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9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
10 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11

12 FRANCISCO CARRILLO GARCIA,

13 Petitioner,

14 v.

15 ERNESTO SANTACRUZ JR., Acting
16 Director, Los Angeles Field Office,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
17 et al.,

18 Respondents.
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No. 2:25-cv-10581-MWC-PD

**FEDERAL RESPONDENTS'
OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S *EX*
PARTE APPLICATION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION**

Hon. Michelle Williams Court
United States District Judge

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**OPPOSITION TO EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER**

Respondents hereby oppose the Petitioner's *ex parte* application for a temporary restraining order either releasing them from detention or else compelling an immigration judge to provide an individualized bond hearing to Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days (the "Application") [Dkt. 4].

The government reiterates here the legal position it has taken in its opposition to the *ex parte* TRO application filed in the *Bautista* case, 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, which the government filed on July 24, 2025 as Docket no. 8.¹ The same legal issue at issue in *Bautista* has subsequently been raised and resolved in this District in a long series of other cases including *Javier Ceja Gonzalez, et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al.*, 5:25-cv-02054-ODW-ADS, *Ruben Benitez et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al.*, 5:25-cv-02190-RGK-AS, and *Miguel Portillo, et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al.*, 5:25-cv-02892-JFW-PVC. This Court recently ruled on this issue in *Edgar Becerra Ortiz v. Todd Lyons et al.*, 2:25-cv-09831-MWC-KES, Dkt. no. 7 (October 21 order granting TRO for § 1226(a) bond hearing within seven days).

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has recently ruled on this issue in its order issued on September 5, 2025 in *Matter of Jonathan Javier Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). After detailed analysis, the BIA determined that based on the plain language of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2018), Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission. A copy of the BIA's decision in *Matter of Yajure* is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Other District Courts have followed the BIA's approach. *See Barrios Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-cv-01467, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025); *Cirrus Rojas v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-

¹ The District Court granted the *ex parte* TRO application in *Bautista* via order issued on July 28, 2025, requiring a Section 1226(a) bond hearing to be provided to the petitioners within seven days [Dkt. 14].

1 1437-bhl, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025); *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, ---
2 F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025); *Chavez v. Noem*, ---
3 F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025).

4 **I. INTRODUCTION**

5 Petitioner, who is a detainee in immigration custody present in the United States
6 without ever having been inspected and admitted, has filed a motion for temporary
7 restraining order and preliminary injunction (“Motion”) [Dkt. 4] asking the Court to
8 release him from custody or order a bond hearing. The Application should be denied for
9 two reasons.

10 **First**, the Petitioner does not yet have a judicially final removal order. He is being
11 detained pending resolution of their immigration proceedings. Accordingly, the
12 government’s position is that the Petitioner fall within the statutory definition of aliens
13 subject to mandatory detention without bond found in § 1225(b)(2), i.e., aliens present in
14 the United States who have not been admitted.² As the BIA determined in *Matter of*
15 *Yajure*, Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to such
16 aliens who are present in the United States without admission.

17 That said, the Respondents acknowledge that—as cited above—the Judges who
18 have considered this issue to date in this District have generally disagreed with the BIA’s
19 interpretation, and ruled that similar individuals are instead being detained under §
20 1226(a). As the appropriate remedy, such decisions have consistently ordered that the
21 Respondents either provide the petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a)
22 within seven (7) days or else release them. The timely provision of such a bond hearing
23

24 ² As the Supreme Court explained in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018),
25 “Under ... 8 U.S.C. § 1225, an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is present’ in
26 this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as ‘an applicant for admission.’ §
27 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission must ‘be inspected by immigration officers’ to
28 ensure that they may be admitted into the country consistent with U.S. immigration law.
§ 1225(a)(3).” Moreover, as the BIA held in *Matter of Yajure*, “aliens who are present in
the United States without admission are applicants for admission as defined under ... 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the duration of their removal
proceedings. 29 I&N Dec. at 220 (citing *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 300).

1 then moots the Petition, which is dismissed.

