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12 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
13
14

15 RAJESH LNU,
16 Petitioner,
17 v.
18 MARK BOWEN, *et al.*,
19 Respondents.

No. 5:25-cv-03384-AH-SK

**FEDERAL RESPONDENTS'
OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S *EX*
PARTE APPLICATION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

Honorable Anne Hwang
United States District Judge

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I. INTRODUCTION

Respondents hereby oppose Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“Petition”) [Dkt. 1] and *ex parte* application for Preliminary Injunction Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) [Dkt. 2]. Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief compelling the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) to conduct bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or for the United States (“U.S.”) Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to release them. However, the government reiterates here the legal position it has taken in the *Bautista* case presided over by the Honorable Judge Sykes, Case no. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM. Judge Sykes granted the *ex parte* TRO application in *Bautista* via order issued on July 28, 2025, requiring a Section 1226(a) bond hearing to be provided to the petitioners within seven days [Dkt. 14]. More recently in *Bautista*, Judge Sykes granted summary judgment on November 20, 2025 [Dkt. 81], and subsequently granted class certification on November 25, 2025 [Dkt. 82].

While this issue is not yet resolved, it appears that (a) other habeas actions should now be stayed or dismissed pending resolution of *Bautista*; since the certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class precludes individual suits (like this) for the same injunctive or declaratory relief; and (b) the class certification order is not a “declaratory judgment” because a court cannot grant declaratory relief prior to the entry of a final judgment, *i.e.*, a declaratory judgment. *See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.*, 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (“prior to final judgment there is no established declaratory remedy comparable to a preliminary injunction”).

In any event, the same legal issue at issue in *Bautista* has subsequently been raised and resolved in this District in a series of other cases including: *Jose Ramon Zaragoza v. Kristi Noem, et al.*, 5:25-cv-02925-HDV-PVC, Dkt. no. 8 (November 11, 2025 order granting TRO for bond hearings); *Javier Ceja Gonzalez, et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al.*, 5:25-cv-02054-ODW-ADS, *Ruben Benitez et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al.*, 5:25-cv-02190-RGK-AS, and *Miguel Portillo, et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al.*, 5:25-cv-02892-JFW-PVC (October 31, 2025 order granting temporary restraining order) [Dkt. no. 7]. Judge Wilson

1 issued an order finding that such detentions are governed by § 1225(b)(2). *See*
2 *Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons et al.*, 2:25-cv-09785-SVW-AJR (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025)
3 (denying application for bond hearing by TRO) [Dkt. no. 8]. Likewise, in an even more
4 recent decision, Judge Blumenfeld, Jr., denied a TRO finding detentions are governed by
5 § 1225(b)(2), and not § 1226(a). *See Hernandez Cruz v. Noem et al.*, 2:25-cv- 8:25-cv-
6 02566-SB-MAA (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) (denying application for bond hearing by
7 TRO) [Dkt. no. 11].

8 The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has ruled on this issue by order dated
9 September 5, 2025, in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). After
10 detailed analysis, the BIA determined that based on the plain language of section
11 235(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2018),
12 Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who
13 are present in the United States without admission. Like the *Altamiranos Ramos* and
14 *Hernandez Cruz* decisions, other District Courts have followed the BIA’s approach. *See*
15 *Barrios Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-cv-01467, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31,
16 2025); *Cirrus Rojas v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-1437-bhl, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wis. Oct.
17 30, 2025); *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept.
18 30, 2025); *Chavez v. Noem*, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24,
19 2025).

20 In sum, to the extent Petitioner would be entitled to any remedy via the TRO
21 Application, at most it would be ordering a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge
22 under Section 1226(a), consistent with what Judge Sykes ordered in the *Bautista* case,
23 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, and not immediate release free of any restrictions.
24 Respondents will reiterate their arguments on the legal claims below, having noted the
25 various prior rulings on these legal issues set forth above.

