Nicolette Glazer Esq. (CSBN 209713)
nicolette@glazerandglazer.com
LAW OFFICES OF LARRY R GLAZER
2121 Avenue of the Stars East #800
Century City, California 90067
T:310-407-5353
F:310-407-5354

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELISA AGUILAR CENTES Plaintiff and Petitioner, vs. JAMES JANECKA, Warden of the Adelanto Detention Center; ERNESTO SANTACRUZ, Jr., Acting Director of the Los Angeles Field Office, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; PAM BONDI, Attorney General, United States Department of Justice; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, United States Department of Homeland Security; TODD LYONS, Acting Director of Unites States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and DOES 1-5 Defendants-Respondents	Case No.: Hon: **PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUCTIVE RELIEF**

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States; the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 1570 [hereinafter 'INA']; and Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 *et seq* [hereinafter "APA"].

2. This Court has further jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 2243, art. I § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution ("Suspension Clause"), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as Petitioner is presently in custody under color of the authority of the United States based on the service of a Notice to Appear, and such custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

3. This Court also may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 5 U.S.C. § 702, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

4. This court has further remedial authority pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq..

5. The use of the Writ of Habeas Corpus to challenge detention by ICE is not foreclosed by the REAL ID Act. The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (May 11, 2005), Title I, Section 106(c), amending INA §§ 242(a)(2)(A), (B), (C) and § 242(g), only deprives the district court of habeas jurisdiction to review orders of removal, not challenges to detention or the denial of constitutional rights. *See INS v. St. Cyr,* 533 U.S. 289, 364-65 (2001) ("The writ of habeas corpus has always been available to review the legality of executive detention.").

6. This Court could enjoin federal officials pursuant to *Ex Parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). *See Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson*, 223 U.S. 605, 619–21 (1912) (applying *Ex Parte Young* to federal official); *Goltra v. Weeks*, 271 U.S. 536, 545 (1926) (same).

7. Plaintiff-Petitioner has exhausted all administrative remedies to the extent available and required by law.

8. Venue properly lies within the Central District of California, because each named Defendant-Respondent is present in this district and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this action occurred and continue to occur in this District. *See* 28 U.S.C. §1391(b). Petitioner is currently detained within this district to wit, at the Adelanto Detention Facility located at 10400 Rancho Road, Adelanto, CA 92301. Accordingly, the "restraint complained of" is occurring within the Court's territorial jurisdiction. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)

9. A petition for habeas corpus was filed for this Petitioner joined with Ms. Maribel Catalan Ramirez and docketed under 5:25-cv-03418-FWS-DFM. Hon Judge Douglas F. McCormick issued an order to show cause why the matter should not be severed in two separate habeas petitions. Petitioner, therefore, refiles this matter as a separate habeas matter to challenge this Petitioner's continuing detention.

PARTIES

10. Plaintiff-Petitioner Melisa Aguilar Centes is a 23-year-old national and citizen of El Salvador who had resided in the United States for over 12 years prior to her detention by Respondents.

11. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") is a cabinet department of the United States federal government with the primary mission of securing the United States.

12. ICE is an agency within DHS with the primary mission of arresting, detaining, and removing non-citizens physically present within the territory of the United States. ICE is also responsible for the custody and care of all detained non-citizens awaiting resolution of their immigration cases or removal after a final order of removal had been entered.

13. Defendant Kristi Noem is the Secretary for DHS. In this capacity, Ms. Noem has responsibility for the administration of immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1103(a), has authority over ICE and its field offices, and has authority to order the release of Plaintiff-Petitioner. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Noem was acting within the scope and course of her position as the Secretary for DHS. Defendant Noem is sued in her official capacity.

14. Defendant-Respondent Todd Lyons is the Acting Director and Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of ICE. Defendant Lyons is responsible for the implementation of all ICE's policies, practices, and procedures, including those relating to detention of non-citizens. Defendant Lyons is a legal and immediate custodian of Petitioner. At all times relevant to this Complaint,

Defendant Lyons was acting within the scope and course of his position as an ICE official. He is sued in his official capacity.

15. Defendant-Respondent Ernesto Santacruz, Jr. is the Acting Director of the Los Angeles Field Office of ICE, which has immediate custody of Plaintiff-Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

16. Defendant James Janecka is the warden of the Adelanto Detention Facility in San Bernardino County, where Plaintiff-Petitioner are currently detained. Defendant Janecka is the immediate, physical custodian of Petitioner. He is named in his official capacity.

17. The true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, of the Defendants-Respondents named herein as Does 1 through 5 are unknown to Plaintiff-Petitioner, who therefore sues said Respondents by such fictitious names, and Petitioner will amend this Complaint to show their true names and capacities when ascertained. Does 1 through 5 are the immediate, physical custodians of Plaintiff-Petitioner

FACTS RELEVANT TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTIONS

18. Petitioner Melisa Aguilar Centes is a twenty-three-year-old woman who was born in, and is a citizen of, El Salvador. She entered without inspection 12 years ago when she was only 11 years old. See Exhibit A.

19. On 17 September 2025 while at her boyfriend's home Petitioner received a phone call from law enforcement requesting that she return to her house. Exhibit A at 1, ¶7. Petitioner complied with the request.

20. When she arrived at her house, she met with around 10 armed officers who took her into custody without any issue. She was booked and arraigned based on a criminal complaint alleging violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(5) (Access Device Fraud $1,000+ in loss). See Exhibit B. On 17 September 2025 Petitioner was granted a $10,000 bond by an United States magistrate. See Exhibit C.

21. Petitioner posted bond but was taken into ICE custody based on a detainer lodged by ICE before release. Respondents issued a Notice to Appear charging respondents as a non-citizen present in the United States without admission or parole. See Exhibit A at page 12.

22. An indictment was filed against Petitioner and she plead non-guilty on all charges. Her criminal trial is scheduled for June 2026.

