District of Massachusetts • 3:26-cv-12148

#1

May 12, 2026

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11738919 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Category Form)(Miller, Jacob) Modified on 5/12/2026 to remove duplicate text (LBO). (Entered: 05/12/2026)

#2

May 12, 2026

Case transferred to Western Division (Springfield) (LBO) (Entered: 05/12/2026)

#3

May 12, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Judge George A. OToole, Jr assigned to case. (MPZ) (Entered: 05/12/2026)

#4

May 12, 2026

General Order 19-02, dated June 1, 2019 regarding Public Access to Immigration Cases Restricted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c). (FGD) (Entered: 05/12/2026)

#5

May 12, 2026

Judge George A. OToole, Jr: ORDER entered. SERVICE ORDER re 2241 Petition. Order entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2243 governing Section 2241 cases for service on respondents. The answer or responsive pleading is due no later than 14 days from receipt of this order. (FGD) (Entered: 05/12/2026)

#6

May 12, 2026

Copy re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241), 5 Service Order - 2241 Petition, emailed to Duty AUSA and mailed to Respondents and USAO on 5/12/2026. (FGD) (Entered: 05/12/2026)

May 12, 2026

Notice of Case Assignment

May 12, 2026

Copy Mailed

May 12, 2026

Case Transferred Out - Divisional Transfer

#7

May 26, 2026

NOTICE of Appearance by Vincent Engingro, III on behalf of Patricia Hyde, Michael Krol, Todd Lyons, Markwayne Mullin (Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 05/26/2026)

#8

May 26, 2026

RESPONSE/ANSWER to Petitioner's 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241), by Patricia Hyde, Michael Krol, Todd Lyons, Markwayne Mullin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 05/26/2026)

#9

Jun 02, 2026

Judge George A. OToole, Jr: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Pursuant to Local Rule 40.1(h), I direct the Clerk to return this case for random assignment to a new district judge. (FGD) (Entered: 06/02/2026)

#10

Jun 02, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Reassignment. Judge Mark G. Mastroianni added. Judge George A. OToole, Jr no longer assigned to case. (MPZ) (Entered: 06/02/2026)

