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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEEISSO DEMIAN VILCA YATACO,

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN, Adelanto Detention Facility, *et al.*,

Respondents.

No. 5:25-cv-03229-JAK-MBK

FEDERAL RESPONDENTS' ANSWER TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Honorable Michael B. Kaufman
United States Magistrate Judge

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RESPONDENTS' ANSWER TO PETITIONERS' HABEAS CORPUS PETITION

I. INTRODUCTION

Respondents hereby answer Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition [Dkt. 1]. Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief compelling the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") to conduct a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or for the United States ("U.S.") Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") to release him. Petitioners' request for relief by the Habeas Petition should be denied. The government reiterates here the legal position it has taken in its opposition to the *ex parte* TRO application filed in the *Bautista* case, Case no. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, which the government filed on July 24, 2025 as Docket no. 8.[1]

The same legal issue at issue in *Bautista* has subsequently been raised and resolved in this District in a series of other cases including: *Jose Ramon Zaragoza v. Kristi Noem, et al.*, 5:25-cv-02925-HDV-PVC, Dkt. no. 8 (November 11, 2025 order granting TRO for bond hearings); *Javier Ceja Gonzalez, et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al.*, 5:25-cv-02054-ODW-ADS, *Ruben Benitez et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al.*, 5:25-cv-02190-RGK-AS, and *Miguel Portillo, et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al.*, 5:25-cv-02892-JFW-PVC (October 31, 2025 order granting temporary restraining order) [Dkt. no. 7]. Judge Wilson issued an order finding that such detentions are governed by § 1225(b)(2). *See Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons et al.*, 2:25-cv-09785-SVW-AJR (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (denying application for bond hearing by TRO) [Dkt. no. 8]. Likewise, in an even more recent decision, Judge Blumenfeld, Jr., denied a TRO finding detentions are governed by § 1225(b)(2), and not § 1226(a). *See Hernandez Cruz v. Noem et al.*, 2:25-cv- 8:25-cv-

[1] The District Court granted the *ex parte* TRO application in *Bautista* via order issued on July 28, 2025, requiring a Section 1226(a) bond hearing to be provided to the petitioners within seven days [Dkt. 14]. More recently in *Bautista*, Judge Sykes granted partial summary judgment on November 20, 2025 [Dkt. 81] and granted class certification on November 25, 2025 [Dkt. 82]. Plaintiffs have moved for clarification and reconsideration of those decisions.

02566-SB-MAA (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) (denying application for bond hearing by TRO) [Dkt. no. 11].

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has ruled on this issue by order dated September 5, 2025, in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). After detailed analysis, the BIA determined that based on the plain language of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2018), Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission. Like the *Altamiranos Ramos* and *Hernandez Cruz* decisions, other District Courts have followed the BIA's approach. *See Barrios Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-cv-01467, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025); *Cirrus Rojas v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-1437-bhl, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025); *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 3025); *Chavez v. Noem*, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025).

In sum, to the extent Petitioner would be entitled to any remedy via his Habeas Petition, at most it would be ordering a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge under Section 1226(a), consistent with what the Court ordered in the *Bautista* case, 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, and not immediate release free of any restrictions. Furthermore, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the statutory regime Petitioner insist applies, the burden rests on the Petitioner to prove that he is not a flight risk or danger. Respondents will reiterate their arguments on the legal claims below, having noted the various prior rulings on these legal issues set forth above.

II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

A. Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225

Section 1225 applies to "applicants for admission," who are defined as "alien[s] present in the United States who [have] not been admitted" or "who arrive[] in the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission "fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2)." *Jennings*

v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

Section 1225(b)(1) applies to arriving aliens and "certain other" aliens "initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation." *Id.*; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii). These aliens are generally subject to expedited removal proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if the alien "indicates an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution," immigration officers will refer the alien for a credible fear interview. *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). An alien with "a credible fear of persecution" is "detained for further consideration of the application for asylum." *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). If the alien does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express a fear of persecution, or is "found not to have such a fear," he is detained until removed. *Id.* §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(iii)(IV).

