Southern District of California • 3:26-cv-05421

#1

Sep 21, 2026

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus against Todd Blanche, Christopher LaRose, Markwayne Mullin, David J. Venturella ( Filing fee $ 5 receipt number ACASDC-21662048.), filed by Pierre Tilus. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Exhibit I-94, # 3 Exhibit NTA, # 4 Exhibit Court Order)The new case number is 3:26-cv-5421-JO-DEB. Judge Jinsook Ohta and Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Butcher are assigned to the case. (Monsalve, Alejandro)(tac) (anh). (Entered: 09/21/2026)

#2

Sep 22, 2026

Minute Order by Judge Jinsook Ohta: The Court adopts the Standard Procedures for Immigration Habeas Petitions from Chief Judge Order No. 144 with the following modifications: The government's return shall identify and address any individualized concerns regarding Petitioner's danger to the community or flight risk, including the factual basis for any such concerns. Petitioner's optional traverse shall be due within three days of the government's return. Further, the Court sets a hearing on the petition for October 15, 2026 at 9:30 AM. All parties may appear by videoconference for the hearing. The courtroom deputy will provide the videoconference information ahead of the hearing, which will proceed unless the Court issues a written decision on the merits ahead of the hearing date. Parties are directed to check the docket at 5:00 PM the day before the hearing. Signed by Judge Jinsook Ohta on 9/21/2026. (ta) (Entered: 09/22/2026)

Sep 22, 2026

Minute Order (No Time) AND ~Util - Set Motion and R&R Deadlines/Hearings

#3

Sep 23, 2026

NOTICE of Appearance and Substitution of Counsel by Danielle Lynn Brown on behalf of Todd Blanche, Christopher LaRose, Markwayne Mullin, David J. Venturella (Brown, Danielle)Attorney Danielle Lynn Brown added to party Todd Blanche(pty:res), Attorney Danielle Lynn Brown added to party Christopher LaRose(pty:res), Attorney Danielle Lynn Brown added to party Markwayne Mullin(pty:res), Attorney Danielle Lynn Brown added to party David J. Venturella(pty:res)(gsw) (Entered: 09/23/2026)

#4

Sep 29, 2026

RETURN to Petition for Writ of H/C by Todd Blanche, Christopher LaRose, Markwayne Mullin, David J. Venturella. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1-3)(Brown, Danielle)(gsw) (Entered: 09/29/2026)

#5

Sep 29, 2026

TRAVERSE to Petition for Writ of H/C by Pierre Tilus filed by Pierre Tilus. (Monsalve, Alejandro)(gsw) (Entered: 09/29/2026)

#6

Sep 29, 2026

MOTION to File Documents Under Seal (Monsalve, Alejandro)(gsw) (Entered: 09/29/2026)

#7

Sep 29, 2026

***Docketed Under Seal at Doc 13 per Order 12 *** SEALED LODGED Proposed Document re: 6 MOTION to File Documents Under Seal. Document to be filed by Clerk if Motion to Seal is granted. (Monsalve, Alejandro) Modified on 10/15/2026 (gsw). (Entered: 09/29/2026)