2 **Second**, the Petitioner argues he was previously released on bond. Petitioner
3 contends that ICE then did not properly revoke his release on bond in connection with
4 arresting and detaining the Petitioner on May 21, 2025. But this occurred after Petitioner
5 was criminally charged on October 1, 2024 with hit and run resulting in actual injury in
6 violation of the California Vehicle Code (VC § 20001(b)(1)). [Dkt 4]

7 **Third**, Petitioner filed the *ex parte* Application on an asserted emergency basis.
8 Yet Petitioner filed the *ex parte* Application over five months after he was arrested and
9 detained on May 21, 2025. While he may have U.S. citizen family members who rely on
10 him for support, including a child who has autism, he has not established that this
11 constitutes an emergency, nor has he established that his belated *ex parte* application
12 meets the high standard that is required for such an application under *Mission Power*.

13 Accordingly, the Application should be denied. Should the Court nonetheless
14 grant the Application, however, the relief should be limited to what other Judges in this
15 District have generally issued in similar cases: Requiring release unless a § 1226(a) bond
16 hearing in Immigration Court is provided within seven (7) days.

17 **II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND**

18 **A. Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225**

19 Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” who are defined as “alien[s]
20 present in the United States who [have] not been admitted” or “who arrive[] in the
21 United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission “fall into one of two
22 categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” *Jennings*
23 *v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

24 Section 1225(b)(1) applies to arriving aliens and “certain other” aliens “initially
25 determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid
26 documentation.” *Id.*; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii). These aliens are generally subject
27 to expedited removal proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if the alien
28 “indicates an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution,” immigration

1 officers will refer the alien for a credible fear interview. *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). An alien
2 with “a credible fear of persecution” is “detained for further consideration of the
3 application for asylum.” *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). If the alien does not indicate an intent to
4 apply for asylum, express a fear of persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” he
5 is detained until removed. *Id.* §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(iii)(IV).

6 Section 1225(b)(2) is “broader” and “serves as a catchall provision.” *Jennings*,
7 583 U.S. at 287. It “applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).”
8 *Id.* Under § 1225(b)(2), an alien “who is an applicant for admission” shall be detained
9 for a removal proceeding “if the examining immigration officer determines that [the]
10 alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8
11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); see *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66, 68 (BIA 2025) (“for
12 aliens arriving in and seeking admission into the United States who are placed directly in
13 full removal proceedings, section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A),
14 mandates detention ‘until removal proceedings have concluded.’”) (citing *Jennings*, 583
15 U.S. at 299). Still, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has the sole
16 discretionary authority to temporarily release on parole “any alien applying for
17 admission to the United States” on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons
18 or significant public benefit.” *Id.* § 1182(d)(5)(A); see *Biden v. Texas*, 597 U.S. 785, 806
19 (2022).

20 **B. Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)**

21 Section 1226 provides for arrest and detention “pending a decision on whether the
22 alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under § 1226(a), the
23 government may detain an alien during his removal proceedings, release him on bond, or
24 release him on conditional parole.³ By regulation, immigration officers can release aliens
25

26 ³ Being “conditionally paroled under the authority of § 1226(a)” is distinct from
27 being “paroled into the United States under the authority of § 1182(d)(5)(A).” *Ortega-*
28 *Cervantes v. Gonzales*, 501 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that because
release on “conditional parole” under § 1226(a) is not a parole, the alien was not eligible
for adjustment of status under § 1255(a)).

1 if the alien demonstrates that he “would not pose a danger to property or persons” and
2 “is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). An alien can also
3 request a custody redetermination (i.e., a bond hearing) by an immigration judge (“IJ”) at
4 any time before a final order of removal is issued. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R.
5 §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1), 1003.19.

6 At a custody redetermination, the IJ may continue detention or release the alien on
7 bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1). IJs have broad
8 discretion in deciding whether to release an alien on bond. *In re Guerra*, 24 I. & N. Dec.
9 37, 39–40 (BIA 2006) (listing nine factors for IJs to consider). But regardless of the
10 factors IJs consider, an alien “who presents a danger to persons or property should not be
11 released during the pendency of removal proceedings.” *Id.* at 38.

