District of Massachusetts • 1:26-cv-12441

#1

May 29, 2026

First PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11777884 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Gerver Lucio REYES-ARCHILA. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Category Form, # 3 Exhibit ICE locator Gerver May 29 2026 at 4 19 PM EST)(Mandache, Costica) (Entered: 05/29/2026)

#2

Jun 01, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. District Judge Julia E. Kobick assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge M. Page Kelley. (CM) (Entered: 06/01/2026)

#3

Jun 01, 2026

General Order 19-02, dated June 1, 2019 regarding Public Access to Immigration Cases Restricted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c). (Currie, Haley) (Entered: 06/01/2026)

#4

Jun 01, 2026

District Judge Julia E. Kobick: ORDER CONCERNING SERVICE OF PETITION AND STAY OR TRANSFER OF REMOVAL entered.The answer or responsive pleading is due no later than June 4, 2026. (Attachment(s): # 1 *SEALED* Appendix) (Currie, Haley) (Entered: 06/01/2026)

#5

Jun 01, 2026

Copies of the following were mailed to all respondents on 6/1/2026: 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) and 4 Order Concerning Service of Petition and Stay or Transfer of Removal (Currie, Haley) (Entered: 06/01/2026)

Jun 01, 2026

Copy Mailed

Jun 01, 2026

Notice of Case Assignment

#6

Jun 04, 2026

Answer/Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241

#7

Jun 04, 2026

District Judge Julia E. Kobick: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. The petitioner is given leave to file a reply brief on or before June 11, 2026. (Currie, Haley) (Entered: 06/04/2026)

Jun 04, 2026

Order

#8

Jun 11, 2026

Memorandum of Law

#9

Jun 12, 2026

Seal

#10

Jun 12, 2026

District Judge Julia E. Kobick: ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 9 First MOTION to Seal Medical evidence only. Counsel will receive an email within twenty-four (24) hours of this order with instructions for submitting sealed documents for which leave has been granted in accordance with the Local Rules of the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts. Counsel must include - Leave to file granted on (date of order)- in the caption of the document. (MBM) (Entered: 06/12/2026)

Jun 12, 2026

Order on Motion to Seal

#11

Jun 15, 2026

Exhibit

#12

Jul 10, 2026

District Judge Julia E. Kobick: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. Petitioner Gerver Lucio Reyes-Achila, a citizen of Guatemala, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on May 29, 2026. ECF 1 . He alleges, among other claims, that his detention constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 33-34. Reyes-Achila asserts that he suffers from Type 2 diabetes and hypertension that require ongoing medical attention, and that respondents failed to timely evaluate his symptoms. ECF 8, ¶¶ 11-13; ECF 11 . The respondents, in opposition to his petition, argue that Reyes-Achila’s detention is authorized pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and comports with due process, but they do not address whether he is receiving appropriate medical care and whether the conditions of his confinement at Plymouth County Correctional Facility comport with the Eighth Amendment. See generally ECF 6 . Accordingly, the respondents are ORDERED to file, on or before July 15, 2026, a supplemental brief or status report explaining Reyes-Achila’s current medical treatments and addressing the Eighth Amendment issue raised by his habeas petition. (Currie, Haley) (Entered: 07/10/2026)

Jul 10, 2026

Order

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Jul 15, 2026

Extension of Time

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Jul 15, 2026

District Judge Julia E. Kobick: ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 13 MOTION for Extension of Time to 7/17/2026 to Respond to Court Order (Currie, Haley) (Entered: 07/15/2026)