Section 1225(b)(2) is "broader" and "serves as a catchall provision." *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287. It "applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1)." *Id.* Under § 1225(b)(2), an alien "who is an applicant for admission" shall be detained for a removal proceeding "if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66, 68 (BIA 2025) ("for aliens arriving in and seeking admission into the United States who are placed directly in full removal proceedings, section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), mandates detention 'until removal proceedings have concluded.'") (citing *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 299). Still, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") has the sole discretionary authority to temporarily release on parole "any alien applying for admission to the United States" on a "case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit." *Id.* § 1182(d)(5)(A); *see Biden v. Texas*, 597 U.S. 785, 806 (2022).

B. Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

Section 1226 provides for arrest and detention "pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under § 1226(a), the

government may detain an alien during his removal proceedings, release him on bond, or release him on conditional parole.[2] By regulation, immigration officers can release aliens if the alien demonstrates that he "would not pose a danger to property or persons" and "is likely to appear for any future proceeding." 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). An alien can also request a custody redetermination (i.e., a bond hearing) by an immigration judge ("IJ") at any time before a final order of removal is issued. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1), 1003.19.

At a custody redetermination, the IJ may continue detention or release the alien on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1). IJs have broad discretion in deciding whether to release an alien on bond. *In re Guerra*, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 39–40 (BIA 2006) (listing nine factors for IJs to consider). But regardless of the factors IJs consider, an alien "who presents a danger to persons or property should not be released during the pendency of removal proceedings." *Id.* at 38.

C. Review at the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")

The BIA is an appellate body within the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"). *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). Members of the BIA possess delegated authority from the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1). The BIA is "charged with the review of those administrative adjudications under the [INA] that the Attorney General may by regulation assign to it," including IJ custody determinations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1), 236.1; 1236.1. The BIA not only resolves particular disputes before it, but also "through precedent decisions, [it] shall provide clear and uniform guidance to DHS, the immigration judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and administration of the [INA] and its implementing regulations." *Id.* § 1003.1(d)(1). "The decision of the [BIA] shall be final except in those cases reviewed by the Attorney

[2] Being "conditionally paroled under the authority of § 1226(a)" is distinct from being "paroled into the United States under the authority of § 1182(d)(5)(A)." *Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales*, 501 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that because release on "conditional parole" under § 1226(a) is not a parole, the alien was not eligible for adjustment of status under § 1255(a)).

General." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7).

III. ARGUMENT

A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Entertain Petitioners' Actions under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

As a threshold matter, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and (b)(9) preclude review of Petitioners' claims. Accordingly, Petitioners are unable to show a likelihood of success on the merits.

First, Section 1252(g) specifically deprives courts of jurisdiction, including habeas corpus jurisdiction, to review "any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to [1] *commence proceedings*, [2] adjudicate cases, or [3] execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter."[3] 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added). Section 1252(g) eliminates jurisdiction "[e]xcept as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title."[4] Except as provided in § 1252, courts "cannot entertain challenges to the enumerated executive branch decisions or actions." *E.F.L. v. Prim*, 986 F.3d 959, 964–65 (7th Cir. 2021).

Section 1252(g) also bars district courts from hearing challenges to the *method* by which the Secretary of Homeland Security chooses to commence removal proceedings, including the decision to detain an alien pending removal. *See Alvarez v. ICE*, 818 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2016) ("By its plain terms, [§ 1252(g)] bars us from questioning ICE's discretionary decisions to commence removal" and also to review "ICE's decision to take [plaintiff] into custody and to detain him during removal proceedings").

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[3] Much of the Attorney General's authority has been transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security and many references to the Attorney General are understood to refer to the Secretary. *See Clark v. Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371, 374 n.1 (2005)

[4] Congress initially passed § 1252(g) in the IIRIRA, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. In 2005, Congress amended § 1252(g) by adding "(statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title" after "notwithstanding any other provision of law." REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 231, 311.

Petitioner's claim stems from his detention during removal proceedings. That detention arises from the decision to commence such proceedings against him. *See, e.g.*, *Valencia-Mejia v. United States*, 2008 WL 4286979, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2008) ("The decision to detain plaintiff until his hearing before the Immigration Judge arose from this decision to commence proceedings[.]"); *Wang v. United States*, 2010 WL 11463156, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2010); *Tazu v. Att'y Gen. U.S.*, 975 F.3d 292, 298–99 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and (b)(9) deprive district court of jurisdiction to review action to execute removal order).