12 **C. Review at the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)**

13 The BIA is an appellate body within the Executive Office for Immigration Review
14 (“EOIR”). *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). Members of the BIA possess delegated authority
15 from the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1). The BIA is “charged with the
16 review of those administrative adjudications under the [INA] that the Attorney General
17 may by regulation assign to it,” including IJ custody determinations. 8 C.F.R.
18 §§ 1003.1(d)(1), 236.1; 1236.1. The BIA not only resolves particular disputes before it,
19 but also “through precedent decisions, [it] shall provide clear and uniform guidance to
20 DHS, the immigration judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and
21 administration of the [INA] and its implementing regulations.” *Id.* § 1003.1(d)(1). “The
22 decision of the [BIA] shall be final except in those cases reviewed by the Attorney
23 General.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7).

24 **III. ARGUMENT**

25 **A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Entertain Petitioner’s Action under 8** 26 **U.S.C. § 1252.**

27 As a threshold matter, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and (b)(9) preclude review of
28 Petitioner’s claims.

1 First, Section 1252(g) specifically deprives courts of jurisdiction, including
2 habeas corpus jurisdiction, to review “any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien
3 arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to [1] *commence*
4 *proceedings*, [2] adjudicate cases, or [3] execute removal orders against any alien under
5 this chapter.”⁴ 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added). Section 1252(g) eliminates
6 jurisdiction “[e]xcept as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision
7 of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code,
8 or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title.”⁵ Except
9 as provided in § 1252, courts “cannot entertain challenges to the enumerated executive
10 branch decisions or actions.” *E.F.L. v. Prim*, 986 F.3d 959, 964–65 (7th Cir. 2021).

11 Section 1252(g) also bars district courts from hearing challenges to the *method* by
12 which the Secretary of Homeland Security chooses to commence removal proceedings,
13 including the decision to detain an alien pending removal. *See Alvarez v. ICE*, 818 F.3d
14 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2016) (“By its plain terms, [§ 1252(g)] bars us from questioning
15 ICE’s discretionary decisions to commence removal” and also to review “ICE’s decision
16 to take [plaintiff] into custody and to detain him during removal proceedings”).

17 Petitioner’s claim stem from his detention during removal proceedings. That
18 detention arises from the decision to commence such proceedings against them. *See, e.g.,*
19 *Valencia-Mejia v. United States*, 2008 WL 4286979, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2008)
20 (“The decision to detain plaintiff until his hearing before the Immigration Judge arose
21 from this decision to commence proceedings[.]”); *Wang v. United States*, 2010 WL
22 11463156, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2010); *Tazu v. Att’y Gen. U.S.*, 975 F.3d 292, 298–
23 99 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and (b)(9) deprive district court of

24
25 ⁴ Much of the Attorney General’s authority has been transferred to the Secretary of
26 Homeland Security and many references to the Attorney General are understood to refer
27 to the Secretary. *See Clark v. Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371, 374 n.1 (2005)

28 ⁵ Congress initially passed § 1252(g) in the IIRIRA, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009. In 2005, Congress amended § 1252(g) by adding “(statutory or nonstatutory),
including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus
provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title” after “notwithstanding any other
provision of law.” REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 231, 311.

1 jurisdiction to review action to execute removal order).

2 As other courts have held, “[f]or the purposes of § 1252, the Attorney General
3 commences proceedings against an alien when the alien is issued a Notice to Appear
4 before an immigration court.” *Herrera-Correra v. United States*, [2008 WL 11336833](#), at
5 *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2008). “The Attorney General may arrest the alien against whom
6 proceedings are commenced and detain that individual until the conclusion of those
7 proceedings.” *Id.* at *3. “Thus, an alien’s detention throughout this process arises from
8 the Attorney General’s decision to commence proceedings” and review of claims arising
9 from such detention is barred under § 1252(g). *Id.* (citing *Sissoko v. Rocha*, [509 F.3d](#)
10 [947, 949](#) (9th Cir. 2007)); *Wang*, [2010 WL 11463156](#), at *6; [8 U.S.C. § 1252\(g\)](#). As
11 such, judicial review of the Application and Petition is barred by § 1252(g). The Court
12 should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

