Western District of New York • 1:26-cv-01457

#1

Jul 17, 2026

First PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus ( Filing fee $ 5 receipt number ANYWDC-5905421.), filed by MOHAMED SALEM EL YAGHOUBY. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(El Nemr, Kareem) (Attachment 1 replaced on 7/20/2026) (KKR). (Entered: 07/17/2026)

#2

Jul 20, 2026

TEXT ORDER re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Mohamed Salem El Yaghouby. So that the petitioner can fully participate in these proceedings and maintain adequate access to legal counsel, the respondents are enjoined from transferring the petitioner to any district outside the Western District of New York. See Perez y Perez v. Noem, 2025 WL 1908284, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2025) (collecting cases). In Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61 (2d Cir. 2026), the Second Circuit held that noncitizens who are present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled are not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) but instead are subject to detention under section 1226. And in Cabrera Martinez v. Marich, 816 F. Supp. 3d 356 (W.D.N.Y. 2025), this Court held that detention of noncitizens who have remained in the country following expiration of parole is under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not section 1225. Additionally, this Court held in Alvarez Ortiz v. Freden, 808 F. Supp. 3d 579 (W.D.N.Y. 2025), "that constitutional due process requires the government to bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is either a danger to the community or a flight risk even at an initial bond hearing under section 1226(a)." Id. at 598. It appears that the holdings of da Cunha, Alvarez Ortiz, and/or Cabrera Martinez may apply to the petitioner in this case. Accordingly, the respondents are hereby ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE on or before 7/27/2026, why, in light of those decisions, (1) the petition in this case should not be granted, and (2) the Court should not order that the petitioner receive a bond hearing at which the government bears the burden to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk and at which the immigration judge must consider non-bond alternatives to detention or, if setting a bond, the petitioner's ability to pay. SO ORDERED. Issued by Hon. Lawrence J. Vilardo on 7/20/2026. (RFI) (Entered: 07/20/2026)

Jul 20, 2026

E-Filing Notification re 1 PETITION: Attachment 1 was flattened and replaced. For future reference, please ensure that all documents are flattened prior to filing. (KKR)

Jul 20, 2026

Case assigned to Hon. Lawrence J. Vilardo. Notification to chambers of online civil opening. (KKR)

Jul 20, 2026

Notice of Availability of Magistrate Judge: A United States Magistrate of this Court is available to conduct all proceedings in this civil action in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 636(c) and FRCP 73. The Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge form (AO-85) is available for download at http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/forms. (KKR)

#3

Jul 27, 2026

NOTICE of Appearance of Government Attorney: Chelsea A. Cruz, appearing on behalf of Michael Ball, Todd Blanche, Executive Office for Immigration Review, William Joyce, Todd M. Lyons, Mark Wayne Mullins, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. CLERK TO FOLLOW UP. (Cruz, Chelsea) (Entered: 07/27/2026)

#4

Jul 27, 2026

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Michael Ball, Todd Blanche, Executive Office for Immigration Review, William Joyce, Todd M. Lyons, Mark Wayne Mullins, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.(Cruz, Chelsea) (Entered: 07/27/2026)

#5

Jul 27, 2026

MEMORANDUM in Support re 4 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Michael Ball, Todd Blanche, Executive Office for Immigration Review, William Joyce, Todd M. Lyons, Mark Wayne Mullins, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Deportation Officer, # 2 Exhibit A to Declaration)(Cruz, Chelsea) (Entered: 07/27/2026)

#6

Jul 28, 2026

TEXT ORDER re 4 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ; 5 Memorandum in Support of Motion, filed by Mark Wayne Mullins, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Todd M. Lyons, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Todd Blanche, Michael Ball, William Joyce. Response due 8/4/2026. Reply due 8/10/2026. SO ORDERED. Issued by Hon. Lawrence J. Vilardo on 7/28/2026. (DDC) (Entered: 07/28/2026)

#7

Aug 04, 2026

MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 4 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Mohamed Salem El Yaghouby. (El Nemr, Kareem) (Entered: 08/04/2026)

#8

Aug 04, 2026

AFFIRMATION re 7 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion filed by Mohamed Salem El Yaghouby filed by Mohamed Salem El Yaghouby. (El Nemr, Kareem) (Entered: 08/04/2026)

#9

Aug 10, 2026

REPLY to Response to Motion re 4 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Michael Ball, Todd Blanche, Executive Office for Immigration Review, William Joyce, Mark Wayne Mullins, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, David J Venturella. (Cruz, Chelsea) (Entered: 08/10/2026)

#10

Aug 17, 2026

TEXT ORDER granting 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Mohamed Salem El Yaghouby; and denying 4 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Mark Wayne Mullins, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, David J Venturella, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Todd Blanche, Michael Ball, William Joyce.On July 17, 2026, the petitioner, Mohamed Salem El Yaghouby, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 8 U.S.C. § 2241 alleging that his detention without a constitutionally adequate bond hearing is unlawful. Docket Item 1. The respondents then moved to dismiss, arguing that El Yaghouby failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his petition. Docket Item 4; see also Docket Item 5 at 4-6. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the petition and DENIES the motion to dismiss. "A habeas petitioner must normally exhaust administrative remedies before seeking federal court intervention." Hernandez-Hernandez v. Feeley, 535 F. Supp. 3d 142, 150 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Michalski v. Decker, 279 F. Supp. 3d 487, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)). This requirement, however, is "prudential." Id. (quoting Hossain v. Barr, 2019 WL 5964678, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2019)). Courts generally "will waive the prudential exhaustion requirement where '(1) available remedies provide no genuine opportunity for adequate relief; (2) irreparable injury may occur without immediate judicial relief; (3) administrative appeal would be futile; and (4) in certain instances a plaintiff has raised a substantial constitutional question.'" Id. (quoting Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2003)). Here, the Court finds that waiving the exhaustion requirement is appropriate for several reasons. First, El Yaghouby seeks a bond hearing with the burden of proof on the government, see Docket Item 1 ¶¶ 5, 22—a remedy that is not available through the administrative process; in fact, the bond hearing El Yaghouby would receive without this Court's intervention would put the burden on him, which this Court has held violates due process, see Alvarez Ortiz v. Freden, 808 F. Supp. 3d 579, 596-601 (W.D.N.Y. 2025). Thus, "available remedies provide no genuine opportunity for adequate relief" and "administrative appeal would be futile." See Hernandez-Hernandez, 535 F. Supp. 3d at 150; see also id. ("[W]here a constitutionally inadequate bond hearing (or no bond hearing at all) has been provided, prudential exhaustion is generally not required."). Second, filing the petition prior to El Yaghouby's receiving a constitutionally adequate bond hearing was necessary to preserve his rights. El Yaghouby sought an order enjoining the respondents from transferring him out of this District, Docket Item 1 ¶¶ 5, 63-72, and the Court granted that request, Docket Item 2. If El Yaghouby had not applied for and received that relief, he may well have been transferred to a different jurisdiction in which he would be deemed ineligible for a bond hearing. Compare Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2026) (holding that "noncitizens[] who are present in the United States after entering the country without inspection and admission, and who were not apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter" are not subject to mandatory detention under section 1225(b)(2)(A) and are eligible for bond hearings under section 1226(a)), with Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2026) (reaching the opposite conclusion). And because transfer prior to a bond hearing would have caused "irreparable injury," see Hernandez-Hernandez, 535 F. Supp. 3d at 150, that also favors waiver of the prudential exhaustion requirement. Finally, the Court finds that the petition "raised a substantial constitutional question" that also warrants waiving exhaustion. See id.For all those reasons, this Court denies the motion to dismiss, Docket Item 4, and grants El Yaghouby's request for a constitutionally adequate bond hearing. For the reasons explained in Alvarez Ortiz, this Court ORDERS the respondents to provide the petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge within seven calendar days of the date of this order. At that hearing, the government shall bear the burden to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk. At that bond hearing, the immigration judge must consider non-bond alternatives to detention or, if setting a bond, the petitioner's ability to pay. If the respondents fail to provide such a hearing within seven calendar days, they shall immediately release the petitioner. On or before 8/25/2026, the respondents shall file a status report confirming that the petitioner has either been granted a bond hearing in compliance with this order or released from custody.SO ORDERED. Issued by Hon. Lawrence J. Vilardo on 8/17/2026. (DDC) (Entered: 08/17/2026)