26 **II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND**

27 **A. Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225**

28 Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” who are defined as “alien[s]

1 present in the United States who [have] not been admitted” or “who arrive[] in the
2 United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission “fall into one of two
3 categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” *Jennings*
4 *v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

5 Section 1225(b)(1) applies to arriving aliens and “certain other” aliens “initially
6 determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid
7 documentation.” *Id.*; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii). These aliens are generally subject
8 to expedited removal proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if the alien
9 “indicates an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution,” immigration
10 officers will refer the alien for a credible fear interview. *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). An alien
11 with “a credible fear of persecution” is “detained for further consideration of the
12 application for asylum.” *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). If the alien does not indicate an intent to
13 apply for asylum, express a fear of persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” he
14 is detained until removed. *Id.* §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(iii)(IV).

15 Section 1225(b)(2) is “broader” and “serves as a catchall provision.” *Jennings*,
16 583 U.S. at 287. It “applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).”
17 *Id.* Under § 1225(b)(2), an alien “who is an applicant for admission” shall be detained
18 for a removal proceeding “if the examining immigration officer determines that [the]
19 alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8
20 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66, 68 (BIA 2025) (“for
21 aliens arriving in and seeking admission into the United States who are placed directly in
22 full removal proceedings, section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A),
23 mandates detention ‘until removal proceedings have concluded.’”) (citing *Jennings*, 583
24 U.S. at 299). Still, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has the sole
25 discretionary authority to temporarily release on parole “any alien applying for
26 admission to the United States” on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons
27 or significant public benefit.” *Id.* § 1182(d)(5)(A); *see Biden v. Texas*, 597 U.S. 785, 806
28 (2022).

B. Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

Section 1226 provides for arrest and detention “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under § 1226(a), the government may detain an alien during his removal proceedings, release him on bond, or release him on conditional parole.¹ By regulation, immigration officers can release aliens if the alien demonstrates that he “would not pose a danger to property or persons” and “is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). An alien can also request a custody redetermination (i.e., a bond hearing) by an immigration judge (“IJ”) at any time before a final order of removal is issued. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1), 1003.19.

At a custody redetermination, the IJ may continue detention or release the alien on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1). IJs have broad discretion in deciding whether to release an alien on bond. *In re Guerra*, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 39–40 (BIA 2006) (listing nine factors for IJs to consider). But regardless of the factors IJs consider, an alien “who presents a danger to persons or property should not be released during the pendency of removal proceedings.” *Id.* at 38.

C. Review at the Board of Immigration Appeals

The BIA is an appellate body within the EOIR. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). Members of the BIA possess delegated authority from the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1). The BIA is “charged with the review of those administrative adjudications under the [INA] that the Attorney General may by regulation assign to it,” including IJ custody determinations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1), 236.1; 1236.1. The BIA not only resolves particular disputes before it, but also “through precedent decisions, [it] shall provide clear and uniform guidance to DHS, the immigration judges, and the

¹ Being “conditionally paroled under the authority of § 1226(a)” is distinct from being “paroled into the United States under the authority of § 1182(d)(5)(A).” *Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales*, 501 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that because release on “conditional parole” under § 1226(a) is not a parole, the alien was not eligible for adjustment of status under § 1255(a)).

1 general public on the proper interpretation and administration of the [INA] and its
2 implementing regulations.” *Id.* § 1003.1(d)(1). “The decision of the [BIA] shall be final
3 except in those cases reviewed by the Attorney General.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7).

4 **III. ARGUMENT**

5 **A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Entertain Petitioner’s Actions under 8** 6 **U.S.C. § 1252.**

7 As a threshold matter, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and (b)(9) preclude review of
8 Petitioner’s claims. Accordingly, Petitioner is unable to show a likelihood of success on
9 the merits.

10 *First*, Section 1252(g) specifically deprives courts of jurisdiction, including
11 habeas corpus jurisdiction, to review “any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien
12 arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to [1] *commence*
13 *proceedings*, [2] adjudicate cases, or [3] execute removal orders against any alien under
14 this chapter.”² 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added). Section 1252(g) eliminates
15 jurisdiction “[e]xcept as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision
16 of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code,
17 or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title.”³ Except
18 as provided in § 1252, courts “cannot entertain challenges to the enumerated executive
19 branch decisions or actions.” *E.F.L. v. Prim*, 986 F.3d 959, 964–65 (7th Cir. 2021).

20 Section 1252(g) also bars district courts from hearing challenges to the *method* by
21 which the Secretary of Homeland Security chooses to commence removal proceedings,
22 including the decision to detain an alien pending removal. *See Alvarez v. ICE*, 818 F.3d
23 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2016) (“By its plain terms, [§ 1252(g)] bars us from questioning

24
25 ² Much of the Attorney General’s authority has been transferred to the Secretary of
Homeland Security and many references to the Attorney General are understood to refer
to the Secretary. *See Clark v. Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371, 374 n.1 (2005)

26 ³ Congress initially passed § 1252(g) in the IIRIRA, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat.
27 3009. In 2005, Congress amended § 1252(g) by adding “(statutory or nonstatutory),
28 including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus
provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title” after “notwithstanding any other
provision of law.” REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 231, 311.

1 ICE’s discretionary decisions to commence removal” and also to review “ICE’s decision
2 to take [plaintiff] into custody and to detain him during removal proceedings”).

3 Petitioner’s claim stems from his detention during removal proceedings. That
4 detention arises from the decision to commence such proceedings against them. *See, e.g.,*
5 *Valencia-Mejia v. United States*, 2008 WL 4286979, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2008)
6 (“The decision to detain plaintiff until his hearing before the Immigration Judge arose
7 from this decision to commence proceedings[.]”); *Wang v. United States*, 2010 WL
8 11463156, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2010); *Tazu v. Att’y Gen. U.S.*, 975 F.3d 292, 298–
9 99 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and (b)(9) deprive district court of
10 jurisdiction to review action to execute removal order).

11 As other courts have held, “[f]or the purposes of § 1252, the Attorney General
12 commences proceedings against an alien when the alien is issued a Notice to Appear
13 before an immigration court.” *Herrera-Correra v. United States*, 2008 WL 11336833, at
14 *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2008). “The Attorney General may arrest the alien against whom
15 proceedings are commenced and detain that individual until the conclusion of those
16 proceedings.” *Id.* at *3. “Thus, an alien’s detention throughout this process arises from
17 the Attorney General’s decision to commence proceedings” and review of claims arising
18 from such detention is barred under § 1252(g). *Id.* (citing *Sissoko v. Rocha*, 509 F.3d
19 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2007)); *Wang*, 2010 WL 11463156, at *6; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). As
20 such, judicial review of the Application and Petition is barred by § 1252(g). The Court
21 should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

22 *Second*, under § 1252(b)(9), “judicial review of all questions of law . . . including
23 interpretation and application of statutory provisions . . . arising from any action
24 taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States” is only proper before the
25 appropriate federal court of appeals in the form of a petition for review of a final
26 removal order. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); *Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination*
27 *Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). Section 1252(b)(9) is an “unmistakable ‘zipper’
28 clause” that “channels judicial review of all [claims arising from deportation

proceedings]” to a court of appeals in the first instance. *Id.*; see *Lopez v. Barr*, No. CV 20-1330 (JRT/BRT), 2021 WL 195523, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 20, 2021) (citing *Nasrallah v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 573, 579–80 (2020)).

Moreover, § 1252(a)(5) provides that a petition for review is the exclusive means for judicial review of immigration proceedings:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), . . .

a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this chapter, except as provided in subsection (e) [concerning aliens not admitted to the United States].