Jun 02, 2026

Order Reassigning Case

Jun 02, 2026

Notice of Reassignment

#11

Jun 09, 2026

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: Electronic order entered granting 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241). The court grants the petition ("Petition") in so far as it seeks a bond hearing before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(a). The court orders the bond hearing, which must be constitutionally adequate pursuant to Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2021), to be held by June 18, 2026. The court further orders Respondents to file a status report by June 23, 2026, stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond and, if his request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial. Petitioner is a noncitizen from Columbia who Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained and took into custody on May 12, 2026. Petitioner asserts that ICE is detaining him without cause and in violation of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. He further states that he has filed for asylum and that he has his next asylum hearing on September 30, 2026. Respondents allege that Petitioner was arrested on November 5, 2025, and charged with rape and a liquor-related offense in Berkshire County, Massachusetts. (Dkt. No. 8, n. 1.) Respondents do not allege nor does their attached exhibit indicate that Petitioner was convicted of any charges. This court has jurisdiction over the Petition as it concerns relief that Petitioner seeks challenging his continued detention. See Kong v. United States, 62 F. 4th 608, 614 (1st Cir. 2023) (noting that "we have held that district courts retain jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of detention in the immigration context" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court finds 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(c) is not applicable to Petitioner and finds that Petitioner's continued detention violates his procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226, non-citizens may generally be "released on bond during the pendency of their immigration proceedings." Romero v. Hyde, 795 F. Supp. 3d 271, 286 (D. Mass. 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(a)). Sec. 1226(c), however, creates "'a statutory category of aliens who may not be released' during removal proceedings, outside of certain limited circumstances." Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018)) (emphasis in original). "Under Section 1226(c), the government 'shall take into custody' any noncitizen who is inadmissible or deportable based on, among other things, a conviction for certain crimes involving moral turpitude, controlled substance offenses, aggravated felonies, certain firearm offenses, or certain acts associated with terrorism." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)). In addition, the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), added a new subparagraph which is not at issue here. In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this mandatory detention provision, holding that criminal noncitizens can be detained for a "brief period necessary for their removal proceedings" without being provided with an "individualized determination as to whether [they] [present] [a] flight risk." Id. However, "[i]n upholding the constitutionality of [S]ection 1226(c)'s mandatory detention procedure in Demore,... the Court explained that that section specifically applies to a class of noncitizens who had already been convicted (beyond a reasonable doubt) of committing certain serious crimes." Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 35. Here, by contrast, Petitioner had been arrested and charged with rape and a liquor-related offense before ICE detained him. It appears likely, but there were no definitive details provided, that Petitioner was, at some point, released from pretrial detention in state court. The government is not alleging that Petitioner has been "convicted of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor [that he has] received 'the full procedural protections' of the criminal justice system, including a trial by a jury of his peers." Alcantara Guerrero v. Wesling, No. 1:26-CV-10928-JEK, 2026 WL 931503, at *4 (D. Mass. Apr. 6, 2026) (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 513); Rincon v. Hyde, 810 F. Supp. 3d 101, 114 (D. Mass. 2025) (finding Sec. 1226(c) inapplicable where "Petitioner has not been convicted of any crime"); see also Felipe de Paula Ataide Almeida v. Moniz, et al., No. 26-CV-12207-AK, 2026 WL 1602119, at *1 (D. Mass. June 4, 2026). Thus, Petitioner is not in the same "class of noncitizens who ha[ve] already been convicted (beyond a reasonable doubt) of committing certain serious crimes." Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 35. Because Petitioner does not appear detainable under Sec.1226(c) pursuant to Demore, the court now turns to the three-part test laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), to assess the due process challenge raised by Petitioner. See, e.g., Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 27-35 (applying the Mathews factors to a detainee held pursuant to Sec. 1226(c)); Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 14748 (2d Cir. 2024) (concluding that procedural due-process challenges to detention under Sec. 1226(c) should be analyzed under Mathews, and noting "[t]he Supreme Court has also, in other contexts, applied Mathews to examine the adequacy of procedures provided to individuals in custody, including noncitizens legally present in the United States" (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 52829 (2004)); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 42533 (1979)); Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 216; Alcantara Guerrero, 2026 WL 931503, at *4; Tenemasa-Lema v. Hyde, 810 F. Supp. 3d 244, 257 (D. Mass. 2025); Rincon, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 114. The Mathews factors consist of: (1) "'the private interest that will be affected by the official action'; (2) 'the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards'; and (3) 'the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.'" Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 28 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). Acknowledging the limited factual record the court has before it, the first Mathews factor nevertheless strongly favors Petitioner as "[u]ndoubtedly, the private interest at stake here 'is the most elemental of liberty interests -- the interest in being free from physical detention.'" Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 216 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) ("[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection."). Petitioner has already been detained for weeks in a situation "where the [g]overnment controls his daily activities and keeps him from his family, community, and work." Felipe de Paula Ataide Almeida, 2026 WL 1602119, at *2. The court finds this enough to be a "substantial deprivation of liberty." Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 28. Likewise, the second factor also weighs in favor of relief. "The risk of erroneous deprivation is high" because Petitioner has pending state court charges for which he appears to be on release in the state system, there is no indication of a subsequent criminal process, including a conviction, and he is presumed innocent of those charges. Alcantara Guerrero, 2026 WL 931503, at *5 (finding high risk of deprivation where Petitioner was detained based solely on an arrest and charge); see also Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 216-17 (finding high risk of deprivation of Petitioner's liberty in part due to his detention being based solely on an arrest with no accompanying charges and where the underlying conduct did not indicate dangerousness or flight risk). Finally, the public interest factor advantages Petitioner because, like in Hernandez-Lara, 10 F. 14th at 32, here "the government fail[ed] to explain why its proffered interest in securing appearance at removal proceedings and for deportation holds sway where a noncitizen is not a flight risk." Id. (citation omitted). The government cannot meet its burden based on a reference to an arrest and criminal charges without anything else. The government also does not address why a bond hearing, which would "evaluate whether [Petitioner] poses a risk of flight or danger to the community," would be insufficient to address any public interest concerns. Alcantara Guerrero, 2026 WL 931503, at *5 (citing Hernandez-Lara, 10 F. 14th at 41). Moreover, "[c]ourts generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is relatively minimal." Tenemasa-Lema, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 258 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hilario M.R. v. Warden, Mesa Verde Det. Ctr., 2025 WL 1158841, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2025) (citing cases). Consistent with other courts' rulings, "the public interest is not well served where, as here, a noncitizen is detained without a bond hearing... simply because he was arrested for, and charged with, an offense under Sec. 1226(c)." Alcantara Guerrero, 2026 WL 931503, at *5; see also Black, 103 F.4th at 154 (finding public interest "in minimizing the enormous impact of incarceration in cases where it serves no purpose".... "[w]here the noncitizen poses no danger and is not a flight risk" (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 217. (TF) (Entered: 06/09/2026)