As other courts have held, "[f]or the purposes of § 1252, the Attorney General commences proceedings against an alien when the alien is issued a Notice to Appear before an immigration court." *Herrera-Correra v. United States*, 2008 WL 11336833, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2008). "The Attorney General may arrest the alien against whom proceedings are commenced and detain that individual until the conclusion of those proceedings." *Id.* at *3. "Thus, an alien's detention throughout this process arises from the Attorney General's decision to commence proceedings" and review of claims arising from such detention is barred under § 1252(g). *Id.* (citing *Sissoko v. Rocha*, 509 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2007)); *Wang*, 2010 WL 11463156, at *6; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). As such, judicial review of the Application and Petition is barred by § 1252(g). The Court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Second, under § 1252(b)(9), "judicial review of all questions of law . . . including interpretation and application of statutory provisions . . . arising from any action taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States" is only proper before the appropriate federal court of appeals in the form of a petition for review of a final removal order. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); *Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). Section 1252(b)(9) is an "unmistakable 'zipper' clause" that "channels judicial review of all [claims arising from deportation proceedings]" to a court of appeals in the first instance. *Id.*; *see Lopez v. Barr*, No. CV 20-1330 (JRT/BRT), 2021 WL 195523, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 20, 2021) (citing *Nasrallah*

v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 579–80 (2020)).

Moreover, § 1252(a)(5) provides that a petition for review is the exclusive means for judicial review of immigration proceedings:

> Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), . . . a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this chapter, except as provided in subsection (e) [concerning aliens not admitted to the United States].

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). "Taken together, § 1252(a)(5) and § 1252(b)(9) mean that *any* issue—whether legal or factual—arising from *any* removal-related activity can be reviewed *only* through the [petition-for-review] process." *J.E.F.M. v. Lynch*, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original); *see id.* at 1035 ("§§ 1252(a)(5) and [(b)(9)] channel review of all claims, including policies-and-practices challenges . . . whenever they 'arise from' removal proceedings"); *accord Ruiz v. Mukasey*, 552 F.3d 269, 274 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009) (only when the action is "unrelated to any removal action or proceeding" is it within the district court's jurisdiction); *cf. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, 434 F.3d 144, 151 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (a "primary effect" of the REAL ID Act is to "limit all aliens to one bite of the apple" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Critically, "[§] 1252(b)(9) is a judicial channeling provision, not a claim-barring one." *Aguilar v. ICE*, 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007). Indeed, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) provides that "[n]othing . . . in any other provision of this chapter . . . shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section." *See also Ajlani v. Chertoff*, 545 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[J]urisdiction to review such claims is vested exclusively in the courts of appeals[.]"). The petition-for-review process before the court of appeals ensures that aliens have a proper forum for claims arising from their immigration proceedings and "receive their day in court." *J.E.F.M.*,

837 F.3d at 1031–32 (internal quotations omitted); *see also Rosario v. Holder*, 627 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) ("The REAL ID Act of 2005 amended the [IIRIRA] to obviate . . . Suspension Clause concerns" by permitting judicial review of "nondiscretionary" BIA determinations and "all constitutional claims or questions of law.").

As such, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action.

B. Even Assuming Jurisdiction, Petitioner Fails to Meet the High Bar for Injunctive Relief.

1. Petitioner is unable to show a likelihood of success on the merits.

a. Under the Plain Text of § 1225, Petitioner Must Be Detained Pending the Outcome of His Removal Proceedings.

Petitioner is an "applicant for admission," subject to mandatory detention under the plain text of § 1225. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)–(b). "Section 1225 governs the inspection, detention, and removal of aliens seeking admission into the United States." *Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-CV-01467, 2025 WL 3048926, at *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025). The statute defines "an applicant for admission" broadly:

> An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival …) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Section 1225 requires mandatory detention of an applicant for admission if "the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted." *Id.* § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Section 1225's definition of "an applicant for admission" is controlling. *See Stenberg v. Carhart*, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000) ("When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning."). As relevant here, an alien is "deemed" to be "an applicant for admission" if he is present in the United States without having been admitted. This unambiguously broad statute does not distinguish among unadmitted individuals who are present in the

U.S. for one hour, one day, one year, or one decade. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Nor does it distinguish between those who arrive in the U.S. for inspection and those who cross the border without inspection. In this case, Petitioner does not dispute the fact that he entered the U.S. unlawfully and is present without having been admitted. *See* Dkt. No. 1 at 10 (stating that after being detained by ICE for entry to the United States without inspection, Petitioner was issued Parole pursuant to 8 CFR §212.5).[5] Consequently, he is an "applicant for admission" under § 1225(a), subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b).