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). “Taken together, § 1252(a)(5) and § 1252(b)(9) mean that *any* issue—whether legal or factual—arising from *any* removal-related activity can be reviewed *only* through the [petition-for-review] process.” *J.E.F.M. v. Lynch*, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original); see *id.* at 1035 (“§§ 1252(a)(5) and [(b)(9)] channel review of all claims, including policies-and-practices challenges . . . whenever they ‘arise from’ removal proceedings”); accord *Ruiz v. Mukasey*, 552 F.3d 269, 274 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009) (only when the action is “unrelated to any removal action or proceeding” is it within the district court’s jurisdiction); cf. *Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice*, 434 F.3d 144, 151 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (a “primary effect” of the REAL ID Act is to “limit all aliens to one bite of the apple” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Critically, “[§] 1252(b)(9) is a judicial channeling provision, not a claim-barring one.” *Aguilar v. ICE*, 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007). Indeed, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) provides that “[n]othing . . . in any other provision of this chapter . . . shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.” See also *Ajlani v. Chertoff*, 545 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[J]urisdiction to review such claims is vested exclusively in the courts of appeals[.]”). The petition-for-review

process before the court of appeals ensures that aliens have a proper forum for claims arising from their immigration proceedings and “receive their day in court.” *J.E.F.M.*, 837 F.3d at 1031–32 (internal quotations omitted); *see also Rosario v. Holder*, 627 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The REAL ID Act of 2005 amended the [IIRIRA] to obviate . . . Suspension Clause concerns” by permitting judicial review of “nondiscretionary” BIA determinations and “all constitutional claims or questions of law.”).

As such, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action.

B. Even Assuming Jurisdiction, Petitioner Fails to Meet the High Bar for Injunctive Relief.

1. Petitioner is Unable to Show a Likelihood of Success on the Merits.

a. Under the Plain Text of § 1225, Petitioner Must Be Detained Pending the Outcome of His Removal Proceedings.

Petitioner is an “applicant for admission,” subject to mandatory detention under the plain text of § 1225. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)–(b). “Section 1225 governs the inspection, detention, and removal of aliens seeking admission into the United States.” *Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-CV-01467, 2025 WL 3048926, at *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025). The statute defines “an applicant for admission” broadly:

An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . .) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Section 1225 requires mandatory detention of an applicant for admission if “the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” *Id.* § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Section 1225’s definition of “an applicant for admission” is controlling. *See Stenberg v. Carhart*, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000) (“When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.”). As relevant here, an alien is “deemed” to be “an applicant for admission” if

1 he is present in the United States without having been admitted. This unambiguously
2 broad statute does not distinguish among unadmitted individuals who are present in the
3 U.S. for one hour, one day, one year, or one decade. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Nor does
4 it distinguish between those who arrive in the U.S. for inspection and those who cross
5 the border without inspection. In this case, Petitioner does not dispute the fact that he
6 entered the U.S. unlawfully and is present without having been admitted (Petition at 4).
7 Consequently, he is an “applicant[] for admission” under § 1225(a), subject to
8 mandatory detention under § 1225(b). *See Sandoval*, 2025 WL 3048926, at *3
9 (inadmissible aliens under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) are “applicants for admission”).

10 The Court should reject Petitioner’s argument that § 1226(a) governs his detention
11 instead of § 1225. When there is “an irreconcilable conflict in two legal provisions,” then
12 “the specific governs over the general.” *Karczewski v. DCH Mission Valley LLC*, 862
13 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017). § 1226(a) “applies to aliens “arrested and detained
14 pending a decision” on removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). In contrast, § 1225 is narrower. *See*
15 8 U.S.C. § 1225. It applies only to “applicants for admission”; that is, as relevant here,
16 aliens present in the United States who have not be admitted. *See id.*; *see also Florida v.*
17 *United States*, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2023). Because Petitioner falls
18 within that category, the specific detention authority under § 1225 governs over the
19 general authority found at § 1226(a).

20 Section 1226(a) applies more generally than § 1225 because it consists of those
21 “who enter lawfully but later become inadmissible.” *Sandoval*, 2025 WL 3048926, at *4.
22 Section 1225(a) differs because it applies specifically to individuals like Petitioner who
23 is deemed an applicant for admission. In these situations, the specific provision controls
24 over the more general one. *See id.*; *see also Altamirano Ramos*, 2025 WL 3199872, at *6
25 (applying this canon of statutory interpretation to §§ 1225 and 1226); *Hernandez Cruz v.*
26 *Noem et al.*, 2:25-cv- 8:25-cv-02566-SB-MAA (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) (denying
27 application for bond hearing by TRO) [Dkt. no. 11]; *United States v. Brumbaugh*, 139
28 F.4th 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2025) (noting that the “well established canon of statutory

1 interpretation . . . that the specific governs the general . . . applies especially where, as
2 here, Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme and has deliberately targeted
3 specific problems with specific solutions”) (cleaned up).

4 Section 1225(b)(2)(A) clearly applies to Petitioner because the definition of an
5 “applicant for admission,” expressly includes those present in the U.S. without
6 inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1); *see Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287 (2018) (noting that
7 § 1225(b)(2) is “a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not
8 covered by § 1225(b)(1) [i.e., those who arrive for inspection]”); *see also Torres*, 976
9 F.3d at 928 (noting that Congress eliminated the distinction between those entering the
10 United States with or without inspection).

11 The BIA recently analyzed and decided this legal issue in its order issued on
12 September 5, 2025, in *Matter of Jonathan Javier Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216
13 (BIA 2025). After detailed analysis, the BIA determined that based on the plain language
14 of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
15 1225(b)(2)(A) (2018), Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to
16 grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission. Other
17 District Courts have followed the BIA’s approach. *See Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons et al.*,
18 2:25-cv-09785-SVW-AJR (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (denying application for bond
19 hearing by TRO) [Dkt. no. 8]; *See Barrios Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-cv-01467, 2025
20 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025); *Cirrus Rojas v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-1437-bhl,
21 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025); *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, --- F.Supp.3d ----,
22 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025); *Chavez v. Noem*, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025
23 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025).

24 “[T]he BIA is the subject-matter expert in immigration bond decisions.” *Aden v.*
25 *Nielsen*, 2019 WL 5802013, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2019). The BIA is well-
26 positioned to assess how agency practice affects the interplay between 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225
27 and 1226. *See Delgado v. Sessions*, 2017 WL 4776340, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15,
28 2017) (noting a denial of bond to an immigration detainee was “a question well suited

1 for agency expertise”); *Matter of M-S-*, 27 I&N Dec. 509, 515-18 (2019) (addressing
2 interplay of §§ 1225(b)(1) and 1226).

3 The BIA’s decision in *Matter of Yajure* is based upon and consistent with the
4 governing statutory language. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), an “applicant for admission” is
5 defined as an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
6 arrives in the United States.” Applicants for admission “fall into one of two categories,
7 those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at
8 287. Section 1225(b)(2)—the provision relevant here—is the “broader” of the two. *Id.* It
9 “serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by
10 § 1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not relevant here).” *Id.* And § 1225(b)(2)
11 mandates detention. *Id.* at 297; *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I & N.
12 Dec. at 69 (“[A]n applicant for admission who is arrested and detained without a warrant
13 while arriving in the United States, whether or not at a port of entry, and subsequently
14 placed in removal proceedings is detained under section 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
15 § 1225(b), and is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under section 236(a) of
16 the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).”). Section 1225(b) therefore applies because Petitioner is
17 present in the United States without being admitted.

18 The BIA has long recognized that “many people who are not *actually* requesting
19 permission to enter the United States in the ordinary sense are nevertheless deemed to be
20 ‘seeking admission’ under the immigration laws.” *Matter of Lemus-Losa*, 25 I. & N.
21 Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012). Statutory language “is known by the company it keeps.”
22 *Marquez-Reyes v. Garland*, 36 F.4th 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting *McDonnell v.*
23 *United States*, 579 U.S. 550, 569 (2016)). The phrase “seeking admission” in
24 § 1225(b)(2)(A) must be read in the context of the definition of “applicant for
25 admission” in § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission are both those individuals present
26 without admission and those who arrive in the United States. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).
27 Both are understood to be “seeking admission” under §1225(a)(1). *See Lemus-Losa*, 25 I.
28 & N. Dec. at 743. Congress made that clear in § 1225(a)(3), which requires all aliens

1 “who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission” to be inspected by
2 immigration officers. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). The word “or” here “introduce[s] an
3 appositive—a word or phrase that is synonymous with what precedes it (‘Vienna or
4 Wien,’ ‘Batman or the Caped Crusader’).” *United States v. Woods*, 571 U.S. 31, 45
5 (2013).