Jun 09, 2026

Order

#12

Jun 15, 2026

Emergency MOTION to Enforce Judgment by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz.(Miller, Jacob) (Main Document 12 replaced on 7/2/2026) (TF). (Additional attachment(s) added on 7/2/2026: # 1 Exhibit) (TF). Modified on 7/2/2026 Motion and Exhibits were incorrectly filed as one document (TF). (Entered: 06/15/2026)

#13

Jun 16, 2026

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: Electronic order entered re 12 Emergency Motion to Enforce Judgement. The respondents shall respond to this motion by June 26, 2026. This order supersedes the court's June 9, 2026, order requiring the respondents to file a status report regarding the bond hearing by June 23, 2026. (TF) (Entered: 06/16/2026)

Jun 16, 2026

Order

#14

Jun 26, 2026

Opposition re 12 Emergency MOTION to Enforce Judgment for Immediate Release or to Enforce the Habeas Order filed by Patricia Hyde, Michael Krol, Todd Lyons, Markwayne Mullin. (Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 06/26/2026)

#15

Jun 28, 2026

NOTICE by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz re 14 Opposition to Motion (Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 06/28/2026)

#16

Jul 03, 2026

REPLY to Response to 12 Emergency MOTION to Enforce Judgment filed by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz. (Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 07/03/2026)

#17

Jul 10, 2026

Emergency MOTION to Expedite by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz.(Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 07/10/2026)

