UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
[EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK]

Wei Yin,

Petitioner,

v.

RAUL MALDONADO, JR., *in his official capacity as Warden of the Metropolitan Detention Center;* KRISTI NOEM, *in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security*; PAMELA BONDI, *in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States;* EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,

Respondents.

Case No. 1:26-cv-103

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner, Wei Yin, is in the physical custody of Respondents at Metropolitan Detention Center, 80 29th Street, Brooklyn, NY 11232. He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) have concluded Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.

2. Petitioner is charged with, inter alia, having entered the United States without admission or inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

3. Based on this allegation in Petitioner's removal proceedings, DHS denied Petitioner release from immigration custody, consistent with a new DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

4. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner.

5. ICE's detention of Petitioner is arbitrary, unsupported by statute, unconstitutional, and effectuated without any procedural safeguards. ICE's conduct fails to comply basic procedural protections required under the Constitution. *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). This Court should immediately order his release.

JURISDICTION

6. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at Metropolitan Detention Center, 80 29th Street, Brooklyn, NY 11232.

7. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

8. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

9. Pursuant to Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Eastern District, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

10. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Eastern District of New York.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

11. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause "forthwith," unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return "within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed." *Id.*

12. Habeas corpus is "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement." *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). "The application for the

writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application." *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

PARTIES

13. Petitioner Wei Yin is a citizen of China who has been detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") since November 20, 2025, following his arrest at 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY, 10278.

14. Respondent Raul Maldonado, Jr. is the Warden of MDC in Brooklyn, New York, where Petitioner is detained. As Warden of MDC, Mr. Maldonado is responsible for the administration, management, and custody of individuals detained at MDC, including implementation of federal detention policies and practices applicable to immigration detainees held at that facility. Mr. Maldonado has custodial authority over detained individuals at MDC and is a proper respondent in a habeas corpus action challenging the legality of Petitioner's detention. Mr. Maldonado is sued in his official capacity

15. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

16. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

17. Respondent Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redeterminations in bond hearings.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

18. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

19. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

20. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

21. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

22. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

23. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

24. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

25. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed "arriving" were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply "restates" the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

26. As recently as January 2025, the Laken Riley Act was enacted. This law amended the mandatory detention provision of INA § 236(c) to apply to aliens who are inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(6)(A), and were arrested for, convicted of, or committed a class of crimes related to theft or injury.[2] If the intent was for aliens charged under INA § 212(a)(6)(A) to be detained under INA § 235, then amending the provisions of INA § 236(c) in this manner would have been unnecessary. Likewise, "[w]hen Congress creates "specific exceptions" to a statute's applicability, it "proves" that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies. *Rodriguez Vazquez vs Bostock*, 2025 WL1193850, at *12 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)). A contrary interpretation would override the purpose of the statute. *See Yao v. Almodovar*, No. 25-cv-9982 (PAE), at 18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025) (finding that such interpretation of the Laken Riley Act "is at odds with modern-day principle of statutory

construction. A foundational tenet of such is that the purpose of a statute as derived from the statements of legislators *cannot* override its plain text.") (emphasis included) citing *W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey*, 499 U.S. 83, 111 (1991) (Scalia, J.); *Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain*, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (Thomas, J.); John F. Manning, *Textualism and the Equity of the Statute*, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (2001)

27. On July 8, 2025, ICE, "in coordination with" DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice.

28. The new policy, entitled "Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,"[1] claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

29. Subsequently, numerous federal courts adopted the same interpretation of the INA's detention provisions and rejected ICE and EOIR's contrary construction. *See, e.g.*, *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-

[1] *Available at* https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission.

ODW (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH), 2025 WL 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *see also, e.g.*, *Palma Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at 2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that "[t]he Court tends to agree" that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 at 3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) *Id*; *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at 2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) *Id.*

30. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS's and EOIR's new interpretation because it defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

31. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to "decid[ed] the inadmissibility or deportability of [all] [noncitizen]."

32. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, "[w]hen Congress creates 'specific exceptions' to a statute's applicability, it 'proves' that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies." *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); *see also Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at 7.

33. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

34. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether [all] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

35. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to people like Petitioner, who have already entered and were residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended.

36. Although a person present without admission may be classified as an "applicant for admission," that status does not make them a person "seeking admission" under § 1225(b).

Treating those terms as synonymous collapses two separate concepts Congress deliberately distinguished. Because Petitioner resides in the United States and is in standard § 1229a proceedings, his detention is authorized, if at all, under § 1226(a). Applying § 1225(b)(2)(A) to individuals in Petitioner's circumstances would disregard the statutory structure and render superfluous. *See Yao v. Almodovar*, No. 25-cv-9982 (PAE), at 11-13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025) (holding that "as a matter of statutory construction [...] § 1225 applies to arriving noncitizens, and § 1226 governs the process of arresting and detaining noncitizens who have entered the United States and remained here pending their removal.") citing *J.G.O.*, 2025 WL 3040142, at *4; *Esperanza*, 2025 WL 3513983, at *5–6; *Tumba Huamani*,2025 WL 3079014, at *3–4; *Cardenas v. Almodovar*, No. 25 Civ. 9169, 2025 WL 3215573, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2025). A noncitizen "cannot be subject to both §§ 1225 and 1226." *Lopez Benitez*, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 485; *see also Villegas*, 2025 WL 3215597, at *2; *Campbell v. Almodovar*, No. 25 Civ. 9509, 2025 WL 3538351, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2025); *Gonzalez*, 2025 WL 2961626, at *4.