Jul 15, 2026

Order on Motion for Extension of Time

#15

Jul 17, 2026

Status Report

#16

Jul 28, 2026

Miscellaneous Relief

#17

Jul 31, 2026

District Judge Julia E. Kobick: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered.Petitioner Gerver Lucio Reyes-Achila, a citizen of Guatemala, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on May 29, 2026 seeking his immediate release. ECF 1, ¶ 13. He was removed from the United States in 2013 pursuant to a final order of removal. ECF 6, at 4; ECF 6-1; ECF 6-4, at 3. In October of that year, he illegally re-entered the United States in violation of his removal order and was subsequently detained. ECF 6, at 4; ECF 6-1; ECF 6-4, at 4. While detained, he made a claim of fear of removal to Guatemala, which was denied by an Immigration Judge. ECF 6, at 4; ECF 6-2. After waiving any appeal of that denial, Reyes-Achila was again removed to Guatemala in May 2014. ECF 6, at 4; ECF 6-2; ECF 6-3. Sometime between that removal and 2022, he illegally reentered the United States for a third time. See ECF 6-3, at 2 (notice of Reyes-Achila’s removal on May 28, 2014 following his October 2013 re-entry); see ECF 16, at 1 (Reyes-Achila contending that he re-entered the United States on foot from Mexico in March 2014); see ECF 6-4, at 7 (documenting arrest for domestic violence on March 11, 2022 in Lowell, Massachusetts). On May 25, 2026, Reyes-Achila was arrested in Massachusetts for driving with a suspended license and released without bond that day. ECF 6, at 4; ECF 6-4, at 7; ECF 16, at 1. Two days later, he was arrested and detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) when he appeared for a criminal proceeding concerning the May 24 arrest. Id.; ECF 6-4, at 5. He remains in ICE’s custody at Plymouth County Correctional Facility in Plymouth, Massachusetts and is awaiting a reasonable fear interview based on his claim of fear of removal to Guatemala. See ECF 15-1; ECF 6, at 2 n.1; ECF 8, ¶ 4.Shortly after being detained by ICE, Reyes-Achila filed his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF 1 . That petition alleges that he is improperly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and that his detention violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights and his Eighth Amendment right not to “be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.” ECF 1, at 10-11. Among other things, Reyes-Achila asserts that he suffers from Type 2 diabetes and hypertension that require ongoing medical attention, and that the respondents failed to provide “the complex medical care that he needs.” ECF 1, ¶ 7; see ECF 11 . The respondents, in opposition to Reyes-Achila’s petition, argue that his detention is authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and comports with due process. ECF 6, at 4-6. Reyes-Achila, in turn, “acknowledges” that he is subject to a “reinstated” final order of removal and is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), not 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) or 1226(a). ECF 8, ¶¶ 27-30. Meanwhile, because the respondents’ opposition did not address whether Reyes-Achila is receiving appropriate medical care and whether the conditions of his confinement at Plymouth County Correctional Facility comport with constitutional requirements, see generally ECF 6, the Court ordered them to file a supplemental brief or status report “explaining Reyes-Achila’s current medical treatments and addressing the Eighth Amendment issue raised by his habeas petition,” ECF 12 . The respondents then submitted an affidavit from the Health Services Administrator at Plymouth County Correctional Facility attesting to Reyes-Achila’s access to medical care while detained. See generally ECF 15-1. On July 28, 2026, Reyes-Achila filed a motion “For Release Under Mapp v. Reno and the Due Process Clause,” which seeks his release with bail pending the adjudication of his petition for habeas. ECF 16, at 11 (formatting altered).To prevail on his habeas petition, Reyes-Achila must demonstrate that he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The burden of proof of showing deprivation of rights leading to unlawful detention is on the petitioner.”). Reyes-Achila first contends that his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights. See ECF 8, ¶¶ 30-42. Detention pursuant to that statute, he contends, “remains subject to constitutional limitations,” which, in his view, have been violated by the respondents. Id. ¶ 31. Although Section 1231 must be “read in light of the Constitution’s demands,” Reyes-Achila’s detention comports with those demands. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). Where, as here, an individual re-enters the United States “without authorization after having already been removed,” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) sets out an “expedited process” for “reinstating [that individual’s] order of removal.” Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 529-30 (2021). Neither Reyes-Achila nor the respondents specify when his removal order was reinstated. If it was reinstated within the past 90 days, he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)-(a)(2). G.P. v. Garland, 103 F.4th 898, 900 (1st Cir. 2024). But the Court assumes that his removal order was reinstated more than 90 days ago, because the respondents contend, and Reyes-Achila does not dispute, that his detention is now governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). ECF 6, at 1; ECF 8, ¶¶ 27-30.In construing Section 1231(a)(6), the Supreme Court has held that six months of detention under the statute is a “presumptively reasonable period,” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701, recognizing that “detention during deportation proceedings [i]s a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process” under the Fifth Amendment, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). After “the presumptively reasonable six-month post-removal period” ends, noncitizens may be released