The Court should reject Petitioner's argument that § 1226(a) governs his detention instead of § 1225. When there is "an irreconcilable conflict in two legal provisions," then "the specific governs over the general." *Karczewski v. DCH Mission Valley LLC*, 862 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017). § 1226(a) "applies to aliens "arrested and detained pending a decision" on removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). In contrast, § 1225 is narrower. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225. It applies only to "applicants for admission"; that is, as relevant here, aliens present in the United States who have not be admitted. *See id.; see also Florida v. United States,* 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2023). Because Petitioner falls within that category, the specific detention authority under § 1225 governs over the general authority found at § 1226(a).

Section 1226(a) applies more generally than § 1225 because it consists of those "who enter lawfully but later become inadmissible." *Sandoval*, 2025 WL 3048926, at *4. Section 1225(a) differs because it applies specifically to individuals like Petitioner who is deemed an applicant for admission. In these situations, the specific provision controls over the more general one. *See id.*; *see also Altamirano Ramos*, 2025 WL 3199872, at *6 (applying this canon of statutory interpretation to §§ 1225 and 1226); *Hernandez Cruz v.*

[5] 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(A) permits DHS officers to parole "into the United States" for urgent humanitarian reasons or where there is a significant public benefit any noncitizen who is seeking admission. The provision specifies that the "parole of such [noncitizen] shall not be regarded as an admission." *Id.*; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(B) (specifying that a noncitizen who is paroled is not considered "admitted").

Noem et al., 2:25-cv- 8:25-cv-02566-SB-MAA (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) (denying application for bond hearing by TRO) [Dkt. no. 11]; *United States v. Brumbaugh*, 139 F.4th 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2025) (noting that the "well established canon of statutory interpretation . . . that the specific governs the general . . . applies especially where, as here, Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme and has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific solutions") (cleaned up).

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) clearly applies to Petitioner because the definition of an "applicant for admission," expressly includes those present in the U.S. without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1); *see Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287 (2018) (noting that § 1225(b)(2) is "a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1) [i.e., those who arrive for inspection]"); *see also Torres*, 976 F.3d at 928 (noting that Congress eliminated the distinction between those entering the United States with or without inspection).

The BIA recently analyzed and decided this legal issue in its order issued on September 5, 2025, in *Matter of Jonathan Javier Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). After detailed analysis, the BIA determined that based on the plain language of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2018), Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission. Other District Courts have followed the BIA's approach. *See Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons et al.*, 2:25-cv-09785-SVW-AJR (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (denying application for bond hearing by TRO) [Dkt. no. 8]; *See Barrios Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-cv-01467, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025); *Cirrus Rojas v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-1437-bhl, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025); *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 3025); *Chavez v. Noem*, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025).

"[T]he BIA is the subject-matter expert in immigration bond decisions." *Aden v. Nielsen*, 2019 WL 5802013, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2019). The BIA is well-

positioned to assess how agency practice affects the interplay between 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. *See Delgado v. Sessions*, 2017 WL 4776340, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15, 2017) (noting a denial of bond to an immigration detainee was "a question well suited for agency expertise"); *Matter of M-S-*, 27 I&N Dec. 509, 515-18 (2019) (addressing interplay of §§ 1225(b)(1) and 1226).

The BIA's decision in *Matter of Yajure* is based upon and consistent with the governing statutory language. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), an "applicant for admission" is defined as an "alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States." Applicants for admission "fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2)." *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287. Section 1225(b)(2)—the provision relevant here—is the "broader" of the two. *Id.* It "serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not relevant here)." *Id.* And § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention. *Id.* at 297; *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I & N. Dec. at 69 ("[A]n applicant for admission who is arrested and detained without a warrant while arriving in the United States, whether or not at a port of entry, and subsequently placed in removal proceedings is detained under section 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)."). Section 1225(b) therefore applies because Petitioners are present in the United States without being admitted.