#18

Jul 15, 2026

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: Electronic order denying 12 Emergency Motion to Enforce Judgment by Darwin A. Gordon Ruiz; and granting 17 Emergency Motion to Expedite by Darwin A. Gordon Ruiz. Petitioner is a noncitizen from Columbia who Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detained and took into custody on May 12, 2026. On November 5, 2025, Petitioner was arrested and charged with rape and a liquor-related offense in Berkshire County, Massachusetts. On June 9, 2026, this court granted Petitioner's petition insofar as it sought a bond hearing before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(a) and ordered a bond hearing, compliant with Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2021), by June 18, 2026. On June 15, 2026, an Immigration Judge ("IJ") timely held a bond hearing and found clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to society. According to Respondent, as is custom pursuant to the Immigration Court Practice Manual, the IJ has not issued a written decision explaining the basis for her denial because Petitioner has not filed an appeal of the decision with the Board of Immigration Appeals. (See Dkt. No. 14 at 1-2, n. 1 (citing Immigration Court Practice Manual, Chapter 9 Detention and Bond, Section 9.3 Bond Proceedings, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1052736/dl?inline)). On June 15, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant motion arguing that the bond hearing he received was constitutionally inadequate, and thus not in accordance with Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 19, because the IJ erroneously relied on Petitioner's pending criminal charges in finding him, by clear and convincing evidence, to pose a danger to the community. (Dkt. No. 12.) This determination, Petitioner argues, violates this court's order in which it stated that an arrest and criminal charges are insufficient to detain a noncitizen under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(c). In support of his argument, Petitioner attaches what the government submitted to the IJ (state court proceedings-related documents), Petitioner's motion requesting bond, and the supporting documents for that motion. (Dkt. No. 12-1.) Respondent argues that the court should deny Petitioner's motion because 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(e) prohibits judicial review of the IJ's discretionary bond decision and because Petitioner should first exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing the IJ's decision to the BIA. (Dkt. No. 16.) Petitioner filed a reply brief in which he argued that the court has jurisdiction despite 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(e), pending charges alone are insufficient to constitute convincing evidence of dangerousness, and administrative exhaustion does not bar relief. (Dkt. No. 17.) Alternatively, Petitioner requests that the court order Petitioner's production for state criminal proceedings. (Id.) As there is no statutory requirement for administrative exhaustion nor a need to decide the issue, the court addresses the merits of Petitioner's arguments. There is nothing indicating that Petitioner's bond hearing did not constitutionally comply with Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 4344 (finding that "[a]ll that is required is that [the adjudication of requests for release under Section 1226] comport with the minimum standards of the constitution"). By statute, "the Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of [8 U.S.C. Sect. 1226] shall not be subject to review," and "[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the... denial of bond or parole" of any noncitizen. 8 U.S.C. Sec.1226(e). Section 1226(e) precludes the court from exercising judicial review over the IJ's discretionary dangerousness determination. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516 (2003) (explaining that 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(e) bars a noncitizen's challenge to "a discretionary judgment by the Attorney General or a decision that the Attorney General has made regarding his detention or release" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hernandez-Azuaje v. Hyde, No. 25-CV-13224-ADB, 2026 WL 221833, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2026); Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140, 144 (D. Mass. 2019); Massingue v. Streeter, No. 3:19-CV-30159-KAR, 2020 WL 1866255, at *5 (D. Mass. Apr. 14, 2020); see also Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 688 (D. Mass. 2018) ("Congress has eliminated judicial review of discretionary custody determinations."). Accordingly, where a petitioner merely "disagrees with the immigration judge's weighing of the evidence and exercise of discretion with respect to dangerousness, [t]he [c]ourt does not have jurisdiction to hear such a challenge." Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 144 (citing 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(e)). However, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(e) does not deprive courts of jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to "'the extent of the Government's detention authority under the 'statutory framework' as a whole.'" Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 3334 (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295-296 (2018)). Accordingly, where courts in the First Circuit have previously entered a conditional grant of habeas relief, including in the form of granting a bond hearing, they have exercised jurisdiction limited to reviewing compliance with that prior order. See, e.g., Orozco Mazariegos v. Moniz et al., 26-cv-10902-DJC, Dkt. No. 15 (April 17, 2026); Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 142; see also Hernandez-Azuaje, 2026 WL 221833, at *1 (explaining that "courts in the First Circuit have reviewed immigration judges' bond determinations for compliance with th[e] constitutionally mandated burden of proof [of clear and convincing evidence]"). Accordingly, while this court lacks jurisdiction to review the IJ's weighing of the evidence and exercise of discretion as to dangerousness, the court has jurisdiction to review the IJ's decision to the extent that Petitioner is arguing that the IJ failed to comply with this court's previous order. "[T]he nature of the [district] courts review at this context is 'highly circumscribed.'" Orozco Mazariegos, 26-cv-10902-DJC, Dkt. No. 15 (quoting Hernandez-Azuaje, 2026 WL 221833, at *1); see also Dos Reis v. Vitello, No. CV 25-10497-RGS, 2025 WL 1043434, at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 8, 2025) (discussing Hernandez-Lara for the proposition that "a court may intervene where an immigration bail determination is ultra vires or facially unconstitutional" (citing Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 