13 *Second*, under § 1252(b)(9), “judicial review of all questions of law . . . including
14 interpretation and application of statutory provisions . . . arising from any action
15 taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States” is only proper before the
16 appropriate federal court of appeals in the form of a petition for review of a final
17 removal order. *See* [8 U.S.C. § 1252\(b\)\(9\)](#); *Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination*
18 *Comm.*, [525 U.S. 471, 483](#) (1999). Section 1252(b)(9) is an “unmistakable ‘zipper’
19 clause” that “channels judicial review of all [claims arising from deportation
20 proceedings]” to a court of appeals in the first instance. *Id.*; *see Lopez v. Barr*, No. CV
21 20-1330 (JRT/BRT), [2021 WL 195523](#), at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 20, 2021) (citing *Nasrallah*
22 *v. Barr*, [590 U.S. 573, 579–80](#) (2020)).

23 Moreover, § 1252(a)(5) provides that a petition for review is the exclusive means
24 for judicial review of immigration proceedings:

25 Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), . . .

26 a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in

27 accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for

28 judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision

1 of this chapter, except as provided in subsection (e) [concerning aliens not
2 admitted to the United States].

3 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). “Taken together, § 1252(a)(5) and § 1252(b)(9) mean that *any*
4 issue—whether legal or factual—arising from *any* removal-related activity can be
5 reviewed *only* through the [petition-for-review] process.” *J.E.F.M. v. Lynch*, 837 F.3d
6 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original); *see id.* at 1035 (“§§ 1252(a)(5) and
7 [(b)(9)] channel review of all claims, including policies-and-practices challenges . . .
8 whenever they ‘arise from’ removal proceedings”); *accord Ruiz v. Mukasey*, 552 F.3d
9 269, 274 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009) (only when the action is “unrelated to any removal action or
10 proceeding” is it within the district court’s jurisdiction); *cf. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of*
11 *Justice*, 434 F.3d 144, 151 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (a “primary effect” of the REAL ID Act is
12 to “limit all aliens to one bite of the apple” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

13 Critically, “[§] 1252(b)(9) is a judicial channeling provision, not a claim-barring
14 one.” *Aguilar v. ICE*, 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007). Indeed, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)
15 provides that “[n]othing . . . in any other provision of this chapter . . . shall be construed
16 as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition
17 for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.”
18 *See also Ajlani v. Chertoff*, 545 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[J]urisdiction to review
19 such claims is vested exclusively in the courts of appeals[.]”). The petition-for-review
20 process before the court of appeals ensures that aliens have a proper forum for claims
21 arising from their immigration proceedings and “receive their day in court.” *J.E.F.M.*,
22 837 F.3d at 1031–32 (internal quotations omitted); *see also Rosario v. Holder*, 627 F.3d
23 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The REAL ID Act of 2005 amended the [IIRIRA] to obviate . . .
24 Suspension Clause concerns” by permitting judicial review of “nondiscretionary” BIA
25 determinations and “all constitutional claims or questions of law.”).

26 In evaluating the reach of subsections (a)(5) and (b)(9), the Second Circuit
27 explained that jurisdiction turns on the substance of the relief sought. *Delgado v.*
28 *Quarantillo*, 643 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2011). Those provisions divest district courts of

1 jurisdiction to review both direct and indirect challenges to removal orders, including
2 decisions to detain for purposes of removal or for proceedings. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at
3 294–95 (section 1252(b)(9) includes challenges to the “decision to detain [an alien] in
4 the first place or to seek removal[.]”). Here, Petitioner challenges the government’s
5 decision and action to detain him, which arises from DHS’s decision to commence
6 removal proceedings, and is thus an “action taken . . . to remove [them] from the United
7 States.” *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); *see also, e.g., Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294–95; *Velasco*
8 *Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) did
9 not bar review in that case because the petitioner did not challenge “his initial
10 detention”); *Saadulloev v. Garland*, No. 3:23-CV-00106, 2024 WL 1076106, at *3
11 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2024) (recognizing that there is no judicial review of the threshold
12 detention decision, which flows from the government’s decision to “commence
13 proceedings”). As such, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action. The reasoning in
14 *Jennings* outlines why Petitioner’s claims is unreviewable here.