23. Petitioner has no prior immigration record.

24. Upon her arrest Respondents transferred Petitioner the Adelanto Detention Facility where she remains detained.

25. Petitioner was not allowed to apply for or post an immigration bond and remain in custody.

26. The Respondents have refused to release Petitioner from custody asserting that she is subject to mandatory detention under section 1225(b).

27. No expedited order of removal was ever entered and served on Petitioner.

28. Petitioner's section 240 removal proceedings are ongoing before the EOIR, Adelanto, CA. Exhibit A at p. 2.

RELEVANT IMMIGRATION STATUTORY SCHEME

Section 1225(b)(1) Expedited Removal Proceedings

29. The expedited removal process, created by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, is codified in INA § 235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(1). The INA permits the DHS to summarily remove non-citizens arriving at a designated U.S. port of entry ('arriving aliens') "without further hearing or review" if they are inadmissible either because they (1) lack valid entry documents, or (2) tried to procure their admission into the United States through fraud or misrepresentation. INA § 235(b)(1) also authorizes—but does not require—DHS to extend application of expedited removal to "certain other aliens" inadmissible on the same grounds if they (1) were not admitted or paroled into the United States by immigration authorities and (2) cannot establish at least two years' continuous physical presence in the United States at the time of apprehension.

30. Respondents have implemented expedited removal mainly for three overarching categories of aliens who lack valid entry documents or attempted to falsely procure admission: (1) arriving aliens (defined by regulation as aliens arriving at U.S. ports of entry); (2) aliens who entered the United States by sea without being admitted or paroled into the United States, and who have been in the country less than two years; and (3) aliens apprehended within 100 miles of the U.S. border within two years of entering the country, and who have not been admitted or paroled.

31. Respondents could not and have not invoked the expedited removal process when they first apprehended Petitioner. See Exhibit A & B.

Regular or 'Section 240' Removal Proceedings

32. The second option for Respondents under the INA is to initiate what is commonly referred to as "section 240" proceedings, the standard mechanism for removing inadmissible and removable noncitizens. Section 240 removal proceedings take place before an immigration judge (IJ), an employee of the Department of Justice who must be a licensed attorney and has a duty to develop the record in cases before them. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1), (b)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a). These are adversarial proceedings in which the noncitizen has the right to hire counsel, file for all relief from removal within the jurisdiction of the immigration judge, examine and present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4). Section 240 proceedings typically take place over the course of multiple hearings., thus allowing time for individuals to gather and present evidence in support of petitions for relief available in immigration court (like asylum, adjustment of status, cancellation of removal, etc.) and to seek collateral relief from other components of the Department of Homeland Security (like U and T visa). See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(B), (c)(4), 1229b.

33. After an IJ renders a decision, either party may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.15, 1003.1. If the Board upholds a removal order, the noncitizen can appeal that decision to a federal court of appeals via a petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

Immigration Detention

34. The INA governs the use of immigration detention both pre- and post-final order. Post-final-order immigration detention is governed by 8 U.S.C § 1231(a); pre-final-order detention by 8 U.S.C. § 1226.

35. In 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1231 Congress created different, but interrelated, comprehensive frameworks for detaining criminal and non-criminal non-citizens.

36. Section 1226 authorizes the detention of non-citizens during removal proceedings: section 1226(a) controls non-criminal aliens' detentions, while section 1226(c) controls criminal aliens' detentions. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)&(c). Once a non-citizen's removal proceedings are completed ICE's detention authority is controlled by section 1231, which also distinguishes between non-criminal and criminal non-citizens. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231.

Section 1226(a) and Non-Criminal Non-citizens During Removal Proceedings

37. The Attorney General has discretion to detain a non-criminal non-citizen "pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States." *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The Attorney General may detain the non-citizen for the duration of the removal proceedings or release him on bond or conditional parole. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2).

38. In connection with § 1226(a), the DHS promulgated regulations setting out the process by which a non-criminal non-citizen may obtain release. The regulations provide that, in order to obtain bond or conditional parole, the "alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose

a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding." *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8).

Section 1226(c) and Criminal Non-citizens
During Removal Proceedings

39. Although the Attorney General has broad discretion to release non-criminal non-citizens during the pendency of their removal proceedings, the INA limits the Attorney General's discretion in the case of criminal non-citizens. Specifically, section 1226(c) mandates that "[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who . . . is deportable by reason of having committed [certain specified offenses]." *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B).

40. Section 1226(c) provides that the Attorney General may release a criminal non-citizen "only if" necessary for narrow witness protection purposes. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2). Under § 1226(c), custody is mandatory for criminal non-citizens throughout the entirety of their removal proceedings, and there is no statutory possibility for release on bond.

41. Petitioner was never detained under the authority of section 1226(c).

42. When a non-citizen is released on bond or under supervision, the non-citizen must periodically appear before an immigration officer, obey written restrictions, and comply with other requirements provided for by regulation. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).

43. When a non-citizen is released on supervision ICE must issue and serve on the individual a standardized form I-220 which imposes the conditions on release.

Petitioner has no criminal record, prior immigration record and has complied with all conditions on release.

Detention Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)

44. Under § 1225(b)(2), "in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). By contrast, an alien arrested on a warrant issued by the Attorney General "may" be detained but is also eligible for release on bond. 8 U.S.C § 1226(a). Courts have repeatedly held that § 1225 applies to arriving aliens, while § 1226 governs detention of "aliens already in the country." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 281 (2018). Neither Petitioner is an arriving alien under § 1225 and in fact Respondents charged both Petitioner as an "alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled" rather than an "arriving alien." See Exhibit A& B [Notice to Appear] (stating Petitioner is charged under INA 212(a)(6)(a), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(6)(a)).