33)); see also Pratt v. Doll, No. 17-cv-01020, 2019 WL 722578, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2019) (holding that habeas relief is appropriate only if the immigration judge's "exercise of discretion in denying bond was so arbitrary that it would offend fundamental tenets of due process") (citation omitted).Succinctly put, "[t]he [c]ourt's task is therefore simply to ascertain whether the immigration court's discretion was exercised in a manner consistent with due process." Miti v. Moniz, No. 26-11327-BEM, 2026 WL 884639, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2026). To show that the denial of his bond violated his due process rights, "Petitioner must either 'point to the language of the immigration judge's opinion or demonstrate that 'the evidence itself could not -- as a matter of law -- have supported' the immigration judge's decision to deny bond.'" Hernandez-Azuaje, 2026 WL 221833, at *1 (quoting Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 143). Petitioner does not dispute Respondent's summary, based on the audio file, of the bond hearing: "[T]he IJ states there is no evidence the criminal charges have been dismissed or dropped. The audio reveals the IJ weighed the totality of the evidence and stated the elements of the crime are inherently dangerous to the community at large." (Dkt. No. 14 at 6, n.3). Rather, Petitioner asserts that the IJ, after reviewing only state-court related documents but no corroborating evidence to support the criminal allegations, found him to be dangerous. (Dkt. No. 12, paras. 12, 17.) The court has reviewed the government's state court-related documents, including arrest records, booking records, charging documents, and court docket materials. See Lee v. Barr, 975 F.3d 69, 76 (1st Cir. 2020) (explaining that "even charges that do not result in a conviction can form the basis for denial of relief"); see also Miti, 2026 WL 884639, at *67; Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 143. Upon review, the court finds there is no plausible argument that the IJ erred in weighing the evidence as a matter of law, violated the court's order, or acted in a facially unconstitutional manner. Petitioner's argument, despite framing his challenge to the IJ's dangerousness finding as "a purely legal question" to enforce the courts prior order, amounts to a disagreement based on the IJ's weighing of the evidence and her exercise of discretion with respect to dangerousness. In arguing that the IJ should not have considered the state court-related documents, Plaintiff relies on this court's June 9, 2026, order in which the court cited and relied on Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 19, to find that Petitioner cannot be mandatorily held under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(c) solely on the basis of pending criminal charges. (Dkt. No. 12 at 12-15.) Petitioner, without providing legal authority, assumes that if an arrest and criminal charges are insufficient to subject him to mandatory detention under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(c), then they must also be insufficient in showing that there is clear and convincing evidence that he poses a danger to the community under 18 U.S.C. Sec.1226(a). This court, however, rejects this analogy because the manner in which an arrest and criminal charges are considered for the purposes of mandatory detention under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(c) and for the purposes of an IJ's bond determination under 18 U.S.C. Section 1226(a) differ. Contrast Alcantara Guerrero v. Wesling, No. 1:26-CV-10928-JEK, 2026 WL 931503, at *4 (D. Mass. Apr. 6, 2026) and Rincon v. Hyde, 810 F. Supp. 3d 101, 114 (D. Mass. 2025) (finding Sec. 1226(c) inapplicable where "Petitioner has not been convicted of any crime"), with Miti, 2026 WL 884639, at *6 ("The mere fact that the assault charge against Petitioner was dismissed does not automatically cancel out its evidentiary value, 'as even charges that do not result in a conviction can form the basis for denial of relief.'" (quoting Lee, 975 F.3d at 76)). Accordingly, by merely arguing as to the weight that the IJ should have given the arrest and charges, the court finds Petitioner has not demonstrated the type of error which this court has jurisdiction to review. See Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 142,144 (finding that it had jurisdiction to review "compliance with its earlier order conditionally granting habeas relief," but not as to petitioner's disagreements "with the immigration judge's weighing of the evidence and exercise of discretion with respect to dangerousness"). Even if this court were to disagree with IJ's finding, "[district] courts cannot override an immigration judge's bond decision simply because they might have reached a different result if considering the issue de novo or in the context of a bail review in a criminal case." Hernandez-Azuaje v. Hyde, 2026 WL 221833, at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the court cannot say that "'the exercise of discretion in denying bond was so arbitrary that it would offend fundamental tenets of due process.'" Massingue v. Streeter, 2020 WL 1866255, at *5 (quoting Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 144). As to the alternative relief sought in Petitioner's reply brief (Dkt. No. 16), the request for Petitioner's Production for Criminal Proceedings is denied without prejudice, as it was raised for the first time in a reply brief, lacks any supporting legal authority, and is an underdeveloped argument. See United States v. Williams, 630 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding that an issue is waived when a party frames an argument in the "most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones" (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is the litigant's "obligation to spell out its arguments squarely and distinctly." United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Coons v. Indus. Knife Co., 620 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that "the district court was 'free to disregard' the state law argument that was not developed in Coon's brief" (quoting Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 260 (1st Cir. 1999)); see Rocafort v. IBM Corp., 334 F.3d 115, 121-22 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Passing reference to legal phrases and case citation without developed argument is not sufficient to defeat waiver.... Instead, a party has a duty to incorporate all relevant arguments in the papers that directly address a pending motion." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also De La Cruz v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 17, 23 n.3 (1st Cir. 2025) (explaining that "argument[s]... raised for the first time in reply [are] waived"). (TF) (Entered: 07/15/2026)