15 While holding that it was unnecessary to comprehensively address the scope of
16 § 1252(b)(9), the Supreme Court in *Jennings* also provided guidance on the types of
17 challenges that may fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9). *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 293–
18 94. The Court found that “§1252(b)(9) [did] not present a jurisdictional bar” in situations
19 where “respondents . . . [were] not challenging the decision to detain them in the first
20 place.” *Id.* at 294–95. In this case, Petitioner *does* challenge the government’s decision to
21 detain them in the first place. Though Petitioner may attempt to frame his challenge as
22 one relating to detention authority, rather than a challenge to DHS’s decision to detain
23 them in the first instance, such creative framing does not evade the preclusive effect of §
24 1252(b)(9).

25 Indeed, the fact that Petitioner is challenging the basis upon which they are
26 detained is enough to trigger § 1252(b)(9) because “detention *is* an ‘action taken . . . to
27 remove’ an alien.” *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. 318, 319 (Thomas, J., concurring); 8 U.S.C.
28 § 1252(b)(9). The Court should dismiss the Application and Petition for lack of

jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(9).

B. Even Assuming Jurisdiction, Petitioner Fails to Meet the High Bar for Preliminary Injunctive Relief by TRO

1. Petitioner is unable to show a likelihood of success on the merits on their claim for § 1226(a) bond hearings

a. *Under the Plain Text of § 1225, Petitioner Must Be Detained Pending the Outcome of Their Removal Proceedings.*

The Court should reject Petitioner’s argument that § 1226(a) governs their detention instead of § 1225. When there is “an irreconcilable conflict in two legal provisions,” then “the specific governs over the general.” *Karczewski v. DCH Mission Valley LLC*, 862 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017). § 1226(a) “applies to aliens “arrested and detained pending a decision” on removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). In contrast, § 1225 is narrower. *See 8 U.S.C. § 1225*. It applies only to “applicants for admission”; that is, as relevant here, aliens present in the United States who have not be admitted. *See id.*; *see also Florida v. United States*, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2023). Because Petitioner falls within that category, the specific detention authority under § 1225 governs over the general authority found at § 1226(a).

The BIA recently analyzed and decided this legal issue in its order issued on September 5, 2025 in *Matter of Jonathan Javier Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). After detailed analysis, the BIA determined that based on the plain language of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2018), Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission. Other District Courts have followed the BIA’s approach. *See Barrios Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-cv-01467, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025); *Cirrus Rojas v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-1437-bhl, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025); *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025); *Chavez v. Noem*, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025).

1 “[T]he BIA is the subject-matter expert in immigration bond decisions.” *Aden v.*
2 *Nielsen*, 2019 WL 5802013, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2019). The BIA is well-
3 positioned to assess how agency practice affects the interplay between 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225
4 and 1226. See *Delgado v. Sessions*, 2017 WL 4776340, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15,
5 *2017)* (noting a denial of bond to an immigration detainee was “a question well suited
6 for agency expertise”); *Matter of M-S-*, 27 I&N Dec. 509, 515-18 (2019) (addressing
7 interplay of §§ 1225(b)(1) and 1226).

