

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO DIVISION

Rafael Loera Solis,
Petitioner,

v.

Kristi Noem, *et al.*,
Respondents.

Civil Action No. EP-26-CV-00010-LS

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING IN RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF

Federal Respondents provide the following supplemental briefing in response to Petitioner's brief, filed February 13, 2026 (ECF No. 8).¹ Petitioner fails to acknowledge that under *Buenrostro v. Bondi*, No. 25-20496, ---- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026), it is immaterial whether a warrant was issued, as 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) governs his detention. Rather, Petitioner argues he is entitled to a bond hearing and that his detention violates due process.

Procedural due process does not entitle Petitioner to a bond hearing

Petitioner asserts his detention violates due process. The Constitution prohibits the government from "depriv[ing]" a "person" of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. V. The Supreme Court has recognized two types of due process claims. *See Department of State v. Munoz*, 602 U.S. 899, 910 (2024). A procedural due process claim takes as given the substantive determinations that would justify a deprivation of life, liberty, or property, but challenges the "adequacy of the[] procedures" for making those determinations. *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The procedural due process claim did not challenge the statute's substantive criteria for who may receive benefits, but the adequacy of the procedures

¹ The Department of Justice represents only federal employees in this action.

available to test whether a person fits within the criteria. *Id.* at 325-26. By contrast, a substantive due process claim challenges the substance of the determinations themselves, arguing that they are inadequate to justify the deprivation “at all, no matter what process is provided.” *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).

Petitioner has not challenged the adequacy of the procedures for determining whether Petitioner is an “applicant for admission,” under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner argues § 1225(b)(2)(A) is a constitutionally insufficient basis on which to justify the deprivation of liberty. Petitioner’s due process argument is therefore substantive, not procedural, in nature.

Petitioner requests this Court find that due process requires additional procedures in the form of a bond hearing. However, a bond hearing is merely the vehicle for making the substantive determination about flight risk or dangerousness. Those factors are irrelevant under the statute. Petitioner’s claim is in reality a substantive due process challenge, not a procedural one.

Congress decided as a substantive policy matter to impose mandatory detention on all applicants for admission. Whether Petitioner is a flight risk or danger is irrelevant under that policy choice. Due process does not require procedures to adjudicate immaterial facts. What Petitioner is asking this Court to do is override Congress’s substantive judgment that all applicants for admission must be detained regardless of whether they are dangerous or flight risks. Procedural due process can do no such thing.

The Supreme Court’s decision in *Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), is definitive on this point. The case involved a statute that required sex offenders to register so their information could be published on a registry. *Id.* at 4-5. John Doe claimed the statute violated his procedural due process rights by requiring registration without a “hearing to determine whether” he was “currently dangerous.” *Id.* at 4 (citation omitted). The Court rejected

Doe's claim, explaining "due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory scheme," and "the fact that [Doe] seeks to prove – that he is not currently dangerous – [wa]s of no consequence under" the relevant statute, which required him to register based on his prior conviction alone. *Id.* at 7. Any claim that Doe was entitled to a hearing to adjudicate facts a legislature had not made relevant "'must ultimately be analyzed' in terms of substantive, not procedural, due process." *Id.* at 7-8. The rule of *Connecticut Department of Public Safety* is straight forward: "Plaintiffs who assert a right to a hearing under the Due Process Clause must show that the facts they seek to establish in this hearing are relevant under the statutory scheme. *Id.* at 9. The Fifth Circuit applied that rule in *Duarte v. City of Lewisville, Texas*, 858 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2017), in a similar context.

