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

29. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was

consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed "arriving" were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply "restates" the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

30. On July 8, 2025, ICE, "in coordination with" the Department of Justice, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice.

31. The new policy, entitled "Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission," claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

32. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a published decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for IJ bond hearings. *Id.*

33. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, dozens of federal courts have rejected their new interpretation of the INA's detention authorities. Courts have likewise rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE. *See infra.*

34. Even before ICE or the BIA introduced these nationwide policies, judges in the Tacoma (Washington) Immigration Court stopped providing bond hearings for persons who entered the United States without inspection and who have since resided here. There, the U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the United States. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

35. Subsequently, court after court – including the Eastern District of Virginia – has adopted the same reading of the INA's detention authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation *See Hasan v. Crawford*, No. 1:25-cv-01408, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184734 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); *Quispe-Ardiles v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-01382-MSN-WEF, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194069 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2025); *Teyim v. Perry*, No. 1:25-cv-01615 MSN-WEF, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207464 (E.D. Va. Oct. 15, 2025). *See also*, e.g., *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Buentrostro Mendez v. Bondi et al*, 4:25-cv-03726 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025); *Almazan Tapia v. Vergara*, No. 5:25-cv-174 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2025); *Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, No. 3:25-cv-0037, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188232 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2025); *Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos*, 1:25-cv-00835-DHU-JMR, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183335 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-25-

02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH), 2025 WL 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); see also, e.g., *Palma Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that "[t]he Court tends to agree" that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

36. Courts across the nation have rejected DHS's and EOIR's new interpretation because it defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

37. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to "decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen]."

38. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, "[w]hen Congress creates 'specific exceptions' to a statute's applicability, it 'proves' that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies." *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); see also *Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7.

39. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

40. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to people like Petitioner, who have already entered and were residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended.

**FACTS**

41. Petitioner has resided in the United States continuously since March 2005, when he entered the United States and has been living in the state of Virginia.

42. On approximately December 4 2025, ICE took custody of Petitioner and he is now detained at the Farmville Detention Center in Farmville, Virginia.

43. ICE has charged Petitioner in Immigration Court, inter alia, as being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without inspection, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as an alien who, at the time of application for admission to the United States was not in possession of any valid entry document. See Exhibit 1, Notice To Appear(NTA)

44. Petitioner has resided in the United States continuously for 20 years and has a U.S. citizen child. In summary, Petitioner is neither a flight risk nor a danger to society.

45. Following Petitioner's arrest and transfer to the Farmville Detention Center, ICE issued a custody determination to continue Petitioner's detention without an opportunity to post bond or be released on other conditions.

46. Petitioner was not able to request an immigration bond given that all immigration judges are subject to the binding precedent that those who entered the country without admission or parole are ineligible for a bond hearing. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

47. As a result, Petitioner remains in detention. Without relief from this Court, he faces the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his family and community.

48. Petitioner also seeks enforcement of his rights as a member of the Bond Denial class certified in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM(C.D. Cal.). On December 18, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered Final Judgment in the nationwide class action Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz. This Final Judgment is critical to the instant Petition for three reasons:

(i) Finality & Preclusion: The Court rejected the Government's argument that the class certification was merely interlocutory. It entered Final Judgment on Counts I-III, certifying the class and declaring the policy unlawful. As a class member, Petitioner's rights are now adjudicated, and the Government is collaterally estopped from relitigating their detention status.

(ii) Futility of Exhaustion: The Court entered Final Judgment specifically because it found "troubling" evidence that the Department of Justice issued a memorandum instructing Immigration Judges to disregard the federal court's prior orders and "hold the position that Yajure-Hurtado remains

good law." This judicial finding confirms that administrative exhaustion is futile, as the agency has prejudged the issue in bad faith.

(iii) Yajure-Hurtado is "No Longer Tenable": The Court explicitly held that "the core holding of Yajure-Hurtado cannot be squared with the [Court's] Order... Yajure-Hurtado is no longer controlling; the legal conclusion underlying the decision is no longer tenable."

Petitioner requests that this Court take judicial notice of this Final Judgment and grant the Writ of Habeas Corpus to enforce these established rights against the local custodian.

## CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

### COUNT I

### Violation of the INA

49. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

50. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

51. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

## COUNT II

### Violation of Due Process

52. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

53. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

54. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

55. The government's detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

## PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;

b. Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the Eastern District of Virginia while this habeas petition is pending;

c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days;

d. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner or, in the alternative, provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five days;

e. Declare that Petitioner's detention is unlawful;

f. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and

g. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 14th day of January 2026.

/S/ Parastoo Golesorkhi Zahedi
Parastoo Golesorkhi Zahedi
Law Office of Zahedi PLLC
8133 Leesburg Pike Suite 770
Vienna, VA 22182
Phone: 703-448-0111
Fax: 703-448-5552
zahedi@zahedilaw.com
*Attorney for Petitioner*

**VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242**

I represent Petitioner, Mario Alberto Lopez Pacheco and submit this verification on his behalf. I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated this 14th day of January 2026.

/S/ Parastoo Golesorkhi Zahedi
Parastoo Golesorkhi Zahedi