8 The BIA’s decision in *Matter of Yajure* is based upon and consistent with the
9 governing statutory language. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), an “applicant for admission” is
10 defined as an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
11 arrives in the United States.” Applicants for admission “fall into one of two categories,
12 those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at
13 287. Section 1225(b)(2)—the provision relevant here—is the “broader” of the two. *Id.* It
14 “serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by
15 § 1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not relevant here).” *Id.* And § 1225(b)(2)
16 mandates detention. *Id.* at 297; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I & N.
17 Dec. at 69 (“[A]n applicant for admission who is arrested and detained without a warrant
18 while arriving in the United States, whether or not at a port of entry, and subsequently
19 placed in removal proceedings is detained under section 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
20 § 1225(b), and is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under section 236(a) of
21 the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).”). Section 1225(b) therefore applies because Petitioner is
22 present in the United States without being admitted.

23 The BIA has long recognized that “many people who are not *actually* requesting
24 permission to enter the United States in the ordinary sense are nevertheless deemed to be
25 ‘seeking admission’ under the immigration laws.” *Matter of Lemus-Losa*, 25 I. & N.
26 Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012). Statutory language “is known by the company it keeps.”
27 *Marquez-Reyes v. Garland*, 36 F.4th 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting *McDonnell v.*
28 *United States*, 579 U.S. 550, 569 (2016)). The phrase “seeking admission” in

1 § 1225(b)(2)(A) must be read in the context of the definition of “applicant for
2 admission” in § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission are both those individuals present
3 without admission and those who arrive in the United States. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).
4 Both are understood to be “seeking admission” under § 1225(a)(1). *See Lemus-Losa, 25 I.*
5 *& N. Dec. at 743*. Congress made that clear in § 1225(a)(3), which requires all aliens
6 “who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission” to be inspected by
7 immigration officers. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). The word “or” here “introduce[s] an
8 appositive—a word or phrase that is synonymous with what precedes it (‘Vienna or
9 Wien,’ ‘Batman or the Caped Crusader’).” *United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31, 45*
10 *(2013)*.

11 The court’s decision in *Florida v. United States* is instructive here. The district
12 court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) mandates detention of applicants for admission
13 throughout removal proceedings, rejecting the assertion that DHS has discretion to
14 choose to detain an applicant for admission under either section 1225(b) or 1226(a).
15 *Florida v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1275* (N.D. Fla. 2023), *appeal dismissed,*
16 *2023 WL 5212561* (11th Cir. July 11, 2023). Such discretion “would render mandatory
17 detention under § 1225(b) meaningless. Indeed, the 1996 expansion of § 1225(b) to
18 include illegal border crossers would make little sense if DHS retained discretion to
19 apply § 1226(a) and release illegal border crossers whenever the agency saw fit.” *Id.* The
20 court pointed to *Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518* (2003), in which the Supreme Court
21 explained that “wholesale failure” by the federal government motivated the 1996
22 amendments to the INA. *Florida, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275*. The court also relied on,
23 *Matter of M-S-, 27 I&N Dec. 509, 516* (A.G. 2019), in which the Attorney General
24 explained “section [1225] (under which detention is mandatory) and section [1226(a)]
25 (under which detention is permissive) can be reconciled only if they apply to different
26 classes of aliens.” *Florida, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275*.

1 b. Congress did not intend to treat individuals who unlawfully
2 enter the country better than those who appear at a port of
3 entry.

4 When the plain text of a statute is clear, “that meaning is controlling” and courts
5 “need not examine legislative history.” *Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp.*, 659 F.3d
6 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2011). But to the extent legislative history is relevant here, nothing
7 “refutes the plain language” of § 1225. *Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 671 F.3d
8 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2011). Section 1225 was added by Congress under the IIRIRA to
9 correct “an anomaly whereby immigrants who were attempting to lawfully enter the
10 United States were in a worse position than persons who had crossed the border
11 unlawfully.” *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc), *declined to*
12 *extend by*, *United States v. Gambino-Ruiz*, 91 F.4th 981 (9th Cir. 2024). It “intended to
13 replace certain aspects of the [then] current ‘entry doctrine,’ under which illegal aliens
14 who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in
15 immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for
16 inspection at a port of entry.” *Id.* (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225). The Court
17 should reject Petitioner’s interpretation because it would put aliens who “crossed the
18 border unlawfully” in a better position than those “who present themselves for inspection
19 at a port of entry.” *Id.* Aliens who presented at port of entry would be subject to
20 mandatory detention under § 1225, but those who crossed illegally would be eligible for
21 a bond under § 1226(a).

