Southern District of California • 3:26-cv-05456

#1

Sep 23, 2026

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus against Gregory J. Archambeault, Does 1 to 10, Doug Glen, Markwayne Mullin, Rodney S. Scott, Warden, Warden of Imperial Regional Adult Detention Facility ( Filing fee $ 5 receipt number ACASDC-21668983.), filed by Christian Nael Madhere. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)The new case number is 3:26-cv-5456-JO-VET. Judge Jinsook Ohta and Magistrate Judge Valerie E. Torres are assigned to the case. (Barrios, Carlos)(ddo) (mjw). (Entered: 09/23/2026)

#2

Sep 23, 2026

NOTICE of Party With Financial Interest. No Parties With Financial Interest. (ddo) (mjw). (Entered: 09/23/2026)

#3

Sep 23, 2026

Minute Order by Judge Jinsook Ohta: The Court adopts the Standard Procedures for Immigration Habeas Petitions from Chief Judge Order No. 144 with the following modifications: The government's return shall identify and address any individualized concerns regarding Petitioner's danger to the community or flight risk, including the factual basis for any such concerns. Petitioner's optional traverse shall be due within three days of the government's return.Further, the Court sets a hearing on the petition for October 15, 2026 at 9:30 AM. All parties may appear by videoconference for the hearing. The courtroom deputy will provide the videoconference information ahead of the hearing, which will proceed unless the Court issues a written decision on the merits ahead of the hearing date. Parties are directed to check the docket at 5:00 PM the day before the hearing. Signed by Judge Jinsook Ohta on 9/23/2026. (ta) (Entered: 09/23/2026)

Sep 23, 2026

Minute Order (No Time) AND ~Util - Set Motion and R&R Deadlines/Hearings

#4

Sep 24, 2026

Notice of Appearance

#5

Sep 30, 2026

Return to Petition for Writ of H/C

#6

Sep 30, 2026

Reply - Other

#7

Oct 14, 2026

Minute Order by Judge Jinsook Ohta: Christian Nael Madhere filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his immigration detention as a violation of due process and seeking his immediate release. See Dkt. 1 ("Pet."). 1. Petitioner entered the United States in April 2023 under humanitarian parole, and he has continuously resided in the country ever since. See Pet. ¶¶ 2, 41; Dkt. 5 ("Response"). On April 29, 2026, Petitioner was arrested and charged with selling a controlled substance, but it appears that no criminal conviction followed. See Dkt. 5. On May 10, 2026, he was detained by immigration officials and has been detained at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility for the past five months. See Pet. ¶¶ 2, 39. Petitioner was granted a bond hearing on June 16, 2026, before an Immigration Judge, who denied his bond. See Dkt. 5. 2. For the reasons stated in Rodriguez Vasquez v. Bostock, No. 25-6842, ---F.4th--- (9th Cir. July 30, 2026) and Esquivel Pacheco v. LaRose, 818 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1174-75 (S.D. Cal. 2026), the Court finds that (i) 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), (a)(5), and (b)(9) do not bar Petitioner's collateral challenge to the constitutionality and legality of his current detention; and (ii) Petitioner is subject to the discretionary detention framework of 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not § 1225(b)(2), because he was already residing in the United States at the time of his arrest. See Pet. at ¶¶ 1, 2, 41. 3. The Court finds that the government violated Petitioner's Fifth Amendment due process rights by revoking his release on humanitarian parole without an individualized determination and written notice that he had violated the conditions of his release. Mathews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (due process analysis considers (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the [government] action"; (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would entail"). Here, Petitioner acquired a protectable liberty interest in his continued release when he was granted humanitarian parole pursuant to U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). See Pet. at ¶ 2. Under the governing statute and regulations, Petitioner held a protectable interest in remaining at liberty absent changes rendering him a security risk or a risk of absconding or a determination that humanitarian reasons and public benefit no longer warranted his continued presence in the country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e); Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F.Supp.3d 1123, 1144-45 (D. Or. 2025) (explaining the regulatory requirements governing parole termination); Chavarria v. Chestnut, No. 25-CV-1755, 2025 WL 3533606, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (finding that noncitizens paroled into the United States have a liberty interest in their continued release and collecting cases). The absence of any such individualized determination to justify his April 29, 2026 redetention significantly risked erroneously depriving Petitioner of his liberty interest, and the government has offered no evidence that the burdens of providing such process would have outweighed this substantial liberty interest. Because the Court finds that Petitioner has been subjected to an unconstitutional detention, it grants his petition for habeas corpus and orders his immediate release on the same conditions of his prior grant of humanitarian parole. 4. The Court disagrees with the Respondents' position that Petitioner's claim is moot because he received a bond hearing a month into his detention. Here, the bond hearing provided to Petitioner did not address Petitioner's primary claim that his re-detention in April 2026 violated his due process rights. See Pet. at ¶¶ 230-284. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8 (1998). A bond hearing provided a month after that re-detention does not moot his claims because any subsequent bond hearing does not sufficiently address the lawfulness of the petitioner's re-detention in the first place. Because Petitioner's claims concerning the lawfulness of his re-detention or ongoing detention have not been adjudicated, this element of the relief requested in his petition is not moot. See, e.g., Andriasyan v. Warden, No. 5:26-CV-01361-JAK (EX), 2026 WL 1850059, *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2026) (finding that a bond hearing provided after six months of detention did not moot a petition seeking immediate release based on unconstitutional detention). 5. For the reasons stated in Andriasyan, 2026 WL 1850059, at *3, the Court finds that waiver of any administrative exhaustion requirement is appropriate because further administrative proceedings would not address Petitioner's constitutional challenge to the fact that his original arrest and redetention was unsupported by any individualized determination or process rendering it unconstitutional. The Court's order and injunctive terms are set forth at Dkt. 8. Signed by Judge Jinsook Ohta on 10/14/2026. (mxc) (Entered: 10/14/2026)

#8

Oct 14, 2026

ORDER Granting the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (DKT. 1 ). Signed by Judge Jinsook Ohta on 10/14/2026.(gsw) (Entered: 10/14/2026)

#9

Oct 14, 2026

CLERK'S JUDGMENT. IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the court GRANTS the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the case is hereby closed.(gsw) (Entered: 10/14/2026)

Oct 14, 2026

Minute Order (No Time)

#10

Oct 16, 2026

Status Report