District of Massachusetts • 1:26-cv-13045

#1

Jul 01, 2026

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11859886 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Estela Nohemy Sola Rivera. (Attachments: # 1 Category Form, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet)(Nader, Eliana) (Entered: 07/01/2026)

#2

Jul 01, 2026

District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ORDER entered. EMERGENCY ORDER CONCERNING STAY OF TRANSFER OR REMOVAL. (CM) (Entered: 07/01/2026)

#3

Jul 02, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Judge Allison D. Burroughs assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge Jessica D. Hedges. (SP) (Entered: 07/02/2026)

#4

Jul 02, 2026

Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ORDER entered. Order Concerning Service of Petition and Stay of Transfer or Removal. The answer or responsive pleading is due no later than Monday, July 6, 2026.(CAM) (Entered: 07/02/2026)

#5

Jul 02, 2026

General Order 19-02, dated June 1, 2019 regarding Public Access to Immigration Cases Restricted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c). (CAM) (Entered: 07/02/2026)

Jul 02, 2026

Notice of Case Assignment

#6

Jul 03, 2026

Notice of Appearance

#7

Jul 03, 2026

Extension of Time

#8

Jul 03, 2026

Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered granting 7 Motion for Extension of Time to July 9, 2026 to Respond to Petition. (CAM) (Entered: 07/03/2026)

Jul 03, 2026

Order on Motion for Extension of Time

#9

Jul 07, 2026

Miscellaneous Relief

#10

Jul 07, 2026

Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered GRANTING 9 Assented-to Motion for Immediate Transfer of Petitioner. (CAM) (Entered: 07/07/2026)

Jul 07, 2026

Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief

#11

Jul 09, 2026

Answer/Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241

#12

Jul 16, 2026

Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. Petitioner is ordered to file a supplemental brief elaborating on the legal argument for the due process claim raised in her Petition, [ECF No. 1 16], in light of Respondents' response, [ECF No. 11 ]. Petitioner's brief shall be filed within fourteen days of this order. Respondents may file a supplemental response within fourteen days of Petitioner's brief. (CAM) (Entered: 07/16/2026)

Jul 16, 2026

Order

#13

Jul 31, 2026

Brief - not related to a motion

#14

Aug 03, 2026

Miscellaneous Relief

#15

Aug 04, 2026

Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. Respondents have given notice of an intent to transfer Petitioner to Louisiana “in preparation for Petitioner’s removal from the United States,” [ECF No. 14 at 2], and they move the Court to vacate its order prohibiting Petitioner’s removal from the United States, [ECF No. 4 ]. See generally [ECF No. 14 ]. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED with leave to renew upon a more concrete showing that Mexico intends to accept Petitioner.Respondents are entirely correct that “habeas jurisdiction only extends to review of the legal propriety of Petitioner’s current detention,” and that pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), the Court “lacks jurisdiction to review [Petitioner’s] removal order and the agency’s intent to effectuate such a final order.” [ECF No. 14 at 3]. Petitioner’s habeas petition, however, does not challenge her final order of removal; rather, it challenges Petitioner’s current detention on the basis that it violated her constitutional due process rights. [ECF No. 1 ¶ 16]. Due to the brevity of Petitioner’s initial petition, after receiving Respondents’ response, [ECF No. 11 ], the Court invited supplemental briefing by Petitioner elaborating on the basis for her due process challenge, and provided that Respondents would be permitted to respond within fourteen days. [ECF No. 12 ]. In light of that procedural history, the Court will not deem arguments raised in Petitioner’s supplemental brief waived. See [ECF No. 14 at 1 n.1].Petitioner’s supplemental briefing challenges whether her removal is sufficiently imminent to support redetention, noting her intent to pursue additional process related to her claim of fear of removal to Mexico, [ECF No. 13 at 3–4], and citing the government’s obligation to make “an individualized determination... that,... based on changed circumstances,... removal has become significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future,” [id. at 5 (quoting Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 619–20 (1st Cir. 2023))]. The only evidence that the government has offered in support of its contention that removal is reasonably foreseeable is its vague “inten[t] to transfer Petitioner... to the South Louisiana ICE Processing Center,” [ECF No. 14 at 1], at which point it “will notify Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Migracion (“INM”) of Petitioner’s upcoming removal to Mexico,” [id. at 2]. Crucially, however, it appears that removal will not occur until “the INM’s final acceptance” is issued, [id. at 2], and the government has not indicated how long the notice or acceptance periods typically last, what percentage of notices are ultimately accepted, or what factors, if any, the INM reviews in deciding whether to issue an acceptance. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 151 (D. Mass. 2025) (explaining what information the government must provide to show that removal is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future where no travel approval has been issued). In Navarro v. Lyons, No. 26-cv-10876, 2026 WL 816791 (D. Mass. Mar. 25, 2026), another session of this Court considered a habeas petition by a Cuban citizen who had been redetained for removal to Mexico pursuant to a similarly vaguely defined process. See id. at *1. The court ordered additional briefing related to the likelihood of removal and, particularly, production of “the agreement between the United States and Mexico whereby Mexico agreed to accept Cuban nationals deported by the United States.” Id. Ultimately, counsel did not produce any written agreement, whether framed in general terms or in terms specific to that petitioner. Id. at *2. The court concluded that the record was “woefully inadequate” and, noting the resemblance between the issues presented in that case and the appeal currently pending before the First Circuit in D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 821 F. Supp. 3d 102 (D. Mass. 2026), concluded that a stay pending decision in D.V.D. was appropriate. Id. at *3.On review of the issues presented by this case, and the showing mustered by the government to date, the Court is not persuaded that removal is sufficiently imminent to warrant dissolution of the stay, particularly where the government has not yet responded to, and the Court has not resolved, the additional arguments raised in Petitioner’s supplemental brief, [ECF No. 13 ]. The government’s motion, [ECF No. 14 ], is DENIED. The government may transfer Petitioner to the South Louisiana ICE Processing Center pursuant to the notice it gave, [id. at 1], provided that it stipulates to the Court’s continued jurisdiction over this action and agrees to give 48 hours’ notice in advance of any further transfers. The stay of removal will remain in place, however, until the issues raised in Petitioner’s supplemental brief are resolved by this Court. (CAM) (Entered: 08/04/2026)

Aug 04, 2026

Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief