UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Elmer Alcides VELASQUEZ LOZANO,
[redacted]

Petitioner,

v.

Joseph SIMON, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, Washington Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; Pamela BONDI, U.S. Attorney General; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW; Jeff CRAWFORD, Warden of Farmville Detention Center,

Respondents.

Case No.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner, Elmer Alcides Velasquez Lozano, is a native and citizen on El Salvador who entered the United States two years ago and who has resided in the United States continuously since that time. Mr. Velasquez Lozano has no criminal history in the United States or elsewhere in the world. Immigration agents recently encountered him in Washington, D.C. at an immigration checkpoint and placed him in immigration custody pending completion of removal proceedings. Although he has no criminal history, and despite his arrival in the United States two years ago, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) have concluded that he is subject to mandatory immigration detention because he should be deemed to be "seeking admission" to the United States.

2. Mr. Velasquez Lozano is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Farmville Detention Center located in Farmville, VA. He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) take the position that Mr. Velasquez Lozano is subject to mandatory detention.

3. Mr. Velasquez Lozano is charged with, inter alia, having entered the United States without admission or inspection and having entered without the not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry document required by the Act, and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality as required under the regulations issued by the Attorney General under section 211 (a) of the Act. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), s*ee also* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).

4. Based on this allegation in Mr. Velasquez Lozano's removal proceedings, DHS' position is that he is subject to mandatory detention, consistent with a new DHS policy issued on

July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

5. Similarly, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges, holding that an immigration judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

6. Mr. Velasquez Lozano's detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Mr. Velasquez Lozano who previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies to people who, like Mr. Velasquez Lozano, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without inspection.

7. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Mr. Velasquez Lozano.

8. DHS and EOIR's position in this case is pursuant to a new policy shift, changing the government's decades-long practice. Respondents' insistence that Mr. Velasquez Lozano is subject to mandatory detention is not only a significant shift from past practice but is contrary to

the plain language of the INA and is also in violation of Mr. Velasquez Lozano's Constitutional rights.

9. This Court should therefore intervene and grant Mr. Velasquez Lozano's petition for writs of habeas corpus and either release Mr. Velasquez Lozano or order EOIR to conduct a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) at which DHS bears the burden of proof that continued detention is required.

JURISDICTION

10. Mr. Velasquez Lozano is in the physical custody of Respondents. Mr. Velasquez Lozano is detained at the Farmville Detention Center in Farmville, VA.

11. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

12. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

13. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the judicial district in which Mr. Velasquez Lozano currently is detained.

14. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Eastern District of Virginia.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

15. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause "forthwith," unless the Mr. Velasquez Lozano is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return "within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed." *Id.*

16. Habeas corpus is "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement." *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). "The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application." *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). This time limit "is subordinate to the Court's discretionary authority to set deadlines under Rule 4[.]" *See Diaz-Ortega v. Lund*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250454 (W.D. La. June 28, 2019) (marks and citation omitted).

PARTIES

17. Mr. Velasquez Lozano is a citizen of El Salvador who has been in immigration detention since September 23, 2025. EOIR's and DHS' position is that Mr. Velasquez Lozano is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to their erroneous decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

18. Respondent Joseph Simon is the Director of the Washington Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, Joseph Simon is Mr. Velasquez Lozano's immediate custodian and is responsible for Mr. Velasquez Lozano's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

19. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Mr. Velasquez Lozano's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Mr. Velasquez Lozano and is sued in her official capacity.

20. Respondent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.

21. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

22. Respondent Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redeterminations in bond hearings.

23. Respondent Jeff Crawford is employed by CoreCivic as Warden of the Farmville Detention Center where Mr. Velasquez Lozano is detained. He has immediate physical custody of Mr. Velasquez Lozano. He is sued in his official capacity.

EXHAUSTION

24. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not bar Mr. Velasquez Lozano's claims unless "Congress specifically mandates" exhaustion. *Miranda v. Garland*, 34 F.4th 338, 351 (4th Cir. 2022) (1993) (quoting *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503. U.S. 140, 144 (1992)).

25. Moreover, because Mr. Velasquez Lozano's continued detention violates his right to due process—a constitutional right—administrative exhaustion is excused. *See Guitard v. U.S.*

Sec'y of the Navy, 967 F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be required when . . . a plaintiff has raised a 'substantial constitutional question.'").

26. Although the Court may impose exhaustion requirements as a prudential matter, it should not do so in this case because further administrative exhaustion would be futile. Critically, as part of the recent policy shift, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), concluding that noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection at any point are forever after considered to be "arriving aliens" who are "seeking admission" and thus subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Even though, as discussed below, this decision is legally erroneous, all immigration judges—including Appellate Immigration Judges at the Board of Immigration Appeals—are obligated to apply published Board precedent, and thus the result of any attempted bond request is foreclosed. 8 C.F.R. § 103.10(b).

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

27. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

28. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

29. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

30. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

31. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

32. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

33. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

34. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed "arriving" were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply "restates" the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

35. On July 8, 2025, ICE, "in coordination with" DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice.

36. The new policy, entitled "Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,"[1] claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended, and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

37. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a published decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are considered applicants for admission and, therefore, are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for IJ bond hearings. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)

38. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, dozens of federal courts have rejected their new interpretation of the INA's detention authorities. Courts have likewise rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

39. Subsequently, court after court has adopted the same reading of the INA's detention authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation. *See, e.g.*, *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11,

[1] *Available at* https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission.

2025), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2466670, at *8 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *see also, e.g.*, *Palma Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566 at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that "[t]he Court tends to agree" that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

40. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS's and EOIR's new interpretation because it defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Mr. Velasquez Lozano.

41. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to "decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen]."

42. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, "[w]hen Congress creates 'specific exceptions' to a statute's applicability, it 'proves' that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies." *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); *see also Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7.

43. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

44. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

45. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to people like Mr. Velasquez Lozano, who have already entered and were residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended.

FACTS

46. Mr. Velasquez Lozano has resided in the United States since September 23, 2023 and when not detained lives in Manassas, VA with his asylee sister and nephews and his U.S. citizen niece.

47. On September 23, 2025, Mr. Velasquez Lozano was a passenger in a work van on his way to work in Washington, D.C. when he and his coworker came across an immigration checkpoint. An ICE officer asked Mr. Velasquez Lozano if he was born in the United States and whether he had lawful identification from the United States. When Mr. Velasquez Lozano replied "no," he was taken out of the vehicle and apprehended. He was taken to the ICE ERO building in Chantilly, VA where he was issued a Notice to Appear. (Exhibit A) He was subsequently taken to the Farmville Detention Center, where he is currently detained.

48. DHS placed Mr. Velasquez Lozano in removal proceedings before the Annandale Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. ICE has charged Mr. Velasquez Lozano with, *inter alia*, being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without inspection and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as someone who is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry document required by the Act, and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality as required under the regulations issued by the Attorney General under section 211 (a) of the Act.

49. Mr. Velasquez Lozano has resided continuously in the United States since 2023. He has extensive ties to the community, including his asylee sister (with pending adjustment of status application) and nephews and U.S. citizen niece and uncle. (Exhibit B, C, D) Mr. Velasquez Lozano has a stable address with his sister and has had steady employment with the same company for over one year. He has paid federal income taxes since 2023. (Exhibit E) Mr. Velasquez Lozano has articulated a fear of return to his native country of El Salvador and intends to file an Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal. He has no criminal history in the United States or elsewhere in the world. Mr. Velasquez Lozano is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.

50. Mr. Velasquez Lozano does not intend to request a bond redetermination hearing before an Immigration Judge as the position of EOIR is that it does not have jurisdiction to grant release on bond to individuals who entered without inspection, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*.

51. As a result, Mr. Velasquez Lozano remains in detention. Without relief from this court, he faces the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his family and community. His detention creates significant and undue burden on Mr. Velasquez Lozano's ability to assist in his own defense with his removal proceedings. Additionally, removal proceedings are expedited for individuals on detained dockets compared to non-detained dockets.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

Violation of the INA

52. Mr. Velasquez Lozano incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

53. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

54. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Mr. Velasquez Lozano unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT II

Violation of Due Process

55. Mr. Velasquez Lozano repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

56. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001).

57. Mr. Velasquez Lozano has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

58. The government's detention of Mr. Velasquez Lozano and argument on that he is not eligible for a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

COUNT II

Violation of the Fourth Amendment

59. Mr. Velasquez Lozano repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

60. The government may not arrest an individual without a warrant, except under narrow exceptions. *See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce*, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); *See United States v. Mendenhall*, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); *United States v. Rodriguez Sanchez*, 23 F.3d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1994); *United States v. Lopez*, 817 F. Supp. 2d 918, 926 n.57 (S.D. Miss. 2011) (citing *Brignoni-Prince*, 422 U.S. at 885-87); *Sanchez v. Sessions*, 885 F.3d 782, 792 (4th Cir. 2018); *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) ("*On a warrant issued by the Attorney General*, a [noncitizen] may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed."); 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (describing warrantless arrests); *See United States v. Varkonyi*, 645 F.2d 453, 458 (5th Cir. 1981); *De La Paz v. Coy*, 786 F.3d 367, 376 (5th Cir. 2015) ("[E]ven if an agent has reasonable belief, before making an arrest, there must also be a likelihood of the person escaping before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest."); 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii) ("A warrant of arrest shall be obtained except when the designated immigration officer has reason to believe that the person is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.").

61. Mr. Velasquez Lozano has a fundamental interest in being free from warrantless arrest.

62. The government's continued detention of Mr. Velasquez Lozano after a warrantless arrest violates his Fourth Amendment right to protection against unreasonable search and seizure.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;

b. Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the jurisdiction of the Eastern District of Virginia while this habeas petition is pending;

c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days;

d. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner or, in the alternative, provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;

e. Declare that Petitioner's detention is unlawful;

f. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and

g. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 9th day of October, 2025.

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