45. The Courts to have addressed the issue have found the Government invocation of the mandatory detention provision under section 1225 unlawful and have ordered release of non-citizens held in detention based of such erroneous reading of the Immigration and Nationality Act and application of § 1225(b) to noncitizens who, like Petitioner, are not apprehended upon arrival in the United States. *See Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz Jr.*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, Dkt 81 (C.D. Cal. Nov 20, 2025); *Rodriguez Vasquez* v. *Bostock,* No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC,---F.Supp.3d---, 2025 WL 1193850 (W.D.Wash. Apr. 24, 2025); *see*

also Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-CV- 11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025) granting habeas based on same ground); *Diaz A1artinez v. Hyde,* No. CV 25-11613-BEM,---F.Supp. 3d---2025 WL 2084238, at *9 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (ordering release where noncitizen was redetained based on ICE's assertion of detention authority under§ 1225(b)); *Helal v. Janecka*, No. 5:25-CV-02650-HDV-JC, 2025 WL 3190132, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (same).

46. Under *Loper Bright v. Raimondo*, this Court should independently interpret the statute and give the BIA's expansive interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) no weight, as it conflicts with the statute, regulations, and precedent. 603 U.S. 369 (2024).

47. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Following IIRIRA, the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") issued regulations clarifying that individuals who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225, but rather under § 1226(a). *See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures*, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) ("Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination").

48. The statutory context and structure also make clear that § 1226 applies to individuals who have not been admitted and entered without inspection. In 2025,

Congress added new mandatory detention grounds to § 1226(c) that apply only to noncitizens who have not been admitted. *See* The Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, § 2, 139 Stat. 3, 3 (2025) (8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)).

49. By specifically referencing inadmissibility for entry without inspection under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(6)(A), Congress made clear that such individuals are otherwise covered by § 1226(a). Thus, § 1226 plainly applies to noncitizens charged as inadmissible, including those present without admission or parole.

50. The Supreme Court has explained that § 1225(b) is concerned "primarily [with those] seeking entry," and is generally imposed "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether [a noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 297, 2987 (2018). In contrast, Section 1226 "authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens *already in the country* pending the outcome of removal proceedings." *Id.* at 289 (emphases added).

51. Furthermore, § 1225(b)(2) specifically applies only to those "seeking admission," and the implementing regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 address noncitizens who are "coming or attempting to come into the United States." The use of the present progressive tense would exclude noncitizens like Petitioner who are apprehended in the interior years after they entered, as they are no longer "seeking admission" or "coming […] into the United States." *See Martinez v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 2084238 at *6 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citing the use of present and present progressive tense to support conclusion that INA § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to individuals apprehended in the interior); *see also Al Otro Lado v. McAleenan*, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1200

(S.D. Cal. 2019) (construing "is arriving" in INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i) and observing that "[t]he use of the present progressive, like use of the present participle, denotes an ongoing process").

52. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to Petitioner, who had entered the U.S. years ago.

COUNT ONE

Detention in Violation of the Fifth Amendment
(substantive due process)
Against all Defendants

53. Petitioner repeats and incorporates by reference all allegations in paragraphs 19 to 52 above.

54. The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. U.S. Const. Amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

55. "Government detention violates the Due Process Clause unless it is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural safeguards, or in certain special and non-punitive circumstances 'where a special justification, . . . outweighs the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.'" *Zavala v. Ridge*, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997)).

56. Respondents cannot show any "special justification" or compelling governmental interest which would outweigh Petitioner' constitutional liberty.

57. Petitioner is not a danger to anyone or flight risk.

58. The governmental interest in the continued detention of these least-dangerous individuals does not and cannot outweigh the liberty interest at stake.

COUNT TWO
Violation of Fifth Amendment Right
Procedural Due Process
Against All Defendants

59. Petitioner repeats and incorporates by reference all allegations in paragraphs 19 to 52 above.

60. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits the federal government from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. V.

61. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Constitution generally requires a hearing before the government deprives a person of liberty or property. *Zinermon v. Burch*, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990).

62. Under the *Mathews v. Eldridge* framework, the balance of interests strongly favors Petitioner's release.

63. Petitioner' private interest in freedom from detention is profound. The interest in being free from physical detention is "the most elemental of liberty interests." *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); *see also Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) ("Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.").

64. The risk of erroneous deprivation is exceptionally high. Petitioner was arrested for violation of section 1029(a) but was found eligible for bond of $10,000 by a magistrate of this Court and is subject to restrictions that assure her appearance for all future proceedings.

65. The government's interest in detaining Petitioner without due process is minimal. Immigration detention is civil, not punitive, and may only be used to prevent danger to the community or ensure appearance at immigration proceedings. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

66. Furthermore, the "fiscal and administrative burdens" of providing Petitioner with a bond hearing are minimal, particularly when weighed against the significant liberty interests at stake. *See Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 334–35.

67. Considering these factors, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court order her immediate release from custody or in the alternative order that he be provided with a bond hearing before an immigration judge where Respondents bear the burden of proof.

COUNT THREE
Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
Unlawful Denial of Release on Bond
Against All Respondents

68. Petitioner repeats and incorporates by reference all allegations in paragraphs 19 to 52 above.

69. Petitioner may be detained, if at all, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under § 1226(a) and its associated regulations, Petitioner are entitled to a bond hearing. *See* 8 C.F.R. 236.1(d) & 1003.19(a)-(f).

70. Petitioner has not been, and will not be, provided with a bond hearing by Respondents as required by law unless the Court so order.

71. Petitioner' continuing detention is therefore unlawful.

COUNT FOUR
Violation of the Bond Regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1 and 1003.19 Against All Respondents

72. Petitioner repeats and incorporates by reference all allegations in paragraphs 19 to 52 above.

73. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the heading of "Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of [Noncitizens]," the agencies explained that "[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination." 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323. The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had entered without inspection were eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing regulations.

74. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates their continued detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

COUNT FIVE

Non-Statutory Ultra Vires Action/Accardi Doctrine Violation Against all Defendants

75. Petitioner repeat and incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 19 to 52 above.

76. There is no statute, constitutional provision, or other source of law that authorizes Respondents to detain Petitioner under the circumstances of this case.