The BIA has long recognized that "many people who are not *actually* requesting permission to enter the United States in the ordinary sense are nevertheless deemed to be 'seeking admission' under the immigration laws." *Matter of Lemus-Losa*, 25 I. & N. Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012). Statutory language "is known by the company it keeps." *Marquez-Reyes v. Garland*, 36 F.4th 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting *McDonnell v. United States*, 579 U.S. 550, 569 (2016)). The phrase "seeking admission" in § 1225(b)(2)(A) must be read in the context of the definition of "applicant for admission" in § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission are both those individuals present

without admission and those who arrive in the United States. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Both are understood to be "seeking admission" under §1225(a)(1). *See Lemus-Losa*, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 743. Congress made that clear in § 1225(a)(3), which requires all aliens "who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission" to be inspected by immigration officers. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). The word "or" here "introduce[s] an appositive–a word or phrase that is synonymous with what precedes it ('Vienna or Wien,' 'Batman or the Caped Crusader')." *United States v. Woods*, 571 U.S. 31, 45 (2013).

The court's decision in *Florida v. United States* is instructive here. The district court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) mandates detention of applicants for admission throughout removal proceedings, rejecting the assertion that DHS has discretion to choose to detain an applicant for admission under either section 1225(b) or 1226(a). *Florida v. United States*, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2023*), appeal dismissed*, 2023 WL 5212561 (11th Cir. July 11, 2023). Such discretion "would render mandatory detention under § 1225(b) meaningless. Indeed, the 1996 expansion of § 1225(b) to include illegal border crossers would make little sense if DHS retained discretion to apply § 1226(a) and release illegal border crossers whenever the agency saw fit." *Id.* The court pointed to *Demore v. Kim,* 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003), in which the Supreme Court explained that "wholesale failure" by the federal government motivated the 1996 amendments to the INA. *Florida*, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275. The court also relied on, *Matter of M-S-,* 27 I&N Dec. 509, 516 (A.G. 2019), in which the Attorney General explained "section [1225] (under which detention is mandatory) and section [1226(a)] (under which detention is permissive) can be reconciled only if they apply to different classes of aliens." *Florida*, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275.

b. Congress did not intend to treat individuals who unlawfully enter the country better than those who appear at a port of entry.

When the plain text of a statute is clear, "that meaning is controlling" and courts

"need not examine legislative history." *Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp.*, 659 F.3d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2011). But to the extent legislative history is relevant here, nothing "refutes the plain language" of § 1225. *Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 671 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2011). Section 1225 was added by Congress under the IIRIRA to correct "an anomaly whereby immigrants who were attempting to lawfully enter the United States were in a worse position than persons who had crossed the border unlawfully." *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc), *declined to extend by, United States v. Gambino-Ruiz*, 91 F.4th 981 (9th Cir. 2024). It "intended to replace certain aspects of the [then] current 'entry doctrine,' under which illegal aliens who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry." *Id.* (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225). The Court should reject Petitioners' interpretation because it would put aliens who "crossed the border unlawfully" in a better position than those "who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry." *Id.* Aliens who presented at port of entry would be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, but those who crossed illegally would be eligible for a bond under § 1226(a).

Nothing in the Laken Riley Act ("LRA") changes the analysis. Redundancies in statutory drafting are "common . . . sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure." *Barton v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 222, 239 (2020). The LRA arose after an inadmissible alien "was paroled into this country through a shocking abuse of that power." 171 Cong. Rec. H278 (daily ed. Jan 22, 2025) (statement of Rep. McClintock). Congress passed it out of concern that the executive branch "ignore[d] its fundamental duty under the Constitution to defend its citizens." *Id.* at H269 (statement of Rep. Roy). One member even expressed frustration that "every illegal alien is currently required to be detained by current law throughout the pendency of their asylum claims." *Id.* at H278 (statement of Rep. McClintock). The LRA reflects a "congressional effort to be doubly sure" that such unlawful aliens are detained. *Barton*, 590 U.S. at 239.

c. Prior agency practices are not entitled to deference under Loper Bright.