Jul 15, 2026

Order on Motion to Enforce Judgment AND Order on Motion to Expedite

#19

Jul 16, 2026

NOTICE by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz re 18 Order on Motion to Enforce Judgment, Order on Motion to Expedite (Miller, Jacob) Modified on 7/17/2026 (TF). (Entered: 07/16/2026)

#20

Jul 17, 2026

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: Electronic order entered construing 19 NOTICE by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz re 18 Order on Motion to Enforce Judgment, Order on Motion to Expedite as a motion. 19 is granted. Petitioner shall file his motion for leave to amend his petition and a motion for an order directing his production for state criminal proceedings by July 27, 2026. Respondent shall file a response by August 10, 2026 . (TF) (Entered: 07/17/2026)

Jul 17, 2026

Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief

#21

Jul 26, 2026

MOTION to Amend by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz.(Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 07/26/2026)

#22

Aug 10, 2026

Assented to MOTION for Extension of Time to August 18, 2026 to File Response/Reply as to 21 MOTION to Amend by Patricia Hyde, Michael Krol, Todd Lyons, Markwayne Mullin.(Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 08/10/2026)

#23

Aug 11, 2026

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered granting 22 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 22 Assented to MOTION for Extension of Time to August 18, 2026 to File Response/Reply as to 21 MOTION to Amend . Responses due by 8/18/2026. (TF) (Entered: 08/11/2026)

Aug 11, 2026

Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply

#24

Aug 18, 2026

RESPONSE to Motion re 21 MOTION to Amend Petition filed by Patricia Hyde, Michael Krol, Todd Lyons, Markwayne Mullin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 08/18/2026)

#25

Aug 19, 2026

NOTICE by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz re 24 Response to Motion (Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 08/19/2026)

#26

Aug 19, 2026

NOTICE by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz COUNSEL'S UNAVAILABILITY (Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 08/19/2026)

#27

Sep 03, 2026

Emergency MOTION ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND PRODUCTION FOR STATE COURT re 25 Notice (Other) by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz.(Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 09/03/2026)

#28

Sep 04, 2026

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered denying 27 Emergency Motion Regarding State Court Proceeding and Breakdown in Access to Counsel. On September 3, 2026, Petitioner filed an emergency motion in this court in connection with Petitioner' s removal hearing, scheduled for today. (Dkt. No. 27.) Petitioner contends that he has been unable to meet with his immigration counsel prior to the hearing, as immigration counsel is unable to access JurisLink and secure any meetings or communications with... Petitioner. (Id. at 3.) Petitioner requests that this court "note the breakdown [in access to counsel] for the record" and "enter any order within its authority directing that Petitioner's access to, and communication with, his immigration counsel of record be restored or otherwise facilitated without further delay." (Id.) This court, however, generally lacks jurisdiction over issues related to petitioners' removal proceedings, including issues related to counsel for a removal hearing. As the First Circuit has explained, "Congress, in enacting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)... direct[ed] challenges to removal through defined administrative channels." Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't Div. of Dep't of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007). In this regard, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) provides: Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States... shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of Title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision... or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such questions of law or fact. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). "By its terms, the provision encompasses 'all questions of law and fact' and extends to both 'constitutional and statutory' challenges. Its expanse is breathtaking." Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 9 (quoiting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)). While the scope of section 1252(b)(9) is expansive, it does not sweep in "claims with only a remote or attenuated connection to the removal of an alien." Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 10. In other words, "arising from," 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), "requires more than a weak or tenuous connection to a triggering event." Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 10 (citations omitted). The First Circuit has previously held that claims arising out of petitioners' right-to-counsel claims in connection with removal proceedings must be administratively exhausted pursuant to § 1252(b)(9). Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 13. As the First Circuit succinctly explained: "claims that are based upon an alleged deprivation of an alien's right to counsel in connection with a removal proceeding, whether pending or imminent, arise from the removal proceeding." Id. That is, "an alien's right to counsel possesses a direct link to, and is inextricably intertwined with, the administrative process that Congress so painstakingly fashioned." Id. "Ultimately," the First Circuit explained, "allowing aliens to ignore the channeling provisions of section 1252(b)(9) and bring right-to-counsel claims directly in the district court would result in precisely the type of fragmented litigation that Congress sought to forbid." Id. at 13-14. Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner's access to counsel issue, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). That Petitioner's access to counsel for this hearing is intertwined with Petitioner's immigration proceedings, and thus under the ambit of § 1252(b)(9), is further evidenced by Petitioner's own statement. Specifically, Petitioner contends that "[t]his breakdown in communication bears directly on Petitioner's ability to meaningfully participate in a hearing that could result in an order of removal." (Dkt. No. 27 at 3 (emphasis added)). That this court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner's right-to-counsel issue does not strip Petitioner from recourse. Rather, Petitioner must channel any such issues via the administrative process. Indeed, Petitioner has already utilized that administrative process, at least on one earlier occasion, to obtain relief from Petitioner's right-to-counsel issue. (See Dkt. 27 at Ex. A (Counsel for Petitioner explaining that while Petitioner initially "had a removal hearing scheduled for August 25, 2026[,]... immigration counsel obtained a... continuance to September 4, 2026[,] to allow immigration counsel additional time to get through to consult with [Petitioner].")) (TRL) (Entered: 09/04/2026)