77. Petitioner has a non-statutory right of action to declare unlawful, set aside, and enjoin Respondents' ultra vires actions in holding them in punitive immigration detention without an opportunity to be heard and apply for a bond.

78. Under the *Accardi* doctrine, Petitioner also has a right to set aside agency action that violated agency procedures, rules, or instructions. *See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260 ("If petitioner can prove the allegation [that agency failed to follow its rules in a hearing] he should receive a new hearing").

79. Respondents violated agency regulations governing who and upon what findings it may holding individual without an opportunity for release.

***

SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS

80. Petitioner repeats and incorporates by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 to 79 above.

81. As shown above Petitioner has shown substantial likelihood of success on her statutory and constitutional claims.

IRREPARABLE HARM

82. Petitioner have resided in the United States for extended periods of time and has established deep roots in the communities. Because of her unlawful detention

Petitioner has been separated from family members and experiencing severe emotional distress. See Exhibit A.

83. "It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012). "When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary." *Warsoldier v. Woodford*, 418 F.3d 989, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). Permitting continued violations of federal law would serve "neither equity nor the public interest." *Galvez v. Jaddou*, 52 F.4th 821, 832 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, the public interest weighs in favor of the Petitioner because continued detention without the legal protections afforded by the INA, Due Process, and the prohibition against non-refoulement potentially violates his due process and statutory rights. *See Xuyue Zhang v. Barr*, 612 F.Supp.3d 1005, 1017 (C.D. Cal. 2019) ("Generally, public interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution.").

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner pray that this Court grant the following relief:

(1) Issue a Temporary Restraining Order ordering release of Petitioner pending resolution of this case or in the alternative that Respondents provide them with a constitutionally valid bond hearing before an Immigration Judge;

(2) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus on the ground that Petitioner' continued detention violates the Due Process Clause and order Petitioner' immediate release on reasonable conditions of supervision;

(3) In the alternative, issue injunctive relief ordering Respondents to immediately release Petitioner, on the ground that their respective continued detention violates Plaintiff's constitutional due process rights;

(4) Issue an injunction ordering Respondents not to arrest and detain Petitioner without a proper finding that each has committed a violation of the conditions of release or bond;

(5) Issue an injunction ordering Respondents not revoke Petitioner' grant of release without providing prior written notice, an opportunity to respond, and be represented by counsel prior to deprivation of liberty when the individual is not yet subject to a final order of removal;

(6) Issue an injunction prohibiting the transfer of Petitioner outside of the jurisdictional limits of this Court;

(7) Enter a judgment declaring that Respondents' detention of Petitioner is and will be unauthorized by statute and contrary to law;

(8) Award Petitioner reasonable costs and attorney fees.

Date: 12/30/2025

Verified and Submitted by

_____*s/ Nicolette Glazer Esq.*________
Nicolette Glazer Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF LARRY R GLAZER
2121 Avenue of the Stars #800

Century City, CA 90067
T: 310-407-5353
F: 310-407-5354
nicolette@glazerandglazer.com
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

My name is Melisa Aguilar Centes and I am over 18 years old and the following is my declaration is truth and correct to the best of my knowledge

1. My name is Melisa Aguilar Centes
2. I am from El Salvador.
3. I am 23 years old.
4. I have entered in the United States over 12 years ago.
5. I escaped from my country because I have fear to return to my country.
6. I have court proceeding pending with the immigration court.
7. On 11/17/2025, I was at my boyfriend's home and got a phone call from the law enforcement and told me to go back to my house. When I arrived at my house, there were 10 people there and armed. The law enforcement arrested me at that time and I went to the Federal court for another case and they released me on bond. However, they never released me but turned me to the ICE. They didn't explain to me why I was being arrested by ICE. They took me to Los Angeles ICE detention center.
8. I stayed in Los Angeles for 1 day then they transferred me to Adelanto.
9. I am very sick now at detention center. It is very cold there and I didn't have enough clothes and blankets. I have so much fear inside and I worry so much about my life.
10. There are a lot of people together stayed in the same room.
11. They gave us food that is not eatable at all.
12. I could not sleep at night because I have a lot of pains at my back. My mental health is deteriorating because of the situation
13. I am very depressed and I am under a lot of stress inside.
14. I could not sleep because of my medical condition. It is a nightmare to me about what happened on 11/17/2025. I came to this country to seek refugee because of the country condition in my country. I never expected to have those inhuman treatments like this. When I slept at night, I would have nightmare about what happened on 11/17/2025
15. I miss my family.
16. I feel very helpless and vulnerable under this circumstance and I am so afraid of my life if I continue to stay inside.
17. I need to get out of there since my family needs me.
18. I miss my family and I need your help

- Josue Zuniga for Melisa Aguilar Centes

NOTICE OF HEARING IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
IMMIGRATION COURT
10250 RANCHO RD., SUITE 201A
ADELANTO, CA 92301

RE: AGUILAR-CENTES, MELISA
FILE: [redacted]

DATE: Nov 18, 2025

TO: Law offices of Vivian N Szawarc
Szawarc, Vivian Noemi
4929 Wilshire Blvd.
Suite 820
Los Angeles, CA 90010

Please take notice that the above captioned case has been scheduled for a VIDEO hearing before the Immigration Judge on Dec 23, 2025 at 08:00 A.M.. The alien will be present via tele/video. All other parties and witnesses should report to:

10400 RANCHO ROAD
ADELANTO, CA 92301

You may be represented in these proceedings, at no expense to the Government, by an attorney or other individual who is accredited to represent persons before an Immigration Judge. Your hearing date has not been scheduled earlier than 10 days from the date of service of the Notice to Appear in order to permit you the opportunity to obtain an attorney or representative. If you wish to be represented, your attorney or representative must appear at the hearing prepared to proceed. You can request an earlier hearing in writing.