The Fifth Circuit later applied the same rationale to reject a procedural due process challenge against mandatory detention under § 1226(c) in *Wekesa v. U.S. Attorney*, No. 22-10260, 2022 WL 17175818 (5th Cir. Nov. 22, 2022). There, Wekesa filed a habeas petition, alleging "his continued detention without an individualized bond hearing violates his due process rights." *Id.* at *1. The Court rejected that claim and explained that § 1226(c) "mandates detention of any alien falling within its scope" and allows release "only if the alien is released for witness-protection purposes." *Id.* "[B]ecause Wekesa d[id] not meet the statutory requirements for release under Section 1226(c)(2)," the Court affirmed the denial of the habeas petition. *Id.* In other words, because Wekesa indisputably was subject to detention under § 1226(c), nothing he hoped to ascertain through a bond hearing would be "relevant under the statutory scheme." *Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety*, 538 U.S. at 9. Accordingly, Petitioner has no procedural due process right to a bond hearing on flight risk or danger to the community. As in *Connecticut Department of Public Safety*,

any claim that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing “‘must ultimately be analyzed’ in terms of substantive, not procedural due process.” 538 U.S. at 7-8.

Mathews articulates a three-part balancing test for analyzing certain “procedural due process” claims. *Nelson v. Colorado*, 581 U.S. 128, 134 (2017). However, that test has no application in the realm of substantive due process. After all, *Mathews* takes the “nature of the relevant inquiry” as given, 424 U.S. at 343, and asks only whether the “procedures” for conducting that factual inquiry are adequate. *Id.* at 335. Here, Petitioner contends that the Constitution requires a different factual inquiry altogether – one that evaluates factors that Congress chose not to make relevant to the detention issue. Because that is a substantive, rather than procedural, due process challenge to the statute, any reliance on *Mathews* is misplaced.

Petitioner does not have a substantive due process right to a bond hearing

Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing during the pendency of removal proceedings does not implicate any fundamental rights. “[P]rior to 1907 there was no provision permitting bail for any aliens during the pendency of their deportation proceedings.” *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 n.7 (2003). So, such a right cannot possibly be “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” *Munoz*, 602 U.S. at 910 (quoting *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)). Accordingly, rational basis review is the appropriate standard for analyzing Petitioner’s substantive due process claims. *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 728. Under that standard, detention under § 1225(b)(2) is constitutionally permissible as long as it is “rationally related to legitimate government interests.” *Id.*

Section 1225 clears the rational basis bar. In *Demore*, the Supreme Court considered a “substantive due process’ challenge to detention under § 1226(c). 538 U.S. at 515. The Court explained its cases had long “recognized detention during deportation proceedings as a

constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process,” because “deportation proceedings ‘would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character.’” *Id.* at 523 (quoting *Wong Wong v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896)); *see also id.* at 526 (reiterating the “Court’s longstanding view that the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings”). Therefore, because “[d]etention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process,” the Court held that the alien’s substantive due process “claim must fail.” *Id.* at 531.

The same reasons for upholding mandatory detention under § 1226(c) apply to § 1225(b)(2)(A). Petitioner does not allege that removal is “unattainable,” so detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) serves the same legitimate interest recognized by *Demore* – preventing aliens “from fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings, thus increasing the chance that, if ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully removed.” 538 U.S. at 528. Nor is detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) “indefinite” or “permanent.” *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 530. As with § 1226(c), detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) lasts only for the duration of “a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 203-03 (2018).

Dated: February 23, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

Justin R. Simmons
United States Attorney

By: /s/ Deborah L. Fischer

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Print Summary

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Rafael Loera Solis,

Petitioner,

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Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security;
Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General,
Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Marcos Charles, Acting Director
of Enforcement and Removal Operations;
Warden of ERO El Paso Camp East
Montana Detention Facility

Civil Case No. 3:26-cv-00010-LS

Respondents.

NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

NOTICE IS GIVEN that the petitioner, by and through the undersigned, voluntarily dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A).

After the initiation of this petition, the petitioner has been transferred outside the jurisdiction of the Western District of Texas. As a result of this transfer the petitioner moves to voluntarily dismiss this action without prejudice.

Counsel has conferred with Deborah L. Fischer, Assistant United States Attorney, who has stated that the United States does not oppose this voluntary dismissal.

Dated: February 25, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Lauren Wallis

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