Sep 04, 2026

Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief

#29

Sep 08, 2026

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: Electronic order entered denying 21 Motion to Amend by Darwin A. Gordon Ruiz.Petitioner seeks to amend his petition for habeas corpus to add a claim for mandamus relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1361, in order to compel the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") to docket and process his pending bond appeal and the Immigration Judge to prepare her written decision regarding his bond hearing. As part of this mandamus claim, Petitioner seeks to add the Acting Attorney General, the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and the Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals as parties. Second, Petitioner seeks an order directing the production of Petitioner for his state criminal proceedings which the court construes as a request for a writ of habeas corpus.On July 10, 2026, Petitioner filed his appeal with the BIA. (Id.) on July 26, 2026, Plaintiff filed this instant motion, and on July 28, 2026, the BIA sent Petitioner correspondence acknowledging receipt of the appeal of his bond hearing. (Id.; Dkt. No. 21.) Petitioner's request for mandamus action as to the docketing and processing of his BIA appeal is moot because the processing of his appeal has been initiated. Accordingly, the court construes Petitioner's request as consisting of the BIA processing his appeal within a certain time frame that he does not specify."A writ of mandamus is issued in only extraordinary circumstances in which: 1) the petitioner is clearly entitled to the writ, 2) there is no other adequate alternative remedy and 3) there is a clear duty on the part of the defendants to do the act in question." Celebi v. Mayorkas, 744 F. Supp. 3d 100, 105 (D. Mass. 2024) (citing Georges v. Quinn, 853 F.2d 994, 995 (1st Cir. 1988)). Petitioner does not cite any legal authority which states that the BIA must accept, docket, or process any appeal within a specific timeframe. Moreover, there is an alternative remedy consisting of filing a motion to expedite an appeal with the BIA. See Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., U.S. Dep't of Just., EOIR Policy Manual, Part III: Board Practice Manual, Chapter 5.4: Expedite Requests (2026), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/policy-manual-eoir/part-III/bia/chapter-5-4 (last accessed August 20, 2026). Petitioner has not indicated that he has attempted to pursue this alternative remedy nor has he addressed whether it is inadequate. Accordingly, there is no legal basis to grant Petitioner's request for mandamus action.Second, Petitioner requests that "this court order Respondents to honor the Berkshire Superior Court's writs and facilitate Petitioner's production for all scheduled state-court proceedings, including the September 14, 2026, trial, and to refrain from transferring Petitioner outside the Commonwealth in a manner that would frustrate that process." (Dkt. No. 21 at 5.) Petitioner is detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and housed at the Plymouth County Correctional Facility, and he has a pending criminal matter in Berkshire Superior Court. On June 10, 2026, the Berkshire Superior Court issued a writ of habeas corpus directing that Petitioner be produced for criminal proceedings scheduled for June 11, 2026. (Dkt. No. 24-2.) Per the state court's record, it appears the writ was honored because the hearing was "held as scheduled." (Dkt. No. 24-3.)A district court may issue a writ of habeas corpus, including as to a prisoner, "[i]f it is necessary to bring [her] into court to testify [ad testificandum] or for trial [ad prosequendum]." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(c)(5). "The writ is 'issued directly by a court of the jurisdiction where an indictment, information, or complaint has been lodged against the prisoner. '" United States v. Kelly, 661 F.3d 682, 686 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Stewart v. Bailey, 7 F.3d 384, 389 (4th Cir.1993)). "The writ allows the issuing court to 'obtain temporary custody of the prisoner.'" United States v. Kelly, 661 F.3d 682, 686 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 362(1978)). The Supreme Court has held that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(c)(5), with regard to the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum in particular, federal courts have the right to issue a writ of habeas corpus "at the request of state prosecutorial authorities." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). The Court did not indicate whether this right extends to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.Some courts have extended the Barber v. Page ruling to writs of habeas corpus for trial, finding that state prosecutors must first seek a writ of habeas corpus in ad testficandum or ad prosequendum before the court can grant a writ of habeas corpus. See Malool v. Castro, No. 1:25-CV-11222-IT, 2025 WL 1424434, at *2 (D. Mass. May 16, 2025) (explaining that because "28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(c)(5) does not distinguish between writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum and writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the court finds no reason not to apply the [Barber v. Page] precedent with regard to for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum"); see also Cortez Rivera v. Hyde, No. 1:25-CV-12390, 2025 WL 2977900, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 22, 2025) (finding that the court could not issue a writ of habeas corpus for trial as to the noncitizen because the state prosecutors had not made any such request, but if the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sought to prosecute the petitioner and "ICE continue[d] to ignore the state court's writ, the prosecutor [could] seek relief from [the] court.")"[O]ther courts have found it sufficient for the state court itself to request the prisoner's presence in the state via a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum or ad testificandum." Xiao v. FCI Berlin, No. 26-CV-082-JJM-AEM, 2026 WL 412425, at *5 (D.R.I. Feb. 13, 2026); see id. (collecting cases and finding it "sufficient that the Rhode Island Superior Court requested Mr. Xiao's presence in Rhode Island via the writ of ad prosequendum/testificandum"); see also Soriano Neto v. Choate, No. 1:25-CV-00425-MSM-AEM, 2025 WL 2969178, at *1 (D.R.I. Oct. 21, 2025). The legal basis for such a finding "implicates the long-standing principal of reciprocal comity between sovereigns in our dual system of justice." Soriano Neto v. Choate, No. 1:25-CV-00425-MSM-AEM, 2025 WL 2969178, at *1 (D.R.I. Oct. 21, 2025). This is because "the power to 'lend' a prisoner from one sovereign to another arises from mutual respect and cooperation in the administration of justice." Id. (citing Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 260-62 (1922)). Moreover, a state court's writ of habeas corpus "functions as a formal invocation of that comity and does not diminish federal authority; rather, it exemplifies the cooperative accommodation that the Ponzi Court deemed essential to ensuring that each sovereign may vindicate its own laws without undue interference from the other." Id.Here, the record indicates that the Berkshire Superior has issued only one writ of habeas corpus for a June 11, 2026, criminal proceeding which was respected. There is no indication that the Berkshire Superior Court has issued a writ of habeas corpus for an upcoming criminal proceeding. See Kelly, 661 F.3d at 686. Petitioner does not cite the authority this court has to issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(c)(5) in a situation like Petitioner's where there is no record of non-compliance by ICE, state prosecutors have not requested a writ of habeas corpus, and there is no state court writ of habeas corpus for a future hearing or trial. That there is no state court writ of habeas corpus for Petitioner's September 14, 2026, trial is further evidenced in Petitioner's notice and emergency motion, filed on September 3, 2026. (See Dkt. No. 27 at 1-2 (Petitioner explaining that the Berkshire County Superior Court denied Petitioner's motion to issue an early writ of habeas corpus with respect to Petitioner's September 14, 2026, trial, and that typically such a writ is issued the night before the trial date)).Accordingly, to the extent the motion requests a writ of habeas corpus, the motion is denied without prejudice. If circumstances change, Petitioner can re-submit his motion for a writ of habeas corpus. (TF) (Entered: 09/08/2026)