22 Nothing in the Laken Riley Act (“LRA”) changes the analysis. Redundancies in
23 statutory drafting are “common . . . sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly
24 sure.” *Barton v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 222, 239 (2020). The LRA arose after an inadmissible
25 alien “was paroled into this country through a shocking abuse of that power.” 171 Cong.
26 Rec. H278 (daily ed. Jan 22, 2025) (statement of Rep. McClintock). Congress passed it
27 out of concern that the executive branch “ignore[d] its fundamental duty under the
28 Constitution to defend its citizens.” *Id.* at H269 (statement of Rep. Roy). One member

1 even expressed frustration that “every illegal alien is currently required to be detained by
2 current law throughout the pendency of their asylum claims.” *Id.* at H278 (statement of
3 Rep. McClintock). The LRA reflects a “congressional effort to be doubly sure” that such
4 unlawful aliens are detained. *Barton*, 590 U.S. at 239.

5 *c. Prior agency practices are not entitled to deference under*
6 *Loper Bright.*

7 The asserted longstanding agency practice carries little, if any, weight under *Loper*
8 *Bright*. The weight given to agency interpretations “must always ‘depend upon their
9 thoroughness, the validity of their reasoning, the consistency with earlier and later
10 pronouncements, and all those factors which give them power to persuade.’” *Loper*
11 *Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 432–33 (2024) (quoting *Skidmore v. Swift &*
12 *Co.*, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (cleaned up)). And here, the agency provided no analysis
13 to support its reasoning. *See* 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323. To be sure, “when the best reading
14 of a statute is that it delegates discretionary authority to an agency,” the Court must
15 “independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress.” *Loper Bright*,
16 603 U.S. at 395 (cleaned up). But read most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate
17 detention for applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded.
18 *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297. Petitioner thus cannot show a likelihood of success on the
19 merits on his claims for a bond hearing under § 1226(a).

20 2. The Balance of Hardships Favors Respondents

21 Where the moving party only raises “serious questions going to the merits,” the
22 balance of hardships must “tip sharply” in his favor. *All. for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632
23 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting *The Lands Council v. McNair*, 537 F.3d
24 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008)). Petitioner fails to do so here. *See id.* The government has a
25 compelling interest in the steady enforcement of its immigration laws. *See Miranda v.*
26 *Garland*, 34 F.4th 338, 365–66 (4th Cir. 2022) (vacating an injunction that required a
27 “broad change” in immigration bond procedure); *Ubiquity Press Inc. v. Baran*, No 8:20-
28 cv-01809-JLS-DFM, 2020 WL 8172983, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2020) (“the public

1 interest in the United States’ enforcement of its immigration laws is high”); *United*
2 *States v. Arango*, CV 09-178 TUC DCB, 2015 WL 11120855, at 2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 7,
3 2015) (“the Government’s interest in enforcing immigration laws is enormous.”).
4 Judicial intervention would only disrupt the status quo. The Court should avoid a path
5 that “inject[s] a degree of uncertainty” in the process. *USA Farm Labor, Inc. v. Su*, 694
6 F. Supp. 3d 693, 714 (W.D.N.C. 2023). The BIA exists to resolve disputes like this. *See*
7 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). By regulation it must “provide clear and uniform guidance”
8 “through precedent decisions” to “DHS [and] immigration judges.” *Id.* Here, the BIA has
9 provided that clear guidance by its decision in *Matter of Jonathan Javier Yajure*
10 *Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

11 **IV. CONCLUSION**

12 The Petitioner’s request for relief by the Application should be denied. Should the
13 Court nonetheless grant the Application, however, the relief should be limited to what
14 other Judges in this District have generally issued in similar cases: Requiring release
15 unless a Section 1226(a) bond hearing is provided within seven (7) days.

16 Respectfully submitted,

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26 contains 5,845 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1.
27
28