Recent Persuasive Authority Further Confirms the Unlawfulness of DHS's § 1225 Detention Policy

37. A recent merits decision addressing the same DHS detention policy at issue here confirms that the government's reliance on 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) to detain noncitizens arrested inside the United States is contrary to law. In *Lazaro Maldonado Bautista et al. v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, the district court granted partial summary judgment invalidating DHS's July 8, 2025 policy, which directed ICE to treat noncitizens arrested in the interior of the United States and charged as inadmissible as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225 rather than discretionary detention under § 1226(a).

38. Under the certified class definition, noncitizens are class members if they: (1) entered the United States without inspection; (2) were not apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not detained under § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time DHS made their initial custody determination. The *Maldonado* court emphasized that the statutory inquiry is governed by longstanding principles of immigration detention: for decades, EWIs not apprehended at the border were treated as individuals detained under § 1226(a), eligible for individualized custody determinations and bond hearings.

39. The court explained that applying § 1225(b)(2)(A) to noncitizens arrested long after entry would effectively nullify § 1226(a) and conflict with the structure and text of the INA. Section 1226(a), the court emphasized, has long functioned as the default detention authority for noncitizens already present in the United States and placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Interpreting § 1225 to govern such detention would improperly collapse two distinct statutory regimes and erase the role Congress assigned to § 1226(a).

40. The court also rejected the government's reliance on *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018). As the court explained, *Jennings* expressly recognized § 1226(a) as authorizing detention of noncitizens already in the United States pending the outcome of removal proceedings and did not support DHS's attempt to subject interior arrests to mandatory detention under § 1225. *See* Maldonado Bautista at 16–17 (citing *Jennings* at 289). Applying traditional tools of statutory interpretation, the court concluded that DHS's expansive interpretation of "applicants for admission" would impermissibly nullify portions of the INA through executive reinterpretation, a result incompatible with separation-of-powers principles. *Id* at 19 (citing *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024)). In reaching that conclusion, the court emphasized that § 1226 nowhere employs the terms "applicant for admission,"

"admission," or "admitted" in the manner DHS sought to import from § 1225, underscoring that Congress intentionally assigned different functions to the two provisions. *Id.* at 19.

41. Finally, the court carefully delineated the scope of the relief it was authorized to grant. In the concluding portion of its order, the court clarified that its ruling was not intended to mandate habeas relief for all class members nationwide, and that any classwide order compelling government compliance on a national basis would implicate the limitations set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). Id at *23. That limitation, however, does not diminish the relevance of the court's statutory and constitutional analysis here. Petitioner does not seek classwide or nationwide relief, nor does he ask this Court to enjoin the operation of the immigration laws. Rather, Petitioner seeks only individualized habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 based on the unlawfulness of his own detention. Section 1252(f)(1) does not bar such relief, and the court's careful adherence to that provision in *Maldonado Bautista* underscores that its conclusions regarding the meaning of §1225 and §1226, the misreading of *Jennings*, and the due process deficiencies of DHS's policy were reached independently of any request for nationwide injunctive relief.

42. The government's 2025 policy shift, which attempted to reclassify all EWIs as "applicants for admission" subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), was rejected as contrary to the INA and to established statutory structure.

FACTS

43. Petitioner has resided in the United States since November 20, 2025, and currently lives at [redacted].

44. On information and belief, on December 20, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement while reporting for a scheduled check-in at 26

Federal Plaza, New York, NY 10278. Petitioner is presently detained at Metropolitan Detention Center, 80 29th Street, Brooklyn, NY 11232.

45. DHS placed Petitioner in removal proceedings before the New York Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. ICE has charged Petitioner with, *inter alia*, being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without inspection.

46. Petitioner is employed at a restaurant in New York and maintains a stable source of income and a fixed residence. He regularly attends services at the Chinese Christian Church of Blessing at 761 60th ST Fl.1, Brooklyn, NY 11220, and is a baptized Christian. He is a person of good moral character and has never had any criminal record.

50. According to official ICE Detainee Locator System, Petitioner is presently detained at Metropolitan Detention Center, 80 29th Street, Brooklyn, NY 11232, within the jurisdiction of this Court. A true and correct copy of this record is attached hereto as **Exhibit A**.

47. On information and belief, ICE served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear (NTA) initiating removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §1229(a). The NTA charges Petitioner as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act and was filed with the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) in New York. A true and correct copy of the NTA is attached hereto as **Exhibit B**.

48. Petitioner has a pending Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, which was filed prior to his detention and remains awaiting adjudication. Although Petitioner has a scheduled Merits Calendar Hearing on January 26, 2026 at 1:00 PM. This pending application demonstrates that Petitioner is actively pursuing lawful relief from removal. A true and correct copy of the pending Form I-589 is attached hereto as **Exhibit C**.

