District of Massachusetts • 1:26-cv-14907

#1

Oct 30, 2026

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number BMADC-12149169 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Flavio Cordeiro Da Silva. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits A-N )(D'Britto, Bruno) Modified on 10/30/2026 to edit docket text (CEH). (Entered: 10/30/2026)

#2

Oct 30, 2026

MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by Flavio Cordeiro Da Silva.(D'Britto, Bruno) (Main Document 2 replaced on 10/30/2026) (CEH). (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/30/2026: # 1 Text of Proposed Order) (CEH). Modified on 10/30/2026 to separate Motion and Proposed Order (CEH). (Entered: 10/30/2026)

#3

Oct 30, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE TO COUNSEL: Counsel shall complete and file in PDF format a Local Category Form and a Civil Cover Sheet. The forms can be found on the court's website under Resources/Forms. Counsel will use the event under Other Documents- Civil Cover Sheet & Category Sheet. (CEH) (Entered: 10/30/2026)

#4

Oct 30, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Judge Myong J. Joun assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge M. Page Kelley. (MBM) (Entered: 10/30/2026)

#5

Oct 30, 2026

General Order 19-02, dated June 1, 2019 regarding Public Access to Immigration Cases Restricted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c). (MBM) (Entered: 10/30/2026)

#6

Oct 30, 2026

Judge Myong J. Joun: ORDER entered. SERVICE ORDER re 2241 Petition. Order entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2243 governing Section 2241 cases for service on respondents. The answer or responsive pleading is due no later than November 4, 2026. (MBM) (Entered: 10/30/2026)

#7

Oct 30, 2026

Copy re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241), 6 Service Order - 2241 Petition mailed to all respondents on 10/30/2026. (MBM) (Entered: 10/30/2026)

Oct 30, 2026

Notice of Case Assignment

Oct 30, 2026

Copy Mailed

Oct 30, 2026

Notice - Other

#8

Nov 05, 2026

Judge Myong J. Joun: ELECTRONIC ORDER Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on October 30, 2026, and shortly thereafter, Respondents were alerted to this Petition and given a date by which to respond they have failed to do so.This Court entered its Service Order at 11:59 a.m. on October 30, 2026. See [Doc. No. 6 ]. Shortly thereafter, the Petition and Service Order were emailed to U.S. Attorneys Office. The U.S. Attorney's Office, through their Civil Process e-mail, confirmed receipt of the Service Order with the Clerk's Office at 12:18 p.m. The Service Order stated: The answer or responsive pleading is due no later November 4, 2026. [Doc. No. 6 ]. As of the morning of November 5, 2026, the U.S. Attorneys Office has not only missed this deadline but failed to file a Notice of Appearance in this case. The Court is aware this is an ongoing issue and the U.S. Attorneys Office has already been warned by at least one other session of this Court that this is not acceptable. See Llanos Sanchez v. Blanche, 26-cv-13938, Doc No. 9 (D. Mass. Aug. 31, 2026). As the judge in that case made clear, failing to file a Notice of Appearance is inappropriate in light of the stakes and time-sensitive nature of such cases. Id. In light of this flagrant violation of the Courts order, Respondents are ORDERED to show cause, by 5:00 p.m. today, as to why the Court should not grant the Petition and release Petitioner. (MAP) Modified on 11/5/2026 (BEL). (Entered: 11/05/2026)

#9

Nov 05, 2026

NOTICE of Appearance by Vincent Engingro, III on behalf of Todd Blanche, Antone Moniz, Markwayne Mullin, David J. Venturella, David Wesling (Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 11/05/2026)

#10

Nov 05, 2026

RESPONSE/ANSWER to Petitioner's 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241), by Todd Blanche, Antone Moniz, Markwayne Mullin, David J. Venturella, David Wesling. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 11/05/2026)

Nov 05, 2026

Order

#11

Nov 06, 2026

Judge Myong J. Joun: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered.Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his detention and reinstated final order of removal. [Doc. No. 1]. This Court has already found that “Petitioner is subject to an expedited removal order.” Cordeiro Da Silva v. Moniz, 26-cv-14089, Doc. No. 12 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2026). Where, as here, an individual reenters the United States “without authorization after having already been removed,” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) sets out an “expedited process” for “reinstating [that individual’s] order of removal.” Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 529–30 (2021). Petitioner’s removal order was reinstated on September 3, 2026, less than 90 days ago. See [Doc. No. 10-3]. He is therefore subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)–(a)(2). See G.P. v. Garland, 103 F.4th 898, 900 (1st Cir. 2024). Petitioner nonetheless asks the Court to keep this case open pending the outcome of his reasonable fear interview and any subsequent review by an Immigration Judge. See [Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 23–27]. Respondents have confirmed that Petitioner’s reasonable fear interview took place on November 3, 2026. [Doc. No. 10 at 3]. On this record, the Court has no reason to doubt that Respondents will continue to follow the applicable regulations under 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.8(e) and 208.21. Because Petitioner does not dispute that he is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, there is no basis for him to contend that his detention is unlawful.In the alternative, Petitioner requests a bond hearing. Petitioner acknowledges that he is not entitled to a bond hearing under § 1231, see [Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 28–32], but cites this Court’s order requiring a bond hearing in Quezada-Martinez v. Moniz, 722 F. Supp. 3d 7 (D. Mass. 2024). In that case, the petitioner’s seven-month detention was no longer presumptively reasonable under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Here, by contrast, Petitioner’s detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)–(a)(2) and is presumptively reasonable for six months thereafter. See Quezada-Martinez, 722 F. Supp. 3d at 11 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)). Next, Petitioner challenges the validity of his reinstated removal order. The Court has already rejected this argument. See Cordeiro Da Silva, 26-cv-14089, Doc. No. 12. Finally, although Petitioner raises an access-to-counsel argument, Respondents correctly contend that Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't Div. of Dep't of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 13–14 (1st Cir. 2007), controls this issue and cuts against Petitioner’s position. In Aguilar, the First Circuit concluded that claims raised in connection with removal proceedings inherently arise from those proceedings themselves. Id. This included claims by noncitizens “that their detention and subsequent transfer by the government infringed their rights to counsel by barring their access to lawyers, interfering with preexisting attorney-client relationships, and making it difficult to secure counsel of their choosing.” Id. Such claims must be raised through the immigration court process, rather than in the district court at this juncture. Holding otherwise “would result in precisely the type of fragmented litigation that Congress sought to forbid.” Id. The same reasoning applies here, where Petitioner is in removal proceedings and has parallel proceedings before the appellate court.Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 1] and the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. No. 2] are DENIED.(FGD) (Entered: 11/06/2026)

#12

Nov 06, 2026

Judge Myong J. Joun: ORDER entered. JUDGMENT. (FGD) (Entered: 11/06/2026)

Nov 06, 2026

Order