Failure to appear at your hearing except for exceptional circumstances may result in one or more of the following actions: (1) You may be taken into custody by the Department of Homeland Security and held for further action. OR (2) Your hearing may be held in your absence under section 240(b)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. An order of removal will be entered against you if the Department of Homeland Security established by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence that you or your attorney have been provided this notice and you are removable.

IN THE EVENT YOU ARE RELEASED FROM CUSTODY, WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF YOUR RELEASE, YOU MUST PROVIDE TO THIS IMMIGRATION COURT A WRITTEN NOTICE/EOIR-33 OF THE ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER AT WHICH YOU CAN BE CONTACTED REGARDING THESE PROCEEDINGS. CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE COURT, INCLUDING HEARING NOTICES, WILL BE SENT TO THE MOST RECENT ADDRESS YOU HAVE PROVIDED, AND WILL BE CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO YOU AND THESE PROCEEDINGS CAN GO FORWARD IN YOUR ABSENCE.

A list of free legal service providers has been given to you. For information regarding the status of your case, call toll free 1-800-898-7180 or 304-625-2050.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THIS DOCUMENT WAS SERVED BY: MAIL [M] PERSONAL SERVICE [P] **ELECTRONIC SERVICE [E]**
TO: [ ] ALIEN [ ] ALIEN c/o Custodial Officer [**E**] ALIEN's ATT/REP [**E**] DHS
DATE: ___**11/18/25**____ BY: COURT STAFF __**A. Madera**____________
Attachments: [ ] EOIR-33 [ ] EOIR-28 [ ] Legal Services List [ ] Other
VW

An official website of the United States government

Here's how you know

EOIR Automated Case Information

Court Closures Today December 6, 2025

Please check https://www.justice.gov/eoir-operational-status for up to date closures.

Home > **AGUILAR-CENTES, MELISA (246-060-099)**

Automated Case Information

Name: AGUILAR-CENTES, MELISA | A-Number: [redacted] **| Docket Date: 9/22/2025**

Next Hearing Information

Your upcoming **MASTER** hearing is on **December 23, 2025** at **8:00 AM**.

JUDGE

Maury, Carlos E.

COURT ADDRESS

10400 RANCHO ROAD

ADELANTO, CA 92301

FILED
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
10/7/2025
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BY: RYO DEPUTY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

June 2025 Grand Jury

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. YING LIU and MELISA ABIGAIL AGUILAR-CENTES, Defendants.	CR 2:25-cr-00812-JLS I N D I C T M E N T [18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(5): Access Device Fraud in Excess of $1,000; 18 U.S.C. §§ 982(a)(2) and 1029: Criminal Forfeiture]

The Grand Jury charges:

[18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(5), 2(a)]

Between on or about November 15, 2023, and on or about February 13, 2025, in Los Angeles County, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendants YING LIU and MELISA ABIGAIL AGUILAR-CENTES, each aiding and abetting the other, with access devices (as defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1029(e)(1)) issued to other persons, namely, Target gift card account numbers issued to persons other than defendants LIU and AGUILAR-CENTES, knowingly and with intent to defraud effected transactions affecting interstate and foreign commerce, namely, fraudulent purchases of high-end electronics at Target retail stores, and by such conduct received things of value, their value totaling $1,000 or more within a one-year period.

FORFEITURE ALLEGATION

[18 U.S.C. §§ 982(a)(2) and 1029]

1. Pursuant to Rule 32.2(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, notice is hereby given that the United States will seek forfeiture as part of any sentence, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 982(a)(2) and 1029, in the event of any defendant's conviction of the offense set forth in this Indictment.

2. Any defendant so convicted shall forfeit to the United States of America the following:

(a) All right, title, and interest in any and all property, real or personal, constituting, or derived from, any proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of the offense;

(b) Any personal property used or intended to be used to commit the offense; and

(c) To the extent such property is not available for forfeiture, a sum of money equal to the total value of the property described in subparagraphs (a) and (b).

3. Pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p), as incorporated by Title 18, United States Code, Sections 982(b)(1) and 1029(c)(2), any defendant so convicted shall forfeit substitute property, up to the total value of the property described in the preceding paragraph if, as the result of any act or omission of the defendant, the property described in the preceding paragraph, or any portion thereof: (a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; (b) has been transferred, sold to or deposited with a third party; (c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court; (d) has been substantially diminished in value; or (e) has

been commingled with other property that cannot be divided without difficulty.

A TRUE BILL

/S/
Foreperson

BILAL A. ESSAYLI
Acting United States Attorney

JOSEPH T. MCNALLY
Assistant United States Attorney
Acting Chief, Criminal Division

KRISTEN A. WILLIAMS
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Major Frauds Section

KEVIN B. REIDY
Assistant United States Attorney
Deputy Chief, Major Frauds Section

KALI M. YALLOURAKIS
Assistant United States Attorney
General Crimes Section

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

NOTICE TO APPEAR

DOB: [redacted]

Even[redacted]

In removal proceedings under section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act:

Subject ID: [redacted] FINS: [redacted] File No: [redacted]

In the Matter of:

Respondent: MELISA AGUILAR-CENTES currently residing at:

[redacted]

(Number, street, city, state and ZIP code) (Area code and phone number)

☐ You are an arriving alien.

☒ You are an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.

☐ You have been admitted to the United States, but are removable for the reasons stated below.

The Department of Homeland Security alleges that you:

1. You are not a citizen or national of the United States;
2. You are a native of EL SALVADOR and a citizen of EL SALVADOR;
3. You entered the United States at or near Unknown, on or about unknown date;
4. You were not then admitted or paroled after inspection by an Immigration Officer.

On the basis of the foregoing, it is charged that you are subject to removal from the United States pursuant to the following provision(s) of law:

212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, in that you are an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.