49. On January 6, 2026, an Immigration Judge conducted a custody redetermination proceeding pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236. The Immigration Judge found that Petitioner is not a danger to the community but denied release on the grounds that the Court deemed Petitioner a flight risk and concluded that, "no amount of bond would mitigate that risk." A true and correct copy of the Immigration Judge's custody order is attached hereto as **Exhibit D**.

50. Notwithstanding the Immigration Judge's custody determination, Petitioner brings this habeas petition to challenge the lawfulness of his continued detention, which is predicated on Respondents' erroneous application of mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) to a noncitizen apprehended inside the United States.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I: Violation of the INA

51. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

52. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

53. The government's own custody paperwork frequently cites §1226 as the basis for detention, reflecting the longstanding agency practice and regulatory understanding that individuals in Petitioner's posture fall under §1226(a). Attempts to recharacterize detention under §1225(b) only after litigation begins deserve little weight, as agencies must justify their

actions on the grounds they relied on at the time the action was taken. A shifting litigation position cannot retroactively validate a detention that was never grounded in §1225(b) to begin with.

54. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT II: Violation of Due Process

55. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

56. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

57. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

58. Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause because ICE re-detained Petitioner at a routine check-in without providing any of the procedural safeguards required when the government seeks to deprive an individual of liberty. The Supreme Court's framework in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), governs this analysis. Under *Mathews*, courts balance three considerations: the weight of the private interest at stake, the risk of erroneous deprivation under existing procedures and the value of additional safeguards, and the government's interest in avoiding additional procedures. Each factor strongly favors Petitioner and demonstrates that the detention is unconstitutional.

59. Even if the statutory question were settled, Petitioner's detention violates the Constitution. The Due Process Clause prohibits the government from depriving a person of physical liberty without procedural safeguards. Detention at a routine check-in, imposed without notice, without an individualized assessment of risk, and without any opportunity to be heard, is fundamentally incompatible with constitutional requirements.

EXHAUSTION

60. Petitioner has exhausted any available administrative remedies with respect to his detention. Petitioner affirmatively sought a custody redetermination before the Immigration Court, and the Immigration Judge issued a custody order on January 6, 2026. Because Petitioner has pursued the only administrative mechanism available to challenge his custody, no further exhaustion is required before seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

61. There is no statutory requirement that an immigration detainee exhaust administrative remedies, including an appeal of a bond determination to the BIA, before seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Courts in this District have repeatedly held that exhaustion in immigration-detention habeas cases is a judicially-created, prudential doctrine, not a jurisdictional bar. *See* Nolasco Rodriguez v. Decker, 507 F. Supp. 3d 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, "a party may not seek federal judicial review of an adverse administrative determination until the party has first sought all possible relief within the agency itself.'" Howell v. I.N.S., 72 F.3d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Guitard v. U.S. Sec 'y of Navy, 967 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1992)).

62. Because Congress has imposed no statutory exhaustion requirement on habeas

challenges to immigration detention, courts in this District treat exhaustion as a judicially-created prudential standard rather than a mandatory prerequisite. *Joseph v. Decker*, No. 18-cv-2640 (RA), 2018 WL 6075067, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2018); *see also Beharry v. Ashcroft*, 329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2003). Further, failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be excused "when such exhaustion would be futile or where the agency has predetermined the issue before it." *Rosenthal v. Killian*, 667 F. Supp. 2d 364, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting *Garcia v. Shanahan*, 615 F. Supp. 2d 175, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)); *see also Beharry*, 329 F.3d at 62. Failing to attempt to use administrative remedies is not necessarily dispositive of the exhaustion question if the ultimate outcome of such administrative remedies would be futile. *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*, No. 19-cv -2912 (ALC), 2019 WL 2655806, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2019) (excusing exhaustion on futility grounds though petitioner had not appealed to the BIA); *see also Garcia v. Decker*, No. 20-cv -1345 (LJL), 2020 WL 1435007, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2020); *Joseph*, 2018 WL 6075067, at *5.

63. Given this binding precedent, pursuing an administrative appeal would serve no practical purpose. Exhaustion is unnecessary "where the agency's position appears already set and recourse to administrative remedies is very likely futile." *Vasquez-Rodriguez v. Garland*, 7 F.4th (9th Cir. 2021).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;

b. Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the New York while this habeas petition is pending;

c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days;

d. Declare that Petitioner's detention is unlawful;

e. Order that, upon release, Respondents shall not impose any electronic monitoring, location-tracking device, GPS ankle bracelet, or any other form of surveillance-based conditions on Petitioner;

f. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and

g. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: January 8, 2026

LAW OFFICE OF NG & WASSERMAN PLLC

/s/ Jed S. Wasserman

By: Jed Wasserman
LAW OFFICE OF NG&WASSERMAN PLLC
27 East Broadway, 2nd Floor
New York, NY 10002
Telephone: (212) 925-5616
jedwasserman@ngwasserman.com

EXHIBIT A