The asserted longstanding agency practice carries little, if any, weight under *Loper Bright*. The weight given to agency interpretations "must always 'depend upon their thoroughness, the validity of their reasoning, the consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give them power to persuade.'" *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 432–33 (2024) (quoting *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (cleaned up)). And here, the agency provided no analysis to support its reasoning. *See* 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323. To be sure, "when the best reading of a statute is that it delegates discretionary authority to an agency," the Court must "independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress." *Loper Bright*, 603 U.S. at 395 (cleaned up). But read most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention for applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297. Petitioner thus cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits.

2. Alleged Violations of the APA Are Not Grounds for Release

Petitioner's argument that he should be released for violations of the APA should be rejected. Only final agency action is reviewable under the APA. *See Bennett v Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997). A court may set aside such final agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706. Under this standard, "[t]he scope of [the Court's] review is narrow; … 'a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.'" *Judulang v. Holder*, 565 U.S. 42, 52-53 (2011) (citation omitted). For a district court to review an agency's action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), there must be a "final agency action" that can be reviewed. Two conditions must be met for there to be a "final agency action" sufficient for APA review: "First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency's decision making process . . . it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or

from which legal consequences will flow." *Gallo Cattle Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.*, 159 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation and citations omitted); *see also FTC v. Standard Oil Co.*, 449 U.S. 232, 241 (1980) (action must be a definitive statement of the agency's position).

The Honorable Judge Blumenfeld rejected a similar APA argument denied in *Ton v. Noem, et al.*, 5:25-cv-02033-SB-AGR, Dkt. 17 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025) (order denying application for PI). Like here, the petitioner Ton "provide[d] little more than conclusory assertions about the facts and the law" in support of the APA argument. *Id.* at p.6. The Court concluded that "Plaintiff has not shown in these circumstances that there is a final agency action subject to APA review, much less that the government failed to observe its own procedures in reaching its decision." *Id.* at p.7. The Court should reach the same conclusion here.

3. The Balance of Hardships Favors Respondents

Where the moving party only raises "serious questions going to the merits," the balance of hardships must "tip sharply" in his favor. *All. for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting *The Lands Council v. McNair*, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008)). Petitioner fails to do so here. *See id.*

Here, the government has a compelling interest in the steady enforcement of its immigration laws. *See Miranda v. Garland*, 34 F.4th 338, 365–66 (4th Cir. 2022) (vacating an injunction that required a "broad change" in immigration bond procedure); *Ubiquity Press Inc. v. Baran*, No 8:20-cv-01809-JLS-DFM, 2020 WL 8172983, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2020) ("the public interest in the United States' enforcement of its immigration laws is high"); *United States v. Arango*, CV 09-178 TUC DCB, 2015 WL 11120855, at 2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 7, 2015) ("the Government's interest in enforcing immigration laws is enormous."). Accordingly, Petitioners' requests for broad injunctive relief that essentially immunizes them broadly from immigration laws is inappropriate, and it certainly is not narrowly tailored to the harm asserted: That he is being held in immigration detention despite allegedly not posing a criminal danger or flight risk. As

noted above, at most it would support a request for a prompt bond hearing before an Immigration Judge, where Petitioner properly carries the burden of proof to prove he is not a flight risk or danger pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

C. Petitioner's Request for a Court Order Prohibiting His Transfer From This District Should Be Denied.

Petitioner fails to carry his demanding burden to establish entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of a Court Order constraining the government's discretion to decide where to place immigration detainees like himself. Furthermore, he does not and cannot establish that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm caused by such a transfer to a detention facility outside of the Central District of California.

1. The Law and Facts Do Not Clearly Favor Petitioner.

The government may detain aliens pending their removal pursuant to a removal order. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1), the Executive has great discretion in deciding where to detain aliens. The INA precludes review of "any . . . decision or action of the Attorney General . . . the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General . . . ." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Therefore, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars relief that would impact where and when to detain Petitioner. *See Van Dinh v. Reno*, 197 F.3d 427, 433–34 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing *Rios-Berrios v. INS*, 776 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1985)) (finding that judicial review of decision to transfer a detainee is inappropriate due to lack of jurisdiction).