☐ This notice is being issued after an asylum officer has found that the respondent has demonstrated a credible fear of persecution or torture.

☐ Section 235(b)(1) order was vacated pursuant to: ☐ 8CFR 208.30 ☐ 8CFR 235.3(b)(5)(iv)

YOU ARE ORDERED to appear before an immigration judge of the United States Department of Justice at:

10400 RANCHO RD, ADELANTO, CA 92301

(Complete Address of Immigration Court, including Room Number, if any)

on 11/18/2025 at 8:00 AM to show why you should not be removed from the United States based on the
(Date) (Time)

charge(s) set forth above. V 3355 TSARKOV - SDDO

(Signature and Title of Issuing Officer)

Date: September 18, 2025 Los Angeles, CA

(City and State)

EOIR - 1 of 4

Notice to Respondent

Warning: Any statement you make may be used against you in removal proceedings.

Alien Registration: This copy of the Notice to Appear served upon you is evidence of your alien registration while you are in removal proceedings. You are required to carry it with you at all times.

Representation: If you so choose, you may be represented in this proceeding, at no expense to the Government, by an attorney or other individual authorized and qualified to represent persons before the Executive Office for Immigration Review, pursuant to 8 CFR 1003.16. Unless you so request, no hearing will be scheduled earlier than ten days from the date of this notice, to allow you sufficient time to secure counsel. A list of qualified attorneys and organizations who may be available to represent you at no cost will be provided with this notice.

Conduct of the hearing: At the time of your hearing, you should bring with you any affidavits or other documents that you desire to have considered in connection with your case. If you wish to have the testimony of any witnesses considered, you should arrange to have such witnesses present at the hearing. At your hearing you will be given the opportunity to admit or deny any or all of the allegations in the Notice to Appear, including that you are inadmissible or removable. You will have an opportunity to present evidence on your own behalf, to examine any evidence presented by the Government, to object, on proper legal grounds, to the receipt of evidence and to cross examine any witnesses presented by the Government. At the conclusion of your hearing, you have a right to appeal an adverse decision by the immigration judge. You will be advised by the immigration judge before whom you appear of any relief from removal for which you may appear eligible including the privilege of voluntary departure. You will be given a reasonable opportunity to make any such application to the immigration judge.

One-Year Asylum Application Deadline: If you believe you may be eligible for asylum, you must file a Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal. The Form I-589, Instructions, and information on where to file the Form can be found at www.uscis.gov/I-589. Failure to file the Form I-589 within one year of arrival may bar you from eligibility to apply for asylum pursuant to section 208(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Failure to appear: You are required to provide the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in writing, with your full mailing address and telephone number. You must notify the Immigration Court and the DHS immediately by using Form EOIR-33 whenever you change your address or telephone number during the course of this proceeding. You will be provided with a copy of this form. Notices of hearing will be mailed to this address. If you do not submit Form EOIR-33 and do not otherwise provide an address at which you may be reached during proceedings, then the Government shall not be required to provide you with written notice of your hearing. If you fail to attend the hearing at the time and place designated on this notice, or any date and time later directed by the Immigration Court, a removal order may be made by the immigration judge in your absence, and you may be arrested and detained by the DHS.

Mandatory Duty to Surrender for Removal: If you become subject to a final order of removal, you must surrender for removal to your local DHS office, listed on the internet at http://www.ice.gov/contact/ero, as directed by the DHS and required by statute and regulation. Immigration regulations at 8 CFR 1241.1 define when the removal order becomes administratively final. If you are granted voluntary departure and fail to depart the United States as required, fail to post a bond in connection with voluntary departure, or fail to comply with any other condition or term in connection with voluntary departure, you must surrender for removal on the next business day thereafter. If you do not surrender for removal as required, you will be ineligible for all forms of discretionary relief for as long as you remain in the United States and for ten years after your departure or removal. This means you will be ineligible for asylum, cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, adjustment of status, change of nonimmigrant status, registry, and related waivers for this period. If you do not surrender for removal as required, you may also be criminally prosecuted under section 243 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

U.S. Citizenship Claims: If you believe you are a United States citizen, please advise the DHS by calling the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center toll free at (855) 448-6903.

Sensitive locations: To the extent that an enforcement action leading to a removal proceeding was taken against Respondent at a location described in 8 U.S.C. § 1229(e)(1), such action complied with 8 U.S.C. § 1367.

Request for Prompt Hearing

To expedite a determination in my case, I request this Notice to Appear be filed with the Executive Office for Immigration Review as soon as possible. I waive my right to a 10-day period prior to appearing before an immigration judge and request my hearing be scheduled.

Before:

____
(Signature of Respondent)

Date: _______________

____
(Signature and Title of Immigration Officer)

Certificate of Service

This Notice To Appear was served on the respondent by me on September 18, 2025, in the following manner and in compliance with section 239(a)(1) of the Act.

☒ in person ☐ by certified mail, returned receipt # __________ requested ☐ by regular mail

☐ Attached is a credible fear worksheet.

☒ Attached is a list of organization and attorneys which provide free legal services.

The alien was provided oral notice in the English language of the time and place of his or her hearing and of the consequences of failure to appear as provided in section 240(b)(7) of the Act.

REFUSED TO SIGN
(Signature of Respondent if Personally Served)

B 9523 DOMINGUEZ - Deportation Officer
(Signature and Title of officer)

Privacy Act Statement

Authority:
The Department of Homeland Security through U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) are authorized to collect the information requested on this form pursuant to Sections 103, 237, 239, 240, and 290 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended (8 U.S.C. 1103, 1229, 1229a, and 1360), and the regulations issued pursuant thereto.

