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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

**LUIS ALBERTO RINCON-
CASTILLO,**

Petitioner

vs.

RON MURRAY, Warden of Mesa
Verde ICE Processing Center;
SERGIO ALBARRAN, Field
Office Director of Enforcement
and Removal Operations, San
Francisco Field Office; **FIELD
OFFICE DIRECTOR**,
Enforcement and Removal
Operations, San Jose Field Office;
TODD M. LYONS, Acting
Director of the United States
Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; **KRISTI NOEM**,
Secretary of the United States
Department of Homeland Security;
PAMELA JO BONDI, United
States Attorney General, *in their
official capacities*,

Respondents

) **CASE NO.**

)
) **PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS**
) **CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241 AND**
) **COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE**
) **AND DECLARATORY RELIEF**

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Luis Alberto Rincon-Castillo (“Mr. Rincon-Castillo”) or (“Petitioner”) is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center. He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) have wrongfully concluded Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention merely because he entered without inspection.
2. Petitioner entered the United States on or about June 07, 2022. Subsequently thereafter, Respondents commenced removal proceedings against Petitioner in immigration court, entitling Petitioner to present an asylum claim with the due process rights under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
3. Petitioner is charged with, inter alia, having entered the United States without admission or inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
4. Based on this allegation in Petitioner’s removal proceedings, DHS denied Petitioner release from immigration custody, consistent with a new DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.
5. Similarly, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA or Board”) issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges, holding that an immigration judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. &

1 N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such individuals are subject to
2 detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on
3 bond.

4 6. Petitioner's detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and
5 Nationality Act. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and does not apply to individuals like
6 Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead,
7 such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on
8 conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies to people who, like
9 Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without
10 inspection.
11

12 7. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework
13 and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like
14 Petitioner.

15 8. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be released on
16 the same conditions as he was previously released without any additional condition.

17 9. Petitioner asks this Court to find that Respondents' detention and transfer of
18 Petitioner are arbitrary and capricious and in violation of the law, and to immediately
19 issue an order preventing Petitioner's transfer out of this district.
20

21 **II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

22 10. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. §
23 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States
24 Constitution (the Suspension Clause).
25

- 1 11. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment
2 Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
- 3 12. Venue is proper in the District of Eastern California because Petitioner is currently
4 detained at the Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center, Bakersfield, California, under
5 color of the authority of the United States, in violation of the Constitution, laws or
6 treaties thereof. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 2241.
- 7 13. Venue is further proper because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
8 rise to Petitioner's claims occurred in this District, where Petitioner is now in
9 Respondent's custody. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

10 **III. REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243**

- 11 14. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to
12 show cause "forthwith," unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. §
13 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return "within three
14 days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed."
15 *Id.*
- 16 15. Habeas corpus is "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . .
17 . . . affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or
18 confinement." *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). "The
19 application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or
20 justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners
21 of the application." *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation
22 omitted).

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IV. PARTIES

16. Petitioner Luis Alberto Rincon-Castillo was detained on September 30, 2025 and remains in immigration custody at the Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center in Bakersfield, California.

17. Respondent Ron Murray is employed as the Warden of the Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center, where Petitioner is detained. He has immediate physical custody of Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

18. Respondent Sergio Albarran is the Director of the San Francisco Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, Sergio Albarran is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

Respondent Todd M. Lyons is the Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. He is named in his official capacity.

19. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of Homeland Security and is Petitioner's ultimate legal custodian. She is sued in her official capacity.

20. Respondent Pamela Jo Bondi is sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the Department of Justice. She is one of Petitioner's legal custodians.

21. Respondent Field Office Director of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division in San Jose is sued in his or her official capacity.

V. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

22. Immigration detention should not be used as a punishment and should only be used when, under an individualized determination, a noncitizen is a flight risk because they are unlikely to appear for immigration court or a danger to the community. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

1 23. Noncitizens in immigration proceedings are entitled to Due Process under the Fifth
2 Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).

3 24. The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) establishes various procedures through
4 which individuals may be detained pending a decision on whether the noncitizen is to
5 be removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

6 25. Removal proceedings described in section 240 of the INA are used to determine
7 whether individuals, such as Petitioner, should be removed from the United States.
8 *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.

9 26. The Refugee Act of 1980, the cornerstone of the U.S. asylum system, provides a right
10 to apply for asylum to individuals seeking safe haven in the United States. The
11 purpose of the Refugee Act is to enforce the “historic policy of the United States to
12 respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands.”
13 Refugee Act of 1980, § 101(a), Pub.L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).

14 27. The “motivation for the enactment of the Refugee Act” was the United Nations
15 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, “to which the United States had been
16 bound since 1968.” *INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 424, 432-33 (1987). The
17 Refugee Act reflects a legislative purpose “to give ‘statutory meaning to our national
18 commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns.’” *Duran v. INS*, 756 F.2d
19 1338, 1340 n.2 (9th Cir. 1985).

20 28. The Refugee Act established the right to apply for asylum in the United States and
21 defines the standards for granting asylum. It is codified in various sections of the
22 INA.
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1 29. The INA gives the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security discretion
2 to grant asylum to noncitizens who satisfy the definition of “refugee.” Under that
3 definition, individuals generally are eligible for asylum if they have experienced past
4 persecution or have a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race,
5 religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion and
6 if they are unable or unwilling to return to and avail themselves of the protection of
7 their homeland because of that persecution or fear. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
8

9 30. Although a grant of asylum may be discretionary, the right to apply for asylum is not.
10 The Refugee Act broadly affords a right to apply for asylum to any noncitizen “who
11 is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States[.]” 8
12 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).
13

14 31. Immigration detention is a form of civil confinement that “constitutes a significant
15 deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” *Addington v. Texas*, 441
16 U.S. 418, 4253 (1979).
17

18 32. Custody determinations for individuals in 1229a removal proceedings are governed
19 by 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Under § 1226(a), an individual may be released if he does not
20 present a danger to persons or property and is not a flight risk. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533
21 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006).
22

23 33. Custody determinations under § 1226(a) are individualized and based on the facts
24 presented in those cases. Unlike § 1226(c), which can provide for categorical
25 determinations for detention regardless of flight risk or safety risks, § 1226(a)
requires a case-by-case review of the facts and circumstances.

1 34. Once a determination to release an individual from custody is made, the release order
2 may be revisited when the facts or circumstances warrant revocation or
3 reconsideration. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b). For an individual who was once in custody, the
4 Attorney General may take that individual back into custody by revoking the
5 individual's release when the facts and circumstances warrant it.

6 35. Revocation and return to custody are authorized only based on the individualized
7 facts and circumstances. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(9). By regulation, revocation decisions
8 are limited in nature and may only be made by certain authorized officials. 8 C.F.R. §
9 1236.1(c)(9).

10 36. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens
11 in removal proceedings.

12 37. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal
13 proceedings before an IJ. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are
14 generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, see 8 C.F.R. §§
15 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or
16 convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, see 8 U.S.C. §
17 1226(c).

18 38. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited
19 removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission
20 referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

21 39. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered
22 removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. §
23 1231(a)-(b).
24
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1 40. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

2 41. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the
3 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996,
4 Pub. L. No. 104–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–582 to 3009–
5 583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the
6 Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

7 42. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining
8 that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not
9 considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under §
10 1226(a). See *Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of*
11 *Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures*, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312,
12 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

13 43. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and
14 were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their
15 criminal history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That
16 practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which
17 noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before
18 an IJ or other hearing officer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); see also H.R. Rep. No.
19 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention
20 authority previously found at § 1252(a)).
21
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23 44. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new policy that
24 rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed
25 decades of practice.

- 1 45. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for
2 Applicants for Admission,”¹ claims that all persons who entered the United States
3 without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under §
4 1225(b)(2)(A). See Ex. 2. The policy applies regardless of when a person is
5 apprehended, and affects those who have resided in the United States for months,
6 years, and even decades.
- 7 46. On September 5, 2025, the Board adopted this same position in a published decision,
8 *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the
9 United States without admission or parole are subject to detention under §
10 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for IJ bond hearings.
- 11 47. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, dozens of federal courts have rejected
12 their new interpretation of the INA’s detention authorities. Courts have likewise
13 rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as
14 ICE.
15
- 16 48. Even before ICE or the Board introduced these nationwide policies, IJs in the
17 Tacoma, Washington, immigration court stopped providing bond hearings for persons
18 who entered the United States without inspection and who have since resided here.
19 There, the U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a
20 reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to
21 noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the *United States*. *Rodriguez*
22 *Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).
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¹ Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission>.

1 49. Subsequently, court after court has adopted the same reading of the INA's detention
2 authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation. *See, e.g., Gomes v. Hyde*,
3 No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez*
4 *v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass.
5 July 24, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL
6 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-25-
7 02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez*
8 *v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025);
9 *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn.
10 Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW (DFMx),
11 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM,
12 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373
13 (DEH), 2025 WL 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No.
14 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v.*
15 *Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak*
16 *v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27,
17 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025
18 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-
19 12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia*
20 *v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025);
21 *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530
22 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL
23 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK,
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2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *see also, e.g., Palma Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that “[t]he Court tends to agree” that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

50. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS’s and EOIR’s new interpretation because it defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

51. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to “decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”

52. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)’s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, “[w]hen Congress creates ‘specific exceptions’ to a statute’s applicability, it ‘proves’ that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies.” *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); *see also* Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7.

1 53. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of
2 being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without
3 admission or parole.

4 54. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who
5 recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on
6 inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States.
7 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this
8 mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry,
9 where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the
10 country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).
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13 **VI. FACTS**

14 55. Petitioner has resided in the United States since June 07, 2022 and lives in San Jose,
15 California.

16 56. DHS placed Petitioner in removal proceedings before the Immigration Court pursuant
17 to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. ICE has charged Petitioner with, *inter alia*, being inadmissible
18 under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without
19 inspection.

20 57. Petitioner's next Immigration Court master hearing is scheduled for December 03,
21 2025 at 1:00 PM.

22 58. On September 30, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by ICE ERO officers during a routine
23 appointment that he had consistently attended.
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1 59. Petitioner is currently married to a Colombian citizen and has three children, one of
2 whom is an eight-year-old boy who lives with his wife in the United States. He is
3 Catholic and attends services at San José Church.

4 60. Pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, the immigration judge is unable to consider
5 Petitioner's bond request.

6 61. As a result, Petitioner remains in detention. Without relief from this Court, he faces
7 the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his
8 family and community.

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10 **VII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

11 **COUNT I**
12 **Violation of the INA**

13 62. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding
14 paragraphs.

15 63. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all
16 noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of
17 inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered
18 the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended
19 and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained
20 under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

21 64. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued
22 detention and violates the INA.
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COUNT II
Violation of Due Process

65. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

66. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

67. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

68. The government’s detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside of the District of Eastern California while this habeas petition is pending;
- c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days;
- d. Declare that Petitioner’s detention without an individualized determination violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;

- e. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release
Petitioner with no additional conditions of release that were not imposed
prior to his detention in 2025;
- f. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release
Petitioner or, in the alternative, provide Petitioner with a bond hearing
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
- g. Declare that Petitioner's detention is unlawful;
- h. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to
Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other
basis justified under law; and
- i. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: November 21, 2025

By: /s/ Connie Chan
Connie Chan
Attorney for Petitioner

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, declare that my office is in San Francisco, California. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the action within. My business address is 405 Sansome Street, 2nd Floor, San Francisco, CA 94111. On November 21, 2025, I served the following documents: **PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241 AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF** by placing a true and correct copy in a sealed envelope, each addressed as follows:

Ron Murray
Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center
425 Golden State Avenue
Bakersfield, CA 93301

Sergio Albarran
San Francisco Field Office
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
630 Sansome Street
Rm 590
San Francisco, CA 94111

Todd M. Lyons
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
500 12th Street SW
Washington, DC 20536

Kristi Noem
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
2801 Nebraska Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20528

Pamela Jo Bondi
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

Field Office Director
San Jose Field Office
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
393 Blossom Hill Road
San Jose, California 95123

1 Civil Process Clerk
2 U.S. Attorney's Office
3 501 I Street, Suite 10-100
4 Sacramento, CA 95814

5 **By mail.** I am readily familiar with the business for collection and processing of
6 correspondence for mailing in the United States Postal Service and that this document, with
7 postage fully prepaid, will be deposited with the United States Postal Service this date in the
8 ordinary course of business.

9 I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on
10 November 21, 2025, at San Francisco, California.

11 /s/ Connie Chan
12 Connie Chan
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