6 The court’s decision in *Florida v. United States* is instructive here. The district
7 court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) mandates detention of applicants for admission
8 throughout removal proceedings, rejecting the assertion that DHS has discretion to
9 choose to detain an applicant for admission under either section 1225(b) or 1226(a).
10 *Florida v. United States*, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2023), *appeal dismissed*,
11 2023 WL 5212561 (11th Cir. July 11, 2023). Such discretion “would render mandatory
12 detention under § 1225(b) meaningless. Indeed, the 1996 expansion of § 1225(b) to
13 include illegal border crossers would make little sense if DHS retained discretion to
14 apply § 1226(a) and release illegal border crossers whenever the agency saw fit.” *Id.* The
15 court pointed to *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003), in which the Supreme Court
16 explained that “wholesale failure” by the federal government motivated the 1996
17 amendments to the INA. *Florida*, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275. The court also relied on,
18 *Matter of M-S-*, 27 I&N Dec. 509, 516 (A.G. 2019), in which the Attorney General
19 explained “section [1225] (under which detention is mandatory) and section [1226(a)]
20 (under which detention is permissive) can be reconciled only if they apply to different
21 classes of aliens.” *Florida*, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275.

22 *b. Congress did not intend to treat individuals who unlawfully*
23 *enter the country better than those who appear at a port of*
24 *entry.*

25 When the plain text of a statute is clear, “that meaning is controlling” and courts
26 “need not examine legislative history.” *Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp.*, 659 F.3d
27 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2011). But to the extent legislative history is relevant here, nothing
28 “refutes the plain language” of § 1225. *Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 671 F.3d

1 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2011). Section 1225 was added by Congress under the IIRIRA to
2 correct “an anomaly whereby immigrants who were attempting to lawfully enter the
3 United States were in a worse position than persons who had crossed the border
4 unlawfully.” *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc), *declined to*
5 *extend by*, *United States v. Gambino-Ruiz*, 91 F.4th 981 (9th Cir. 2024). It “intended to
6 replace certain aspects of the [then] current ‘entry doctrine,’ under which illegal aliens
7 who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in
8 immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for
9 inspection at a port of entry.” *Id.* (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225). The Court
10 should reject Petitioner’s interpretation because it would put aliens who “crossed the
11 border unlawfully” in a better position than those “who present themselves for inspection
12 at a port of entry.” *Id.* Aliens who presented at port of entry would be subject to
13 mandatory detention under § 1225, but those who crossed illegally would be eligible for
14 a bond under § 1226(a).

15 Nothing in the Laken Riley Act (“LRA”) changes the analysis. Redundancies in
16 statutory drafting are “common . . . sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly
17 sure.” *Barton v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 222, 239 (2020). The LRA arose after an inadmissible
18 alien “was paroled into this country through a shocking abuse of that power.” 171 Cong.
19 Rec. H278 (daily ed. Jan 22, 2025) (statement of Rep. McClintock). Congress passed it
20 out of concern that the executive branch “ignore[d] its fundamental duty under the
21 Constitution to defend its citizens.” *Id.* at H269 (statement of Rep. Roy). One member
22 even expressed frustration that “every illegal alien is currently required to be detained by
23 current law throughout the pendency of their asylum claims.” *Id.* at H278 (statement of
24 Rep. McClintock). The LRA reflects a “congressional effort to be doubly sure” that such
25 unlawful aliens are detained. *Barton*, 590 U.S. at 239.