Purpose:
You are being asked to sign and date this Notice to Appear (NTA) as an acknowledgement of personal receipt of this notice. This notice, when filed with the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), initiates removal proceedings. The NTA contains information regarding the nature of the proceedings against you, the legal authority under which proceedings are conducted, the acts or conduct alleged against you to be in violation of law, the charges against you, and the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated. The NTA also includes information about the conduct of the removal hearing, your right to representation at no expense to the government, the requirement to inform EOIR of any change in address, the consequences for failing to appear, and that generally, if you wish to apply for asylum, you must do so within one year of your arrival in the United States. If you choose to sign and date the NTA, that information will be used to confirm that you received it, and for recordkeeping.

Routine Uses:
For United States Citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, or individuals whose records are covered by the Judicial Redress Act of 2015 (5 U.S.C. § 552a note), your information may be disclosed in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), including pursuant to the routine uses published in the following DHS systems of records notices (SORN): DHS/USCIS/ICE/CBP-001 Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking System of Records, DHS/USCIS-007 Benefit Information System, DHS/ICE-011 Criminal Arrest Records and Immigration Enforcement Records (CARIER), and DHS/ICE-003 General Counsel Electronic Management System (GEMS), and DHS/CBP-023 Border Patrol Enforcement Records (BPER). These SORNs can be viewed at https://www.dhs.gov/system-records-notices-sorns. When disclosed to the DOJ's EOIR for immigration proceedings, this information that is maintained and used by DOJ is covered by the following DOJ SORN: EOIR-001, Records and Management Information System, or any updated or successor SORN, which can be viewed at https://www.justice.gov/opcl/doj-systems-records. Further, your information may be disclosed pursuant to routine uses described in the abovementioned DHS SORNs or DOJ EOIR SORN to federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and foreign law enforcement agencies for enforcement, investigatory, litigation, or other similar purposes.

For all others, as appropriate under United States law and DHS policy, the information you provide may be shared internally within DHS, as well as with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and foreign law enforcement; other government agencies; and other parties for enforcement, investigatory, litigation, or other similar purposes.

Disclosure:
Providing your signature and the date of your signature is voluntary. There are no effects on you for not providing your signature and date; however, removal proceedings may continue notwithstanding the failure or refusal to provide this information.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Continuation Page for Form I-862

Alien's Name	File Number	Date
AGUILAR-CENTES, MELISA	[redacted]	09/18/2025

CURRENTLY RESIDING AT:

[redacted]

Signature	Title
V 3355 TSARKOV	SDDO

EOIR - 4 of 4

4 of 4 Pages

BILAL A. ESSAYLI
First Assistant United States Attorney
ALEXANDER B. SCHWAB
Assistant United States Attorney
Acting Chief, Criminal Division
KEVIN B. REIDY (Cal. Bar No. 320583)
Assistant United States Attorney
Major Frauds Section
1100 United States Courthouse
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
Telephone: (213) 894-8536
Facsimile: (213) 894-0141
E-mail: kevin.reidy@usdoj.gov

Attorneys for Plaintiff
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. YING LIU and MELISA ABIGAIL AGUILAR-CENTES, Defendants.	No. CR 25-00812-JLS STIPULATION REGARDING REQUEST FOR (1) CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL DATE AND (2) FINDINGS OF EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS PURSUANT TO SPEEDY TRIAL ACT **CURRENT TRIAL DATE:** 12/02/25 **PROPOSED TRIAL DATE:** 06/30/26

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, Assistant United States Attorney Kevin B. Reidy, and defendants Ying Liu and Melisa Abigal Aguilar-Centes ("defendants"), both individually and by and through their respective counsel of record, Michael S. Evans and Deputy Federal Public Defender Ryan Shelley, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. The Indictment in this case was filed on October 7, 2025. Defendants first appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which the charges in this case were pending on September 17, 2025.

The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, originally required that the trial commence on or before December 16, 2025.

2. On October 14, 2025, the Court set a trial date of December 2, 2025, and a status conference date of November 21, 2025.

3. Defendants are released on bond pending trial. The parties estimate that the trial in this matter will last approximately 3 days. All defendants are joined for trial and a severance has not been granted.

4. By this stipulation, defendants move to continue the trial date to June 30, 2026. This is the first request for a continuance.

5. Defendants request the continuance based upon the following facts, which the parties believe demonstrate good cause to support the appropriate findings under the Speedy Trial Act:

a. Defendants are charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(5): access device fraud in excess of $1,000. The government has produced discovery to the defense, including dozens of pages of written reports, text messages, surveillance video footage, and photographs.

b. Defense counsel are presently scheduled to be in the following trials:

i. Counsel for defendant Liu has the following trial conflicts:

(I) January 21, 2026, People v. Shane Rayment, Case No. LA094956 (Three week estimate);

(II) January 27, 2026, United States v. Wendy Gutierrez, Case No. 25-CR-213-ODW; and

(III) March 10, 2026, United States v. Lizarraga-Rios, Case No. 25-CR-215-DSF.

Case 2:25-cr-00890 Document 1 Filed 10/22/25 Page 3 of 52 Page ID #:125

ii. Counsel for defendant Aguilar-Centes has the following trial conflicts:

(I) United States v. Gallardo, (2:24-cr-00657-WLH), Charge: 1 count felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), Trial date: 12/8/2025;

(II) United States v. Davis, (2:25-cr-00476-MCS), Charge: 3 counts possession with intent to distribute narcotics (21 U.S.C. § 841); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), Trial Date: 12/9/2025;

(III) USA v. Ketcham, (2:23-po-00718-AS-1) Charges: numerous federal misdemeanor citations, Trial Date: 12/15/2025;

(IV) United States v. Terrazas, (2:25-cr-00500-PA), Charge: 1 count assault on a federal employee using a deadly and dangerous weapon resulting in bodily injury (18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1), (b)), Trial Date: 1/27/2026:

(V) USA v. Enriquez, (2:19-cr-00146-GW-1) Charges: 1 count of possession with intent to distribute heroin (21 U.S.C. § 841), Trial Date: 3/10/2026:

(VI) United States v. McClure (2:23-cr-00304-DMG), Charges: possession of stolen mail (18 U.S.C. § 1708); possession of fifteen or more unauthorized access devices (18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3)); aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028(A)); possession of altered obligation or security with intent to defraud (18 U.S.C. § 472), Trial Date: 3/17/2025

(VII) United States v. Quitugua, (2:25-cr-00527-CAS), Charges: conspiracy to commit mail theft (18 U.S.C. §

Case 2:25-cr-00892-JLS Document 1 Filed 10/30/25 Page 47 of 52 Page ID #:126

371); theft of government property in excess of $1,000 (18 U.S.C. § 641, 2(a)); possession of stolen mail (18 U.S.C. § 1708); possession of fifteen or more unauthorized access devices (18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3)); aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028(A)), Trial Date: 3/24/2026;

(VIII) United States v. Stuart (5:25-cr-00285-MCS-1), Charges: 2 counts felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), Trial Date: 3/31/2025;

(IX) United States v. Wysel (2:24-cr-00428-TJH), Charges: 2 counts possession with intent to distribute fentanyl (21 U.S.C. § 841), Trial Date: 4/14/2026;

(X) United States v. Chacon (2:25-cr-00394-HDV-2) Charge: 1 count mail theft (18 U.S.C. § 1708); Trial Date: 4/14/2026;

(XI) United States v. Scripnic (2:25-cr-00667-MCS), Charge: 1 count stalking (18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A(2)(B), 2261(b)(5)), Trial Date: 5/19/2026; and

(XII) United States v. Sanchez-Lizarraga (2:25-CR-405-HRV); Charges: 1 count conspiracy to import controlled substances (21 U.S.C. § 963), 2 counts possession with intent to distribute narcotics (21 U.S.C. § 841), 1 count alien in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)), 1 count alien found in United States following deportation (8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)), Trial Date: 6/23/2025.

iii. Accordingly, counsel represents that they will not have the time that they believe is necessary to prepare to try this case on the current trial date.

c. In light of the foregoing, counsel for defendants also represent that additional time is necessary to confer with defendants, conduct and complete an independent investigation of the case, conduct and complete additional legal research including for potential pre-trial motions, review the discovery and potential evidence in the case, and prepare for trial in the event that a pretrial resolution does not occur. Defense counsel represent that failure to grant the continuance would deny them reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. Defendants believe that failure to grant the continuance will deny them continuity of counsel and adequate representation.

e. The government does not object to the continuance.

f. The requested continuance is not based on congestion of the Court's calendar, lack of diligent preparation on the part of the attorney for the government or the defense, or failure on the part of the attorney for the Government to obtain available witnesses.

6. For purposes of computing the date under the Speedy Trial Act by which defendant's trial must commence, the parties agree that the time period of October 27, 2025, to June 30, 2026, inclusive, should be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (h)(7)(B)(i), and (h)(7)(B)(iv) because the delay results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request, without government objection, on the basis of the Court's finding that: (i) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant in a speedy trial; (ii) failure

to grant the continuance would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice; and (iii) failure to grant the continuance would unreasonably deny defendant continuity of counsel and would deny defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

7. Further, the parties have agreed to the following briefing schedule for any pretrial motions: (1) any motions shall be filed by April 3, 2026; (2) any oppositions shall be filed by April 17, 2026; and (3) any replies shall be filed by April 24, 2026.

8. Nothing in this stipulation shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods be excluded from the period within which trial must commence. Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act may in the future authorize the exclusion of additional time periods from the period within which trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: November 5, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

BILAL A. ESSAYLI
First Assistant United States Attorney

ALEXANDER B. SCHWAB
Assistant United States Attorney
Acting Chief, Criminal Division

/s/
KEVIN B. REIDY
Assistant United States Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

I am YING LIU's attorney. I have carefully discussed every part of this stipulation and the continuance of the trial date with my client. I have fully informed my client of her Speedy Trial rights. To my knowledge, my client understands those rights and agrees to waive them. I believe that my client's decision to give up the right to be brought to trial earlier than June 30, 2026, is an informed and voluntary one.

11/10/25

MICHAEL S. EVANS
Attorney for Defendant
YING LIU

Date

I have read this stipulation and have carefully discussed it with my attorney. This agreement has been read to me in Mandarin, the language I understand best, and I have carefully discussed every part of it with my attorney. I understand my Speedy Trial rights. I voluntarily agree to the continuance of the trial date, and give up my right to be brought to trial earlier than June 30, 2026. I understand that I will be ordered to appear in Courtroom 8A of the Federal Courthouse, 350 W. 1st Street, Los Angeles, California, on June 30, 2026, at 9:00 a.m.

11/10/25

YING LIU
Defendant

Date

I, DANNA Xiong, am fluent in the written and spoken English and Mandarin languages. I accurately translated this entire agreement from English into Mandarin to defendant YING LIU on this date.

INTERPRETER DANNA Xiong

Date 10/16/2025

I am MELISA ABIGAIL AGUILAR-CENTES's attorney. I have carefully discussed every part of this stipulation and the continuance of the trial date with my client. I have fully informed my client of her Speedy Trial rights. To my knowledge, my client understands those rights and agrees to waive them. I believe that my client's decision to give up the right to be brought to trial earlier than June 30, 2026, is an informed and voluntary one.

RYAN SHELLEY Deputy Federal Public Defender Attorney for Defendant MELISA ABIGAIL AGUILAR-CENTES	11/13/25 Date

I have read this stipulation and have carefully discussed it with my attorney. I understand my Speedy Trial rights. I voluntarily agree to the continuance of the trial date, and give up my right to be brought to trial earlier than June 30, 2026. I understand that I will be ordered to appear in Courtroom 8A of the Federal Courthouse, 350 W. 1st Street, Los Angeles, California on June 30, 2026, at 9:00 a.m.

MELISA ABIGAIL AGUILAR-CENTES Defendant	11/13/25 Date