#8

Oct 14, 2026

Minute Order by Judge Jinsook Ohta: Pierre Tilus, a citizen of Haiti, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his detention as a violation of due process. See Dkt. 1 ("Pet."). 1. Petitioner entered the United States on May 12, 2023, and was granted parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Pet. at 5; Dkt. 4 at 1. On July 1, 2024, an immigration judge dismissed Petitioner's removal proceedings, and Petitioner affirmatively applied for asylum. Dkt. 5 at 7, 9-10. On September 12, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officers arrested Petitioner in the Mission Valley area of San Diego and served him with a Notice to Appear ("NTA"). Pet. at 5-6. Petitioner has since been detained without a bond hearing at the Otay Mesa Detention Center. Pet. at 5; Dkt. 4 at 1.2. For the reasons stated in Esquivel Pacheco v. LaRose, 818 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1174-75 (S.D. Cal. 2026), the Court finds that (i) 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), (a)(5), and (b)(9) do not bar Petitioner's collateral challenge to the constitutionality and legality of his current detention.3. The Court finds that the government violated Petitioner's Fifth Amendment due process rights by revoking his release on humanitarian parole without an individualized determination. See Mathews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (due process analysis considers (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the [government] action"; (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would entail"). Here, Petitioner acquired a protectable liberty interest on May 12, 2023, when he was granted humanitarian parole pursuant to § 1182(d)(5). See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (grant of parole carries an "implicit promise" that liberty will be revoked only for violation of release conditions). Under the governing statute and regulations, Petitioner held a protectable interest in remaining at liberty absent changes rendering him a security risk or a risk of absconding, the completion of his asylum proceedings, or a determination that humanitarian reasons and public benefit no longer warranted his continued presence in the country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e); Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1144-45 (D. Or. 2025). The absence of any individualized determination significantly risked erroneously depriving Petitioner of his liberty interest, and the government has offered no evidence that the burdens of providing such process would have outweighed this substantial liberty interest. 4. Moreover, Petitioner's detainment is unconstitutional because the government violated its own regulations and denied Petitioner his right to due process as a result. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) ("Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures."). The government commits an Accardi violation when (1) a government agency violates its own regulations; and (2) the violation causes substantial prejudice as a result. See Backcountry Against Dumps v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 77 F.4th 1260, 1270 (9th Cir. 2023). Where a regulation protects fundamental constitutional rights, however, prejudice may be presumed. Sanchez v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 643, 652 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[W]here, as here, compliance with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution, prejudice may be presumed."); U.S. v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Because the regulatory violation here constituted a denial of [Petitioner's] right to notice and an opportunity to respond, no showing of prejudice is necessary to establish a due process violation."). Here, under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e), if Petitioner's parole had not yet expired, the government was required to provide Petitioner written notice of his parole termination and specify that neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrant his continued presence in the U.S. No such notice was provided to Petitioner. Though the government argues that the NTA was adequate written notice, the NTA did not explain that Petitioner's parole had served its purpose, or that humanitarian or public interest reasons warrant his removal. See Dkt. 5 at Ex. 3. Also, though the government claims no written notice is necessary as Petitioner's parole had expired, see id. at 4-5, Respondent states Petitioner's parole was valid for four years and, here, four years has not yet passed since Petitioner was granted parole in 2023. Accordingly, the government's failure to provide Petitioner adequate written notice of his parole termination violated § 212.5(e). Further, because this regulatory violation implicated Petitioner's right to notice and an opportunity to respond, no showing of prejudice is necessary to establish a due process violation. See Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d at 1204 ("Due process always requires, at a minimum, notice and an opportunity to respond."); id. at 1205 ("[W]here, as here, compliance with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution, prejudice may be presumed."); Ulloa v. LaRose, 2026 WL 2446791, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2026) (finding DHS' failure to provide notice of Petitioner's parole termination under § 212.5(e) was a due process violation without an express prejudice finding). Here, the government's violation of § 212.5(e) denied Petitioner the right to written notice and thus was a violation of due process.5. For the reasons above, the Court finds that Petitioner has been subjected to unconstitutional detention and orders his immediate release on the same conditions as his prior grant of humanitarian parole.The Court's order and injunctive terms are set forth at Dkt. 9. Signed by Judge Jinsook Ohta on 10/14/2026. (txa) (Entered: 10/14/2026)

#9

Oct 14, 2026

ORDER Granting Habeas Petition [Dkt. 1]. Signed by Judge Jinsook Ohta on 10/14/2026. (txa) (Entered: 10/14/2026)

#10

Oct 14, 2026

CLERK'S JUDGMENT. IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the court GRANTS the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the case is hereby closed.(gsw) (Entered: 10/14/2026)

Oct 14, 2026

Minute Order (No Time)

#11

Oct 15, 2026

STATUS REPORT by Todd Blanche, Christopher LaRose, Markwayne Mullin, David J. Venturella. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration)(Brown, Danielle)(gsw) (Entered: 10/15/2026)

#12

Oct 15, 2026

Minute Order by Judge Jinsook Ohta: On September 29, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion to seal Exhibit 4 of his traverse. Dkt. 6. Because Exhibit 4 is an order from a state criminal proceeding which has been sealed by the state court, the Court finds Petitioner has established a compelling reason to justify its sealing. See Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner's motion to file Exhibit 4 under seal [Dkt. 6]. Signed by Judge Jinsook Ohta on 10/15/2026. (txa) (Entered: 10/15/2026)

Oct 15, 2026

Minute Order (No Time)