26 *c. Prior agency practices are not entitled to deference under*
27 *Loper Bright.*

28 The asserted longstanding agency practice carries little, if any, weight under *Loper*

1 *Bright*. The weight given to agency interpretations “must always ‘depend upon their
2 thoroughness, the validity of their reasoning, the consistency with earlier and later
3 pronouncements, and all those factors which give them power to persuade.’” *Loper*
4 *Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 432–33 (2024) (quoting *Skidmore v. Swift &*
5 *Co.*, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (cleaned up)). And here, the agency provided no analysis
6 to support its reasoning. *See* 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323. To be sure, “when the best reading
7 of a statute is that it delegates discretionary authority to an agency,” the Court must
8 “independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress.” *Loper Bright*,
9 603 U.S. at 395 (cleaned up). But read most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate
10 detention for applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded.
11 *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297. Petitioner thus cannot show a likelihood of success on the
12 merits.

13 2. The Balance of Hardships Favors Respondents

14 Where the moving party only raises “serious questions going to the merits,” the
15 balance of hardships must “tip sharply” in his favor. *All. for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632
16 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting *The Lands Council v. McNair*, 537 F.3d
17 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008)). Petitioner fails to do so here. *See id.*

18 Here, the government has a compelling interest in the steady enforcement of its
19 immigration laws. *See Miranda v. Garland*, 34 F.4th 338, 365–66 (4th Cir. 2022)
20 (vacating an injunction that required a “broad change” in immigration bond procedure);
21 *Ubiquity Press Inc. v. Baran*, No 8:20-cv-01809-JLS-DFM, 2020 WL 8172983, at *4
22 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2020) (“the public interest in the United States’ enforcement of its
23 immigration laws is high”); *United States v. Arango*, CV 09-178 TUC DCB, 2015 WL
24 11120855, at 2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 7, 2015) (“the Government’s interest in enforcing
25 immigration laws is enormous.”). Accordingly, Petitioner’s requests for broad injunctive
26 relief that essentially immunizes them broadly from immigration laws is inappropriate,
27 and it certainly is not narrowly tailored to the harm asserted: that he is being held in
28 immigration detention despite allegedly not posing a criminal danger or flight risk. As

1 noted above, at most it would support a request for a prompt bond hearing before an
2 Immigration Judge.

3 **C. Petitioner’s Request for a Court Order Prohibiting His Transfer From**
4 **This District Should Be Denied.**

5 Petitioner fails to carry his demanding burden to establish entitlement to the
6 extraordinary remedy of a Court Order constraining the government’s discretion to
7 decide where to place immigration detainees like himself. Furthermore, he does not and
8 cannot establish that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm caused by such a transfer to a
9 detention facility outside of the Central District of California.

10 1. The Law and Facts Do Not Clearly Favor Petitioner.

11 The government may detain aliens pending their removal pursuant to a removal
12 order. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1), the Executive has great discretion in deciding where
13 to detain aliens. The INA precludes review of “any . . . decision or action of the Attorney
14 General . . . the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the
15 discretion of the Attorney General . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Therefore,
16 § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars relief that would impact where and when to detain Petitioner.
17 *See Van Dinh v. Reno*, 197 F.3d 427, 433–34 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing *Rios-Berrios v.*
18 *INS*, 776 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1985)) (finding that judicial review of decision to
19 transfer a detainee is inappropriate due to lack of jurisdiction).

20 In *Van Dinh*, the noncitizen-plaintiffs were incarcerated at a facility in Colorado,
21 where they were notified of the “distinct possibility” that they would be transferred to
22 another facility. *See* 197 F.3d at 429. Plaintiffs filed a *Bivens* class action complaint
23 requesting injunctive relief restraining all noncitizen transfers until local counsel had an
24 opportunity to interview their clients and injunctive relief restraining transfer outside the
25 area of those noncitizens with an established attorney-client relationship. *See id.* There,
26 the Tenth Circuit concluded that “the district court had no jurisdiction to review the
27 Attorney General’s discretionary decision to transfer and detain appellants in another
28 INS facility under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)” and thus no *Bivens* class action was available. *Id.*