In *Van Dinh*, the noncitizen-plaintiffs were incarcerated at a facility in Colorado, where they were notified of the "distinct possibility" that they would be transferred to another facility. *See* 197 F.3d at 429. Plaintiffs filed a Bivens class action complaint requesting injunctive relief restraining all noncitizen transfers until local counsel had an opportunity to interview their clients and injunctive relief restraining transfer outside the area of those noncitizens with an established attorney-client relationship. *See id.* There, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "the district court had no jurisdiction to review the Attorney General's discretionary decision to transfer and detain appellants in another

INS facility under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)" and thus no Bivens class action was available. *Id.* at 435. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that "[t]he Attorney General is mandated to 'arrange for appropriate places of detention for [noncitizens] detained pending removal.'" *Id.* at 433 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1)). "The Attorney General's discretionary power to transfer [noncitizens] from one locale to another, as [he or] she deems appropriate, arises from this language." *Id.* Thus, it is "apparent that a district court has no jurisdiction to restrain the Attorney General's power to transfer [noncitizens] to appropriate facilities by granting injunctive relief in a Bivens class action suit." *Id.*

Judicial intervention in this case is not proper with respect to the government's decision about where to detain Petitioner.

2. Petitioner Also Fails to Show That He Is Likely to Suffer Serious Irreparable Harm by Being Transferred to Outside of the District.

Petitioner also has not demonstrated that he will suffer irreparable injury if he is transferred to a detention facility outside of this District pending the resolution of his removal proceedings. To show irreparable harm, he must demonstrate "immediate threatened injury." *Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldrige*, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing *L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League*, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980)). Merely showing a "possibility" of irreparable harm is insufficient. *See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).

As a threshold matter, if this Court had jurisdiction when the Petition was filed, then axiomatically any later transfer of Petitioner to a detention facility in another District within the United States would not end that jurisdiction. A writ of habeas corpus operates not upon the prisoner, but upon the prisoner's custodian. *See Braden v. 30th Jud. Circuit Ct. of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 494–495 (1973). Jurisdiction over a § 2241 petition attaches when a petitioner files a petition in his district of confinement and names his custodian. *See Mujahid v. Daniels*, 413 F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2005) ("jurisdiction attaches on the initial filing for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed

by a transfer of the petitioner and the accompanying custodial change."). *See, e.g.*, *Acosta v. Doerer*, No. 5:24-cv-01630-SPG-SSC, 2024 WL 4800878, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2024) (holding that the district court maintained jurisdiction even after immigration detainee petitioner was transferred from one federal facility to another); *Rincon-Corrales v. Noem*, No. 2:25-cv-00801-APG-DJA, 2025 WL 1342851, at *2 (D. Nev. May 8, 2025) ("[O]nce a petitioner has properly filed a habeas petition in the district of confinement, any subsequent transfer does not strip the filing district of habeas jurisdiction."). There is no basis to enjoin transfer outside of this District on this point, and Petitioner fails to establish any specific serious and irreparable harm that would arise from his potentially being detained outside of the Central District.

Finally, the requested TRO is also not narrowly tailored on this issue. For example, detention in the Southern District of California, i.e. San Diego, would patently not be an "irreparable harm" relative to Petitioner's current detention at Adelanto within the Central District of California. Nor would detention in the Northern District of California, the Eastern District of California, etcetera. Yet the order sought here would bar Petitioner's transfer to any detention facility outside the Central District. The effect is to essentially confer upon an immigration detainee a "veto right" against any non-preferred detention location, in contravention of law. That trivializes the high legal standard for issuing preliminary exigent relief, and particularly mandatory injunctive relief, which requires a much more stringent evidentiary demonstration and much more severe prejudice.

Accordingly, Petitioner's request for a TRO barring his transfer to detention facilities outside of this District should be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

Petitioners' request for relief by the Habeas Petition should be denied. Should the Court nonetheless grant the Petition; however, the relief should be limited to what other Judges in this District have generally issued in similar cases, consistent with this Court's ruling in *Bautista*: Requiring release unless a Section 1226(a) bond hearing is provided

within seven (7) days.

Respectfully submitted,

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