Sep 08, 2026

Order on Motion to Amend

#30

Sep 14, 2026

NOTICE by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz (Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 09/14/2026)

#31

Sep 21, 2026

NOTICE by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES AND INTENT TO SEEK RELIEF (Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 09/21/2026)

#32

Oct 02, 2026

NOTICE by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz re 31 Notice (Other) SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES AND REQUEST FOR BRIEF EXTENSION (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit MA Trial Court Docket, # 2 Exhibit Bond Hearing Decision)(Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 10/02/2026)

#33

Oct 09, 2026

Emergency MOTION IMMEDIATE RELEASE BASED ON CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit MA Trial Court Docket, # 2 Exhibit Appeal of Removal Order, # 3 Exhibit Luis Luis Decision)(Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 10/09/2026)

#34

Oct 12, 2026

NOTICE by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz re 33 Emergency MOTION IMMEDIATE RELEASE BASED ON CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES NOTICE OF BOND REDETERMINATION REQUEST, CORRECTED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE, AND LOCAL RULE 7.1 STATEMENT (Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 10/12/2026)

#35

Oct 14, 2026

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: ORDER entered. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2243 governing Sec. 2241 cases for service on respondents, Respondent shall file an answer or response to Petitioners motion, (Dkt. No. 33). The answer or responsive pleading is due by 10:00 a.m. on October 16, 2026. Respondents shall also include the petitioner's full alien file (A-file) from the Department of Homeland Security, to the extent not earlier filed. If the A-file is unavailable, the government shall include all documents within its possession, custody, or control which reflects any asserted reason for Petitioner's continued detention. (TF) (Entered: 10/14/2026)

Oct 14, 2026

Order

#36

Oct 16, 2026

Stay

Oct 16, 2026

~Util - Case Stayed

Oct 16, 2026

Order on Motion to Stay

#38

Oct 21, 2026

Miscellaneous Relief

Oct 21, 2026

Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief

#40

Oct 22, 2026

Notice - Other

#41

Oct 29, 2026

Dismiss

Oct 30, 2026

Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief

Oct 30, 2026

Order on Motion to Dismiss

#44

Nov 04, 2026

Order Dismissing Case