1 at 435. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that “[t]he Attorney General is
2 mandated to ‘arrange for appropriate places of detention for [noncitizens] detained
3 pending removal.’” *Id.* at 433 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1)). “The Attorney General’s
4 discretionary power to transfer [noncitizens] from one locale to another, as [he or] she
5 deems appropriate, arises from this language.” *Id.* Thus, it is “apparent that a district
6 court has no jurisdiction to restrain the Attorney General’s power to transfer
7 [noncitizens] to appropriate facilities by granting injunctive relief in a Bivens class
8 action suit.” *Id.*

9 Judicial intervention in this case is not proper with respect to the government’s
10 decision about where to detain Petitioner.

11 2. Petitioner Also Fails to Show That He Is Likely to Suffer Serious
12 Irreparable Harm by Being Transferred to Outside of the District.

13 Petitioner also has not demonstrated that he will suffer irreparable injury if he is
14 transferred to a detention facility outside of this District pending the resolution of his
15 removal proceedings. To show irreparable harm, he must demonstrate “immediate
16 threatened injury.” *Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldrige*, 844 F.2d 668, 674
17 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing *L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League*, 634 F.2d
18 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980)). Merely showing a “possibility” of irreparable harm is
19 insufficient. *See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).

20 As a threshold matter, if this Court had jurisdiction when the Petition was filed,
21 then axiomatically any later transfer of Petitioner to a detention facility in another
22 District within the United States would not end that jurisdiction. A writ of habeas corpus
23 operates not upon the prisoner, but upon the prisoner’s custodian. *See Braden v. 30th*
24 *Jud. Circuit Ct. of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 494–495 (1973). Jurisdiction over a § 2241
25 petition attaches when a petitioner files a petition in his district of confinement and
26 names his custodian. *See Mujahid v. Daniels*, 413 F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2005)
27 (“jurisdiction attaches on the initial filing for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed
28 by a transfer of the petitioner and the accompanying custodial change.”); *see also*,

1 *Acosta v. Doerer*, No. 5:24-cv-01630-SPG-SSC, 2024 WL 4800878, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
2 Oct. 24, 2024) (holding that the district court maintained jurisdiction even after
3 immigration detainee petitioner was transferred from one federal facility to another);
4 *Rincon-Corrales v. Noem*, No. 2:25-cv-00801-APG-DJA, 2025 WL 1342851, at *2 (D.
5 Nev. May 8, 2025) (“[O]nce a petitioner has properly filed a habeas petition in the
6 district of confinement, any subsequent transfer does not strip the filing district of habeas
7 jurisdiction.”). There is no basis to enjoin transfer outside of this District on this point,
8 and Petitioner fails to establish any specific serious and irreparable harm that would arise
9 from his potentially being detained outside of the Central District.

10 Finally, the requested TRO is also not narrowly tailored on this issue. For
11 example, detention in the Southern District of California, i.e. San Diego, would patently
12 not be an “irreparable harm” relative to Petitioner’s current detention at Adelanto within
13 the Central District of California. Nor would detention in the Northern District of
14 California, the Eastern District of California, etcetera. Yet the order sought here would
15 bar Petitioner’s transfer to any detention facility outside the Central District. The effect
16 is to essentially confer upon an immigration detainee a “veto right” against any non-
17 preferred detention location, in contravention of law. That trivializes the high legal
18 standard for issuing preliminary exigent relief, and particularly mandatory injunctive
19 relief, which requires a much more stringent evidentiary demonstration and much more
20 severe prejudice.

21 Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for a TRO barring his transfer to detention
22 facilities outside of this District should be denied.

23 **IV. CONCLUSION**

24 Petitioner’s request for relief by the TRO Application should be denied. Should
25 the Court nonetheless grant the Application, however, the relief should be limited to
26 what other Judges in this District have generally issued in similar cases, consistent with
27 this Court’s ruling in *Bautista*: Requiring release unless a Section 1226(a) bond hearing
28 is provided within seven (7) days.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: December 18, 2025

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