if they “provid[e] good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future” and the respondents fail to “rebut that showing.” G.P., 103 F.4th at 901-02 (quotation marks omitted). Reyes-Achila does not contend that his detention under Section 1231(a)(6) has extended beyond the presumptively reasonable six-month period; indeed, he was detained approximately two months ago. Because his detention appears to be within the presumptively reasonable period of detention under Section 1231(a)(6), Reyes-Achila has not met his burden to show that he is presently in custody in violation of his due process rights.Reyes-Achila additionally argues that the respondents have violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to provide “the complex medical care that he needs.” ECF 1, ¶ 7; id. at 11; see ECF 11 . While the Eighth Amendment does not apply to detainees who, like Reyes-Achila, have not been convicted of a crime, the Constitution’s due process clauses “provid[e] at least as much protection . . . as the Eighth Amendment” for persons civilly detained and awaiting deportation. Ruiz-Rosa v. Rullan, 485 F.3d 150, 155-56 (1st Cir. 2007) (pre-trial detainees); see Edwards v Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 2000) (a person “detained for deportation [is] the equivalent of a pretrial detainee”); Peruano v. Wesling, No. 26-cv-10300-LTS, 2026 WL 1413758, at *1 (D. Mass. May 20, 2026). “For medical treatment in [detention] to offend the Constitution, the care must involve acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to [the petitioner’s] serious medical needs.” Ruiz-Rosa, 485 F.3d at 156 (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, to prevail, Reyes-Achila must meet his burden to demonstrate that (1) he has serious medical needs and (2) the respondents were deliberately indifferent to those needs. Id.Reyes-Achila has met his burden on the first element. Evidence submitted to the Court demonstrates that he suffers from diabetes mellitus, hypertension, a history of odontoid fracture, and post-traumatic headaches, and that, because of those conditions, he requires ongoing evaluation and treatment, including multiple forms of prescription medication. ECF 16-1, at 1. He has not, however, demonstrated that the respondents acted with deliberate indifference to those needs. To demonstrate deliberate indifference, Reyes-Achila must demonstrate that the respondents were “subjectively . . . aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]” and that they actually drew that inference. Ruiz-Rosa, 485 F.3d at 156 (quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference “may be shown by the denial of needed care as punishment and by decisions about medical care made recklessly with actual knowledge of impending harm, easily preventable.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). However, “substandard care, malpractice, negligence, inadvertent failure to provide care, and disagreement as to the appropriate course of treatment are all insufficient to prove a constitutional violation.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).Reyes-Achila has not submitted evidence indicating that he was denied or received inadequate care in the face of a substantial risk of serious harm. See generally ECF 1, ECF 8, ECF 11, ECF 16 . He has not, for example, submitted an affidavit attesting that he has received medical care so reckless as to give rise to a risk of preventable harm. The respondents, on the other hand, have submitted evidence indicating that Reyes-Achila has received consistent and responsive medical care while in custody. The evidence reveals that, upon his detention, Reyes-Achila received near-immediate medical attention in the form of a nursing intake to document his conditions, an initial physical assessment with a nurse practitioner, a meeting with a mental health clinician, and an x-ray, and that he was “started on medication for his diabetes, hypertension, and headaches.” ECF 15-1, ¶¶ 4-6 (documenting initial intake, and care appointments occurring on May 27, 2026); see also id. ¶¶ 13, 16, 19 (documenting additional appointments including with dentist during detention). It further indicates that each time Reyes-Achila has submitted a “sick slip” requesting to meet with a provider for an acute need, a provider treated him the next day unless he was unavailable. See id. ¶¶ 8, 17, 20 (documenting assessments, treatment changes, and referrals following appointments); but see id. ¶¶ 12, 15 (documenting instances where provider “attempted” to see Reyes-Achila, but he was “not in unit” or “did not come to sick call line”). Because the record “provides no evidence of deliberate indifference on the part of . . . the defendants,” Reyes-Achila’s arguments do not support his release. Ruiz-Rosa, 485 F.3d at 156.Reyes-Achila’s petition also asserts a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to bail and his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. ECF 1, at 10-11. But because he fails to develop those arguments beyond singular statements in his petition, the Court deems them waived. See generally ECF 1, ECF 8, ECF 11, ECF 16 ; Rodriguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[W]e deem waived . . . claims adverted to in a cursory fashion, unaccompanied by developed argument.”); Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am., Inc., 591 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[I]issues adverted to . . . in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some developed argumentation, are deemed to have been abandoned.” (quotation marks omitted)).For the foregoing reasons, Reyes-Achila’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, ECF 1, is DENIED. His motion seeking release with bail pending the adjudication of his habeas petition, ECF 16, is accordingly DENIED as moot. (Currie, Haley) (Entered: 07/31/2026)

#18

Jul 31, 2026

Judgment

#19

Jul 31, 2026

Notice - Other

Jul 31, 2026

Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief